WEDNESDAY 15 JANUARY 2003

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Members present:

Mr Bruce George, in the Chair
Mr James Cran

Mr Mike Hancock
Mr Gerald Howarth
Mr Kevan Jones
Jim Knight
Patrick Mercer
Syd Rapson
Mr Frank Roy
Rachel Squire

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RT HON GEOFFREY HOON, a Member of the House, Secretary of State for Defence, MR NICK WITNEY, Director General, International Security Policy, and MR PAUL TAYLOR, Director of Strategic Technologies, Ministry of Defence, examined.

Chairman

Secretary of State, thank you for coming. After only giving us your name, rank and serial number for a number of years, we are now being overwhelmed with statements in the House and your appearance here. I will ask you to make a statement first but I must say the questions we give you will not have any surprise element about them, they will be basically the ones we asked you a few months ago.

(Mr Hoon) I am grateful, Chairman, for the warmth of your welcome and for inviting me here today. I have with me Nick Witney, who is the Director General for International Security Policy at the Ministry of Defence, and Paul Taylor, who is the Director of Strategic Technologies. As your kind and thoughtful comments have indicated, this is a good way to follow up my oral statement to the House earlier this afternoon setting out the Government's preliminary conclusion that we should agree to the request from the United States to upgrade RAF Fylingdales for missile defence purposes. I do not propose to use up the time of the Committee by repeating that statement, except to emphasise that we have not yet formally communicated a final decision to the US administration. Our aim today was to set out current thinking on the upgrade request as a basis for discussion, but I doubt that I could have got through questioning in the House nor indeed your questioning this afternoon without indicating our view on the way forward. It seems therefore sensible to do that. There is an opportunity for further parliamentary discussion on 22 January and I am particularly keen to understand any remaining issues which we may not yet have taken into account in our analysis. The views of this Committee will, as ever, be of vital important. As you have indicated, Chairman, when we last discussed this issue in March, I did somehow get the impression that you felt that I was being less than forthcoming. If that was an accurate sense that I had, I make no apology for it whatsoever! It was simply impossible for me to offer at that stage a useful comment until the shape and context of the US request for the use of UK facilities became clear. It may be necessary for me to be equally reticent if you invite me to gaze into a crystal ball about what may happen in subsequent, undetermined phases of the evolving proposals, but for now we have the Presidential decision on initial missile defence deployments and a specific request to upgrade Fylingdales. As I made clear to the House this afternoon, I believe that agreeing to the upgrading of RAF Fylingdales is in the UK's interests. It enables the United Kingdom at minimal cost to ensure that we keep the option open to defend ourselves against a potentially catastrophic threat in the future, and I am certainly willing to discuss our thinking on that matter with you today.

Thank you very much. The discussion paper was published on 9 December and then you received the US request to upgrade Fylingdales on 17 December four weeks ago. You told the House recently that you were keen for the Government to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion. I think many of us have our own views on what the Government should do but most of us - certainly I am - are waiting until all the evidence is presented before commenting. Can you give us the background as to why you have said what you wish the end product to be, before a parliamentary and public consultation which you are now going through? You have clearly made your mind up and now you are asking the rest of us for our observations. Did you consider it the other way round of beginning a parliamentary debate, a public debate, and then making a decision afterwards?

(Mr Hoon) I can understand that argument and, if I may say so, that was the debate that we had in the Ministry of Defence as to what was the right way of proceeding, whether it was better for me to make the statement I made today indicating my preliminary thinking, or whether it was better to wait and have the debate and then make a statement setting out the conclusions informed by that debate. I simply felt from some experience now of this issue that it was almost impossible to be able to debate this in the abstract without indicating the way in which the Government thought this debate should go. I felt that was a more open, straightforward way of dealing with it. It leaves open the opportunity to honourable and right honourable Members in the debate next week to set out their concerns, if they have them, and indeed to raise new issues if there are new issues to be raised, but had I adopted a different approach today that said the Government had not yet reached a position I felt that you, Chairman, in particular but other honourable and right honourable Members would have decried that as being somehow disingenuous and less than open with the House, so I felt it was much better to deal with this issue in the way that I did.

When will you reply to the US request? Have you been given some sort of indication by the United States that they would like a response by a certain point in time?

(Mr Hoon) The timing of any response is entirely a matter for the government of the United Kingdom. Clearly it is in the interests of United States - I assume, although they have not said this specifically - to have an early response to their request, but it is not driven by any specific deadline. It is driven by the process which I set out some time ago to the House and I believe has given people and Members of Parliament the opportunity of engaging in a debate.

As far as the Committee is concerned, we are very pleased that most of us have been to Fylingdales and that we are talking to you today, and we would like to talk to other people who have a wide variety of views and we need time to have a report presented to us and then to consider the report and publish the report, with whatever conclusions we reach. Can you give us some indication whether that is going to be very difficult if there is going to be a date which you may or may not have in mind? Do you think that you will say in one month, six weeks, two months, "Look, now I have listened to all the debates, I have been and talked to people, the Committee has produced this report, I am going to make a decision"? I know you do not run your department simply on what is convenient to the Defence Committee, but if we are going to have an informed investigation we do need at least a month before we can publish our report. Do you anticipate that we are going to be caught by surprise by the decision of acquiescence or rejection, if that is what is going to happen, before we have had the opportunity of consulting and producing a report?

(Mr Hoon) Perhaps we could discuss that further. I am perfectly well aware of the work that the Committee is proposing to undertake. I do not particularly want to close off our options at this stage by giving an open-ended commitment to await the outcome of the Committee's deliberations, although I would prefer to be able to do that. Equally, it is not my responsibility to ask you questions but I think it would be helpful if we could have a further discussion about the timescale that you are proposing.

I am sorry I was not in the House for your statement but I was travelling back from an OSCE meeting in Vienna, and I heard on the radio that you draw a distinction between this decision and a wider decision on whether or not we commit ourselves in one way or another to the programme. What we propose, Secretary of State, is to produce a report hopefully in a month which will relate just to the issue that we are talking about today and then we will resume our inquiry which we began some nine months ago, with a report in due course. Perhaps if we can talk about that, that would be helpful to both parties. The last question that I have concerns whether you have had any dialogue with Denmark because they, too, I presume, had a request around the same time to upgrade the radar at Thule in Greenland. Can you tell us if there has been any consultation with our main European partners on the missile defence programme on what the US now proposes?

(Mr Hoon) I have certainly discussed this issue with my Danish counterpart. As you will be aware, Denmark received a parallel request from the United States at the same time as a request was made to the United Kingdom. I anticipate that they are going through the same sort of processes that we have gone through in recent times. I have not had a conversation with my Danish colleague since the parliamentary recess.

Chairman: Okay, thank you. I will now move on to Mr Hancock.

Mr Hancock

When you came before us last year you and your officials made great play of the relevance of missile defence based on the axis of evil around Iraq and North Korea. What has changed since then and where, since then, have the threats increased or maybe even decreased?

(Mr Hoon) I think the specific change - if I can go back to the slight admonishment given by the Chairman of the Committee in his introductory remarks - is that we were made aware towards the end of last year, as a result of the Presidential directive announcing the deployment of the initial missile defence capability for 2004-05, of the preliminary shape of US thinking and that is why the request to the United Kingdom was made and why I made the statement today, so there is a proper time sequence and events sequence dating from the US decision and the US request. The reason I was unable to satisfy the Committee previously was because in the absence of a specific US decision I was not prepared, nor did I judge it sensible, to make a decision in the abstract before any specific decision or request was made by the United States.

Has the threat or the potential threat of a rogue state being able to launch a missile that could threaten either Western Europe or the North American continent got any more real than it was six months ago when you were here?

(Mr Hoon) I think that recent concerns about North Korea, both in terms of its development of missiles for its own use and, indeed, its continuing willingness to sell complete ballistic missile systems to anyone who has the hard currency and is prepared to buy them, is a continuing issue to which we have to have very careful regard. Although North Korea has not yet flight tested its systems it could certainly do so in a matter of if not days certainly weeks, if it abandoned its recent moratorium. There are certain indications very recently in North Korea that North Korea no longer believes that it is bound by its previous undertakings and in those circumstances North Korea does pose a very real threat to the United Kingdom, to other members of the alliance, and indeed there is a threat of proliferation to which I think we need to have very clear regard.

In your statement today and previously you talked again about North Korea and you said that it could flight test missiles with the potential to reach Europe or the United States within weeks. Whilst I can accept the possibility of it reaching the US, are you suggesting that you now have evidence in your possession to suggest that the North Koreans have a missile system which is capable of flying (even if it went over the Pole) some 4,000 miles?

(Mr Hoon) Yes, I am.

That is an existing system that they have not flight-tested but they have built?

(Mr Taylor) The Taepo-Dong II is the missile system you are describing.

Stacking one on top of the other.

(Mr Taylor) Taepo-Dong II is essentially a collection of No-Dong motors and a No-Dong front end. It has that range that you are talking about and they could test one of those within weeks, although we believe that the capability to deploy them will take possibly to the end of the decade.

That is extraordinarily helpful. If we look then at the other component of the situation at the moment, the Fylingdales initiative is really targeting the possibility of missiles coming in via the Middle East to America and Europe, and if the situation in the next few months meant that the Iraqi regime was changed and Iraq was disarmed, what would that do to the need to build the extension of Fylingdales and to upgrade the radars at Fylingdales, when that specifically was seeming to prevent a missile coming in from that part of the world? Would the need still be there in your opinion?

(Mr Hoon) I believe it would, not least because of the reference I made a few moments ago to North Korea's willingness to proliferate its ballistic missile systems to anyone with the hard currency willing to buy them. I do not believe that we should simply base all of our decisions on Iraq, important though that threat is. There are other threats that are either current or are emerging and the whole point of taking a decision at this stage is to allow us the timescale in which to properly protect allies should that protection prove necessary in years to come.

(Mr Witney) Perhaps I could just add that Fylingdales' radar does have the capability of looking all around. Its immediate interest to the US and thus the upgrade is that it is so much closer to a Middle Eastern threat than anything they can put in the United States, but it can look all around.

To make that really effective, would it have to rely solely on Fylingdales or would they need another station somewhere in Europe, maybe further south, to enable that to be truly effective and offer us some protection as pay-back for allowing Fylingdales to be upgraded? Would the UK need to be covered by a similar installation elsewhere in south west Europe?

(Mr Witney) We believe that the Fylingdales's radar coupled with some form of interceptor system, ground based or sea based, somewhere around north western Europe would provide a capability to protect the United Kingdom. If you want a more robust, more layered system and one which is capable of defending a larger tranche than the European continent, then further installations would probably be necessary (whether radars or interceptors) in other parts of the continent.

Fylingdales alone has the capability, if properly integrated into the American missile defence system, of giving a missile defence system to the United Kingdom?

(Mr Witney) If complemented with some form of interceptors somewhere in the north west European area.

Mr Hancock: Which has to be located in Europe to defend us? Fine, thank you very much.

Mr Jones

First of all, Secretary of State, can I apologise if it seems like Groundhog Day. Can I ask about the concerns that have been raised, certainly locally and also by some organisations, concerning the upgrade which some people think is the thin end of the wedge in terms of further down stream asking for the x-band radar. Does the request cover the possibility of x-band radar and would such a development in future need a further request from the United States? Just finally, in such circumstances as the x-band radar was developed, is there a compelling reason why such a new radar in the United Kingdom would be based at Fylingdales rather than somewhere else?

(Mr Hoon) Can I make it absolutely clear, as I made it clear to the House this afternoon, that the request is solely and specifically concerned with the upgrade of radar and related communications facilities in RAF Fylingdales. There is no request at all about siting an x-band radar and, indeed, again as I indicated to the House, American thinking on the development and location of x-band radar, should that be necessary, is still evolving and current thinking clearly indicates moving away from a fixed installation towards something that could be located at sea. Certainly there is no necessity nor any assumption that an x-band radar would be located at Fylingdales, and in any event there is no particular thinking at the present time that there would be any requirement for x-band radar to be located anywhere in the United Kingdom but, as I said, the issue is still being looked at, I hope consistently with the way in which I have approached these matters. Members of the Committee will forgive me if I do not go further than that at this stage because if I say at present I see no necessity for an x-band radar to be located in the United Kingdom that is the current state of ours and, as far as I am aware, United States' thinking.

Can I clarify the point although I think you have made it quite clear. This upgrade has got nothing at all to do with x-band radar and if at any future date x-band or anything else changed at Fylingdales there would have to be another request from the United States; is that correct?

(Mr Hoon) I am tempted to agree with your point about "nothing to do with" but I think that is probably over-egging the pudding in the sense that I have sought to make it clear that the United States is engaged in what they describe as a test bed, that is testing different assumptions, different models, different means of providing a layered missile defence system and therefore clearly it is assumed that such a system will evolve. If you will forgive me, I will try and explain it and I am perfectly willing to try to answer your further questions. That evolution may well lead to the development and use of x-band radars, but the assumptions that have been made in the past that they would be required to be located, say, in the United Kingdom by those who have speculated - and I have met some of them who say they might have to be located at Fylingdales - are certainly to my understanding today wrong. I do not want to mislead the Committee in any way. Clearly the idea in the United States is to develop a system. That system almost certainly would involve the use of x-band radar but perhaps not in the way it was previously thought of by some commentators who assumed that that meant somehow the construction of an 18-storey facility in a National Park in North Yorkshire. I do not see that as being a very likely development today.

I want to nail this down because some of the documents we have seen contain some comments about what this permission actually involves, which is around the threat, for example, of increased radiation from x-band radar, etcetera. This permission is not going to be on x-band radar and if there were a future request for Fylingdales or anywhere else in the UK for the siting of x-band radar - and I accept the point you made about sea-based systems - that would have to be another request from the United States; is that correct?

(Mr Hoon) That is absolutely right and, indeed, given the size, complexity and sophistication of such a facility would have to be dealt with through the then usual planning arrangements.

Mr Jones: Thank you.

Mr Howarth

Secretary of State, the US plans for an interim missile defence capability "in the 2004 time-frame" centred on sensors and interceptors around the Pacific, and designed primarily to face North Korea. If the intention of the upgrade of Fylingdales is to protect against Middle Eastern threats rather than that from North Korea, why the urgency for Fylingdales?

(Mr Hoon) Because it is important, as Nick Witney indicated earlier, that the all round view that Fylingdales provides should be able to go to the United States, not least because it is looking at development of the system. The United States is not simply trying to develop a system that protects the United States against North Korea, it is looking at how that system would develop and evolve to deal with a number of different threats, including, as members of the Committee have already pointed out, the threat and emerging threats from the Middle East region, so the idea is to have available to them the information that is required in order to achieve that ultimate objective.

The United States is looking at both sensors and interceptors in the Pacific and the two seem to be inextricably linked and, indeed, Mr Witney referred a minute or two ago to protection from the radar being coupled with the interceptors. Is it a realistic prospect for the United Kingdom to say, yes, we agree to the upgrade but, no, we do not yet agree to the interceptors because, frankly, without the interceptors based in Europe we are not going to achieve the objective about which you spoke so eloquently this afternoon, namely to provide the people of these islands with the protection they need?

(Mr Hoon) I did indicate to the House this afternoon that what is important is that we consider the request stages in the light of our knowledge and understanding at the time. I do not believe it is necessary at this stage, nor particularly useful, to talk about developments that have not reached any kind of practical reality as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. What I can say as part of the request that the United States has made is that the system, consistent with the President of the United States' earlier declaration, specifically indicates the possibility of the United Kingdom being covered by a missile defence arrangement, subject obviously to technological developments and our willingness to participate in such a system. It does seem to me, as I indicated to the House today, that that is a matter for the future once we are at the point of requiring that decision, which is not needed today.

You do give the impression, Secretary of State, of being dragged to each decision. I warmly welcome the decision you announced to the House and country this afternoon but if you reflect back on the position we had less than a year ago where no decision had been made, no requests had been received - and my colleague, James Cran, referred to your "fig leaf" which happily has now been thrown away in respect of the decision on Fylingdales but it looks as though the fig leaf is still in place with regard to the interceptors - can I suggest that it is not in the British national interest for us to be perceived to be dragged to a decision, nor is it in your interests, given the robust way in which you articulated the case today, to be seen to be somewhat sceptical and surely a whole-hearted embracing of this philosophy, including the participation of British companies in interceptors, ought to be part of your policy?

(Mr Hoon) I accept that there is a range of opinions on the timescale. I have seen the phrase "indecent haste" used to describe the process of our decision making. I accept that different commentators, perhaps for different reasons and different motivations, will ascribe different adjectives to the pace of the decision making. I am content that we have taken the decision at an appropriate pace and in an appropriate way.

Since the leader of the Opposition showed the way in 1995 I am bound to say that I cannot see any undue haste ---

(Mr Hoon) The leader of the Opposition in 1995 was a Labour leader so I entirely consent to that!.

Iain Duncan-Smith in 1995 pointed the way, so I could not possibly describe your conversion as having been taken with undue haste.

(Mr Hoon) I think we will leave that to the realms of party politics.

Chairman: There are no politics in here, Secretary of State, just good questions. Any more questions, Mr Howarth?

Mr Howarth: No.

Mr Cran

Secretary of State, I have skim-read your statement and I do not think anywhere within it is a timescale mentioned. I wonder if you could throw a little bit more light on the timescale? When is the upgrade likely to start and when is it likely to finish? No timescale has been thus far determined.

(Mr Hoon) Clearly the upgrade cannot begin until we have formally communicated our response to the United States. I have indicated to the Committee, Chairman, that I am anxious to complete this process reasonably quickly, but I certainly accept that we need to take account of this Committee's deliberations if at all possible. I would anticipate then that the work would begin probably towards the end of this year and take in the order of some two years to complete. This is something obviously which is complex and difficult, it will involve a good deal of very sophisticated work on the radar, but that is the sort of timescale we are thinking of.

(Mr Witney) I think the middle of the decade is when the US would like to feel that this facility is commissioned. It relates very much to the evolution of threat, which is so hard to predict. As I think our discussion document notes, the wild card in all this is North Korea and its capability to proliferate the most advanced ballistic missile technology that is available to states of concern. The earliest the Middle East threat, in the US view, might emerge is around the middle of the decade and to be sure they would like to pre-empt that by having Fylingdales in place by that timescale.

Will the United Kingdom be able to make independent use of any of the information that may be gathered by the system that we are talking about in the event that it is no use to the United States? In other words, will we have access to the information that comes out?

(Mr Hoon) We compile and collect the information so certainly we have access to it. That has always been part of the arrangement at RAF Fylingdales which is an RAF base.

That does indeed continue under the new arrangement?

(Mr Hoon) That will certainly continue.

Do you consider there will be any direct benefits to the United Kingdom from the upgrade, apart from the obvious?

(Mr Hoon) What the upgrade will in any event do is improve the ability of the radar to track in the way it does already so that the sophistication of the system will be enhanced by the extra work done for missile defence purposes. Given that for the great majority of its time in any event RAF Fylingdales continues to carry on its existing missions - firstly, to track the threat of ballistic missile attack against the United Kingdom and, secondly, to deal with objects in orbit in space - my assumption is the enhancements will improve its ability to perform those tasks, which will still remain its primary role and responsibility. Paul, you are the technical expert.

(Mr Taylor) Let's look at the current role. The current role is not just to provide early warning data for the US; it also provides the UK's early warning data, so the data goes to Strike Command at High Wycombe and is used by Strike Command to assess the threat to the UK as well as being sent to Cheyenne Mountain in the US. It has a secondary UK-only role at Fylingdales which is to catalogue the many, many objects that are in space that fly over the UK in our portion of space. When Fylingdales was first commissioned there were only a few hundred objects in space and now there are many thousands and these re-enter the Earth's atmosphere at variable times and it is nice to know when they are coming back in, so that role will be enhanced. Finally, it may be possible to do more cataloguing. Some objects are too small to see now and it might be possible to see them and so enhance that role.

Mr Cran

Just one other question; is the upgrade that we are talking about an interim upgrade in terms of what the Americans want to do? Is this an upgrade not only for the interim but also for the long term?

(Mr Taylor) As the Secretary of State mentioned previously, Fylingdales has been upgraded continuously since it was first built. This is another upgrade. I think it is important to remember that the US missile defence system proposals require an early warning radar which forms a fence that hands off threat to other systems such as x-band radars (ie, they are different, separate) and early warning radar will continue to be required. The US and UK continue to have a need to have ballistic early warning radar, that risk has not gone away.

(Mr Hoon) Without speculating too far into the future, a key component of the upgrade will be to improve both the hardware and software and the system run by those computers at Fylingdales. It does not require anyone to speculate too far to say that given the pace of progress in computer hardware and software that at some stage that would be improved, once again because the more power brought to bear in relation to tracking objects, the more accurate is the analysis and data that is ultimately produced. There is no request for that at this stage. I simply speculate in the light, as Paul has said, of our previous experience of Fylingdales and the continual process of improving its ability to do its job.

Mr Cran: Thank you, Chairman.

Rachel Squire

I just wanted to clarify that even if radars in the future were sited in other European countries, you still consider that looking to upgrade the radar facility of Fylingdales is relevant and useful for the United Kingdom?

(Mr Taylor) Absolutely.

Chairman: I wish all the questions were as terse as that then we could leave early! Frank Roy?

Mr Roy

Secretary of State, some groups have written to us expressing their concerns in relation to health matters from an upgraded Fylingdales and they say that the risk of electromagnetic radiation is dangerously near the internationally set safety standards at the moment. What can you say at this point in time to reassure this Committee and those organisations? Will it increase radiation levels in the Fylingdales area?

(Mr Hoon) The current position is that the radiation emissions from the radar are many times lower than the safe limits set by the relevant authorities, so there is no health risk. I suggest that those who have written to you along those lines are not as informed as perhaps they should be about the facts. There will be no change in the power output from the radar, nor indeed in the maximum length of time that it is transmitting, so the emissions will remain many times lower than the safe limits that are already set.

We know that Fylingdales is surrounded by a National Park. What consultation have you had with the National Park authorities?

(Mr Hoon) In the course of a visit that I made recently to North Yorkshire we met representatives of the planning authority. I am not suggesting for a moment that we have met the planning authority as such, although Nick certainly has been in regular consultation with them. I accept that it is a matter for them to determine what is an appropriate way forward now as far as planning is concerned. We will supply them with as much information as is appropriate in order to allow them to take the decision which we judge can be made, which is that there are no implications as far as planning law is concerned for this request to be accepted. I accept that that determination ultimately is a matter for the planning authority. It is our judgment there is no legal planning requirement for them to take a formal planning decision but I accept entirely (and that was the result of our conversation when I came to North Yorkshire) that it is a matter for the planning authority to reach that conclusion by itself.

Will you make a planning application to that authority?

(Mr Hoon) What I am saying is that we do not judge that it is necessary for there to be a formal planning application and a formal planning process, but I accept that it is for the relevant planning authority to reach that decision in the light of the information we supply to them.

If they decide that it does need a planning application, do I take it that you have got to bring that planning application?

(Mr Hoon) Obviously if they make that decision we will consider carefully our position in the light of the ruling that they make.

If there were an application put forward, ultimately, as Secretary of State, are you able to override that?

(Mr Hoon) I do not think it is helpful at this stage to go into the precise planning position in the sense that ---

--- That is the generality.

(Mr Hoon) Let me make it clear, there is an argument that says these kind of defence installations do not require a formal planning process, but it has always been the position of the Ministry of Defence that we submit our requirements to what would be the legally required planning process. So I am not in any sense proposing that we would change the existing arrangements, which is that we go through what would otherwise be the normal planning process.

(Mr Witney) Can I add a footnote. As the Secretary of State says, we at the present time do not have to go through planning processes but we are committed to following procedures, so in this particular case what the question boils down to is what is proposed at the Fylingdales development within the terms of the 1990 Town and Country Planning Act. I think we are increasingly confident that it is not development in that sense. We are not going to be doing anything, we think - and I will come back to that caveat in just a minute - in that there is nothing going to be involved that is going to alter the external appearance of the radar, all the work is going to be on the interior to the pyramid structure, and there is going to be no change in the emissions that are relevant in the perimeter to the base. There is going to be, we think, no increase in manning levels or traffic nor activity at the base, nothing that would constitute development as defined in the Act. The caveat is that we have only had the request on 17 December, so we do need to do some more work with the Americans, conduct some more comprehensive site surveys to see what specific work needs doing, and we need to get the results of some of the environmental assessment work that we have set in hand ourselves. We cannot be categoric today. We have told the local planning authorities that we are fairly confident that the question of formal planning consultation is simply not going to arise and we have said that we of course understand that they are not going to accept it like that, they will want us to provide them with the evidence, and that is what we will do in due course.

Chairman

Because if it is sensitive, even if you think you have the power to not take them into account formally, nevertheless people who do have anxieties would want the opportunity to go through the process. It would seem fairer if there were no time constraints. You are a former barrister (if you are ever a "former" barrister, it is like if you were mason, once a mason always a mason!) I am sure you have strung out many a planning appeal, Secretary of State. Are there any time constraints in the sense that if you go for the process of telling them, "Sorry, but we do not need your input", and then there was a challenge and then if there was a planning inquiry or decision of some kind would you or the Americans be getting a little twitchy that whilst they are thinking of expanding or at least amending what is in Fylingdales barristers are making a meal of it and taking three or four months? Is there any real time constraint that might influence you to try to not go down through the formal planning route?

(Mr Hoon) I think Nick and I hope I have clearly set out both the Government's view of the planning process and the legal requirements. Obviously we will give as much information as we can to support our contention that there should not need to be a full planning process. If the planning authority reached a different view, then clearly we would have to consider the legal position at that stage, but I do not think it is particularly helpful to go further than that at this point. Ultimately this is a matter of law and it would be the relevant planning law that the planning authority would have to apply.

Jim Knight

Secretary of State, one of the other concerns that the locals have is that an upgraded Fylingdales would be more of a target, so there is an understandable concern about security. I noticed in your statement that you believe that any increased threat to RAF Fylingdales itself is negligible. I think I accept what you say that for the foreseeable future states of concern are unlikely to have the sophistication or size of arsenal to consider targeting specific points or military installations. What I would like to question you a little more on, though, is where you said that the station is well-defended against terrorist attack. It would seem to me that a rogue state, a state of concern, with its limited number of long-range missiles, should it develop in the future, would be most likely to attack largely populated areas, but would look to take out installations such as Fylingdales, possibly from the ground. We saw mortar attacks on 10 Downing Street just a few years ago. There are forests close to Fylingdales and we saw woodlands from where it could be possible to try and launch an attack. When we were there we saw areas that we did not think were adequately covered by the infrared cameras and we were certainly told by the Ministry of Defence Police that it is possible to go on the Internet and get all sorts of information about the security situation at Fylingdales. They also said that the defence bylaws really needed to be looked at again because you can drive a legal horse and cart through them. What sort of additional security measures are going to be needed if we go through with this upgrade?

(Mr Hoon) I do not believe that any additional security measures are required specifically as a result of the upgrade, not least, as I indicated in my statement today, because we do not judge that that makes Fylingdales any greater risk than it already is, if I can put it that way, and as it already was throughout the Cold War for example. All of our military installations are well-defended against terrorist attack. That security was reviewed in the light of what happened on 11 September and further thought was given to precisely the kinds of eventualities that you have set out. We continue to keep the security at all of our bases under review in the light of emerging threats and developments. In the course of my visit to RAF Fylingdales I was made aware of some concerns that the Ministry of Defence Police have and it is certainly our intention to act upon them.

So you would address the question of the bylaws, and you might be able to re-deploy some of the infrared cameras we might not be using in Northern Ireland any more at Fylingdales to get rid of any dark spots?

(Mr Hoon) I certainly believe that those who are responsible for security there will provide the appropriate advice and if we judge it necessary we will act upon it.

And we discussed while we were there the attitude of the United States to security at Fylingdales. They operate all of the other four stations in the BMEWS network and I got the impression that they probably looked with wry amusement at the sort of security that we offer here in relation to the way that they would do it. Have you been to any of the other stations and observed their security? Are the United States happy with the way we operate Fylingdales in this regard?

(Mr Hoon) I have been to other stations and we are in close consultation with the United States about the kind and level of security that is required. It is something that we discuss on a regular basis with the United States and indeed with other allies where relevant.

And they are happy?

(Mr Hoon) I would not be saying so otherwise.

So they are happy?

(Mr Hoon) It is not for me to speak on behalf of the United States but I assure you that those consultations are based on an exchange of information and common understanding of the threat and a common approach to dealing with that threat.

Rachel Squire

Secretary of State, you have made clear more than once in your statement today that the upgrade of Fylingdales did not commit the United Kingdom in any way to a deeper involvement in missile defence. I think you will appreciate that there is some level of scepticism about that amongst a number of members of the British public so I would like to give you the opportunity to persuade those who see this commitment today as tying the UK into a key role in the further development of missile defence, why they should not see it as taking us down that road and why they should consider that your statement today demonstrates what are UK defence interests rather than US defence interests.

(Mr Hoon) What I sought to explain to the House today was our response to a specific request from the United States that will allow them to develop further their ideas and emerging technologies to produce, ultimately, a layered missile defence system. By layered, I recognise that may involve a number of different ways in which a ballistic missile threat is approached. That is work in progress as far as the United States is concerned, it does not therefore mean that today the United Kingdom has to take a decision, nor in my judgment would it be sensible for the UK to take a decision about procuring missile defence for our purposes, not least because as of yet there is no system to procure, and moreover, clearly, as the discussions have already indicated in the Committee today, there would have to be further decisions taken about, for example, the location and provision of an interceptor system specifically designed to protect the United Kingdom. No such system exists and is available for the UK today. It would be something that would have to develop as and when we judged it necessary and, of course, as and when the technology reached a level of maturity to give us the confidence that we would spend what would inevitably be considerable sums on providing such a system to protect the United Kingdom. Therefore, what I sought to do today was not to close off the opportunity to keep that option open, but an option open for the future.

Patrick Mercer

Secretary of State, how much will the requested upgrade of Fylingdales cost and who will pay for it?

(Mr Hoon) The upgrade will not cost the United Kingdom anything at all and it will be paid for by the United States.

Have you had any discussions about whether the United States would expect a financial contribution for stepping under their umbrella?

(Mr Hoon) Sorry, I misheard that.

Have you had any discussions about whether the United States would expect any financial contribution for stepping under that defensive umbrella?

(Mr Hoon) As I indicated earlier, part of the request from the United States indicated a willingness to provide coverage under a developed missile defence system to the United Kingdom, subject obviously to financial and other implications, and that is part of the specific request that the United States have made and that is why, again, it does not seem sensible at this stage to commit the United Kingdom to something which clearly a future government, for example, might not be able to afford. That is part of the decision that a future government will have to take when and if the time comes that such a system is sufficiently mature and successful and the threat is sufficiently great for us to judge it necessary to participate in it.

Thank you. How important is the upgrading of Fylingdales to America? For instance, do they need to simultaneously upgrade both Fylingdales and Thule?

(Mr Hoon) My assumption is yes, otherwise they would not have made this request.

What would the consequences of a negative response in terms of our relationship with America be?

(Mr Hoon) I think that is a factor that any UK government must take account. We have as close as is possible military and other relationships with the United States. I indicated that the key test, though, remained what benefit was likely to flow to the United Kingdom and indeed to members of the NATO alliance. That still seems to me to be the right way to approach this issue.

Can we say no to this now and yet still hope to be part of a system of radars and interceptors based elsewhere in Europe?

(Mr Hoon) That is why I have approached it in the way that I have. It seems to me inherently unlikely that we could say no at this stage and then in years to come, assuming more than an emerging threat but a real threat to the United Kingdom, then to be able to say, "Sorry, we got that wrong earlier and we would like now to join in rather belatedly." The whole point of giving us this option for the future is to take this decision in the way that we are proposing to do now.

Chairman

I do not suppose the special relationship would survive for very long if we declined their request.

(Mr Hoon) I believe that it would have a negative impact on our relationship with the United States but I want to assure the Committee that the overwhelming reason is the reason that I have set out more than once now, which is the consideration of the United Kingdom's security interests and our relationship to the United States is obviously a vital part of that security interest.

Mr Hancock

I am interested in developing that idea because in response to Patrick's earlier question when he asked about the cost that the United Kingdom might have to bear, you said that one of the benefits was this enhancement not only of our security but that of our NATO allies in Europe. That is only enhanced if there is an interceptor available. I had the idea that I would look in the Pentagon's budget on missile defence. It is amazing what you find because there is money for the upgrading of the radar but there is no suggestion of a non-continental US interceptor priced into their budget, so who will pay for the increased security benefits we will get if at the end of the day they cannot afford it?

(Mr Hoon) Let me just deal with the point about security enhancement. I do not think I entirely agree with you that there is no benefit from upgrading the radar. If you are a relatively poor country and, for whatever reason, you judge it worthwhile to develop intercontinental ballistic missile systems you must presumably intend at some stage that it is worthwhile using those systems rather than spending the money, for example, on feeding your own people or providing a higher standard of living to them. An indication by the United States and a contribution from the United Kingdom that we intend to develop defensive systems in order to protect our people against such an emerging threat might well lead such a country to think that perhaps it is not at all sensible to go down that particular route. There is a sense in which the mere fact that we are contemplating these developments might have a deterrent effect on other countries contemplating such proliferation. I do not think necessarily that the enhancement is not of significance in security terms in its own right, but I do accept that ultimately, if there is to be such a system and it is to have what I might describe as provable effect, it would have to be a complete system and that complete system would obviously involve interceptors based somewhere in order to protect the United Kingdom. That is a judgment, as I indicated earlier, that a future United Kingdom government would have to take in the light of the prevailing financial and security circumstances at the time. I cannot assume anything at this stage other than that would be a matter for the United Kingdom government at the time to finance. It seems to me that that would be the only proper assumption to make at this stage.

You are saying a lot of good, positive things about why we should agree to this request. Are there any negatives that you have looked at within the Ministry of Defence associated with agreeing with this request?

(Mr Hoon) None that is convincing.

Internal ones or external ones?

(Mr Hoon) I am perfectly happy for other people to do the job of criticising the decisions I take. I do not see any particular reason why I should do it for them.

If it is such a good thing and you cannot come up with a single negative ----

(Mr Hoon) I did not say that.

Is there a negative factor that you can come up with?

(Mr Hoon) Of course I could but I am not going to because I do not find them persuasive. My job is to exercise my judgment on these questions in the best interests, as I see it, of the security of the people of the United Kingdom. That does not involve finding fault with the decisions that I reach, at least not publicly.

We have to reserve judgment on some of those.

(Mr Hoon) That may be your job; it is certainly not mine.

Why would we bother with a debate if there are only good things that could possibly come out of this? Why are you fluffing and not just saying, "Yes, let's get on with it" if you cannot think of a single negative thing? You have sold it hook, line and sinker to everyone else. Why the need for a debate?

(Mr Hoon) I indicated that I can think of objections. I am simply not prepared to articulate them publicly. It is not my job to do so. I realise Mr Hancock is a member of a political party that is capable of holding a whole series of diverse and inconsistent positions simultaneously, but ----

You have taken most of them on board, Secretary of State. When the new, upgraded radar is in place, will all of the information supplied by that radar system be instantly available to the United Kingdom government or will it be filtered through the United States security system?

(Mr Hoon) That information is available to United Kingdom personnel. On my visit to RAF Fylingdales, there was one single, attached US officer present at the base.

Chairman

There was a major in the briefing.

(Mr Hoon) But this is an RAF base. It is a UK base and the information is secured, compiled and interpreted by RAF personnel.

Mr Hancock

You see that being the case in the future?

(Mr Hoon) That will continue to be the case.

After the upgrade is in place?

(Mr Hoon) Yes.

Under British control, all of it?

(Mr Hoon) Yes.

Chairman

When I went, I thought that there would be the sound of American accents everywhere one went. It was quite a relief to find it was one person.

(Mr Witney) It is one uniformed liaison officer.

Syd Rapson

How much of the Fylingdales work will be resourced from UK industry?

(Mr Hoon) That I do not know the answer to, but I know a man who does.

(Mr Witney) I do not know the answer definitively, but I suspect unfortunately not much because in contradistinction to the big upgrade that occurred a decade ago where a lot of construction work and so on was involved we are talking here about hardware and software modifications fundamentally to a US designed radar. We have not got into that detail yet. I suspect that there will not be a huge amount of work coming to the UK industry out of this particular upgrade.

As this is the only facility we have in the country that can detect incoming space debris, amongst other things, and we rely upon this American equipment to detect space debris coming in, would it not be better if our technicians had a grasp of the complicated technology required for that? If the Americans ever said, "We are not playing the game. We are not happy and we are taking that facility away", Britain's technology would not be able to cope, because they are not involved in upgrades of this nature. Is there a danger that we would lose the technology?

(Mr Hoon) Our technicians are perfectly competent in terms of servicing, understanding and being trained in the technologies that are used at Fylingdales. That is not the same as saying that we have the industrial ability to produce the kind of sophisticated software that will be required as part of the upgrade itself. There is a distinction there. Outside the United States, I suspect that there is no other country that is in a position to be able to produce the sophisticated software and hardware that will be required. It is an industrial issue, not one of competence of our people.

Can I turn next to theatre missile defence? In earlier examinations of defence both yourself and the MoD highlighted the need to have passive missile defence measures for deployed forces, something we are a little short of. There is a changing emphasis, however. Recently, there has been talk about the fact that we must seek to protect the deployed forces from such attacks, such as missile attacks. The cost of theatre missile defence is still unknown. We will consider the most efficient approach to theatre missile defence for coalition forces. This may involve a degree of role specialisation. Role specialisation is on the agenda for missile defence, but are you seeking US protection for our deployed troops in exchange for allowing the use of Fylingdales as a quid pro quo?

(Mr Hoon) That is not specifically part of the arrangement that we propose to enter into. We are in discussion with the United States about developments in the technology that could protect deployed forces. There are various programmes under way between the United States and two or three other countries but, as yet, the technology has not reached a sufficient level of maturity for us to be confident that it would be wholly successful.

We have something the Americans want and presumably we might want it as well. They are desperate for us to say, "Yes, go ahead and upgrade." That will complete the four units and we will have good missile defence coverage. Could we not squeeze them a little tighter and try and get something out of them that would be beneficial to us? Then we would not have to worry about the expense.

(Mr Hoon) I do not think we need to approach our friends in the United States in quite that mechanistic way. We have very good exchanges with the United States on the subject of theatre missile defence and in relation to other missile defence systems, so I am sure that excellent relationship will continue.

Mr Howarth

I do think it is an opportunity for the United Kingdom to drive a bit of a bargain with the United States in terms of getting access to some of their technology. I want to encourage you to specify how you will fight on behalf of British companies to get them access to that. In your statement this afternoon, you said, "We intend to agree a new technical memorandum of understanding with the US which would give us full insight into the development of their missile defence programme and the opportunity for UK industry to reap the benefits of participation." I applaud that and I would encourage you to strike the hardest bargain you can on behalf of British industry. How do you propose to do that?

(Mr Hoon) I do not propose to improve on the words I used before the House. We do intend to draw up a memorandum of understanding with the United States that will deal with these kinds of issues, but obviously we need to be confident that we can play a part industrially in this process and equally that we have the skills and the technology to be able to make an effective contribution.

(Mr Witney) This business of technology transfer from the US and some of the restrictions that are imposed on US technology is a long running problem. We stub our toe against it in other collaborative areas such as the joint strike fighter.

That is why now is a good moment.

(Mr Witney) It is indeed. We are very conscious of that and that is one of the reasons why we are extremely keen to crack on and negotiate a good MoU and to explain again to US colleagues that it is in their interests to arrive at arrangements with us which allow them to harness the full potential of UK industry in this area.

Can you confirm that at the present time, if there were a missile launched by North Korea along the lines that you speculated on the floor of the House, we do not have any defence against such a missile any more than the US does?

(Mr Hoon) That is the position today.

With the upgrade, will the new radar be able to differentiate between the warheads and the decoys because some have suggested that even the new radar will not be able to achieve that. Obviously, trying to identify which is a warhead and which is a decoy is going to be rather critical.

(Mr Hoon) That is part of the research programme that the US are undertaking and part of the process of research and development that they want to engage on with the test bed facility that they are developing. That is part and parcel of defining a successful missile defence system.

Can I not persuade you to go further and recognise that it is in Britain's interests now to declare an interest in participating in the essential corollary to what you have announced today, namely to get British industry to participate in the difficult development of the interceptor technology? Perhaps it ought to be something which ought to be funded by NATO as a whole for the protection of the whole of the European continent.

(Mr Hoon) Belatedly, if you will forgive me for saying so, you did come to at least the $64,000 question, which is how these things should be funded. Clearly, that is something that will be better dealt with once we have a clearer picture of what the United States propose to develop and to utilise in the future. I cannot see any practical purpose in committing ourselves to something today and seeking means of funding it that has not yet evolved, is not yet available and we are not aware of what shape and size it will be. If that was a spending commitment, I would be delighted to give you some estimates as to how much it is likely to cost.

Jim Knight

We were told when we went to Fylingdales that the Serco contractors did have considerable software writing capability that they had developed over the many years that they had the contract there. Would it not be sensible to see if it is at all possible for that expertise to be used in developing the upgrade? Would that in turn not ensure that all of the automatic data transfer that takes place is equally shared, because there would be some suspicion that the US are installing this software on the internet and all sorts of things. They could easily write software that would give them information that perhaps would not be passed on to strike command and some exclusive stuff could go to Fylingdales.

(Mr Hoon) That is not the nature of our relationship with the United States, as far as the latter part of your question is concerned. As far as the first part is concerned, it seems to me that, given the efforts that the United States are presently making, they would welcome contributions from whatever quarter. If there is expertise in this area, my view of the discussions I have had with the United States is that they would be very keen to take advantage of it.

Chairman

Serco are running education in Walsall and I think they have more than enough on their hands!

(Mr Hoon) Only you could say that, Mr Chairman.

Chairman: We are expecting a vote at any moment and we are suspending proceedings. When we return after the vote the Committee will sit in private.