The United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK) is deeply concerned by the United States' (US) plans to deploy a missile defence system and remains opposed to any UK involvement. We welcome the opportunity to submit a written contribution to the Defence Committee during its inquiry on missile defence.

  Below is a re«sume« of some of our concerns accompanied by some recommendations for the Defence Committee. We also refer you to the following briefing paper US Missile Defence: Ten Reasons for UK Concern produced by the Missile Defence Working Group. Please visit http://www.una-uk.org/Disarmament/nmd/MISSILEper cent 20leaflet.pdf to download a copy. This further outlines UNA-UK's concerns about the implications for both UK and global security from the deployment of a US missile defence system.

UK Involvement

  Now that the Government has received a formal request for UK agreement to upgrade the Early Warning Radar at RAF Fylingdales, more substantive detail regarding the exact nature of possible UK involvement should be forthcoming from the Secretary of State for Defence. UNA-UK urges the Defence Committee to seek clarification on the exact nature of the US request and to make public this information.

  The Defence Secretary's Parliamentary Statement on 17 December 2002 said that Her Majesty's Government will only grant that request "if we are satisfied that it will ultimately enhance the security of the UK and NATO alliance." UNA firmly believes that our involvement will put UK security at risk.

  Fylingdales is crucial to US plans but UNA-UK sees agreement on it as a potential threat to our security. Any attempt by an armed group or state to thwart the system could involve a strike on the bases at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill. It appears that the Government has given little consideration to the impact on the local population and UK society at large of such an attack, particularly if it involved a nuclear, biological or chemical strike. UK involvement would potentially increase the risk of an armed attack against the population by terrorists.

Weaponisation of Space

  A major concern of the Association is that missile defences will almost certainly involve putting weapons in space. One of the systems under consideration involves intercepting missiles in outer space and/or basing interceptors in space. For example, high-energy lasers are already under development to intercept missiles in space. We have before us the opportunity to prevent the weaponisation of space through the adoption of an international legally-binding instrument. This should be a key priority of the UK Government.

Proliferation Risks

  UK policy should be developed within existing UN and other international arms control and disarmament instruments and not follow the recent US willingness to abrogate them. The full impact of missile defence deployment on arms control and disarmament remains to be seen and it is likely that this will, over the long-term, lead to an increase of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Alternative Methods for Addressing Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapon Proliferation

  Traditional approaches to non-proliferation and disarmament have served to ensure that arms control and disarmament agreements are meaningful and permanent. Therefore, we believe that arms control and disarmament is the best way of tackling the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, not a defensive shield. The aggressive attitude of the Bush Administration to multilateral arms control is damaging to the international community's efforts to support and strengthen relevant agreements including, for example, the Biological Weapons Convention, through the adoption of a legally-binding verification instrument, and the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Public and Parliamentary Discussion

  The United Nations Association welcomes the recent publication of the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) discussion paper on Missile Defence. UNA-UK will be submitting a response to this discussion paper shortly. However, we are very concerned by the absence of a definite time frame for contributions and the ambiguous nature surrounding this process.

  It is imperative that the Government is both transparent and accountable about any decision regarding UK involvement. Such a debate must be open, informed and considered. Therefore, it is vital that the MoD's discussion paper is the beginning, not the end, of such a debate. UNA-UK asks the Select Committee to seek reassurances from the Government that no decision regarding UK agreement to upgrade Fylingdales