1.  Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Paper Number 6 Return to Geneva: The United Kingdom Green Paper June 2002 Series Editors Graham S Pearson and Malcolm R Dando, University of Bradford (and Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference Paper Number 7 Return to Geneva: A Comprehensive List of Measures, August 2002).

  2.  Strengthening the biological and toxin weapons convention: countering the threat from biological weapons, Dr Vivienne Nathanson, British Medical Association 6 July 2002.

  3.  Daryl G Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, Washington DC, 22 July 2002.

  4.  FCO Green Paper: Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Professor David King, Chief Scientific Advisor, Office of Science and Technology, 2 August 2002.

  5.  Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Dr Jim Neilson, Head of Biological Agents Policy, Health and Safety Executive, 7 August 2002.

  6.  Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological Weapons Comments on the UK Green Paper "Strengthening the BWC: countering the Threat from Biological Weapons", 13 August 2002.

  7.  Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Comments from Gene Watch UK, 16 August 2002.

  8.  Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: countering the threat from Biological Weapons Cm 5484 April 2002 Response of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies University of Southampton, 27 August 2002.

  9.  Nicholas Sims, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, Response to UK Green Paper of 29 April 2002, 29 August 2002.

  10.  VERTIC's response to the UK Green Paper Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: countering the threat from Biological Weapons, 3 September 2002.

  11.  Professor Julian Perry Robinson, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Comments on FCO Green Paper about the BWC, 12 September 2002.

  12.  Dr Susan Wright, Research Scientist, Institute for Research on Women and Gender, University of Michigan Comment on "Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, Cmnd 5484 (April 2002).

  13.  The Royal Society Submission to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Policy Document 25/02, September 2002.

  14.  Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Countering the threat from Biological Weapons. Response from the BioIndustry Association (BIA) 17 September 2002.

  15.  Dr Philip Wright, Director of Science and Technology, The Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry, 25 September 2002.

3.  Note on Overseas Science Students in the UK, Including Information on the Take-up of the Voluntary Monitoring Scheme (QQ28-29 and 50)

  The latest figures available for the academic year 2000-01 indicate that there were 12,565 postgraduate students from non-EU countries in the UK. In implementing the Voluntary Vetting Scheme, we divide Universities and other institutions of higher education into categories, based on our assessment of the value of their research to potential proliferating states. In the category of highest concern, 100 per cent of institutions participate in the Scheme, together with some 70 per cent of institutions in the category of medium concern and 85 per cent in the category of low concern. The FCO is in regular touch with these institutions to encourage increased take-up.

5.  Note on Whether the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court Would Cover the Use of BW by Iraq (QQ86-88)

  1.  The use of biological weapons in not specifically a crime under the ICC Statute at present. However their use could amount to a crime under the ICC Statute depending on the circumstances. For example:

—  in the context of an international armed conflict, intentionally directing a biological weapons attack against civilians could constitute a war crime (Article 8(b)(i)); and

—  a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population using biological weapons could amount to a crime against humanity (Article 7).

  2.  Even if a particular use of biological weapons fell within the scope of crimes covered by the ICC Statute, the Court world only have jurisdiction if:

(a)  the matter was referred to it by the Secretary Council;

(b)  the conduct in question took place within the territory of a State party;

(c)  the perpetrator is a national of a State party; or

(d)  the perpetrator is a national of State which, although not being a party to the Statute, agrees on an ad hoc basis to the Court having jurisdiction.

  3.  Iraq is not a party to the ICC Statute. Therefore, unless the Security Council made a referral, the Court would only have jurisdiction over a biological weapons attack by Iraq if the attack had taken place in the territory of a State Party or if Iraq consented to such jurisdiction.

  4.  As for jurisdiction over a biological weapons attack by individuals not linked to any State, terrorism is not itself a crime under the Statute. Given the difficulty in arguing that such an attack would have taken place in the context of an armed conflict, it is hard to see how such conduct could fall within the scope of war crimes under the ICC Statute. Moreover, although crimes against humanity can take place outside of an armed conflict, they must be part of a systematic attack furthering State or organisational policy. Thus it may be difficult to establish that isolated acts of terrorism constitute crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute. If a particular terrorist act did fall within the crimes set out in the Statute, again the Court would only have jurisdiction if one of the four grounds set out in paragraph two was satisfied.