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25 Feb 2003 : Column 126—continued
Mr. Iain Duncan Smith (Chingford and Woodford Green): I thank the Prime Minister for updating the House on the latest situation. The decisions that are taken over the next few weeks and months will, perhaps, determine the course of world events for years to come. Twelve years and 17 resolutions on, it is crucial that we understand exactly why we are pursuing the course that we are. Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who tortures and murders his own people and poses a threat to the safety and stability of the middle east. There are few people in Iraq or in the surrounding area who would at any stage mourn his passing. When Iraq's prisons are opened and the stories of persecution and repression can truly be told, many people inside and outside the House will wonder why we waited so long to take such action.
However, Saddam Hussein is not the only example of evil in our world. The difference is that he has the means, mentality and motive to reach beyond his own borders and pose a threat to the safety and security of many—crucially, to British people at home and abroad.
As we head towards the process outlined by the Prime Minister and tabled at the United Nations last night, several questions arise. The Prime Minister told the House on 15 January that the only way he would support military action without a second resolution would be if any country used an unreasonable veto. I assume that that is still the Prime Minister's position. For example, would a French veto at the Security Council constitute an unreasonable veto? What if there is no majority in the Security Council? Would that also be considered an unreasonable position?
France and Germany have today outlined a plan for dealing with Iraq, to which the Prime Minister referred, with a specific timetable for the inspectorate that would take us deep into July. The Prime Minister clearly said that he does not agree with them on the timetable or the plan. Could he specify exactly what timetable should exist as part of the draft resolution announced last night and tabled by Spain, the United States and the Government?
If Dr. Blix tells the Security Council on 7 March that Iraq is not complying with resolution 1441, will Britain and America push for an immediate vote on a second resolution—and will that constitute the timetable? This morning, the Foreign Secretary seemed not too clear about that matter. I hope that the Prime Minister will be able to clear it up.
Saddam Hussein is reported today as saying that he will not comply with his obligation to destroy his al-Samoud missiles. The Prime Minister made it clear in his statement that a failure by Iraq to do that would constitute a material breach of resolution 1441. However, if at the last moment Saddam Hussein destroys his missiles but still does not produce the evidence to show that the biological and chemical stockpiles that we know he had in 1998 have been destroyed, will the Prime Minister confirm that the destruction of the missiles is not enough to avoid a vote on the second resolution?
At this time, the thoughts of the whole House will be with our servicemen and women but they need to be assured of certain things. Will the Prime Minister assure the House that equipment failures alluded to by the National Audit Office and the shortage of personnel equipment reported have all been rectified and that our troops will have the very best equipment by the time they get into place? If military action takes place, it is vital that we are clear what may happen after that action concludes. My hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Mrs. Spelman) has consistently been critical of United Nations contingency planning for humanitarian relief in Iraq and the Government's part in that. Will the Prime Minister assure the House that all those shortcomings have been addressed and that mechanisms are now in place? Of perhaps most critical importance now is the need to understand what contingencies the Government have planned for a representative Government in Iraq. Have the Prime Minister and his US counterparts discussed that at any stage, and will he now give an indication of what those discussions have entailed? He rightly spoke about his plans for the middle east and the peace process. Can he now go further and give any specific details of his plans to bring those two sides together beyond what he said in his statement?
This issue is not about time, as the Prime Minister said, but about Saddam Hussein's attitude. There are many in the House who legitimately fear the consequences of military action in Iraq and therefore urge us not to take it. However, I put it to them that there is a greater fear—the failure to deal with Saddam Hussein now will lead to greater suffering, not just for the people of Iraq but for the whole world. We still believe that Saddam Hussein holds in his hands the power to pull his country and his people back from the brink of war, which any soldier will tell you, must always be the last resort. This is a crucial test, not just for the UK or the USA, but for the United Nations. For the sake of the United Nations and the peace of the world, such a tyrant must be left in no doubt that if he does not disarm after years of terror and evasion, he must finally face the consequences of his actions.
The Prime Minister: First, I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his support for the Government's
general approach. He talked about the circumstances in which countries might use their veto—I am still hopeful that that will not be the case. I reject the timetable set out by France and Germany for the reasons that I gave. I do not think that it deals with the central point—whether Saddam is willing to co-operate fully. As for our own timetable, it is obviously open, but we have already said that this has to be resolved within weeks, not months. The coming report of Dr. Blix will evidently be extremely important in that, but the precise moment at which we put the second resolution in the UN to a vote is something that we are discussing with key allies.To deal simply with the issue of Army equipment, about which there are many stories, I should say that those stories are categorically denied both by people in the military and ourselves. I urge people not to take everything that they read at face value. I very much hope that people understand that not only are our armed forces among the finest in the word but they are also among the best equipped. The best testament to that comes from members of the armed forces themselves.
In relation to humanitarian considerations and what type of Government might succeed the Government of Saddam, again that is something that we are discussing closely with allies and the UN. I should like to emphasise that in my view if it comes to conflict, the UN's role in the resulting humanitarian situation and in finding the right way through for Iraq will be immensely important, so we will continue to work with allies, even if there are differences on the military side of things, to find the right answers to those questions.
Finally, on the middle east peace process, I very much hope that we will be in a position to announce further steps on that in the not too distant future. It is tremendously important in its own terms, but it is also obviously important in the broader context of giving a very clear statement to the Arab and Muslim world that we approach these issues in an even-handed and just way. There is nothing more important but that they understand that, and our commitment to taking that process forward remains absolute.
Mr. Charles Kennedy (Ross, Skye and Inverness, West): Given that there is unanimous agreement in the House about supporting the United Nations in its efforts to rid Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction, and that the best route for doing so is the UN-authorised weapons inspectorate, will the Prime Minister amplify his opening remarks, as there will be considerable anxiety in this country and others that in tabling what could be construed as a pre-emptive draft resolution, Britain is in fact undermining the very work of the weapons inspectors? Given Dr. Blix's explicit statement that he feels that the inspectors are meeting with a degree of success but that more time is required, should not we as a country subscribe to that view rather than conducting ourselves as we are?
Why is the Prime Minister so fundamentally hostile to the memorandum that the French and others have now tabled? Should we not respond more positively? Would that not offer a better way forward? On several occasions, senior military opinion in this country has been publicly expressed to the effect that the best route for disarmament is the location, detection and dismantling of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by the weapons inspectors themselves. Is that not preferable to a precipitate war?
Is the essence of what the Prime Minister has told us today that there are now no circumstances in which, if the Americans decide to take action against Iraq, Britain will not be there in support? Is that not the fact of the matter, whether it is UN-authorised or not?
As for the conflict itself, which seems increasingly inevitable, will the Prime Minister clarify an issue that he has not chosen to clarify thus far? What will be the operational military chain of command? Will British forces that this House of Commons will ask to go into battle in our name be under an American chain of command? I think that those forces and the House have a right to know the answer.
Finally, what post-war scenario do the Government envisage? Would they prefer a United States-administered post-conflict Iraq or some form of UN protectorate? What will our contribution be in such circumstances?
The fundamental anxiety felt by many in this country is that the argument has shifted from regime change last summer, through the UN route—which we strongly support—to the Prime Minister's most recent utterances about the overwhelming moral case for this action. When the argument keeps shifting like that, there can be little doubt, and every reason for people in this country to remain highly sceptical about the wisdom of the current approach.
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