OPEN SESSION

  Question numbers refer to the transcript of evidence.

Q7-9:   Clarification of the answers would be appreciated. It is unclear what is meant by "the summary in totals". How are sales, transfers and gifts of military equipment by Government agencies included in the Government's Annual Report? Is it the case that "there are no transactions not included" in the Report?

  In Part III of the 2001 Annual Report (pages 367 to 371 inclusive), the second column of Table 4 gives the "Value of Exported Goods". These figures are compiled from the tariff codes listed at Appendix C to the Report, Parts I and II. It should be noted, however, that these figures are subject to the caveats listed as footnotes to Table 4: these arise in part from the fact that the customs classifications and those of licensable goods are not entirely compatible.

  The figures in Part III of the Annual Report relating to the value of physical exports of all strategic equipment include all such items sold, transferred or gifted by Government. However, Table 6 of this part of the Report contains only information on exports in specific categories, and as such not all transactions are listed in the Report. The Government's response to the Committee's Question 69 gave details on all Government to Government transfers of military equipment in 2001 that do not appear in Table 6. In addition, the answer to Question 72 indicted that a further number of items had been gifted by the Government; details have been provided to the Committee.

Q10:   Clarification of the answer would be appreciated. Where equipment does not require an export licence because transfer of ownership from the Government takes place outside the UK, "we may use the F680 procedure" (my italics), according to Mr Dowse. In what circumstances (if any) would government not use the F680 procedure for such transfers?

  The F680 procedure may be used for sales of defence equipment by UK Government agencies to other Governments where transfer takes place outside the UK. Transfer of ownership of equipment outside the country may also take place by letter of Crown Immunity. Under Crown Immunity provisions, an export licence is not required in respect of goods that are owned by the Crown, or where the Crown holds similar rights of disposal.

  Also, when utilising the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, some items are gifted following interdepartmental consideration. Formal instructions on gifting are also framed to ensure financial propriety and regularity.

Q17-20:   The Government has promised to write with answers to Mr Chidgey's questions "when the programme for the destruction of the Russian arsenal was first agreed, including the radioactive material, after identifying the problem following the collapse of the Russian Empire, what the scale and quantity of these materials was and how much has been destroyed?" and "in terms of percentage how much of that material has currently been destroyed 10 or 11 years later?"

  The UK has been actively assisting Russia in dealing with its nuclear legacy since 1992. Between 1992 and 1996, the Ministry of Defence spent £38 million on nuclear weapons transportation and dismantlement in the Former Soviet Union. The DTI has had an assistance programme since 1995, focusing on the civil nuclear sector. A cross-cutting review in 2000 recommended refocusing UK activities on security and non-proliferation. In the subsequent spending review, a budget for nuclear legacy work of £84 million over three years was established, and work to identify new projects began.

  The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was announced in June 2002 at the Kananaskis summit. The Prime Minister announced in July 2002 that the UK would commit up to $750 million over 10 years to the Partnership. This includes the budget launched in 2000.

  The UK's contribution to the Global Partnership covers nuclear and chemical legacy work. In the nuclear sector, the UK has committed a significant sum—£70 million over 10 years—to the Plutonium Disposition Programme. This Programme, for which multilateral financing arrangements are currently being negotiated, is designed to help Russia dispose of 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, so that it can never again be used in nuclear weapons. The UK is also assisting in dealing with spent nuclear fuel from submarines, and the physical protection for their nuclear reactors both at sea and in port, akin to the level of protection at UK nuclear power stations. We are also preparing projects designed to help create sustainable employment for former Soviet weapons scientists and technicians in Russia's closed "Nuclear Cities".

  In the chemical sector, just over 200 tonnes of toxic agent of the total declared Russian stockpile of approximately 40,000 tonnes have been destroyed to date at the Gorny destruction facility. The UK has committed £12 million over three years to help Russia destroy chemical weapons and meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. This money is being spent developing the infrastructure for another chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye.

  The nuclear and chemical weapons legacy of the Former Soviet Union presents an enormous and long-term challenge. The Government does not have information to quantify precisely the scale of the materials involved, either at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union or now. But its work in Russia, is an important element of wider counter-proliferation policy, as demonstrated by our pledge to the Global Partnership.

Q25:   Mr Dowse says in answer to this question that "I think this is an issue which is currently under negotiation with the United States in the context of the ITAR waiver". It is not clear from the context to which particular issue Mr Dowse is referring. It would be useful for the Committee to have clarification.

  The issue referred to was the policy applied by the United States on export licensing decisions involving incorporation overseas and onward export. While the US does not have publicly announced incorporation criteria, as is the case in the UK, its export licensing decisions are made on a case by case basis according to their licensing guidance, taking into account any relevant circumstances at the time.

Q24-27:   Answers refer to how to other EU countries deal with incorporation cases. Is there any further information on this that could be made available to the Committee?

  As stated, the Government did obtain information from other EU Member States regarding their policies on "incorporation cases". However, this information was received in confidence, and as such, cannot be made available to the Committee.

Q36-38:   The Government has undertaken to pursue Ann Clwyd's question about "the use of vehicles supplied by the UK to spray demonstrators with dye so they could be identified subsequently by the Indonesian authorities" in the context of end-use monitoring

  In Bandung in 1996, there were reports that water cannons and dye were used against demonstrators. We understand that UK-sourced vehicles were used by the authorities. There was no information to suggest that the use was anything other than non-toxic, non corrosive dye used as a marker.

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  There have been no exports of water cannons to Indonesia since 1997, and there have been no confirmed reports that water cannons, with or without the use of dye, have been used against peaceful demonstrators.

Q39-42:   Clarification of the "specific circumstances" under which end-use monitoring takes place, and of measures that the Government takes in these cases to ensure that end-use conditions are met. In how many countries did such monitoring occur in 2001? Can the Government provide any information on cases other than in Israel where such monitoring has occurred?

  The Government has already made clear its commitment to effective monitoring of the end-use of UK defence exports where that can make a genuine contribution to preventing their diversion or misuse. To this end, the Government has taken a number of steps to improve risk assessment at the export licensing stage.

  There are no defined specific circumstances when end-use monitoring takes place. However, guidance is issued to overseas posts and the desk officers who consider approval of the licence application. This guidance sets out circumstances in which end-use monitoring should be considered. Information is gathered from a wide range of interlocutors.

  There is no database of end-use monitoring and so it is impossible to say in how many countries end-use monitoring occurred in 2001. Many overseas posts have a defence attaché, who will liaise with commercial and government contacts and make visits to military establishments through the normal course of their duties. These connections can and do establish if there are end-use concerns. Most end-use monitoring shows that UK arms exports are not being mis-used, and as such this goes unreported.

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Q45:   Mr Dowse answered that "across the entire EU, our understanding is that there have only ever been 20 refusals on a Criterion 8 basis alone, since the code was adopted". Does the Government have any further information on these 20 refusals that it could make available to the Committee?

  On further investigation, we have ascertained that Criterion 8 has been used by EU Members States as a ground to deny an export licence in 27 cases since 1998. The reasons for denying a particular licence are confidential to the Member State in question, and such information is only provided to the Government on the basis that it not be disclosed.

Q56-58:   The Government has undertaken to write with an explanation of a statistical discrepancy concerning SIELs granted in 2001 for oversized handcuffs.

  The DTI has now written to Mr Chidgey correcting the discrepancy between the figures published in the 2001 Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls and its response to his Parliamentary Question of 26 November 2002. A copy of the letter is attached;[25] further copies have been placed in the Libraries of the House.

Q60 and 64:   The Government has undertaken to look at the provision of information on the Internet about the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, as compared to the Africa Pool.

  The Foreign Office is looking to see how the FCO web-site information on the GCPP can be improved and updated. We understand the importance of making such information easily accessible to interested parties and the public.

  The FCO website contains information about the establishment of the two Pools and some material on the operation of the Global Pool since then, under individual country or thematic areas. With our Pool partners, DFID and MOD, we are currently preparing a publication which will review more systematically the strategies and activities of the Global Pool over the two years of its life so far. The publication should be ready in the next few months. It will be made available to Parliament and distributed widely to the public, international organisations and NGOs. We plan also to place summary of this information on the FCO website.

Q60-65:   Does the Government plan to undertake end-use monitoring of the helicopters gifted to Nepal? Is the use of the helicopters to deploy armed troops permitted by the agreement under which the helicopters are being provided?

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Q65-66:   The Government has undertaken to respond to Sir John Stanley's point that "Unless the delivery of these medical supplies [to Nepal] is accompanied by hugely greater security for those medical supplies, you are to be gifting medical supplies and everything that goes with them to the Maoist terrorists".

  The agreement between HMG and the Royal Nepalese Army did not mention the delivery of medical supplies by the transport helicopters. The term "medical purposes" envisages the medical evacuation of security force personnel and civilians from combat areas. It is not our intention to gift medical supplies to the Royal Nepalese Army.

  Whether the transport helicopters should be used for the delivery of medical supplies is a matter for the Nepalese authorities. The current cease-fire has resulted in a change of circumstances in Nepal since the decision to provide the helicopters was made. The safe passage of food and medicines in Nepal is one of the main points listed within the recently signed cease-fire Code of Conduct between the Maoists and the Nepalese authorities. This will further ease the supply of medicines to rural areas, and is also an important step towards creating a suitable environment for peace negotiations.

CLOSED SESSION

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