APPENDIX 10
Memorandum submitted by the Council for
National Parks (9 January 2003)
BACKGROUND
1. RAF Fylingdales was first operational
as an Early Warning System (EWS) site in 1963. It has since been
upgraded several times, including a major rebuilding in the period
1989-93, when the famous "golf balls" were demolished
and the existing truncated pyramid built.
2. At the time of this rebuilding, the Fylingdales
installation was covered by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABMT). The Ministry of Defence (MoD) was not prepared to present
information on alternatives to the rebuilding of Fylingdales to
demonstrate the national need for the continued use of the site.
The North York Moors National Park Committee[39]
was thus unable to subject the development to the rigorous scrutiny
required for major proposals in National Parks because the Secretary
of State for the Environment was the only authority with access
to information to determine that there were no possible alternatives
to the site at Fylingdales. Today, the ABMT no longer applies.
3. The Council for National Parks (CNP)
is the national charity that works to protect and enhance the
National Parks of England and Wales, and areas that merit National
Park status, and promote understanding and quiet enjoyment of
them for the benefit of all.
CONFLICT WITH
NATIONAL PARK
STATUTORY PURPOSES
4. The present installation is highly intrusive
in the North York Moors landscape and conflicts with the achievement
of National Park statutory purposes[40],
which are:
— to conserve and enhance the natural
beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the National Parks;
— to promote opportunities for the
public understanding and enjoyment of the Parks' special qualities.
5. In 1986 the North York Moors National
Park Committee stated[41]:
". . . the present installation at Fylingdales
and the proposed modernisation are both considered totally incompatible
with the National Park, and that Committee deeply regrets the
proposal to develop the modernised Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales"
6. The Committee continued:
". . . the Committee asks . . . [that]
. . . the Government seeks to ensure that in the event of any
future modernisation being necessary that it is then possible
to relocate BMEWS outside the National Park on environmental grounds."
7. CNP shares the view of the North York
Moors National Park Committee and has a long term objective of
securing the complete removal of the existing Early Warning System
installation from the National Park and restoration of the site
to heather moorland. This would ensure the delivery of National
Park statutory purposes.
8. In the medium term, CNP considers that
should the MoD be minded to pursue further development at Fylingdales,
a public inquiry should be held and the Government policy's test[42]
relating to major development proposals in National Parks applied
in a publicly transparent way.
9. The wider issue of the need for Missile
Defence is not within the remit of CNP, except insofar as it is
related to a fully informed judgement on whether a case for national
need and no alternatives can be demonstrated for any further major
development at Fylingdales.
KEY ISSUES
10. CNP considers that the following issues
should be addressed in any consultation process concerning the
development of missile defence facilities at Fylingdales:
— the clear distinction between United
Kingdom (UK) participation in a missile defence system and playing
host to US facilities which did not contribute directly to UK
security;
— the distinction between the national
strategic questions of missile defence and the question of the
role of Fylingdales in any missile defence system, whether involving
UK security systems or not;
— ensuring that the Government decides
to employ the proper consultation process in all respects and
at all stages;
— securing a public inquiry as the
means of applying the Government's policy test for major development
proposals in National Parks;
— maintaining the distinctiveness of
the arguments for correct decision making throughout what might
become a complex debate on the issue of national security and
the morality of deterrence and missile defence development.
CONSULTATION
11. CNP understands that the UK government
has been approached by the United States government with a request
for the use of Fylingdales for the new purpose of missile defence.
This proposal should be subject to a decision making process which
ensures that National Park purposes are fully considered in a
public and transparent way. The MoD is committed to such a process[43].
12. The MoD has issued a consultation document
on the question of missile defence[44].
The Secretary of State has visited Fylingdales and has met the
National Park Authority and local people. It is not clear whether
these actions constitute the opening of a formal public consultation
period and if so, how the public and interested organisations
should respond. CNP considers that there has not been an adequate
provision of information for such a public consultation to be
meaningful and properly informed.
Adequate time should be allocated by the Government
for full public scrutiny and discussion of the issues covered
in the paper[45].
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
13. CNP considers that a full Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) of any proposed development should be
prepared by the MoD, setting out the need for any development
and demonstrating the absence of alternatives. A clear assessment
should also be made of the proposal's impact on National Park
purposes. This should then be submitted to the National Park Authority
alongside the Notice of Proposed Development (the military equivalent
of a planning application).
14. The submission of an EIA is required
by Paragraph 56 of Circular 12/96, which states:
". . . the Government . . . is . . . committed
to ensuring that new, renewed or intensified military use of National
Parks for defence purposes should be subject to formal consultation
with the National Park Authorities . . . and to an environmental
impact assessment, and should be tested against any provisions
set out in planning policy guidance."
15. CNP also notes that the EIA Directive[46]
applies to any proposal for the development of Fylingdales as
the proposals would not, it appears, serve "national defence
purposes"[47].
LACK OF
INFORMATION
16. CNP considers that there is considerable
uncertainty surrounding many aspects of a possible missile defence
installation at Fylingdales and that such uncertainty seriously
inhibits a sufficiently rigorous and publicly transparent consideration
of the issues.
EFFECTS OF
NON-IONISING
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION
17. CNP is concerned that there appears
to be considerable uncertainty concerning the environmental effects
of the non-ionising electromagnetic radiation (EMR) associated
with EWS and "X" band systems. The advice of the International
Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection (ICNIRP) and the
findings of the report to the European Parliament "Physiological
and Environmental Effects of Non-ionising Electromagnetic Radiation"[48]
are at variance with one another. There also appears to be a more
cautious approach to the likely dangers of EMR in Russia. Further
concern surrounds the possible effects of EMR upon communities
near the Cape Cod installation in the United States of America.
CNP considers that these uncertainties should be addressed before
any Environmental Impact Assessment is undertaken because of the
possible effects on the local communities near Fylingdales.
18. As an essential first step, CNP considers
that a baseline survey of EMR should be undertaken in the area
surrounding Fylingdales including local settlements. This should
take account of the particular characteristics of EMR, including
the concentration, pulsing and varying direction of these magnetic
fields, their possible biological potency and possible athermal
effects, which are not addressed in the ICNIRP guidelines.
THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE
EXISTING EWS AND
ANY NEW
MISSILE DEFENCE
SYSTEM
19. It is not clear whether the possible
upgrading mentioned in "Missile Defence—a public discussion
paper" would be undertaken as an additional capability to
the existing EWS or as a replacement of the existing EWS. Furthermore,
there is no mention in the discussion paper of the possibility
of the later installation of an "X" band system as presently
under test at Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean. CNP considers
that it is essential to clarify the relationship between any early
installation of new computer software at Fylingdales as a first
phase of a missile defence capability (and the significant investment
this would mean) and the likely later development of capabilities
which would require significant new buildings. This relationship
is critical to the appraisal of alternatives to the use of Fylingdales
and also to avoiding any additional major impact on National Park
statutory purposes in the medium term.
ALTERNATIVES TO
THE USE
OF FYLINGDALES
20. CNP considers that the absence of information
on the use of alternative sites or installation methods (such
as on sea going vessels) prevents informed consideration of the
question of alternatives, which is a key consideration when determining
major development proposals in National Parks.
TEST FOR
MAJOR DEVELOPMENT
PROPOSALS IN
NATIONAL PARKS
21. Any proposal to use the RAF Fylingdales
site for missile defence should be subject to the major development
test set out in paragraph 4.5 of PPG7. This requires the demonstration
of exceptional circumstances and public interest before major
developments in National Parks can be considered acceptable.
22. The major development test also requires
an examination of:
— need in terms of UK national considerations;
— impact of refusing or permitting
the development on the local economy;
— the availability of alternatives,
including alternative sites and alternative ways of meeting any
proven need; and
— a thorough assessment of potential
impacts on National Park statutory purposes and the extent to
which these could be moderated.
23. Should the North York Moors National
Park Authority not be satisfied that the arguments put forward
by the MoD establish clearly that there are exceptional circumstances
and that such a development of Fylingdales would be in the public
interest, and that there would be no adverse impact on National
Park purposes, the Authority should object to the proposal.
24. In this situation a public inquiry would
be held to allow a full and publicly transparent examination of
the arguments for and against such a development. CNP considers
that it is essential that the National Park Authority is able
to make a fully informed judgement of the case and that the undemocratic
procedure of 1986 is not repeated.
25. CNP considers that a public inquiry
is vital in order to ensure that National Park purposes are fully
considered in the decision making process, as is required by Section
11A of the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act[49].
LEGAL OPINION
26. CNP has taken advice from Counsel on
the possibility of development of Fylingdales for missile defence
purposes. CNP is advised that any such development for missile
defence would be unlawful:
(a) without being the subject of an Environmental
Statement within the formal terms of the EIA directive; or
(b) without being assessed by reference to
the relevant parts of PPGs, including, in particular, PPG7; or
(c) without a public inquiry being held under
the auspices of an inspector who would determine factual disputes.
39 The North York Moors National Park Committee was
a Committee of North Yorkshire County Council until the North
York Moors National Park Authority was established as a free-standing
authority by the Environment Act 1995. Back
40
Section 61, Environment Act 1995. Back
41
Letter concerning the 1989 upgrading of Fylingdales sent to the
Chair of the Leeds City Council Peace and Emergency Planning Committee
on 10 October 1986 by M Webster, Assistant National Park Officer
of the North York Moors National Park Committee, referring to
the resolution of the Development Control Sub Committee of 8 October
1986. Back
42
Para 4.5, PPG7. Back
43
A policy statement by the Secretary of State for Defence in July
2000 committed the MoD to follow the planning system as closely
as possible: "Departmental standards and arrangements are
to be introduced which will be, so far as is reasonably practical,
at least as good as those required by legislation. I will only
invoke any powers given to me to disapply legislation on the grounds
of national security when such action is absolutely essential
for the maintenane of operational capability". Back
44
"Missile Defence-A Public Discussion Paper" was issued
by the MoD on 9 December 2002 on the subject of the new missile
defence system under development by the Ministry of Defence. Back
45
The Cabinet Office Consultation Code of Practice aims to increase
the involvement of people and groups in public consultations,
and to give them a proper time-a standard minimum period of 12
weeks-to respond. Back
46
The EIA Directive (EU legalisation on Environmental Impact Assessment)
of the effects of projects on the environment was introduced in
1985 and was amended in 1997. Member States had to transpose the
amended EIA Directive by 14 March 1999. Back
47
Aannemersbedriif PK Kraaijeveld BV-v-Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid
Holland (1996) ECR 1-5403 ECJ 48. Back
48
"The Psychological and Environmental Effects of Non-ionising
Electromagnetic Radiation", by G J Hyland, Private Treaty
No EP/IV/A/STOA/2000/07/03. Back
49
Section 11A(2) of the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside
Act requires all relevant authorities to have regard to National
Park purposes in their decision-making. Back
| 
