INTRODUCTION
AND
LIST
OF
CONCLUSIONS
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Since April 2001, the National Probation Service
(the Service) has been responsible for probation services in England
and Wales. Previously the probation service was a network of 54
autonomous and locally managed services, each under the control
of an independent board.[1]
In 1993, the Home Office and local probation services adopted
the National Probation Service Information Systems Strategy (NPSISS)
to create a network of computers and supporting software across
all the probation services in England and Wales, and to introduce
a standard case record and management system, CRAMS. Until April
2001, implementation of the strategy was managed by the Home Office's
Probation Unit.[2]
2. Installation of the computer infrastructure began
in 1995 and was scheduled to be completed by March 1999.
By the end of March 2001, the Home Office had succeeded in installing
a common information technology infrastructure in 49 out of the
54 probation services. The full economic cost of the NPSISS programme,
including CRAMS, was expected to be at least £118 million
by the end of 2001 (£105 million at 1994-95 prices),
70 per cent at constant prices above the expenditure forecast
in the Home Office's original business case.[3]
3. Not all of the areas which are part of the NPSISS
network have chosen to introduce CRAMS. Users have found CRAMS
difficult to operate and its development did not keep pace with
the changing business requirements of the probation service. 34
of the new National Probation Service local areas use CRAMS in
some way, with only 16 using it substantially. The Home Office
suspended further development of CRAMS in 1999 except for essential
maintenance of the software.[4]
4. The Home Office's contract with the supplier,
Integris, formerly Bull Information Systems Limited, expired on
31 December 2001. A new contract between Integris and the National
Probation Service, expected to run for at least two and a half
years and known as the Phase 1 contract, provides for the support
and maintenance of the existing probation information technology
infrastructure, including CRAMS, and an upgrade of the system.
In 2004, the National Probation Service expects to let a contract,
known as the Phase 2 contract, to procure new systems, including
a replacement for CRAMS.[5]
5. On the basis of a Report by the Comptroller and
Auditor General,[6] we
took evidence from the Home Office, the National Probation Service
for England and Wales, and Integris.
6. Our main conclusions are:
- Some 49 out of 54 probation services have installed
the NPSISS infrastructure but only 16 probation services make
substantial use of the case record and management system, CRAMS.
The lack of take up can be attributed to a poor user interface,
emphasising the need for sufficient user buy-in and involvement
as major projects progress. In taking the lead on implementing
an information technology system across a group of autonomous,
locally managed services the Department lacked a strategy for
communicating with them, and failed to enlist the support of users
in those bodies.
- The importance of leadership and project management
by specialists to the effective delivery of large information
technology projects was emphasised in our predecessors' Report
on the management of Government information technology projects.[7]
The project management team assigned to the NPSISS programme was,
however, badly under-resourced; lacked the skills and capacity
necessary to perform effectively; and, with seven programme directors
in seven years, suffered from frequent changes of leadership.
If future projects are to succeed, the Home Office needs to strike
a better balance between developing and rewarding people for their
breadth of knowledge, and developing people with specialist project
management and other information technology skills.
- The Home Office's original contract with its
supplier was not sufficiently flexible to address the changing
needs of the probation service, to facilitate effective partnership
working with the supplier or to fully protect taxpayers' interests.
There were flaws in the original framework agreement including
poor specification of expected outputs. Future contracts should
better balance risks between the Home Office (or the National
Probation Service) and the supplier by reflecting, in contractual
incentives, the business implications of late delivery or poor
product quality.
7. Our more specific conclusions and recommendations
are set out below:
On the Home Office's management and oversight
of the programme
(i) Where information technology is
being introduced to link a group of organisations, responsibility
for delivering the programme, and the resources needed, should
be clearly specified from the start, along with the desired outputs
and outcomes. (paragraph 13)
(ii) The programme management team were
not properly equipped with the resources and skills needed to
deliver a complex information technology system. Excessive turnover
amongst specialist staff and potential skill shortages on individual
projects must be identified and addressed quickly (paragraph 14)
(iii) Normal project controls and reporting
arrangements were not followed, nor was timely action taken to
address these weaknesses. The Home Office executive board should
review regular, independent reports on progress of information
technology projects, for example from the Government's Gateway
review process and the Department's internal auditors, and assess
the adequacy of the action taken in response to recommendations
made by such reports. (paragraph 15)
On meeting the computing needs of local probation
services
(iv) NPSISS has delivered some, but
not all, expected benefits to local probation services. The absence
of rigorous monitoring against the original business plan has,
however, made it impossible to assess the full impact of the programme.
Management information systems should be in place to enable the
costs of information technology projects to be monitored against
plans, progress to be reviewed against milestones and, crucially,
the achievement of the desired impact on services to be assessed.
(paragraph 23)
(v) The impact of new information technology
systems on staff should be assessed regularly, and health and
safety issues addressed quickly. (paragraph 24)
(vi) In introducing any replacement to CRAMS
the National Probation Service should put in place appropriate
information technology systems to support the supervision of potentially
dangerous offenders. (paragraph 25)
(vii) Neither the Home Office nor its supplier
fully appreciated the risks of developing CRAMS from an existing
software application. In taking forward future information technology
projects, the National Probation Service should identify all key
risks, including technical risks, and put in place plans for managing
the risks. In particular, where monitoring reveals significant
departures from planned delivery, costs and benefits, the risks
of continuing with the project should be compared with alternative
strategies before deciding the way forward. (paragraph 26)
(viii) Users were not engaged sufficiently
closely in the specification of the information technology systems
by the Home Office. User involvement should be built into project
management structures, and users' representatives should be sufficiently
knowledgeable to carry those they represent with them. (paragraph
27)
On the Home Office's relationship with its supplier
(ix) Flaws in the original enabling
agreement with Integris held back urgent developments needed by
local probation services. Future contracts should receive proper
legal scrutiny prior to being finalised and, if problems occur,
solutions should be identified which minimise the impact on probation
services. (paragraph 35)
(x) For contracts that may run for some
years, it may not be possible for all aspects of all services
to be specified in detail at the time the contract is signed.
Any significant new developments during the life of the contract
should be based on a clear specification of the required outputs
from the contractor, with costs being controlled tightly. (paragraph
36)
(xi) For a time, probation services received
non-Year 2000 compliant equipment even though this fell short
of best industry practice. Any failure to receive services or
equipment in line with best industry practice should be vigorously
pursued and suitable reparation received. (paragraph 37)
(xii) The Home Office underestimated the
effort required to properly manage the contract with Integris.
The National Probation Service should specify clearly the roles
and responsibilities of its project management team, users and
its contractor, establishing a shared understanding of key terms
and deadlines. (paragraph 38)
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