

House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts

**DEPARTMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT:
PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT—HELPING
TO REDUCE WORLD
POVERTY**

Forty-eighth Report of Session 2001–02

*Report, together with
Proceedings of the Committee,
Minutes of Evidence and an Appendix*

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Committee of Public Accounts

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Footnotes

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FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT

The Committee of Public Accounts has agreed to the following Report:

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT—HELPING TO REDUCE WORLD POVERTY

INTRODUCTION AND LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Eliminating poverty is one of the greatest challenges facing the world. With over 1 billion people having to survive on less than \$1 a day, the aid they receive must be well spent. Knowing what is effective in reducing poverty; understanding the conditions which help aid to succeed; setting appropriate targets which motivate those involved in development; and being able to identify progress or the lack of it are therefore important factors in the fight against poverty.

2. The Department for International Development (the Department) lead the United Kingdom's contribution to global efforts to tackle world poverty. Under internationally agreed targets, the aim is to halve by the year 2015 the number of people living in extreme poverty. The Department provide aid in two main ways: bilateral programmes undertaken directly with individual countries and multilateral programmes run by organisations such as the European Union and the World Bank. In 2000–01, the Department spent £1.4 billion (50 per cent of their total expenditure of £2.8 billion) on bilateral aid and £1.3 billion (46 per cent) on multilateral aid.¹

3. The Department are recognised by their peers and by developing nations as having a leading role in international development. At the same time they face challenges common to all international development organisations, particularly the numerous factors that can influence development results, and the difficulty of measuring achievements.² Against this background and, on the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General,³ we examined how successful the Department have been in meeting their objectives. As a result of this examination we make five main points:

- **The Department should provide aid in ways, and in countries, which reflect more closely research on aid effectiveness.** Countries with large numbers of very poor people and governments committed to poverty reduction benefit most from external aid. In addition, aid provided to support poor countries' own strategies for tackling poverty, and integrated with their governments' budgets has a more sustainable effect than supporting stand-alone projects. The Department have made progress in targeting their bilateral aid on the poorest countries, with increasing use of 'budget support'. But in 2000–01, 22 per cent of the Department's bilateral aid went to countries which, although they contained pockets of severe deprivation, were not poor countries overall and where aid could indirectly subsidise non-development activities.
- **The Department cannot ensure that the aid they provide through multilateral organisations is best applied to reduce poverty.** In 2000–01, the Department provided £1.3 billion (46 per cent of their total aid budget) to organisations such as the European Union and the World Bank. But the Department have little direct control over how multilateral development organisations use these funds. The Department aim to influence how and where these organisations provide aid, but

¹ C&AG's Report, para 1.7

² *ibid*, paras 4, 3.36–3.37; Qs 139, 172

³ C&AG's Report, *Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to Reduce World Poverty* (HC 739, Session 2001–02)

they have not yet succeeded in achieving their target of increasing the proportion of European Union aid which goes to poor countries.

- **The Department need to adopt performance targets against which they can measure their performance in reducing poverty.** The Department operational staff have had either little knowledge of the Department's first two Public Service Agreements and associated priority performance targets or did not see them as key influence on their work. The short timescale of the targets has not fitted well with the slower emergence of evidence for development results. And targets have not been well structured to offer a balanced coverage of the countries and activities which the Department support. The next set of targets needs to take account of the way the Department manages their operations.
- **When planning their country programmes the Department do not quantify the poverty reduction they expect to achieve, and so cannot be certain that aid resources are being used cost-effectively.** Programmes for helping to reduce poverty in individual countries are the main way in which the Department commit their bilateral aid. But the Department's country plans have lacked targets against which to measure progress; and have not identified the links between the resources allocated and the contribution they will make to reducing poverty.
- **The Department should give greater attention to evidence of poor governance and its effect on the aid they provide.** The Department have carried out a number of governance assessments in recent years on individual countries. But they have not systematically assessed the quality of governance when drawing up plans for each of the countries in which they provide aid. The Department need to take a broad view of evidence on the quality of governance arising from all sources, including that relating to other donors' programmes or from local press reports or court proceedings.

4. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations are as follows:

Aid needs to be provided in ways which are most effective in reducing poverty

- (i) The European Union does not make poverty reduction a priority when choosing which countries to aid, but in 2000–01 it received 55 per cent of the Department's £1.3 billion multilateral aid budget; a level of funding which is largely outside the Department's control. As a result, only 38 per cent of European Union aid went to poor countries in 2001 compared with 50 per cent in 1998 and the target of 55 per cent which the Department have been urging the European Union to achieve by 2002. This significant slippage threatens to undermine the effectiveness in reducing poverty of more than half of the Department's multilateral aid budget. We endorse the Department's commitment to work with the Foreign Office, the Treasury, other Member States and the international aid community to change European Union policy on aid to ensure that the United Kingdom's contributions are used as effectively as possible to reduce poverty.
- (ii) Only 2 out of 23 key targets in the Department's current Public Service Agreement address directly the effectiveness of their multilateral aid. Moreover, the strategies the Department have adopted towards individual multilateral organisations do not establish performance indicators to measure those organisations' effectiveness. In order to clarify their reasons for channelling aid through agencies beyond their direct control, whose main objective may not be poverty reduction, the Department need to identify indicators by which they can assess the poverty reduction performance of these organisations, as well as measures designed to show whether the Department are having the desired influence on the policies and practices of these organisations.

- (iii) The Department provide aid to countries which are not poor but which contain pockets of severe deprivation. These countries could do more to support their own poor if they chose to, and there is a risk that they could use external aid in order to free resources to fund non-developmental activities. The Department need to demonstrate that they have properly assessed the relative merits of such aid against competing demands from poorer countries.

The Department need targets which promote cost-effective aid and give a fair view of their performance

- (iv) The Department, like all other main government departments, are required to set out their aims, objectives and targets in a Public Service Agreement against which performance is monitored. The Department's Agreement is built around helping to eliminate poverty in the poorest countries. They need these targets to provide a sharp focus on their priorities. But the current three-year targets do not sit well with the longer periods needed for development results to emerge, and provide only limited coverage of the range of the Department's activities or countries aided. The Department would rightly prefer their next Public Service Agreement to have a longer time frame and be more closely tailored to pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.
- (v) Performance against many of the Department's Public Service Agreement targets reflects not only the Department's work, but also the work of other donors and global economic factors. The Department consider that it is possible to establish plausible associations between their work and changes in the levels of poverty over time. It is difficult to isolate the Department's performance in reducing levels of poverty, however, and sometimes such associations are tenuous or difficult to make. The new target regime needs to be supported by a clear definition of the arrangements for monitoring progress towards them, and for deriving a fair and balanced view of the Department's contribution.
- (vi) The Department's ability to provide a reliable view of their performance has been constrained by the poor quality of data they have had to use to measure progress against their Public Service Agreement targets. They are working, both internationally and within individual countries, to address the poor state of statistical systems in many poor countries. When designing quantitative targets for their next Public Service Agreement, the Department should confirm that targets will be supported by data of sufficient quality and timeliness before those targets are formally adopted.
- (vii) The Department are failing to make the most of their evaluation studies to influence the design of aid projects and programmes because at project level, the results have not become available in time and few formal evaluations have related to country programmes. The Department plan to make their evaluations more relevant and timely. They need to evaluate their country programmes as a whole, and ensure that the results can inform reviews of spending and aid strategy. Where possible, the Department should undertake joint evaluations with other major donors to those countries.

The Department need to improve how they assess the prospects of reducing poverty

- (viii) The planning of aid programmes for individual countries is the Department's main tool for choosing where and how to provide aid. But the resulting country strategies have often been insufficiently precise to inform decisions on the ground, and have not usually contained quantified poverty reduction targets. So the Department have not been able to analyse the degree of poverty reduction which could be expected to result from the resources they were planning to

commit in a particular country. Future country planning needs to address these issues if it is to provide a proper basis for decisions on the use of aid resources – between countries as well as within them – and to secure the greatest possible reduction in poverty.

- (ix) A poor country can receive aid from more than 100 different donor organisations. Many poor countries do not have the administrative resources to deal with a large number of donors. Subject to an appropriate quality of governance, the Department have increasingly used budget support as a means of giving aid, which reduces administrative burdens and promotes national ownership of development programmes. They should also seek other ways of reducing the burden on developing countries, such as sharing expert personnel between donors.

THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD PROVIDE AID WHERE AND HOW IT CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN REDUCING POVERTY

5. The approach of donor countries to the provision of aid has changed over the last 20 years. Strong state-domination was replaced in the 1980s by a more market-orientated view, while in the 1990s some state involvement was considered essential if aid was to be effective. Recent research has concluded that monetary aid is most effective when allocated to the poorest countries, especially those with governments which support poverty reduction. Over the last ten years, donors have also realised the importance of supporting countries' own strategies for reducing poverty rather than imposing their own—a focus on providing what a country needs rather than on what donors can readily deliver.⁴


6. Figure 1 shows that the Department provide substantial funding to a number of multilateral organisations. Such funding is not always at the Department's discretion. Most of the Department's funding to the European Union, for example, is based on budgeted costs for the Union's aid programme, which are decided by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The Department do not have direct control over the use of multilateral aid.⁵ They told us that they have tried instead to influence how multilateral organisations worked but with mixed success. They have fared much better with the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme, with whom they have worked to help redesign the organisations' poverty reduction strategies, than they have with the European Union.⁶

⁴ C&AG's Report, para 2.14; Q148

⁵ C&AG's Report, para 4.9; Ev 24; Qs 3, 101, 159–163

⁶ Q2

Figure 1: The Department's contributions to multilateral development institutions, 2000–01 (total £1.3 billion)



Source: National Audit Office (2002), *Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to Reduce World Poverty* (HC 739, Session 2001–02), Figure 14.

7. The Department have a target to increase the proportion of European Union aid going to poor countries from 50 per cent in 1998 to 55 per cent in 2002. By the end of 2001, however, the proportion of Union aid going to poor countries had slipped to 38 per cent, with the remainder going to middle-income countries such as in North Africa, Latin America and parts of Eastern Europe. The slippage occurred because many Member States believe that aid should support foreign policy interests as well as poverty reduction, hence the greater focus on middle-income countries. The Department are actively involved with the Foreign Office and the Treasury in building up support from Member States who share the United Kingdom view that the prime purpose of aid is to reduce poverty, including working with the Foreign Office and the Treasury during their own negotiations in the European Union. The Department have also worked to promote this view of aid through other influential international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.⁷

8. While the Department recognise the importance of multilateral aid, they cannot easily measure the effectiveness of the funding they provide to multilateral agencies. Although 46 per cent of DfID's aid budget goes on multilateral aid, only two of 23 key performance targets are focused on measuring how well such aid is used. The Department told us that the predominance of targets focused on bilateral aid was a reflection of the need to get the right balance between targeting activities over which they had direct control and targeting the funding where they had to rely instead on influencing performance.⁸ To underpin their funding of multilateral aid, the Department have developed strategies for influencing these international organisations and helping to improve their effectiveness. These strategies have included seconding staff from the Department to work within these organisations and building coalitions of support for the direction the Department wanted them to take. But

⁷ C&AG's Report, Figure 8; Qs 5, 47, 50–51, 53, 123–129

⁸ Q3

the strategies have lacked any detailed performance measures or targets with which to measure the Department's success in achieving their objectives.⁹

9. Despite promoting aid to poor countries as the most effective means of reducing poverty, nearly a quarter of the Department's bilateral aid (£233 million) was given to better off countries in 2000–01.¹⁰ The Department explained that although such 'middle-income' nations could not be described as poor, they did contain pockets of severe deprivation. These countries, however, often have substantial non-development public sector budgets, which creates a risk that aid from the Department and other donors could indirectly subsidise non-development related expenditure. The Department seek to mitigate this risk by concentrating their aid in parts of such countries where poverty is most severe; working with partners running programmes which are targeted at reducing poverty; and discussing the composition of governments' own public expenditure to try and achieve a greater focus on poverty reduction. The Department's main achievement in these countries is through influencing the attitudes of governments, leading to changes in such areas as economic policy, which can create far-reaching benefits for the poor.¹¹

10. In 2000–01, the Department provided aid directly to more than 140 countries but managed the programmes themselves in only about 60. The amount of bilateral aid provided to many countries is small, with over 100 countries receiving less than 10 per cent of the Department's total. This breadth of coverage brings with it a danger of dissipating aid effort and generating high administration costs. The Department agreed that they needed to focus on a smaller number of countries where their aid could make a real impact. They have therefore chosen a small group of countries around which to focus targets on improving the effectiveness of education and health care assistance.¹² Where the Department do not manage the programme, aid is often provided via non-governmental organisations, such as aid charities, which received a total of £184 million from the department in 2000–01. The Department have largely pulled out of some parts of the world, such as the Pacific region, where their programmes were very small with high administration costs; and where other donors already had much larger programmes in the area.¹³

11. The Department recognise the need to control their administrative costs, some £77 million in 2000–01.¹⁴ They are doing more to support government budgets rather than discrete projects, which tend to be extremely costly in administrative terms. They have also established agreements with some of the larger non-governmental organisations with the aim of reducing their overhead costs. Under these arrangements the organisations have received funds without the Department continually checking their use of the money, once their controls on expenditure have been assessed.¹⁵

THE DEPARTMENT NEED TARGETS WHICH PROMOTE COST-EFFECTIVE AID AND GIVE A FAIR VIEW OF THEIR PERFORMANCE

12. Like all main government departments, the Department set out their aims, objectives and performance targets in a Public Service Agreement; they have published two so far covering the periods 1999–02 and 2001–04. The Agreements are associated with the resources given to each department to achieve their targets. The central aim of the

⁹ C&AG's Report, paras 2.23, 2.26; Q2

¹⁰ C&AG's Report, para 2.19; Q32

¹¹ Qs 58, 135–137, 184

¹² C&AG's Report, para 4.25; Q32

¹³ DfID (2001), *Statistics on International Development 1996/97 – 2000/01* (Figure 14); Qs 32, 105, 107

¹⁴ DfID, *Departmental Report 2002: The Government's Expenditure Plans 2002–03 to 2003–04*, Cm 5414 (Table 6, p108)

¹⁵ Qs 36–39

Department's Public Service Agreements is the elimination of poverty in the poorest countries.¹⁶

13. The Department believe their Public Service Agreements targets have provided a sharper focus to what they hope to achieve.¹⁷ But, in many respects, these targets are unsuited to measuring performance in the development field. The achievement of an input target such as the level of bilateral aid the Department provide to poor countries, is within the Department's direct control. But meeting other targets, such as improving education and health are not. Achievement of poverty reduction targets depends on the efforts of all donors, and the developing nation, as well as the Department. Poverty trends are also susceptible to the effects of economic, social and political factors. This variety of important influences on poverty reduction makes it virtually impossible to isolate how much of any progress achieved is due to the Department's own efforts. The Department accepted that they could not always establish how much poverty reduction in a given country was due to their aid, and that the proportion of targets over which they did not have direct control had increased with their current Agreement. But they considered that in some cases it was possible to establish a link to changes in the level of poverty on the ground, even if it was due to the collective efforts of all donors.¹⁸

14. The problems of identifying the Department's contribution to reducing poverty emphasise the importance of evaluation studies to determine what has worked and what has not. The Department spend about £2 million a year on formal evaluations of the effectiveness of projects and programmes. But their operational staff have taken little notice of the results because they have been produced too late. The lack of timely evaluation has forced country teams to turn to their own informal networks and contacts for information in order to help them operate in the field. The Department considered that there had been an unhappy separation between evaluation and country teams, who needed to work more closely together when monitoring the results of projects and programmes to generate lessons quickly enough to have an influence on future practice. Little evaluation takes place at the country level either, making it harder to identify the extent of the Department's contribution to changes in the level of poverty, even as part of a collective effort with other donors.¹⁹

15. The three year time scale of the Agreements also makes them unsuitable for managing the Department's progress in contributing to poverty reduction because it does not fit well with the longer time scales needed for the effect of aid to show. At the time of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report the Department were negotiating with the Treasury to include five-yearly targets in their next Public Service Agreement for the period 2003–06. This would allow decisions taken during the lifetime of a target to influence the performance achieved at the end of the target period. The Department's targets would also become clearer staging posts on the way to helping to achieving the longer term Millennium Development Goals.²⁰

16. These weaknesses have meant that the Public Service Agreements have failed to capture the imagination of the Department's staff. Figure 2 illustrates some of their comments to the National Audit Office about the Agreements, which in practice have not been key factors in performance management in the Department. The Department did not, however, see these Agreements as irrelevant but recognised that a much clearer link was needed between them and the work of individual members of staff if they were to fulfil their purpose effectively. The Department are planning to explain their next Public Service

¹⁶ C&AG's Report, paras 2.2–2.3; Q11

¹⁷ Q41

¹⁸ Qs 34, 42, 48–49, 95–96, 118–121

¹⁹ Qs 12–13, 149–157

²⁰ Qs 48, 84, 111, 117

Agreement to staff so that they understand its relevance and how it supports achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The structure of the Agreement for 2003–06, with targets focused on different regions, is intended to increase the relevance of particular targets to country teams. The Department are also emphasising the need for their senior managers to review country plans against new guidance to ensure that they have clear links to the Public Service Agreement.²¹

Figure 2: Comments made by Department for International Development staff on the importance of the Public Service Agreements

"The PSA is irrelevant – the PSA is meant to reflect [the International Development Targets], so people don't think about the PSA"

"The PSAs are a bit remote to people working on the ground, whereas [the International Development Targets] are less time bound and more realistic"

"I would say the PSA was the least known document in DfID"

Source: National Audit Office (2002), *Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to Reduce World Poverty* (HC 739, Session 2001–02); extracts from Figure 24.

17. The biggest problem the Department face in trying to measure how far they have met their Public Service Agreement targets is the poor quality of data they have to use. The Department rely largely on data provided by international organisations such as the World Bank, who in turn depend on information provided by countries receiving aid. Data produced by many of these countries are often late, unreliable and patchy. These problems have been severe enough for the Department to drop targets relating to maternal mortality, economic growth and increasing the prosperity of the poorest from their 2001–04 Public Service Agreement.²²

18. But it would weaken even further the Department's ability to focus their aid where it is most effective if they stopped trying to measure changes in poverty because of data problems. The Department are, therefore, supporting international initiatives such as the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century. They are also funding projects aimed at improving the statistical capacity and capability in specific poor countries where they are one of the larger donors. The success of these initiatives will have implications for the types of targets the Department should include in future Public Service Agreements so that they make the most of improvements in the quality of underlying data.²³

THE DEPARTMENT NEED TO IMPROVE THEIR PLANNING FOR POVERTY REDUCTION IN INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

19. Global targets for poverty reduction must be translated into specific aid programmes in individual countries. Figure 3 illustrates the links between key documents in preparing a country programme. But despite the importance of country planning, the country strategies the Department use do not contain quantified poverty reduction targets. As a result, the Department cannot assess the extent to which poverty will be reduced as a result of the aid they provide, nor can they establish a link between the resources they intend to commit and the reduction in poverty they can achieve.²⁴


²¹ C&AG's Report, paras 3.23–3.25; Qs 6, 81–87, 178

²² C&AG's Report, paras 4.33–4.34; Qs 7, 9, 43–44, 46

²³ C&AG's Report, paras 4.35–4.36; Q16

²⁴ C&AG's Report, paras 3.2–3.13; Qs 10, 145

Figure 3: The different levels of planning within the Department



20. Performance objectives have been set more clearly for individual aid projects. But identifying the overall impact of a number of different projects is not straightforward. In the past the Department had found that individual projects had been very successful but their success had not translated into a noticeable reduction in poverty at the country level.²⁵

21. The prospects of reducing poverty in a particular country are heavily dependent on the quality of governance. There is little point in providing aid to countries where corruption is so pervasive that the aid would be wasted.²⁶ What represents 'good governance' however, is not straightforward. The Department have identified seven key capabilities they consider necessary for a system of governance in a recipient country to support poverty reduction. But there is no universal agreement as to how to measure 'good governance'. Attempts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to identify a representative set of indicators, which would be able to measure change over time, failed because developing countries would not accept data collected by private organisations, and other data available from international organisations were not of sufficient quality. The World Bank is carrying out further work, partly funded by the Department, to identify governance indicators, which will meet these requirements.²⁷

22. The Department need to know the state of governance in a country if they are to identify whether the situation is improving or deteriorating. The evidence about governance needs to be broadly based. External aid can be spent on development activities but release domestic funds for non-developmental purposes. In addition, the effectiveness of aid provided through multilateral channels can be as adversely affected by poor governance as bilateral aid. The Department told us that of the six billion euros the

²⁵ Qs 22, 145, 158

²⁶ C&AG's Report, paras 3.28-3.35; Q14

²⁷ C&AG's Report, Figure 26; Ev 24; Qs 166-169

European Union spends annually on international development, about 15 million euros was possibly lost through fraud, of which the United Kingdom's share was two million euros. But governance assessments have not been a regular part of how the Department plan their future aid programmes in individual countries. The Department explained that their approach to assessing governance depended on the extent to which they consider a government is committed to reform and to improving governance. Countries which have established formal strategies for reducing poverty, including an assessment of governance, do not need a separate assessment by the Department. Other countries, which have not established such strategies, will need to have their governance reviewed.²⁸ The Department have recently issued new guidance on country planning which emphasises the importance of governance in identifying the size, shape and form of aid programmes in individual countries.²⁹

23. When the Department have come to a view on the quality of governance, there is a range of possible responses. If corruption is endemic with little commitment to tackling it, DfID take extreme care in how they provide aid. They may stop using government channels; restrict aid to regions where corruption is less of a problem or where there is a commitment to change; or provide aid only through non-governmental organisations. The Department actively support governments which tackle problems of corruption.³⁰

24. The Department emphasised the importance they place on governance including evaluations of public financial management and audit systems, and of the government's commitment to improve them. They expect to have the necessary safeguards on the ground to make sure that aid will not be wasted because of poor governance, including evaluations of public financial management and audit systems, and of the government's commitment to improve them. Where risks remain, the Department assess whether the benefits for the poor of working with the government outweigh those risks; and aim to identify how they can manage the risks to minimise their impact.³¹ The Department could not provide an estimate of the scale of corruption in developing countries and they did not consider that estimates produced by other organisations were wholly reliable. The Department were confident, on the basis of checks carried out by their own Internal Audit, that all the aid they provided was well spent, and was not being wasted as a result of poor governance in countries receiving support.³² We believe that avoidable corruption and bad governance is the key promoter of poverty. We would like it to be addressed as a top priority in our aid programme.

25. The quality of governance is just one aspect of assessing the risks faced by DfID's country programmes. The Department have routinely carried out risk assessments for individual projects but they have not done so for the risks that their entire aid programme in a particular country could be jeopardised by natural catastrophes, conflict or political upheaval. The Department are introducing new guidance on planning country aid programmes to address these issues. In addition, with the next Public Service Agreement, the risks of not achieving particular targets will also have to be identified.³³

26. When planning and implementing their country aid programmes, the Department have to take account of the fact that they are not working in isolation. As many as a 100 different donor governments, international development organisations and aid charities can be operating in a single country; as well as the government of the country itself. This level of interest can be counter-productive, creating administrative burdens on the government

²⁸ Ev 24; Qs 14–15, 164

²⁹ Qs 143–144

³⁰ Qs 28, 56, 58–59

³¹ Qs 134, 181

³² Qs 68–70, 131, 182–183

³³ Q146

of the country receiving aid, which may be unable to deal with a large number of donors. It can also lead to duplicated or wasted effort if donors do not co-ordinate their programmes. And projects and programmes which have been designed without regard to the needs of the government's own poverty reduction strategy will be less sustainable and less effective in contributing to that strategy.³⁴

27. The Department are increasingly taking steps to reduce the burden on the countries where they are involved, and to increase the overall effect of the collective aid effort of all donors and development organisations. The Department are working to support governments' own strategies for reducing poverty, rather than imposing their own; and making increased use of budget support, which is less costly in administrative terms than individual projects. The Department are also seeking to establish common frameworks for expenditure controls which all donors in a particular country will rely on to try and reduce the administrative pressure on the government receiving aid.³⁵

³⁴ Q108

³⁵ Qs 36, 108

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

SESSION 2001–02

WEDNESDAY 24 APRIL 2002

Members present:

Mr Edward Leigh, in the Chair

Mr Richard Bacon
Geraint Davies
Mr Barry Gardiner
Mr Nick Gibb
Mr Brian Jenkins

Mr George Osborne
Mr David Rendel
Mr Gerry Steinberg
Jon Trickett

Mr Tim Burr, Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General, was further examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Mr Rob Molan, Second Treasury Officer of Accounts, was further examined.

The Comptroller and Auditor General's Report on Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to reduce world poverty (HC 739) was considered.

Mr Suma Chakrabarti, Permanent Secretary, and Mr Mark Lowcock, Director, Finance and Development Policy, Department for International Development, were examined (HC 793-i).

Mr David Rendel declared a non-pecuniary interest in that he is a member of the Council of Voluntary Services Overseas.

The witnesses were further examined.

The witnesses withdrew.

The Committee further deliberated.

Resolved, That the provisions of paragraph 1(a) of Standing Order No. 137A (Select Committees: power to work with other committees) be applied to the transcript of evidence taken before the Committee this day, in respect of the International Development Committee.—(The Chairman).

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[Adjourned until Monday 29 April at Four o'clock.

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WEDNESDAY 3 JULY 2002

Members present:

Mr Edward Leigh, in the Chair

Mr Richard Bacon	Mr Nigel Jones
Mr Ian Davidson	Mr George Osborne
Geraint Davies	Mr David Rendel
Mr George Howarth	Mr Gerry Steinberg
Mr Brian Jenkins	Mr Alan Williams

Mr Tim Burr, Deputy Comptroller and Auditor General, was further examined.

The Committee deliberated.

Mr Rob Molan, Second Treasury Officer of Accounts, was further examined.

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Draft Report (Department for International Development: Performance Management – Helping to reduce World Poverty), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 3 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 4 postponed.

Paragraphs 5 to 27 read and agreed to.

Postponed paragraph 4 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Forty-eighth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select Committees (Reports)) be applied to the Report.

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[Adjourned until Wednesday 17 July at Four o'clock.

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