House of Commons - Environmental Audit

Select Committee on Environmental Audit Twelfth Report

THE JOHANNESBURG OUTCOMES

6. The day before he spoke at the Summit, Tony Blair commented "It would be wildly utopian to believe summits are going to solve the problems of the world. Equally it is crudely cynical to dismiss them. A summit provides focus for an issue. It forces an agenda. It persuades, cajoles and embarrasses governments into commitments. And at least some direction and action follow".[4]

7. WSSD was widely recognised as a major opportunity to reinvigorate the global commitment to sustainable development. While the Rio Earth Summit delivered key policy frameworks and conventions, progress towards the goals established has been slower than anticipated.[5] WSSD was therefore billed as the Summit which would talk action rather than agree yet more new conventions. To make a clear step forward, and avoid being just a talking shop, the Summit needed to arrive at a focussed agenda for action, with targets and timetables, to facilitate the delivery of existing Rio commitments and to provide a coherent framework to take forward the trade and aid discussions of Doha and Monterrey.[6]

8. Against these hopes lay the practical reality. Although the international preparations for developing the Summit agenda were comprehensive and inclusive, it was a struggle to develop a workable agenda with clear priorities amid the vast array of issues competing for global discussion. At first, international political profile for the event was lack-lustre with many heads of state and Government initially planning to delegate attendance to their environment ministers. [7] With so many nations set to discuss a wide range of topics, few dared to hope for more than summit deliberations which reached some level of consensus without breaking down completely.

9. In the preparations for WSSD, the UK advocated that poverty eradication and access to clean water should be priorities for the agenda. We supported this position and they were indeed key discussion topics at the Summit.

10. In the end, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's, succinct agenda of Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity (known as WEHAB) won widespread support and proved to be an effective framework for the Summit negotiations. There was a collective sigh of relief when WSSD actually delivered three key tangible products: the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (the political declaration), the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, and a range of partnership initiatives.

The Political Declaration

11. The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development is reproduced at Appendix 1. It singles out poverty eradication, changing consumption and production patterns, and protecting and managing the natural resource base for economic and social development as the overarching objectives of, and essential, requirements for sustainable development. It also highlights the challenge of globalisation, the need for corporate accountability and responsibility and urges all developed countries to meet the agreed levels of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).

12. The declaration states "that humankind is at a crossroad" and that nations responded positively to the need to "produce a practical and visible plan that should bring about poverty eradication and human development." This gives the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation an impressive billing.

The Plan of Implementation

13. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation sets out over 150 commitments, encompassing a diverse range of issues (from healthcare to sustainable tourism) and sectors (from agriculture to mining).

14. The key commitments are set out in Box 1. The Plan reaffirms some previous commitments (eg the Millennium Development Goals)[8] and key principles of the Rio Declaration, such as the precautionary principle,[9] which survived attempts at renegotiation. The Plan also includes new commitments - most notably a global target for access to clean water and sanitation and the development of action plans for sustainable production and consumption.

15. Mrs Beckett has described the plan as "impressive".[10] However, the absence of detail on how commitments will be delivered and associated timetables and targets has been widely criticised.[11] The Canadian Commissioner of Environment and Sustainable Development, Johanne Gélinas, acknowledged the plan's "weakness, fuzziness and more than ample rhetoric", but felt it still yielded important ideas and commitments.[12]

16. The plan is littered with undertakings to "strengthen", "promote", and "encourage"—the hallmarks of compromise. The targets and work programmes it does contain are aspirational rather than legally binding.[13] It has been estimated that of the 531 commitments made only 17 might be considered SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic and Timely) and only seven could be considered completely new and not restating existing commitments.[14]

Box 1: Key commitments of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation
(not including restated Millennium Development Goals - see Appendix 2)



1. Sustainable consumption and production: Agreement to develop a 10-year framework of programmes to accelerate the shift to more sustainable patterns of consumption and production, decoupling economic growth and environmental degradation. (paragraph 14)



2. Water and Sanitation: New work programmes on access to water, sanitation and energy services. Agreed a target to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation which adds to the existing Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people without access to clean drinking water by 2015. (paragraph 7). Develop integrated water resource efficiency management and water efficiency plans at national levels by 2005. (paragraph 25)



4. Energy: "With a sense of urgency" to substantially increase the global share of renewable energy sources with the objective of increasing its contribution to total energy supply (paragraph 19 (e)). Also agreed to take actions to improve access to affordable and environmentally sound energy as part of poverty reduction programmes. (paragraph 8).



5. Oceans: A new targeted international focus on building sustainable fisheries, with depleted stocks to be restored as a matter of urgency and no later than 2015 (where possible): and the establishment of networks of marine protected areas by 2012. Destructive fishing practices to be eliminated by 2012 and a report on the state of the marine environment be delivered by 2004 (with a process to continue reporting). (paragraph 30)



6. Biodiversity: target to significantly reduce the current rate of loss of biodiversity by 2010, including by strengthening efforts to control invasive species. (paragraph 42)



7. Chemicals: A strategic approach to international chemicals management to be developed by 2005. (paragraph 22)



8. Education: Commitment to a decade for education for sustainable development in 2005-2015.



9. Forests and Trees: Accelerate implementation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests/Intergovernemntal Forum on Forests proposals for action by countries and by the Collaborative Partnership on Forests, and intensify efforts on reporting to the UN Forum on Forests to contribute to an assessment of progress in 2005. (paragraph 43)



10. Corporate Accountability: agreement to "actively promote" corporate accountability, through both national regulation and intergovernmental agreements (paragraph 45) and encourage industry to improve social and environmental performance through voluntary initiatives (paragraph 17).



11.   Small Island States: In 2004 there will be a full and comprehensive review of the implementation of the Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. (paragraph 55)

Partnerships

17. The Partnerships for Sustainable Development are voluntary, non-negotiated collaborations between government and civil society groups. Practical and project orientated, they are intended to contribute to and reinforce the implementation of the Johannesburg declaration and Plan of Implementation as well as giving added impetus to implementing Agenda 21[15] and the Millennium Development Goals.[16] These were the most novel outcomes of WSSD. Such partnerships are familiar to many governments but Margaret Beckett described them as a "bold new idea for the UN".[17]

18. The UK took a lead in advocating and instigating discussion on partnerships in the preparatory meetings prior to WSSD; a development which we supported.[18] The UK Government was keen that these should not be perceived or promoted as a vehicle for governments to delegate their commitments to less publicly accountable bodies, a concern also raised by NGOs and others.[19]

19. At its 11^th meeting in May 2003, the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD-11) emphasised that WSSD partnerships were intended to complement intergovernmental commitments rather than act as a substitute for them[20] —a point which Margaret Beckett stressed in her written answer to Parliament on her return from the Summit and one which DEFRA was keen to ensure was made explicit at international level.[21]

20. Over 220 Partnerships were identified at the Summit representing some £152 million in resources. Each Partnership was checked against principlesset out at the Bali Prepcom in June 2002 as part of an official UN registration process.[22] This is an on-going process and subsequent partnerships will be checked against new criteria and guidelines agreed at CSD-11.[23] There are now at least 264 registered partnerships, which can be inspected on the UN website.[24] The UN requires partnerships to submit a report on their activities at least every two years.[25]

21. CSD-11 also called for activities aimed at strengthening partnerships and facilitating new ones through initiatives such as partnership fairs. In response, the Italian Government, in conjunction with the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, will be hosting an "International Forum on Partnerships for Sustainable Development" in Rome from March 4-6, 2004. The outcome of the Forum, will be presented to CSD-12 in New York in April 2004.[26]

Success or failure?

22. Margaret Beckett reported to Parliament that the summit had "reaffirmed and strengthened the international community's commitment to sustainable development", "reinvigorated the Rio Earth Summit agreements as well as the UN Millennium Development Goals on poverty eradication", and "generated a new political commitment and momentum for the attainment of a sustainable world".[27] She commented that WSSD had helped to forge close links between development and environment policy. The Plan of Implementation acknowledges that sustainable management of natural resources and of the environment are essential for poverty eradication and should be reflected in the poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies of developing countries.

23. She went on to state:

24. Friends of the Earth were among those disappointed by the Summit, on the grounds of its lack of targets, institutional arrangements, or legal frameworks. They told us that they had been

25. Not surprisingly, UK Ministers have not lingered on the Summit's shortfalls when making their assessment of its achievements. In her statement to the press on the last day of the Summit, Margaret Beckett hailed the final outcome as "truly remarkable".[30] It was perhaps "remarkable" that any targets and timetables emerged at all from the tough negotiations which could easily have come to nothing. However, this was an upbeat take on a Summit which had visibly struggled to break new ground beyond existing commitments. It was a solid outcome but by no means revolutionary.

26. We recognise the difficulties associated with an international event of the scale of the Summit. However, in the context of the scale of the global challenges we face and the potential which the Summit presented, we find it impossible not to feel a sense of missed opportunity. Nevertheless, the Summit achieved more than many expected. The outcomes were solid if somewhat limited and it is essential the UK Government rigorously pushes for their implementation.

27. The outcomes of WSSD could provide a helpful step along the path to sustainable development, if implemented effectively. However, like many, we are disappointed that participating nations could only agree a handful of specific targets and timetables amongst the range of commitments which they made.

28. We welcome the extensive range of Partnerships for Sustainable Development which have been established to support the commitments made at the Summit. It is important that these Partnerships are effectively monitored to ensure that they amount to more than a re-branding of existing initiatives.

29. We are encouraged that the UN Commission on Sustainable Development has introduced measures to monitor the progress of Partnerships against UN guidelines and has required them to report regularly on their progress. This monitoring process will be crucial in maintaining the credibility of these projects. It is important that the UK Government maintains pressure at UN level to ensure that this process is sufficiently resourced and rigorously followed-up.

UK performance at the Summit

HIGH LEVEL LEADERSHIP

30. The UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, made a fleeting visit to the Summit, staying for less than a day. His speech announced commitments to increase Britain's development aid and highlighted the importance of the Kyoto Climate Change agreement.[31] The day before his arrival he had taken the opportunity to make a more wide ranging speech on sustainable development issues in Mozambique. This again highlighted the need to ratify the Kyoto agreement as well as touching on all the WEHAB issues.[32]

31. Each national leader only had a ten minute speaking slot to try and display some political leadership at the Summit. Prof. Tim O'Riordan, one of the Sustainable Development Commissioners at the Summit, commented that they had made a relatively small contribution to the WSSD proceedings in comparison to the importance of the matters being discussed and had conveyed a sense of being disconnected from the whole proceedings, reluctant to give even a day of their time.[33] However, Prof. O'Riordan and others have credited Tony Blair for taking the opportunity to make his mark with his speech in Mozambique.[34]

THE UK DELEGATION

32. In addition to Mr Blair, four other UK Ministers attended the Summit: the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, Margaret Beckett—Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (delegation head), Clare Short—then Secretary of State for International Development, and Michael Meacher, the then Environment and Agri-Environment Minister. The delegation also included parliamentarians, representatives from NGOs, business, the devolved administrations, local government, and the Sustainable Development Commission.

33. There was some initial confusion regarding the Ministerial line-up and who was effectively heading the delegation. Newspaper reports at the beginning of August 2002 suggested that Mr Meacher would not be included in the official delegation on the grounds that the government was keen to avoid accusations of a large Ministerial "junket".[35] There was a public outcry, led by environmental NGOs concerned that it appeared that the Government was prepared to leave behind one of its most experienced Ministers in terms of the Summit's agenda issues. Friends of the Earth went as far as to offer to pay Mr Meacher's air fare. Within 48 hours of this offer Mr Meacher was confirmed as part of the official delegation.

NEGOTIATIONS

34. DEFRA admitted that the WSSD negotiations were "tough".[36] The UK negotiated through the EU at the Summit and both were recognised by NGOs and other delegations as being prepared to recommend more ambitious targets and timetables than many other negotiating parties, such as the United States who took a less progressive approach to sustainable development.[37] DEFRA's evidence highlights the gaps in the Plan of Implementation where the UK would have preferred to have secured stronger commitments.[38]

35. The UK, like many NGOs, would have preferred stronger targets in relation to increasing renewable energy use. DEFRA reports that the UK and other EU member states exerted strong pressure on this issue and wanted specific targets to increase the share of world energy produced from renewable sources.[39] However the US and some key oil producing nations successfully blocked their efforts despite Brazil and Mexico breaking ranks to lobby for the G-77 to adopt a more positive position on renewables. [40] The UK has been involved with EU Commission efforts since the Summit to build upon this support. [41]

36. The UK Government would also have liked to have gone further in untying development assistance from the purchase of donor goods and services, and for more countries to have committed to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol. However, the ratification announcements by China and Russia made at the Summit were enough to bring the Protocol into force.[42]

37. Some NGOs felt that the negotiating leverage for obtaining the EU's goals was weak and that internal EU negotiating co-ordination was poor and undermined by the occasional unilateral decision from the Presidency, apparently without the consent of Member States.[43] The RSPB commented that with commitments on trade reform and increased funding for development already made at Doha and Monterrey, and with a domestic review of the Common Agricultural Policy already underway, the EU was unwilling or unable to make concessions sufficiently attractive to win over some members of the G-77, including OPEC, and the US was opposed to specific actions, targets and timetables generally.[44]

38. Thames Water praised the UK Government's role as an "honest broker" between the EU and US Delegations. The company felt that this approach, coupled with "patient, skilful UK diplomacy" had been essential to breaking a deadlock between these two negotiating blocks on a specific sanitation target.[45] The US was the only nation which was initially opposed to such a target.

39. Our representatives were impressed by the organisation and co-ordination of the UK's official delegation,[46] an impression shared by a number of NGOs.[47] The RSPB commended the delegation for the degree to which it involved NGOs and was struck by the time, commitment and effort put in by UK Ministers to communicate with civil society. [48]

40. The RSPB observed the relationship between the government and business to be less clear-cut from an NGO standpoint.[49] It felt that business delegates on the UK delegation had not played a prominent or active role in communications between government and civil society. Lord Holme, Vice Chair of Business Action for Sustainable Development (a business group set up specifically for the Summit), told us that business had wanted to be constructive and engaged partners in the process and had not been there "primarily to lobby line by line through the text".[50]

41. Many NGOs reported that the preparatory meetings in the run-up to WSSD (Prepcoms) had helped to develop good, collaborative working relationships which had facilitated a comprehensive exchange of information during the Summit. This was largely facilitated by a good deal of staff continuity during the lengthy Summit preparations. Both sides are keen to build upon these enhanced relations—a helpful Summit outcome in themselves.

42. A number of individuals with a key involvement in the Summit have inevitably moved to new posts which has led some NGOs to voice concern that the loss of their expertise and international contacts could affect the UK's capacity to take the sustainable development agenda forward.[51] It is clearly important that collective knowledge about the Summit and related contacts is not lost. The NGO, Tearfund has credited DEFRA with being mindful of the situation and effectively managing the transition. For example, in the light of the numerous staff changes, the Department distributed a list of new contact points to NGOs.[52]

43. We believe that the UK delegation took a realistic and sensible approach to negotiations at the World Summit, and performed well despite the limitations of negotiating through EU channels.

COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY

44. The Government prepared a Communications Strategy for WSSD. Although welcome, we were critical that the strategy was too little too late to provide a sound foundation of public awareness upon which to launch a more powerful media offensive in the weeks before the Summit.[53] The RSPB concurred that the strategy was generally weak in spite of some limited discussions with civil society on how to make improvements.[54] WWF felt that the UK had "categorically failed" to capitalise on the Summit in terms of raising awareness of sustainable development issues at home.[55]

45. It was disappointing the pre-summit media coverage in the UK persistently concentrated on the size and content of the proposed delegation and the level of luxury of their travel and accommodation. This was not unusual coverage in relation to Ministerial travel and yet we saw no evidence that such comment had been anticipated or that the Communications Strategy could counter it. Our fears about ineffective pre-planning were further compounded when the Government fuelled this coverage by generating confusion about Michael Meacher's attendance. Ironically, this heightened the Summit's UK media profile.

46. Initially at least, the delegation's own media messages failed to divert journalistic comment from the disparities in wealth and facilities between the Summit venue and the nearby township of Alexandra or on the size, cost and make-up of the delegation, their travel arrangements, accommodation and refreshments.

47. However, it is widely agreed that UK Government communications with the media at the Summit were very effective.[56] The UK delegation held daily press briefings, and Ministers conducted many interviews which secured them as a regular feature in the "Summit Star"- the daily Summit newspaper. Margaret Beckett alone conducted 35 interviews.[57] As the Government media machine kicked in there was a noticeable shift in the UK media coverage which started to highlight the WEHAB issues being discussed. During the period of 31 July-18 September sustainable development achieved a media profile in the UK which it rarely enjoys. Friends of the Earth felt that media coverage of the event in the UK had been in more depth than in many other countries.[58]

48. DEFRA are currently reviewing Government sustainable development communications with a view to producing a strategy. This will draw upon WSSD experience.

49. The Government was slow to capitalise on the sustainable development communications opportunity offered by the Summit. The confusion surrounding Michael Meacher's attendance was an appalling own-goal, serving only to detract media coverage further from the Summit's purpose. However, we congratulate the Government for its effective media briefing at the Summit. It is essential that the Government's sustainable development communications review evaluates Summit experience to inform future sustainable development communication strategies.

4 We can only face these challenges together, Prime Minister's speech, Mozambique,1 September 2002. See www.sustainable-development.gov.uk/wssd/updates/01speech.htm. Back

5 COM (2001) 53 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament, Ten years after Rio: Preparing for the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, 2 June 2001. Back

6 A World Trade Organisation meeting in Doha, November 2001, agreed an agenda for a development-focussed World Trade Round. The Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development (March 2002) agreed to increase the volume and effectiveness of international aid. Back

7 See Environmental Audit Committee, Third Report of Session 2001-02, UK Preparations for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, HC 616-I, March 2002, paras 39-46. Back

8 See Appendix 2. Back

9 The Precautionary Principle has been internationally endorsed as a key element of policy decisions concerning environmental protection and management. Agenda 21, arising from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, advocates the widespread application of the Precautionary Principle in the following terms: 'In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.' (Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration). Back

10 HC Debate, 17 October 2003, col919W. Back

11 See for example, Ev 43, para 1. Back

12 Ev 139, para 28. Back

13 Achieving a better quality of life: Review of progress towards sustainable development: Government annual report 2002, DEFRA, February 2003, para 1.4. Back

14 Ev 154. Back

15 The sustainable action plan for the 21^st century for the international community, agreed at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. Back