SUMMARY

Introduction

1. The United Nations Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.[1] In 1991 the UN Security Council, concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation inside Iraq, adopted Resolution 986 which established the 'oil-for-food' (OFF) programme, designed to allow Iraq to sell oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian supplies. The programme was implemented in 1996 when a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the United Nations and the Government of Iraq.[2] Oil-for-Food has been a lifeline for Iraq to such an extent that today, more than 60% of the population is dependent of food rations provided under the OFF programme.

2. Concerns have been raised about the apparent lack of preparation for the humanitarian consequences of any military action against Iraq. Comparisons have been drawn with the extent of humanitarian planning prior to military action against Afghanistan. But there are major differences: although the two countries have similar population figures (approximately 26 million) Afghanistan is a predominantly rural society while Iraq has a relatively urbanised population. Iraq, prior to 1991, was an upper-middle income country with the majority of its population in full employment. Iraqis had come to expect their government to deliver the basic public services. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was a failed state. The Afghan population had low expectations of their government to deliver basic services and as a result they had become largely self-reliant. This self-reliance, combined with an accepted risk of drought, meant that most rural Afghans had developed coping strategies for dealing with times of food shortage or crisis. In 1991, Iraqis had the cash and material assets to develop their own coping strategies. But a number of factors, including the impact of sanctions, has meant that more than 60% of the population of Iraq is dependent on the Government of Iraq for the majority, if not all, of their basic needs.

3. As we pointed out in our report on sanctions during in the last Parliament,[3] not all the humanitarian distress has been the direct result of the sanctions regime. There has been a tendency to blame all such distress on sanctions in the absence of clear evidence. Saddam Hussein has been quite prepared to manipulate the sanctions regime and the exemptions scheme to his own ends, even if that involves hurting ordinary Iraqi people. The responsibility for the plight of the Iraqi people must ultimately lie with the Iraqi leadership.

4. This report examines the likely humanitarian consequences of any military action against Iraq and the adequacy of planning and preparations for dealing with these consequences. We begin by focussing on the effectiveness of, and constraints faced by, humanitarian agencies and organisations, as well as governments, in planning for the humanitarian response. We then look at the various consequences in more detail: food distribution and the role of the OFF programme, refugees, the effect of attacks on Iraq's infrastructure, the risk of internal conflict and the use of biological or chemical weapons. We then ask who will deliver humanitarian relief, how the relief effort will be funded, what is needed, and how international humanitarian law applies.

5. During the inquiry we heard evidence in public from Rt Hon Clare Short MP, Secretary of State for International Development, with Mr Alistair Fernie, Head of Middle East and North Africa Department, and Mr Peter Troy, Head of the Humanitarian Programmes Team, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, at the Department for International Development, Mr Raja Jarrah, Programme Director, CARE International, Mr Roger Riddell, Director, International Department, Christian Aid, Mr Mike Aaronson, Director General, Save the Children UK and Dr Al-Sharistani, Iraqi Refugee Aid Council. We also held a private meeting with Mr Ross Mountain, Assistant Emergency Relief Co-ordinator and Director of the United Nations' Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Ms Anupama Rao Singh, Deputy Director Field Support and Inter-Agency Collaboration Section, Programme Division, UNICEF, and Mr Nicholas Oberlin, Programme Adviser for Iraq, World Food Programme. We would like to thank all those who contributed written and oral evidence to the inquiry as such short notice. We would also like to express our gratitude to our specialist adviser, Mr Larry Hollingworth, but stress, as always, that the views contained in the report are those of the Committee alone.

The problems of planning—a multiplicity of scenarios

6. The main obstacle to planning for the humanitarian consequences of war in Iraq is the range of the possible scenarios. These stretch from quick and effective air strikes resulting in Iraqi surrender and the welcome into Baghdad of coalition troops as liberators, to a long drawn out ground war with the possibility of use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Planners do not know what it is they are planning for and may be planning for the best rather than the worst-case scenario. Clare Short told us: "The danger is that there is not full preparation for the risks. There is preparation for what is the hopeful scenario but that is not good enough—what happens if something goes wrong and we need more effort?".[4] Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have also expressed concern that not enough is being done to prepare for the humanitarian consequences of war.[5] There are constraints on planning which have heightened the concern of NGOs and other commentators. These constraints include: government and UN reluctance to plan openly; the apparent and perceived lack of information sharing between the key players; and a lack of immediately available resources for preparation.

7. There has been a lack of information on contingency planning from the UK Government. The Archbishops' Council noted the absence of assurances from the Prime Minister about humanitarian action in Iraq and compared this with statements which Tony Blair made in advance of the attack on Afghanistan. It also noted the lack of announcements from DFID about the state of the Government's humanitarian contingency planning.[6] In the case of Afghanistan, three years of drought ensured that DFID was involved in humanitarian relief even before military action took place. DFID has been responsive to humanitarian need in Iraq over the last five years. But there remains a noticeable contrast between Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of the prominence given to humanitarian issues in the build up to possible military action.

8. It appears that both the UK Government and the UN are reluctant openly to plan for the consequences of war for fear that this could be seen as either condoning military action, or accepting the inevitability of war.[7] There are also understandable reasons for keeping information confidential, particularly when it is of a sensitive military nature. However, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) seems to be less affected by such constraints on open planning and information sharing. USAID has described the measures it is taking and gives details of its Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART).[8] Although the USAID plans lack detail, they identify likely humanitarian relief requirements and state the Agency's intention to deliver assistance to meet these requirements. [9] Almost every day, details of the likely military plan appear in the media; rarely is there any leak of the plan for humanitarian operations. We recommend that DFID immediately issues a statement outlining its basic humanitarian contingency plans. This would be a useful source of information for humanitarian actors and would also provide reassurance that adequate importance has been attached to the humanitarian consequences of military action.

9. The UN told us that they had been planning since February 2002, and that detailed planning began in October 2002. In contrast to UK NGO perceptions of a lack of cooperation, the UN informed us that NGO consortia[10] have taken part in "low key meetings" and that closer cooperation between NGOs and UN Agencies has taken place at the field level. The UN told us that it needed and valued the support of NGOs, although we note that there are differing views between NGOs and the UN on the adequacy of information sharing. We understand that sectoral tasks have been allocated to the appropriate UN agencies—in certain cases with NGO involvement.

10. Despite the UN's claim that it has involved NGOs in planning, NGOs have emphasised the difficulties they have experienced in the absence of information from the UK Government or the UN.[11] CARE International, one of the few NGOs operating in central and southern Iraq, told us it has had no formal meetings or information sharing with DFID since the beginning of December 2002.[12] HelpAge International has spoken of the "vacuum" in which multilateral and NGO planning is taking place because of the lack of information about UK Government or other donor planning.[13] Although some NGOs have reported that DFID has made efforts to increase information sharing with NGOs, there is some information it cannot share and this has meant that NGOs are unable to assess overall preparedness.[14] Clare Short stressed during oral evidence that there were scenarios in which NGOs would not be able to participate in the delivery of humanitarian relief inside Iraq.[15] Later she told the House of Commons that "NGOs would not be operational in the early stages, as they are not the first call to get things right"[16] Nevertheless, we believe that communication between the UK Government, other donors, the UN, international and local NGOs is important. Some NGOs are operational and will play a role in delivering humanitarian relief, at least in the long term, if not during military action itself.[17] Concern has also been expressed about the lack of visible preparations on the ground in Iraq.[18] Notwithstanding the difference of opinion between UN and NGOs, and understanding the need for confidentiality, we urge DFID and the UN, where possible, as a principle to provide confidential briefings to NGOs to facilitate effective planning. Even if the military is the main deliverer of humanitarian relief in the first instance, cooperation and coordination with agencies and NGOs will be necessary in the longer term. Given the likely scenario that a US military administration will be established in the shorter term following any conflict, we believe that there should be immediate cooperation between the UN and the US in planning the likely UN role in meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people.

11. The UN has established a Regional Coordination Office in Larnaca, Cyprus as a focal point for its humanitarian activities. The UN Steering Group on Iraq, with the endorsement of the UN Secretary General, appointed a Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq with effect from 1 February 2003.[19] He will operate from the Regional Coordination Office in Cyprus. But despite the appointment, there is concern about the lack of leadership in co-ordinating the planning and preparation of the humanitarian response to possible military action. The Director of Save the Children Fund UK told the Committee:

there is a general lack of preparedness and there is a general lack of leadership within the international community, for all sorts of reasons, so, frankly it would be wrong to count on an effective response...the fact that the UN has not been prepared to take a leadership role contributes to that.[20]

Concern over the adequacy of preparations is undoubtedly linked to the lack of information sharing. Tearfund argued that DFID could have been more proactive in promoting joint preparedness planning between Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) members, MoD, FCO and other relevant actors.[21] USAID has stated that its Disasters Assistance Response Team will "serve as a central point of contact, exchanging information, and coordinating humanitarian assistance among... NGOs... UN agencies, international organizations... and the US military".[22] USAID has also funded the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative which is based in Jordan and will support coordination of planning and preparedness activities amongst US agencies.[23] This is in addition to the Humanitarian Operations Centre in Kuwait.[24] There is a pressing need for a mechanism for coordinating the UK humanitarian response so that UK NGOs can be connected with the UN, the military and local NGOs to facilitate information sharing between all relevant actors.

12. Adequate preparations require appropriate resourcing. The UN has launched a consolidated appeal to raise $93 million and the DEC and NGOs are likely follow suit with appeals to the public.[25] But UN Agencies and NGOs need immediate access to money to allow them to start preparatory work. DFID has allocated £3.5 million (on top of its regular funding to UN agencies which includes some provision for emergency preparedness) to support UN humanitarian contingency planning and pre-positioning of supplies.[26] But evidence affirms that the UN itself is underfunded.[27] Clare Short pointed in particular to a "funding strain" on the World Food Programme (WFP).[28] Discussion with the UN revealed that it has had difficulty quickly accessing funds, especially in the early stages of planning. Some money is now becoming available but the lead time is shrinking and the lack of available funds is likely to have a significant impact of the UN's preparedness once any military action starts. The UN and NGO finances are limited and are already strained by other global crises.[29] Those NGOs which gave evidence told us that they did not have enough money available to them to make the necessary preparations.[30] The Iraqi Refugee Aid Council, for example, has stated that it obtained permission to set up camps for refugees along Iraq's borders, but had been unable to do so for lack of funds.[31] A forum of NGOs working in northern Iraq warned: "Without urgent clarification by donors and the release of funding now, there will be limited ability by agencies to respond".[32] It is clear is that the scale of funds needed will be massive, given the dependency of the majority of the Iraqi population on the OFF programme which delivers $5 billion worth of commodities into the country in each six month phase, the food element of which costs $250 million a month to maintain.

The likely consequences and how they might be managed

Food distribution and the oil-for-food programme

13. Since 1991 most Iraqis have had to depend on food aid for their survival. Food aid comes in the form of rations financed by the oil-for-food programme (OFF) which generates funds from oil revenues to be spent on humanitarian needs. Limits were set on the amount of oil that Iraq could sell but the ceiling was removed by the Security Council in 1999. Receipts from the sale of oil are paid into a UN bank account and the spending monitored closely. Supply and delivery of humanitarian supplies is contracted out commercially. At the end of the delivery chain are small locally-run ration shops. Aside from government-contracted and local delivery mechanisms a number of UN agencies are involved, particularly in those areas of northern Iraq which comprise the Kurdish-controlled governorates. The OFF programme costs $250 million per month for the food component alone. OFF is vital to the survival of Iraqi civilians. The head of DFID's Middle East and North Africa Division told us: "It is the biggest food distribution system in the world. It is bigger than the whole of WFP operations elsewhere in the world and it is largely run by Iraqis".[33]

14. Malnutrition is widespread, though nutrition has improved in recent years. UNICEF has estimated that 22% of children under five are chronically malnourished.[34] As CARE International highlighted in its written evidence "60-70% of people in southern and central Iraq depend on government food rations, supplied under the Oil-for-Food programme, and some 40% have no other source of food".[35] The situation in northern Iraq is similar: most households are too poor to buy locally-produced items, at least 20% are completely dependent on rations and poor families often have to sell a portion of their rations to buy other essentials.[36] A written submission from a group of NGOs operating inside northern Iraq even emphasised the development of a "dependency culture" amongst Iraqi civilians who have limited coping strategies.[37] The OFF programme has, it seems, developed an efficient distribution system but it has also created dependency, undermined agricultural initiatives and encouraged migration to the urban centres. In the last few months, the Iraqi Government had been doubling the volume of rations in its food parcels and the WFP have distributed three months' food in advance. But these supplies consist mostly of dried goods which will be difficult to prepare without clean water or electricity or fuel for cooking.[38] Poorer Iraqi families are unlikely to be in a position to stockpile food and may sell rations to provide for other basic needs.[39] It is also possible that, in the event of conflict, the Iraqi government may divert food to the military.[40] If delivery of food through OFF does breakdown it will affect the 60% of Iraqis to whom the programme currently delivers, two-thirds of whom have no other source of food.[41] Even in northern Iraq, where the WFP have trebled the ration to allow stockpiling, a food crisis would spread to northern Iraq within three months and would be severely worsened by a likely influx of internally displaced persons.[42] Humanitarian contingency planning must take account of the serious risk that at least 40% of the population will be without any source of food in the absence of OFF rations.[43]

15. But the key question is whether OFF will continue to function if military action starts. In central and southern Iraq, at least, the Iraqi Government is heavily involved in administration of the OFF programme and their involvement could well cease if military action starts. Furthermore, the sale of oil would be likely to stop, which would halt the funds going into the programme. There is also some concern that retreating Iraqi troops may sabotage oil wells, as happened in the Gulf war, thus halting oil production.[44] Even in a best case scenario, where any military action is quick and effective, there is still a high risk of disruption of the oil flow. Clare Short seemed confident that OFF would continue despite military action but she was aware of the risk that it would not:

if Oil-for-Food can keep working that is one scenario, but if it were to completely break down then where is the food coming from? It would have to be procured and if there is a lot of military activity you get blockages of ports and so on. It will be a very complex problem with very great dangers and it will require enormous concentration and resources to make sure that food gets through.[45]

Written evidence from DFID emphasised that the continuing functioning of the network of 40,000—50,000 local Iraqi distribution points could not be depended on in the event of military action and stated: "Military planning aims to minimise the impact on civilian infrastructure critical for the delivery of humanitarian assistance".[46]

16. USAID has recently indicated the importance of ensuring that the OFF delivery system continues to function, even in the event of military action: "USAID will... work with international organisations to maintain the country-wide ration system on an emergency basis".[47] One possible solution is that USAID and its partners will provide the necessary funds to maintain OFF in the absence of oil revenues, and re-coup the expenditure after the conflict. However, because the OFF programme, its administration, and operation are all mandated by UN Security Council Resolutions, a new Resolution will be necessary to allow OFF to continue with a revised administration. There are two possible scenarios: first, a UN Security Council Resolution to allow OFF to continue. This will take from six to eight weeks to implement. Hence a new Resolution on OFF is needed to allow the UN Secretary General to take executive control as soon as hostilities begin. The second scenario assumes that OFF will cease to operate and necessitate the provision of a replacement system. This will take two and three months to implement. It is to be noted that the current mandate for OFF ends on June 3^rd 2003. CARE International were concerned that any use of OFF funds for humanitarian operations should bridge a gap rather than provide the primary source of funding because of the precedent that may be set.[48] The Director of USAID, Andrew Natsios, told a US Senate panel that the intention was to protect the existing food distribution system which, he noted, had an efficient computerised rationing network.[49] Whether the network will be able to function in the event of a loss of electricity or the use of weaponry designed to target computer systems remains to be seen.

17. The UN expressed some scepticism concerning the USAID statement that a seven month supply of food stocks was available.[50] By their assessment, current supplies were more likely to last for two to three months. The UN were concerned that current OFF contracts would be hindered as a result of conflict. At present it is the Government of Iraq which pays, outside of OFF, for internal transport, and the salaries of civil servants engaged in humanitarian distribution tasks as well as those working in infrastructure support.

18. NGO witnesses were pessimistic about the prospect of the OFF programme continuing in the event of military action. They foresaw problems not only at the upper echelons of the OFF programme administration, but also in the middle—if there is disruption to lorries and roads—and at the bottom if civilian-run ration shops are affected by any bombardment.[51] They were worried that the supply pipeline could break down if commercial suppliers, fearing that they will not be paid, stop sending supplies, or if ports are closed.[52] We heard in evidence that "[OFF] is a programme that depends on a very complex chain and, for example, the prospect that people might send grain from faraway places, from Australia or wherever, knowing that there is a war with all the questions about whether it would get through and whether they would get paid I think, to be honest, the likelihood of existing mechanisms being sustainable in the event of conflict is actually pretty remote".[53] The Director of Save the Children Fund, giving evidence to the Committee immediately following Clare Short commented: "it seemed to me that everyone is hoping that somehow it [oil-for-food] might continue in the event of military action, but frankly I think that is just completely unrealistic".[54]

19. The distribution of food through government-controlled outlets has contributed to a situation in which, by contrast with Afghanistan, there is no widespread network of NGOs operating in Iraq. Few international agencies or organisations have worked regularly in central and southern Iraq. NGO operation has to be authorised by the Government of Iraq (GoI), and NGOs operating in northern Iraq are therefore seen by the GoI as working illegally.[55] The Red Cross and Red Crescent is present and has worked under the auspices of the government. Although some international NGOs operating in Iraq have partners there, such relationships are limited, as is the number of local Iraqi NGOs.[56] Dr Al-Shahristani, representing IRAC, warned that the existing network would not be able to distribute food to all those that would need it.[57] The Government of Iraq procures food and basic medical supplies in bulk and is responsible for the distribution in the 15 central and southern governorates and to the UN warehouses in northern cities. The WFP is responsible for food distribution on behalf of the Government of Iraq in the northern govenorates through a chain of 11, 000 food agents. But even if the WFP were practically able to take over food distribution, there are concerns about its funding. DFID's Head of Humanitarian Programmes Team told us: "we are talking about a six-month programme of food assistance over $300 million to $578 million, so there are pipeline and funding issues and potential difficulties over delivery as well".[58]

20. Perhaps the most hopeful option for food distribution in the absence of the OFF programme is to utilise the existing Iraqi delivery network, replacing the current central government supply with an alternative. But to do so will require significant pre-positioning of supplies. Clare Short told us that the UN was drawing down on some of its resources in order to pre-position stocks.[59] While the NGO witnesses were confident that a new supply could be channelled through existing delivery networks, they were concerned about the lack of evidence of pre-positioned stocks: "It would be a matter of plugging in a supply from elsewhere rather than from the central government and there should be sufficient supplies pre-positioned to be able to be plugged in and quite frankly we have not been able to see such preparations".[60] As we have already commented, there may be problems with the delivery of existing Government of Iraq contracts. Detailed planning around how a replacement supply of food to OFF can be provided is necessary as is consideration of how such a supply can be channelled through existing delivery mechanisms. Consideration has also to be given to alternative food distribution options, given the risk that local delivery outlets may not be operational.

2   Oil-for food programme-A fact-sheet, UN Office of the Iraq Programme, January 2003 Back

3   The Committee reported on the impact of sanctions on Iraq in its Second Report of Session 1999-2000, "The Future of Sanctions"(HC67) Back

4   Q6 Back

5   Ev 45, Q37 Back

6   Ev 34 Back

7   Ev 17 Back

8   USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back

9   Ibid. Back

10   ICVA, InterAction and SCHR Back

11   Ev 33, Ev 37 [HelpAge International], Ev 45 Back

12   Q53 Back

13   Ev 38 Back

14   Ev 17 Back

15   Q5 Back

16   HC Deb, 26 February 2003, col 244 Back

17   Ev 14, Q45 Back

18   Q33 Back

19   Ev 32 Back

20   Q37 Back

21   Ev 45 Back

22   USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back

23   Ev 46 Back

24   This is run by the military rather than Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Back

25   Qq3, 55 Back

26   Ev 2 Back

27   Ev 13 Back

28   Q8 Back

29   Ev 13, Ev 45 Back

30   Qq56-57 Back

31   Q55 Back

32   Ev 35 Back

33   Q10 Back

34   Report of Forum to discuss humanitarian contingency plans should there be a war with Iraq, chaired by Caroline Spelman MP, 26 November 2002 Back

35   Ev 12 Back

36   Ev 21, Ev 37 Back

37   Ev 36 Back

38   Ev 12, Ev 16 Back

39   Ev 21 Back

40   Ev 34 Back

41   Ev 12, Ev 15 Back

42   Ev 16 Back

43   Q29 Back

44   Q55 Back

45   Q8 Back

46   Ev 32 Back

47   USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back

48   Q55 Back

49   US has secret plans to ensure food distribution to Iraq: USAID Chief, Agence France-Presse, 25 February 2003 Back

50   USAID contingency plans for humanitarian assistance to Iraq, USAID Fact Sheet, 24 February 2003 Back

51   Q30 Back

52   Q29 Back

53   Q29 Back

54   Q29 Back

55   Ev 38 Back

56   Q31 Back

57   Q33 Back

58   Q8 Back

59   Q3 Back

60   Q33 Back