INTRODUCTION AND LIST OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The radio spectrum is a range of radio frequencies used to deliver services such as radio, radar, and mobile telephones. It is a finite resource of great and growing economic importance. The Radiocommunications Agency (the Agency) are an Executive Agency of the Department of Trade and Industry and manage the civil radio spectrum throughout the UK by issuing licences to mobile telephone operators and other users of radio.[1]

2. In April 2000 the Radiocommunications Agency raised £22.5 billion from an auction of five licences for radio spectrum to support the third generation of mobile telephones (3G). The first generation of mobile phones provided simple voice telephony, while the second provides additional data facilities such as messaging services. The third generation of mobile phones is expected to offer full interactive capabilities for voice, video or data transmission. In designing the auction the Agency worked in consultation with the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), which maintains and promotes effective competition in telecommunications markets.[2]

3. On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General we examined how the Agency conducted the auction, the consequences of the very high proceeds for the industry and how the Agency will balance the interests of industry, consumers and the environment.[3] We underline two main points:

• There is a risk that the amount raised—the biggest single transfer of funds from the private to the public sector from any initiative - could slow the successful development of the industry and limit the extent of competition. The Agency and Oftel will need to look seriously at the scope for containing the industry's costs, for example through allowing operators to share networks or trade spectrum where this is consistent with consumers' interests.

• As a scarce and valuable resource, it is important that spectrum is used efficiently. We recommend that the Agency review the utilisation of spectrum with the parties concerned, with a view to identifying means of improving utilisation and releasing any surplus for more beneficial uses.

4. Our specific conclusions and recommendations are as follows.

On how the Agency conducted the auction

  (i)  The Agency succeeded in stimulating interest from a large number of potential new entrants and the auction design worked well even with much higher than expected proceeds. They were also able to bring a new competitor into the mobile telephone market (paragraph 18).


  (ii)  There are a number of factors, for example the expected number of bidders, which help to determine the right type of auction to use. The Agency took expert advice which underpinned their choice of a successful model. Other public bodies considering auctions should also make use of the best available advice in carrying out analyses of the suitability of different auction designs (paragraph 19).


  (iii)  Shortly after the auction Hutchison and two partners bought out TIW, the new entrant, in a transaction which valued the licence at £1.7 billion more than TIW had paid for it. The Agency said that they had no evidence to indicate that, at the time of the auction, Hutchison had arranged to take over TIW, which would have been contrary to the auction rules and grounds for forfeiture of TIW's licence and deposit. Hutchison had informed them only of an arrangement to take TIW's capacity. We note that the Agency had sought undertakings and had received assurances that the agreement did not breach the rules of the auction (paragraph 20).


  (iv)  The Agency should in future auctions consider the possibility of including clawback provisions so as to be able to share in windfall gains of the sort achieved by TIW in this case (paragraph 21).

On the consequences of the high proceeds for the industry

  (v)  The Agency conceded that they had performed no risk assessment based on such high proceeds and said that observers had also been astonished by the outcome. Risk assessments on similar exercises in the future should model the possibility of a wide range of outcomes (paragraph 31).


  (vi)  The Agency expect shareholders rather than consumers to bear the high licence costs, because competition will determine prices in the market as firms seek to build up their business volumes. The Agency and Oftel should develop contingency plans so as to be able to take prompt action if, contrary to their expectations, the market is not fully competitive to the detriment of consumers (paragraph 32).


  (vii)  There may yet be further mergers or take-overs between the five licensees. It will remain important to ensure a competitive market if consumers are not to be left with an excessive share of the high costs incurred by the companies (paragraph 33).

On balancing the interests of the companies, consumers and the environment

  (viii)  Environmental concerns about the siting of masts can conflict with the need for improved access to services. As well as taking into account local issues, the planning authorities need to consider fully the potential commercial and economic benefits of the development of 3G services. The Government should ensure that local planning authorities have the guidance necessary to achieve a satisfactory balance (paragraph 43).


  (ix)  The Agency acknowledged that, in the meantime, many rural areas will be disadvantaged by continued lack of access to 3G and broadband services, such as high capacity data transfer and video conferencing. They nevertheless doubted whether licensees could be required to invest in rural areas if it did not make commercial sense. The Agency and Oftel should facilitate the sharing of infrastructure to assist access to 3G and broadband services in rural areas (paragraph 44).


  (x)  The Agency had worked with the European Commission to remove the unintended prohibition on the trading of radio spectrum, and hoped that new provisions for trading would be implemented in this country through the Communications Bill in 2002. The Government should make provision for spectrum trading in the Bill so that spectrum can find the most advantageous uses (paragraph 45).


  (xi)  The Agency should assess the case for a levy on net gains from spectrum trades as recommended in Professor Martin Cave's report on radio spectrum management published in March 2002 (paragraph 46).


  (xii)  The defence and emergency services take up 28 per cent of the spectrum compared to the seven per cent sold for 3G mobile phone services. The Ministry of Defence should invest in a comprehensive audit of their use of spectrum, periodically updating the data and sharing it with the Agency, as recommended in Professor Martin Cave's report. The Agency should review the allocation of spectrum and propose action to secure an optimal distribution among existing and potential users (paragraph 47).

HOW THE AGENCY CONDUCTED THE AUCTION

5. The Agency decided to allocate the 3G licences through an auction because it would promote competition and lead to spectrum being allocated to the mobile phone operators who valued it most and who would be incentivised to roll out services as quickly as possible to achieve returns for shareholders. Raising greater proceeds than in previous allocations of spectrum was a subsidiary objective.[4]

The design of the auction

6. The auction raised far more than anyone had expected. There had been no previous such auction and the Agency were unable to obtain valuations from the industry. The Agency's advisers made an initial estimate of proceeds of £1.5 billion in April 1999, which they updated to between £1 billion and £3 billion in January 2000 after 13 applications to bid had been received. Outside commentators also underestimated the proceeds possible. The highest external estimate, published after the commencement of the auction, was £6 billion.[5] The Agency said that they had been more interested in getting a vigorous market than in maximising proceeds. They had been surprised at the amounts bid but were pleased to have devised an auction that performed well in a situation which was novel to them and to bidders and where the proceeds were very much higher than expected (Figure 1).[6]

Figure 1: Price paid per licence and the overall estimate of proceeds pre-auction

Source: Comptroller and Auditor General's Report (HC 233, Session 2001-02, Figure 6)

7. The Agency had attached priority to stimulating interest from potential new entrants, linking the remuneration of their financial advisers to the number of bidders participating in the auction. At the time of the auction there were four incumbent mobile phone operators. The Agency decided to auction five licences, the largest of which was set aside for a new entrant to the market. They also ensured that a new entrant would be able to use an incumbent's existing network for a period while it built its own. These factors were crucial in getting strong competition for the licences from thirteen bidders.[7]

8. In the Netherlands the auction design was close to that of the UK and five licences were also offered. There were, however, already five incumbent operators who bid in association with potential new entrants to the market, resulting in only six bidders and much lower proceeds than in the UK.[8] The Agency said that one of the lessons was to design auctions in the light of the particular circumstances and current market developments. A key factor was the number of bidders. Countries which had followed the UK's format, but with fewer bidders, had not had as successful an outcome.[9]

9. The Agency gave successful bidders the options of paying in full for their licence when it was awarded or paying 50 per cent on award and equal ten per cent instalments on the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth anniversaries. All chose to pay the licence fee in full at the start because of the cost of a bank guarantee, which the Agency would have required for instalment payments.[10] The Agency told us that they front-loaded the payments because they did not want the companies treating the licences like options to develop the spectrum they had won, as they might have done if they had been able to defer payment. The design of the 3G auction meant that the Agency could rely on shareholders and banks to decide whether the companies were serious about their bids and were able to implement their proposals.[11]

The changed ownership of the new entrant's licence

10. The original winner of the licence reserved for a new entrant was TIW UMTS UK (TIW), a subsidiary of Telesystem International Wireless Inc. Before the auction Hutchison had signed an exclusive agreement with TIW to take all the capacity of its 3G network. Shortly after the auction TIW formed a joint venture company with Hutchison Whampoa (Hutchison). By July 2000 Hutchison had formed a partnership with NTT DoComo, Japan's largest telecommunications company, and KPN Mobile, the leading telecommunications company in the Netherlands, and bought out TIW in a transaction valuing the licence at £6 billion compared to the £4.385 billion that TIW had paid.[12]

11. We asked the Agency how TIW came to be replaced immediately after the auction by Hutchison. Hutchison had been unable to bid in their own right in the auction because at the time of prequalification they had not fully divested themselves of their shareholding in Orange, another bidder, which they were in the process of selling to Mannesmann. Neither were they allowed to agree to buy TIW at the time of the auction because of the connection with Orange. They could arrange to buy all TIW's capacity because this was not covered by the rules of the auction. The Agency explained that they had looked very carefully at the arrangement. They had checked that TIW had complied with the auction rules and that there was no agreement that breached the rules. The Agency had required companies to declare their intention to enter the auction and then say how they were constituted and to whom they were connected.[13]

12. We asked the Agency about the possibility of an informal agreement at the time of the auction that if TIW won a licence Hutchison would buy it out. The Agency said that they had found no evidence of any such agreement, which would have constituted a breach of the auction rules. They had sought undertakings and received express assurance from both companies that there had been no such breach. Had there been a breach TIW would have been expelled from the auction or forfeited its licence and a substantial deposit.[14]

13. We asked the Agency why they did not get a proportion of the additional £1.7 billion, over and above the £4.385 billion that TIW paid for the new entrant licence, when the company was sold on.[15] The Agency confirmed that there was no way that they could benefit if a company, the main asset of which was one of the 3G licences, was sold on. The acquiring company would still have to implement the licence. The Agency said that they had considered building in some provisions to share in gains from sell-ons, but in their view such rules would make it difficult to incentivise companies to go ahead and use the asset to best advantage. They also thought it would be difficult to distinguish proceeds from the sale of the licence itself from money made by exploiting the licence.[16]

The timing of payments for the licences

14. Orange and Vodafone could not be awarded their licences immediately because of Vodafone's acquisition of Mannesmann, which had a shareholding in Orange, in February 2000. European competition authorities allowed the acquisition to proceed provided that Mannesmann divested themselves of their shareholding in Orange as soon as possible. Vodafone sold their shareholding to France Telecom in August 2000 when the licences were awarded. Payment from these two bidders was therefore made in September 2000. The other successful bidders paid for the licences in May 2000. BT and One2One took legal action against the Government, having incurred about £85 million additional interest each by paying earlier than Orange and Vodafone. Asked whether the different payment dates for the licences were known in advance and fair, the Agency said that the Court of Appeal had supported the Agency's position that the dates of payments could be different, a point which had always been explicit in the rules for the auction. The rules had been considered in draft by the Auction Consultative Group, a forum in which the companies were regular and active members.[17]

15. We asked the Agency whether a fixed payment date, once all successful bidders were eligible to receive their licences, would have resulted in more competitive bids, since those who knew they were able to pay later could have afforded to bid more. The Agency's view was that all the companies were well aware of the provisions and that by requiring everyone to pay at the date they were able to do so, £250 million more had been raised for the taxpayer. They believed that the bids placed by the winning bidders had not been influenced by affordability constraints but had been determined by what they needed to bid to win a licence—the price at which the last remaining bidder pulled out.[18]

The later auction of fixed broadband spectrum

16. In November 2000 the Agency carried out an auction of fixed broadband spectrum, which can provide business and domestic users with high capacity data transfer and video conferencing services without the need for cable or telephone connections. Although there is some synergy between these services and 3G services, fixed broadband operates between fixed locations. Of the 42 licences on offer 26 were unsold, leaving seven of fourteen regions without broadband provision. The auction raised £38 million against the Agency's total reserve price of £78.3 million.[19]

17. The Agency said that they regarded the auction as a success, even though the proceeds were low and licences were left unallocated. The auction had revealed the value of the licences to companies in this new market and showed that the idea of fixed broadband providing broadband services in rural areas was optimistic, at least in the present state of development of the technology and the state of the market. They said that companies would only invest in rural areas if it made commercial sense. The Agency would have to find another way of getting broadband access everywhere. It also meant that the Agency now had spectrum which they could allocate in some other way, rather than leaving it in the hands of operators who had no means to exploit it. It had not in their view been a mistake to hold the auction, though they agreed that it was now appropriate to adopt a different approach and wait for companies to come to them. The licences were now effectively available at the auction reserve price.[20]

Conclusions

18. The Agency succeeded in stimulating interest from a large number of potential new entrants and the auction design worked well even with much higher than expected proceeds. They were also able to bring a new competitor into the mobile telephone market.

19. There are a number of factors, for example the expected number of bidders, which help to determine the right type of auction to use. The Agency took expert advice which underpinned their choice of a successful model. Other public bodies considering auctions should also make use of the best available advice in carrying out analyses of the suitability of different auction designs.

20. Shortly after the auction Hutchison and two partners bought out TIW, the new entrant, in a transaction which valued the licence at £1.7 billion more than TIW had paid for it. The Agency said that they had no evidence to indicate that, at the time of the auction, Hutchison had arranged to take over TIW, which would have been contrary to the auction rules and grounds for forfeiture of TIW's licence and deposit. Hutchison had informed them only of an arrangement to take TIW's capacity. We note that the Agency had sought undertakings and had received assurances that the agreement did not breach the rules of the auction.

21. The Agency should in future auctions consider the possibility of including clawback provisions so as to be able to share in windfall gains of the sort achieved by TIW in this case.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE HIGH PROCEEDS FOR THE INDUSTRY

The prime objectives of the auction

22. The Government's overriding aim was "to secure, for the long term benefit of United Kingdom customers and the national economy, the timely and economically advantageous development and sustained provision of third generation services in the United Kingdom". Subject to this overriding aim, the Government's objectives for the auction were to:

  (i)  utilise the available spectrum with optimum efficiency;


  (ii)  promote effective and sustainable competition for the provision of third-generation services; and


  (iii)  subject to the overall objectives above, design an auction that is best judged to realise the full economic value to customers, industry and the taxpayer of the spectrum.


The latter objective was worded to make it clear that the interests of industry and consumers should be taken into account, rather than just maximising the proceeds for the taxpayer.[21]

23. The Agency did not believe that the combination of high proceeds and companies strapped for cash, possibly to the detriment of competition, was effectively the reverse of what they had been aiming for. They acknowledged that raising proceeds was not the aim of the auction, which was intended primarily to get licences out to people who would use them and in a way which would deliver sustainable competition, and deliver economic value. They felt that they had five companies with a tremendous incentive to use the resource for which they had paid so much money.[22]

24. We asked the Agency to estimate the amount that they could have raised if they had tried to maximise proceeds. They said they were unable to give us a figure for the maximum they could have raised, but suggested that it would have been possible to get even more than £22.5 billion by designing the auction so that the four incumbent companies had to bid for three licences, and fight to the point where the weakest fell away. There would have been all sorts of difficulties with that approach in terms of the Agency's other objectives.[23]

25. The Agency had not asked their advisers what the proceeds would be, and had not made any assessment of them. They had not thought about what would happen if proceeds were more than several billion pounds. The modelling they had done was to understand the value of a licence to a new entrant compared to an incumbent. They had adopted a working assumption of £1 billion.[24]

The implications of the auction for the industry

26. Since the auction the financial strength of nearly all telecommunication companies has been downgraded, and they face a more difficult investment climate. The major credit rating agencies attribute this situation to a range of factors besides the cost of licences such as regulatory pressures, the cost of acquisitions and the shift to more competitive, risky services. The Agency agreed that falls in debt ratings had occurred, making it more difficult for companies to fund the cost of building the 3G network. The sums that the companies decided to pay might have damaged their businesses, but that was the choice of the companies, themselves strong international players, not the Agency.[25]

27. We asked whether the Agency could have designed the auction in a better way, that would have raised a smaller sum and reduced the risk of damage to the industry. The Agency said that they had designed the auction so as to give bidders time to consider the implications of bidding beyond their expectations. In agreement with bidders they advanced the auction in very small steps and provided for them to call a recess day if they needed to pause and perhaps call a board meeting to rethink their strategy.[26]

28. The Agency said that delays in the introduction of 3G services were not attributable to the auction but were due mainly to the limited availability of handsets from manufacturers. The Agency believed that the amount the companies paid in the UK auction meant they were now very aggressive in trying to bring on advanced services. As a result services were likely to be available earlier in this country than in others. [27]

The implications of the auction for consumers

29. The UK auction raised more proceeds per person than any other European auction. Asked what the regulator would do if operators decided that they were going to get their money back through the consumer, the Agency said that the licence cost was a big but not dominating part of the overall cost, which also included infrastructure and advertising. More importantly, the price that someone could charge in the market place was determined by what the market would stand. The Agency saw no evidence of the regulator having compromised in the face of monopoly or oligopolistic power in the market place when facing pressure from the industry to recover the £22.5 billion. The companies felt the recent review by Oftel was quite tough and should have taken into account the costs of 3G.[28]

30. The Agency were particularly pleased to have, in Hutchison, a new entrant with considerable experience of mobile communications across the world, and a shareholding from NTT DoCoMo who were operating the first 3G system in the world. They felt that the new entrant would be quite aggressive in bringing interesting services to consumers in order to build market share to cover the cost.[29]

Conclusions

31. The Agency conceded that they had performed no risk assessment based on such high proceeds and said that observers had also been astonished by the outcome. Risk assessments on similar exercises in the future should model the possibility of a wide range of outcomes.

32. The Agency expect shareholders rather than consumers to bear the high licence costs, because competition will determine prices in the market as firms seek to build up their business volumes. The Agency and Oftel should develop contingency plans so as to be able to take prompt action if, contrary to their expectations, the market is not fully competitive to the detriment of consumers.

33. There may yet be further mergers or take-overs between the five licensees. It will remain important to ensure a competitive market if consumers are not to be left with an excessive share of the high costs incurred by the companies.

BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE COMPANIES, CONSUMERS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Incentives for companies to share their networks

34. 3G services will require many more mobile phone transmitters than existing mobile telephony, possibly as many as 28,000, although many of the new ones will be placed on existing structures. We asked whether the Agency would allow the mobile telephone companies to share their networks as a way of meeting public concern and to help reduce the companies' infrastructure costs, thereby potentially helping those in rural areas obtain 3G and broadband coverage.[30]

35. The Agency said that some months previously they had agreed with the Department of Trade and Industry and Oftel a statement of formal guidance they could give companies on sharing infrastructure. So long as agreements for sharing infrastructure respected competition law then there was a prima facie case to allow those agreements to stand. The authorities would also look for the advantage that the companies gained through sharing infrastructure to be shared with the consumer. The Agency would look to see greater benefits to consumers, for example a faster roll out of services. They were working with operators to encourage them to share masts, and were providing more information through their website for people about masts in their localities.[31]

36. Asked why they did not arrange for all masts to be the responsibility of a single provider, the Agency said they were not attracted to the idea of a mast operating monopoly. Citing Railtrack, they did not see that having one entity would improve efficiency. All masts were on sites which were owned by different organisations and companies and they considered it better not to stand in the way of the industry. Currently it was difficult to get permission to put a new mast up so companies were forced to try to share in order to roll out services quickly. The Agency identified companies, such as Crown Castle and NTL, which run mast businesses, acquiring mast sites and selling them on to 3G companies.[32]

Arrangements for trading spectrum

37. Some companies or licensees have been less successful than others in attracting customers. We asked the Agency whether they were going to allow licensees to trade surplus spectrum with each other in the way farmers are allowed to trade dairy quotas. They told us that they had been interested in spectrum trading for several years, but a European Community Directive prevented anyone in the European Union from introducing it at present. The necessary legislative changes were going through the Council and the European Parliament. The Agency were already drafting clauses to put into the Communications Bill which they hoped the Government would introduce, possibly in 2002.[33]

38. As to whether there should be a market for trading spectrum the Agency said that they would be introducing a market in a cautious way because they wanted it to work properly. There were spectrum markets in other parts of the world, so they could look at what had happened there.[34] We asked whether it would be preferable to have stable spectrum prices, maintained and overseen by Government, rather than prices that fluctuated in the market place. The Agency's view was that stabilising prices artificially could have perverse effects, and they favoured a market that was free floating.[35]

The use and pricing of the radio spectrum

39. The 3G auction was for only seven per cent of the radio spectrum. In comparison defence and the emergency services take up 28 per cent (Figure 2). The Agency said the industry would generally agree that there were inefficiencies in the way these services used their spectrum. If they could release more spectrum, there could be opportunities for other successful auctions. There were some constraints on spectrum allocated for defence purposes due to international agreements for NATO use. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence were conscious of the potential risks to future defence opportunities of more Defence wave bands being sold.[36]

40. There are wide variations in the way that spectrum is priced. The Agency said that they had introduced spectrum pricing to communications spectrum, but not to spectrum used for other purposes like radar. Aeronautical users paid fees which covered the Agency's costs of administering spectrum. To find out what scope there was for further pricing, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had set up a joint independent review of radio spectrum management under Professor Martin Cave, whose Report was published after our hearing, in March 2002.[37]

41. This Report made a large number of recommendations aimed at encouraging efficiency and innovation in spectrum use, including:

• the application of spectrum pricing at more realistic levels and more comprehensively across spectrum uses to ensure economy and efficiency of use;

• the use of markets, through spectrum trading and auctions, to allocate spectrum used commercially;

• that the Ministry of Defence should carry out a comprehensive audit of their use of the spectrum, which they should periodically update and share with the Agency;

• the introduction of spectrum trading in the UK as soon as possible with trading rights granted free to all extant licences; and

• the assessment of the case for the Government to levy a duty on net gains from spectrum trades.[38]

42. Asked how much scope there was for releasing more spectrum for 3G telephony, the Agency said that they would be able to provide extension bands in the same timetable for the release of spectrum internationally. There was also spectrum currently used for second generation mobile phones which could probably be reused for 3G in the future. Some of the spectrum released when analogue television was turned off, once digital television was fully rolled out, could be used for this sort of technology. On whether releasing extra spectrum would be resisted by some of the bidders who bid on the presumption that spectrum was limited, the Agency said that they had described in their Information Memorandum their plans for further auctions.[39]

Conclusions

43. Environmental concerns about the siting of masts can conflict with the need for improved access to services. As well as taking into account local issues, the planning authorities need to consider fully the potential commercial and economic benefits of the development of 3G services. The Government should ensure that local planning authorities have the guidance necessary to achieve a satisfactory balance.

44. The Agency acknowledged that, in the meantime, many rural areas will be disadvantaged by continued lack of access to 3G and broadband services, such as high capacity data transfer and video conferencing. They nevertheless doubted whether licensees could be required to invest in rural areas if it did not make commercial sense. The Agency and Oftel should facilitate the sharing of infrastructure to assist access to 3G and broadband services in rural areas.

45. The Agency had worked with the European Commission to remove the unintended prohibition on the trading of radio spectrum, and hoped that new provisions for trading would be implemented in this country through the Communications Bill in 2002. The Government should make provision for spectrum trading in the Bill so that spectrum can find the most advantageous uses.

46. The Agency should assess the case for a levy on net gains from spectrum trades as recommended in Professor Martin Cave's Report on radio spectrum management published in March 2002.

47. The defence and emergency services take up 28 per cent of the spectrum compared to the seven per cent sold for 3G mobile phone services. The Ministry of Defence should invest in a comprehensive audit of their use of spectrum, periodically updating the data and sharing it with the Agency, as recommended in Professor Martin Cave's Report. The Agency should review the allocation of spectrum and propose action to secure an optimal distribution among existing and potential users.

2   C&AG's Report paras 1, 3, 5 Back

3   C&AG's Report, The Auction of Radio Spectrum for the Third Generation of Mobile Telephones (HC 233, Session 2001-02) Back

4   C&AG's Report, para1.15 and Figure 4 Back

5   C&AG's Report, paras 2.3-2.5 Back

6   Q2  Back

7   C&AG's Report, paras 2.10-2.11, 2.28 Back

8   C&AG's Report, para 2.10  Back

9   Qs 46, 99 Back

10   C&AG's Report, para 2.30 Back

11   Q47 Back

12   C&AG's Report, paras 26, 4.5 Back

13   Qs 5, 119-126 Back

14   Qs 17-22, 115-133 Back

15   Qs 20-22 Back

16   Qs 134-138 Back

17   C&AG's Report, para 2.13, Figures 10 and 19; Qs 39-42 Back

18   Qs 40-41, 44-45; C&AG's Report, para 2.17  Back

19   C&AG's Report, para 2.22 Back

20   C&AG's Report, paras 2.22-2.24 and Figure 15; Qs 6-9 Back

21   C&AG's Report, paras 4-5, 1.15 Back

22   Qs 3, 71 Back

23   Qs 14-16, 92 Back

24   Qs 79, 101 Back

25   C&AG's Report, paras 4.16, 4.17; Qs 60-61, 75 Back

26   Qs 71-73  Back

27   Q64 Back

28   C&AG's Report, Figure 7; Qs 29-30, 83; Oftel, Review of the Charge Control on Calls to Mobiles, September 2001 (not printed here) Back

29   Q3 Back

30   C&AG's Report, 3.14; Qs 4, 32 Back

31   Qs 4, 32 Back

32   Qs 37-38, 96-97, 110-112 Back

33   Qs 12-13 Back

34   Q107 Back

35   Q109 Back

36   C&AG's Report, Figure 5; Qs 10, 91 Back

37   Qs 10, 54-56; Review of Radio Spectrum Management, Professor Martin Cave, for the Department of Trade and Industry and HM Treasury, March 2002 (not printed here) Back

38   Review of Radio Spectrum Management, Professor Martin Cave, for the Department of Trade and Industry and HM Treasury, March 2002 (not printed here) Back

39   Qs 11, 87-91 Back