The costs of other forms of generation
28. The above analysis shows that renewable sources of energy
are likely to become extremely competitive over the next 20 yearseven
by comparison to present day energy costs. And this takes no account
of possible increases in the costs of nonrenewable forms
of generation. At present, the wholesale cost of energy (2p/kWh)
in the UK is very low. This may have been due in part to UK isolation
from European markets together with oversupply: electricity generating
capacity still exceeds demand by 30 per cent. Gas prices are likely
to rise as the UK becomes more dependent on imports and more exposed
to the operation of longterm contracts which are such a
feature of European markets. There is also the possibility that
gas supplies may ultimately be controlled by an OPEC style body,
or subject to monopolistic control by a few panEuropean
energy companies.[45]
29. Similarly, the costs of other forms of generation are likely
to increase. At present, coal is one of the cheapest sources of
electricity. But costs are likely to rise as a result of increasingly
stringent environmental requirements, such as the fitting of fluegas
desulphurisation to combat acid rain.[46]
Carbon sequestration would make it still more expensive. There
is, however, a danger that governments might find it economically
attractive to relax environmental requirements for coal generation,
as indeed has happened in the US, with the attendant impacts this
would have on emissions.[47]
30. With regard to nuclear, the cost of electricity from Sizewell
B, Britain's newest reactor, has been estimated at 6p/kWh.[48]
The nuclear industry suggests that a new generation of reactors
could supply electricity for as low as 2.2p/kWh. But there is
considerable scepticism about how realistic such estimates are,
given the history of the industry to date. The PIU itself suggested
that a central range of 3 to 4p/kWh is likely to be more realistic,
though costs could rise to as much as 5p/kWh in some circumstances.[49]
But even these estimates may not represent the full internalisation
of the costs of energy from a new generation of nuclear power
stations.
31. We have a number of concerns about nuclear costs. Insurance
liabilities for nuclear are capped at £140 million, with
the Government itself underwriting risks in excess of this.[50]
If the nuclear industry were obliged to bear such risks itself,
it is unclear how far the price of nuclear power would have to
rise in order to meet increased insurance premiums - or indeed
whether such risks would be insurable at all. Furthermore, the
costs of dealing with nuclear waste are unknown. The Government's
latest White Paper, Managing the Nuclear Legacy, suggests
a figure of £48 billion but acknowledges that "better
definition of the problem will almost certainly mean that liabilities
estimates will rise".[51]
Nuclear waste, admittedly, is largely a historical problem and
the volume of waste from a new generation of power stations will
be relatively small.[52]
But it is at least questionable whether new nuclear power should
benefit through the treatment of its waste and decommissioning
costs on a marginal basis. We are also concerned about the proposed
manner of funding the eventual treatment of waste and decommissioning.
This relies on the nuclear industry setting aside each year in
an investment fund a sum of money which will accumulate over time.
Such an approach raises many wider issues relating to the adequacy
of the fund, its independence, future investment performance,
the continuity of business entities, and the overall political
and economic development of the UK.[53]
32. While it is very difficult to forecast future price movements,
there seems widespread agreement at present that UK energy prices
are currently at an unsustainably low level. Increases in the
costs of nonrenewable generation appear likely, making renewable
energy increasingly competitive.
The role of nuclear
33. The primary focus of our report is on renewable power. While
nuclear might provide a reliable source of lowcarbon power,
it is not a source of renewable power. There is widespread concern
amongst the public about pollution, safety and security, and no
consensus on the treatment of radioactive waste. In view of the
complexity of the issues involved, we have not investigated them
in depth. We are nevertheless concerned about the wider role of
nuclear in a future energy strategy.
34. In his evidence to us, the Energy Minister stated "nobody
has satisfactorily explained to me how we are going to meet our
environmental aspirations while at the same time wishing away
the contribution from nuclear".[54]
Yet the main thesis of the PIU Energy Review is that the development
of renewables, together with major gains in energy efficiency,
would enable the UK to do so. If we were, for example, to achieve
20 per cent renewables by 2020the target suggested by the
PIU Reviewthis would replace the contribution previously
supplied by nuclear. Major developments in energy efficiencythe
other main recommendation of the PIUwould then provide
additional large reductions in carbon emissions. There may, however,
be a need for the UK to meet more stringent targets, and we recommend
that the DTI and DEFRA should review as a matter of urgency its
emissions forecasts in the light of these strategic choices for
the power generation sector. This needs to be done now in order
to feed into the consultation process and the Government's White
Paper.
35. Some forms of renewables already represent a costeffective
approach to replacing existing generation sources, while others
will become increasingly competitive over the next two decades.
We have pointed out above that the costs of the new generation
of power stations proposed by the nuclear industry are likely
to be at least as great as, or indeed greater than, various forms
of renewable generation by 2020. In addition, there is no likelihood
that liberalised energy markets will provide the huge capital
investment required to support a new programme. This might remain
the case even if a carbon tax or more comprehensive emissions
trading system were introduced, from which nuclear were exempt.
Further financial support and commitment from the Government would
therefore be required for any nuclear build. We are concerned
that any form of further support for nuclear will reduce both
the amount of funding for, and commitment to, the development
of renewables on an adequate scale.
36. We therefore see renewables, together with the need for
radical improvements in energy efficiency, as being the primary
tool to fulfil the UK's climate change commitments. The Government
must provide commitment and leadership here, and should not allow
itself to drift into a position in which nuclear appears to be
the only alternativeas a result of a failure to maximise
the potential which renewables have to offer.
25
Scottish Executive study, Scottish Renewable Resource 2001,
Garrad Hassan, December 2001. Back
26
PIU Energy Review, working paper h, Technical and economic
potential of renewable energy generating technologies: Potentials
and cost reductions to 2020. Back
27
PIU Energy Review, para 6.31. Back
28
PIU working paper h, p29. The DTI analysis suggested that biomass
might contribute about 33 TWh of electricity a year, though this
might be substantially increased if assumptions about land availability
are relaxed. With regard to on-shore wind, the DTI 1998 study
considered the economic potential to be 58 TWh a year, and the
practical potential - somewhat counter-intuitively-to be only
8 TWh a year. Back
29
Ev 181. Back
30
PIU working paper h. Back
31
PIU working paper h, p27. Back
32
European Commission, Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources
of Energy, COM(97)599 final, 26 November 1997 Back
33
Directive 2001/77/EC, On the promotion of electricity produced
from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market,
27 September 2001. Back
34
We are grateful to the European Environment Agency and to Eurostat
for making available the data. Back
35
Ev 25. Back
36
Directive 2001/77/EC, article 3 para 4. Back
37
European Environment Agency, Energy and the Environment in
the EU, May 2002. Back
38
QQ403, 405. Back
39
PIU working paper h. Back
40
PIU working paper h, p6. Back
41
PIU Energy Review, para 6.36. Back
42
DTI, The Renewables Obligation Statutory Consultation,
Annex A, para 25. Back
43
PIU Energy Review, para 7.55. Back
44
Inter-departmental Analysts Group (IAG), Long Term Reduction
in Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the UK., February 2002. Back
45
Ev 227. See also Dr Helm's comments in The Utilities Journal,
March 2002, and Power UK, April 2002, p10. Back
46
PIU Energy Review, para 4.23. Back
47
See, for example, comment at www.recordonline.com/archive/2002/07/09/09myview.htm
. Back
48
PIU working paper h, p6. Even this cost estimate excludes certain
"first of a kind" costs. Back
49
Ibid. p14. Back
50
Ibid. p11. This limit is expected to rise under the Paris
and Brussels Conventions to _700 million. Back
51
Para 2.7, Managing the Nuclear Legacy, Cm 5552, DTI, July
2002. Back
52
PIU Energy Review, working paper i. Back
53
See the Guardian article on BNFL, Sellafield: a nuclear black
hole, Friday 14 June 2002. Back
54
Q441. Back