"You cannot foster harmony by the apparatus of discord, nor cherish goodwill by the equipment of hate. But it is by harmony and goodwill that human security can be obtained." (Quaker Faith and Practice 24.40)

A MISGUIDED RESPONSE

  An effective response to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction depends on prioritising diplomacy, arms control and international disarmament, as well as building the conditions of inclusive security over the long-term. Political and financial commitments to non-military security measures, such as co-operative threat reduction programmes, the Millennium Development Goals and disarmament and non-proliferation instruments, are being displaced by a surge in military measures. The estimated costs of missile defences alone exceed those of all the Millennium Developments Goals combined. Achieving peace depends on developing good relationships, not a quest, represented in missile defences, for an illusory security based on military supremacy.

BEYOND DEFENCE

  There are reasons to doubt the US assertion that a missile defence system would be exclusively defensive. First, missile defences would form part of a wider United States security policy that explicitly supplements defensive measures with coercive intimidation and pre-emptive attack, including nuclear attack. [37]The US is also committed to making available military forces to protect not only national security but general US political and economic interests abroad. Second, US-built missile defences cannot be considered in isolation from its nuclear forces, to which it remains explicitly committed for decades to come in apparent contravention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. [38]Missile defences are partly intended to increase the strategic and military potency of nuclear weapons. It is deplorable that the capacity to annihilate should become a tool of foreign policy. Third, a missile defence system could be developed to incorporate offensive capabilities and within the context of military logic this should be expected. This could be used for coercion or possibly attack of other countries. Fourth, there are numerous indications that US ambitions include the weaponisation of space for the first time. The concern of Russia, China and other States—that weapons in space could be used for coercion and military attack—threatens to intensify the struggle for control of space and risks a space war. Space must be kept for peaceful purposes in the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty and similar agreements. A new treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space is part of the way forward but the United States opposes this.

ACCOUNTABILITY

  The operational secrecy of US bases in the UK is a matter if abiding public concern. The perception that the UK is unable to overrule the US in the use of these facilities in the UK is reinforcing a widely held assumption that arrangements for incorporating these into a missile defence system have already been made. Accurate and adequate information are prerequisites of democracy. It is only with the provision of accurate factual information that Parliament can hold government to account and that the public has the opportunity to make an informed decision regarding a government`s record. On many defence related issues both regarding the arms trade and the Chevaline upgrading of Polaris, defective and inadequate information regarding security issues has undermined democracy. Decisions have been made without reference to Parliament and governments have had their mandate renewed without the public being aware of important policy issues.

  The change of role of Fylingdales and Menwith Hill and possible UK participation in missile defence raises questions, which have not been adequately answered. It is hoped that the select committee will address these in its deliberations:

  1.  What planning enquiries will take place locally to ensure accountability at a constituency level?

  2.  What debate will take place at a Parliamentary level and will MPs have the opportunity to vote on an issue of long-term security and economic importance?

  3.  What opportunities will there be for informed public debate, (which the Defence Secretary has expressed a willingness to see) and when will information be made publicly available regarding the cost of missile defence, the time scale for implementation and the purposes of changes to the use of Fylingdales and Menwith Hill?

  Without an answer to these questions there is a danger that important long-term security issues will be made by default or on the basis of inadequate information.

  We hope that adequate time will be allowed for this debate before a decision is made and that the Government will listen in good faith to all sides, making a judgement that best reflects the long-term security needs of the world as a whole.

38   2001 United States Nuclear Posture Review. Back