We examine therefore the circumstances under which the US missile defence programme, using the upgrade at Fylingdales, could offer protection for the UK, and whether acceding to the US request would tie in the UK to further development of the US programme.

46. In his statement to the House on 15 January, the Secretary of State said—

The upgrade of the Fylingdales radar can and should be considered as a discrete proposition. It does not commit us in any way to any deeper involvement in missile defence, although it gives us options to do so.[50]

And he expanded on his statement to the House on 15 January when, later that day, he told us—

What I sought to explain to the House today was our response to a specific request from the United States that will allow them to develop further their ideas and emerging technologies to produce, ultimately, a layered missile defence system... That is work in progress as far as the United States is concerned, it does not therefore mean that today the United Kingdom has to take a decision, nor in my judgment would it be sensible for the UK to take a decision about procuring missile defence for our purposes, not lease because as of yet there is no system to procure... there would have to be further decisions taken about, for example, the location and provision of an interceptor system specifically designed to protect the United Kingdom. No such system exists and is available for the UK today. It would be something that would have to develop as and when we judged it necessary and, of course, as and when the technology reached a level of maturity to give us the confidence that we would spend what would inevitably be considerable sums on providing such a system to protect the United Kingdom. Therefore, what I sought to do today was not to close off the opportunity to keep that option open, but an option open for the future.[51]

It seems to me inherently unlikely that we could say 'no' at this stage and that in years to come, assuming more than an emerging threat but a real threat to the United Kingdom, then to be able to say 'Sorry, we got that wrong earlier and we would like to join in rather belatedly'.[52]

47. Thus while agreement to the US request would help protect the US from missiles from the Middle-East, it brings no immediate additional defensive cover to the UK itself. Indeed, it would not do so in the future, either, unless interceptors (ground-based or sea-based) were also located in Europe.[53] Neither does it oblige the UK Government to take an active part in any missile defence programme. But it does make RAF Fylingdales an active element in the proposed US missile defence system. That facility will be providing information with which US interceptors could be directed to their targets. So agreement will increase UK involvement, in the broadest sense, in missile defence.

48. Furthermore in announcing his preliminary conclusion on 15 January the Secretary of State said—

Separately, we intend to agree a new technical memorandum of understanding with the United States that would give us full insight into the development of their missile defence programme and the opportunity for UK industry to reap the benefits of participation.[54]

So, although it is clear that acquiring missile defence for the UK itself would be subject to a separate decision, it is also the case that the UK's proposed involvement at this stage in the US programme is more than simply permissive.

49. We were assured that any further upgrades or developments would be the subject of further requests; permission for them is not contained in, or implied by, the MoD's proposed response to the US request[55]. The question though is whether the involvement now contemplated could undermine the Secretary of State's assertion that "it does not commit us in any way to any deeper involvement in missile defence" and that therefore the request can be properly considered as "a discrete proposition".[56] This question matters because many of those who have written to us urging that the US request should have been refused have argued that agreement would, in effect, tie the UK into the US plans for future missile defence development. Yorkshire CND, for example, described it as "a path that is hard to turn back on, once the journey has been started".

50. Many of those who have written have done so in the belief that agreeing to the present request will lead to far more extensive developments than may be apparent from the terms of the request itself (as far as they are known). A prime example of this is the fear that an X-Band radar (able to track more missiles and to discriminate decoys more effectively) will also be built at Fylingdales. Yorkshire CND, for example, stated—

The upgraded early-warning radars will still be extremely limited in their ability to discriminate real warheads from decoys or to deal with other types of counter-measures. The system will therefore also deploy new high resolution phased-array X-band radars which use high frequencies (5.2-8.5 GHz) and advanced radar signal processing technology to improve target resolution. Phase-1 would see an X-band radar at Shemya in the Aleutian Islands (to cover missile launches from North Korea). Phase-2 would include additional X-band radars at the current [Ballistic Missile Early Warning System] sites (including Fylingdales).[57]

51. In February 2002, however, Mr Brian Hawtin, the MoD's Director-General of International Security Policy, told us that—

... we are concerned to understand the technology that goes with an X-band radar, but ... [the US] have not decided they wish to proceed with that, and were they to do so, the location of any X-band radars are again far from clear.[58]

52. Since then the US has explored a number of options, including putting X-band radars on ships and sea platforms, as well as using other sensors. On 15 January this year the Secretary of State noted that Missile Defence now "almost certainly would involve the use of X-band radar, but perhaps not in the way it was previously thought," and he described the assumption that the evolution of Missile Defence would require an X-band radar located at Flyingdales as "certainly to my understanding today, wrong".[59] Furthermore any request for an X-band radar at any location in the UK would also require a further request from the US and would be subject to planning procedures.[60] It is also our understanding that an X-band radar requires a large aircraft exclusion zone around it, so that it might be difficult to find an appropriate site in western Europe.

53. A similar concern for some is that the US will want to follow up the present upgrade with the deployment of interceptor missiles at Fylingdales, or elsewhere in the UK. The Secretary of State told the House last week, however, that—

... Interceptors would be required for missile defence coverage of Europe, although there is no need necessarily to collocate them with the radars... Whether the United Kingdom should acquire missile defence is a quite separate decision for the future. The immediate question is whether we should preserve the possibility of such defences ever protecting the people of the United Kingdom... An upgraded radar at RAF Fylingdales would provide us, at no cost to the United Kingdom, with a vital building block on which missile defence for this country and for our European neighbours could be developed if the need arose, and if that is what we decide.[61]

54. We do not intend in this report to examine the merits or otherwise of UK active participation in the US Missile Defence programme. That is a subject for the second stage of our inquiry. We see no reason to believe that agreeing to this upgrade will lead inevitably to further development or deployment at Fylingdales itself, or indeed elsewhere in the UK. But we should note at this stage that agreement to the US request does represent at least a step or two down the path towards active participation in Missile Defence.

Arguments against

55. In his statement on 15 January and in his evidence to us, the Secretary of State set out the arguments for agreement to the US request, in terms of supporting our close ally and leaving options open for possible UK involvement. And more directly the upgrade would provide better tracking of missiles attacking the UK and allow the UK to monitor better the thousands of objects in space.[62] We asked him whether there were arguments against agreeing which he and the MoD had examined. His reply was "None that is convincing".[63] He declined to list what they were on the grounds that it was not his job to articulate them publicly—

I am perfectly happy for other people to do the job of criticising the decisions I take. I do not see any particular reason why I should do it for them.[64]

56. The arguments against agreeing which have been made to us can be divided into a number of categories. There are concerns that agreement now implies agreement later to further upgrades and development at RAF Fylingdales, which we have discussed above. There are also those who argue that the US plans for Missile Defence are wrong in principle and that the UK should have nothing to do with them. Finally there are local concerns about the effect of this specific upgrade.

WRONG IN PRINCIPLE?

57. Many of the arguments about principle are tinged with mistrust of the US. The Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain states—

There are reasons to doubt the American assertion that a missile defence system would be exclusively defensive.[65]

Scientists for Global Responsibility argue that the Bush Administration supports missile defence because it "provides a market for expensive new military technology and new science, providing jobs and rewarding key corporate supporters of President Bush's Presidential candidacy".[66] We do not believe that the opponents of missile defence strengthen their case by resorting to such allegations. The United States of America is one of the UK's closest allies. We share many of the same values, both political and ethical. We prefer to judge American intentions on the basis of their official statements. We do not assume that there must be some more or less sinister ulterior motive behind their request to upgrade Fylingdales.

58. There are, however, other arguments levelled against missile defence. It could, as CND argue, "increase the risk of nuclear proliferation and undermine arms control efforts and diplomacy".[67] This is a common theme in the arguments of opponents. These concerns were previously focussed on what they saw as the importance of maintaining the ABM Treaty, with dire predictions routinely made of the consequences of unilateral US withdrawal from it. Additionally it has been argued that China, with a relatively small nuclear arsenal, would feel particularly threatened by missile defence and would therefore accelerate its acquisition of additional nuclear weapons and possibly disengage from the non-proliferation regime. So far these fears have not materialised. China, which has been pursuing its nuclear forces modernisation programme for some years anyway, has, in fact, reiterated its commitment to preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.[68] And US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was preceded by the agreement of the Moscow Treaty which commits both Russia and the US to large reductions in their operationally deployed nuclear forces.

59. We will want to examine these issues, including both whether future developments in missile defence might in certain circumstances create instability or tensions in particular regions or globally, and whether in the longer term it may have other unwelcome or dangerous implications, in our later inquiries. They will be important factors when it comes to considering whether the UK or Europe should acquire missile defence systems themselves. They may also influence our response to future requests from the US Government for certain types of new facilities or upgrades of existing facilities. At this stage, however, where the issue is limited to our agreement to the proposed upgrade of Fylingdales, some of these arguments (such as the longer term potential for the weaponisation of space) may be of limited immediate relevance. Therefore, and bearing in mind the muted international reaction so far, we do not believe that arguments that missile defence may cause international instability provide compelling grounds for rejecting the US request.

LOCAL CONCERNS

60. In the third category of opponents are those who are concerned that the proposed upgrade itself may directly adversely affect local people. These concerns in turn are of two types, firstly that the upgrade will increase radiation emissions to potentially dangerous levels and secondly that the upgrade and the consequent inclusion of Fylingdales in a US missile defence system will make the base a target for those who might wish to attack the United States.

61. Many of those who wrote to us with concerns about radiation hazards drew on an assumption that in due course an X-band radar would be built at Fylingdales (or elsewhere in the UK) and focussed their anxieties on the radiation emissions that they envisaged such a facility would generate. As we discussed above, there are no strong grounds for making such an assumption at this stage. Some of our contributors were also concerned, however, with radiation levels currently experienced at Fylingdales and how they might be made worse with the upgrade now in prospect.

62. We sent the MoD one of the submissions to the Committee, from Yorkshire CND,[69] which made specific observations on radiation levels. The MoD's detailed response[70] provides a strong defence of the safety of current emission levels (against standards set by the National Radiological Protection Board and others). Indeed, the Secretary of State had assured us that "the current position is that the radiation emissions from the radar are many times lower than the safe limits set by the relevant authorities, so there is no health risk".[71] As regards the potential for more harmful emissions after the upgrade, the MoD explained that "the radar will acquire an extra capability and mission which will be periodically tested, and used in the event of ballistic missile attack... The new missile defence capability will be exercised and used only very rarely. For the vast majority of the time the radar will continue to function exactly as before".[72] When the MoD puts foward the further information to the planning authorities noted at paragraph 66 below, it should state clearly what the consequences for radiation emissions will be when the upgraded capability is 'switched on'.

63. Many of those writing to us expressed a concern that Fylingdales (or the UK more generally) would present a more attractive target for those wishing to disable the site and 'blind' the US ability to employ its missile defence, or for those wishing to attack a symbol of the UK's close ties with the US. We raised this with the Secretary of State, who told us that—

I do not believe that any additional security measures are required specifically as a result of the recent upgrade, not least... because we do not judge that that makes Fylingdales at any greater risk than it is already.[73]

And subsequently, in the House, he stated that —

... The Fylingdales radar was designed during the Cold War, when we faced the threat of military assault from the Soviet Union. It is well within the capabilities of the system to withstand a lesser threat.[74]

64. Others who wrote to us objected to the continued operation of Fylingdales in a National Park, often raising issues of radiation emissions and security. The Council for National Parks highlighted concerns about use of the North York Moors National Park for missile defence purposes, and called for a full investigation into whether changes at Fylingdales should prompt a reassessment of its compatibility with the status and amenity objectives of the National Park.[75] We also received background material from the planning authority itself—the North Yorks Moors National Park Authority.[76] They have indicated that they are seeking clarification on the planning position in regard to the upgrade at Fylingdales, including the applicability of a government undertaking in 1987 (when the 'golf balls' were replaced by the current 'pyramid') that the structures would be removed when the station was "no longer required for its present purposes".[77]

65. We raised the concerns of the Council for National Parks with the MoD, and sought clarification about the planning issues involved. The MoD told us that the Government is not bound by planning law, but it has committed itself to behave as though it were.[78] The MoD does not consider that ' the question of development' arises in this case because "the proposal is unlikely to involve building works which materially affect the external appearance of the building, and the additional missile defence mission does not generate any material affects on the use of the site or its impact on the surrounding area". They elaborated that "the radar's essential role of providing surveillance of the upper atmosphere and space, and tracking objects, will continue as before, with no extra environmental impact whether related to traffic and activity levels, radio frequency emissions, or anything else".[79]

66. Nevertheless, the MoD told us that it intends to provide full supporting evidence to the planning authorities, based on further discussions with the US authorities and detailed site surveys, to substantiate the position that no 'development' is involved. The MoD therefore expects to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the local planning authorities that no need for formal planning consultation arises. It intends to have this evidence assembled within two to three months, in a form that the Planning Authority would be able to make public, to "assist in assuaging the 'uncertainties' that the Council for National Parks refer to".[80] We very much welcome this approach. Those who will need persuading that the local impact of the upgrade will not be significant extend beyond the planning authorities. It would seem that many of the concerns raised by various groups spring from a misplaced apprehension that the UK will inevitably field the full panoply of the Missile Defence system, and an exaggerated view of health hazards that might be caused by the proposed upgrade. But the MoD has not done as much as it could to present the full facts and explain carefully how such misgivings are misplaced. The MoD must now grasp this opportunity to clarify Fylingdales' role and its environmental impact.

The UK Preliminary Conclusion

67. We have already discussed the process by which the Secretary of State came to his preliminary conclusion that it must be right to agree to the US request. We found that process to be deeply unsatisfactory. But what of the conclusion itself? Is the Government right to agree to the US request?

68. There are many arguments that have been raised against missile defence. It is, at the very least, unproven. It remains unclear whether missiles have ever been successfully intercepted in combat.[81] Some elements of the technology in the US programme, X-band radars for example, raise serious questions in term of human health and electro-magnetic interference. It is very expensive. Precisely how expensive is disputed, but in February 2002 the MoD's then Director of Strategic Technologies, when pressed for a borad order-of-magnitude estimate, told us that for the UK, "assuming we have access to the information that Fylingdales provides and [the] upgrade had taken place and that we procured US ground based interceptors, five to ten billion [pounds]".[82] Some suggest that under certain circumstances it may have the potential to destabilise existing arms control and non-proliferation regimes.

69. Such arguments would all need to be weighed carefully before any decision was reached that the UK itself should acquire a missile defence system (which would most likely be as part of an international collaborative programme). But would any of these arguments justify the UK Government refusing a request from our closest ally for a technical upgrade to existing facilities, which will cost the UK nothing[83] but which for the US is a key element in a major defence programme? The Secretary of State in December 2002 stated that—

The Government would agree to ... a [US] request only if the security of the United Kingdom and the Alliance would ultimately be enhanced.[84]

In evidence to us he expanded on this by saying—

... the overwhelming reason [for agreeing] is... the consideration of the United Kingdom's security interests, and our relationship with the United States is obviously a vital part of that security interest.[85]

70. We do not have objections in principle to Missile Defence. We understand the concerns of the US Administration that they face a real threat not only of being actively targetted by 'rogue' states in possession of ballistic missiles, but also coerced or blackmailed by them. As Dr Stephen Pullinger put it—

The US does not want to enter into MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction] relationships with states of concern; it does not want to have its coercive options towards such states curtailed. Rather, it wants to be able to confront them militarily and to prevail without suffering significant casualties itself. The US is clearly worried that it might be deterred from pursuing its war aims as it would wish, or even of getting involved in a conflict at all, if it faces an adversary capable of landing a nuclear, chemical or biological warheads on its territory.[86]

71. We remain to be persuaded that missile defence is either practicable or affordable for the UK, an issue which we will examine in more detail in our forthcoming inquiry. But if the UK wishes to keep its options open, it clearly is in our interests to respond positively to the present request. Furthermore, we do not believe that the UK, or the Fylingdales area, would face any material additional risks from the upgrade, in terms either of health risks from radiation or an increased likelihood of potential attackers identifying Fylingdales as a target.

72. Agreement will leave open the door to further co-operation on missile defence, as indicated by the Secretary of State's parallel announcement of a new technical memorandum of understanding with the United States "that would give us full insight into the development of their Missile Defence programme and the opportunity for UK industry to reap the benefit of participation".[87] It preserves the possibility that in time the US programme may be extended to cover the UK.[88] We conclude therefore that the United Kingdom Government should agree to the US Government's request for the proposed upgrade to the facilities at RAF Fylingdales for missile defence purposes.

73. Agreement strengthens our relationship with the United States, and the importance of that relationship may indeed have been sufficient in itself to justify our agreement. Further steps down the path towards a UK missile defence capability, however, will require a more robust justification couched more directly in terms of our own national interest. Future upgrades will have to be judged on their merits at the time.

51   Q 278 Back

52   Q 284 Back

53   Q 250 Back

54   HC Deb 15 January 2003, Col 698 Back

55   Q 254 Back

56   Ev 90

57   Ev 90 Back

58   Q 64 Back

59   Q 253 Back

60   Q 254 Back

61   HC Deb 22 January 2003, Col 333 Back

62   Q 263 Back

63   Q 287 Back

64   Q 288 Back

65   Ev 80 Back

66   Ev 81 Back

67   Ev 123 Back

68   Missile Defence: a public discussion paper, MoD, December 2002 Back

69   Ev 90 Back

70   Ev 59 Back

71   Q 266 Back

72   Ev 59, para 6 Back

73   Q 273 Back

74   HC Deb 22 January 2003, col 330 Back

75   Ev 85 Back

76   They have resolved at this stage to submit background 'factual material' to us (not printed), rather than 'formal evidence'. Back

77   NYMNPA's papers include a letter giving that undertaking from Lord Belstead, then a minister at the Department of the Environment, to the Authority, dated 13 August 1987 Back

78   Ev 59, para 2 Back

79   Ev 59, para 4 Back

80   Ev 59. Back

81   Operation Desert Storm-Project Manager's Assessment of Patriot Missile's Overall Performance Is Not Supported GAO/T-NSIAD-92-97 Back

82   Q 103 Back

83   Q 279 Back

84   HC Deb, 9 December 2002, col 7 Back

85   Q 285 Back

86   Ev 74, para 15 Back

87   HC Deb, 15 January 2003, col 698 Back

88   Q 284 Back