APPENDIX 8
Observations on Change in Military Law
from Professor G R Rubin, Kent Law School, University of Kent
at Canterbury (September 2000)
INTRODUCTION
Whenever a detailed examination of specific
legal provisions is undertaken, it is often useful for the analyst
to commence with an overview of the field of study and to pose
broad questions on the relationship between that field of study
and the wider polity. Consequently, this submission to the Commons
Defence Select Committee seeks to draw attention to a number of
broad issues relating to military law and to its development which
it is hoped will be helpful to the Committee in its own deliberations
on more specific matters concerning military law which the Committee
may be addressing. Thus rather than offering a close analysis
of existing provision in service discipline law or of detailed
proposals for new military laws, this submission will pose three
principal questions. First, what factors have prompted changes
in military law over the past 20 years or so? Second, which bodies
or organisations have sought such changes? And third, is there
sufficient democratic oversight in the United Kingdom of the law-making
process in military law, especially given the complex and confusing
structure of rules affecting military discipline and terms and
conditions of service?
A few preliminary points should be stressed.
First, this submission is a "distilled" version of a
much larger paper in which the author has developed in greater
detail many of the points presented here.1 Second, in referring
to "military law", the submission addresses service
discipline law and military "administrative" law. The
latter includes terms and conditions of service, such as equal
opportunities provisions which may have been adapted from civilian
law. The submission does not, however, specifically address the
law of war (sometimes described as international humanitarian
law). Third, it deals with laws intended, broadly, to apply during
peacetime, though service discipline law is obviously also applicable
to wartime. Fourth, the submission accepts in principle that military
service has unique characteristics which will attract both rules
exclusively applied to military service and also the selective
adaptation of civilian legal norms to military circumstances.
It does not, however, develop and analyse that issue in further
detail, and assumes that other witnesses and memoranda will be
addressing that particular aspect.
THE COMPLEXITY
AND EXPANSION
OF MILITARY
LAW
Before adverting to the factors prompting recent
military law change, it may be observed that the military law
agenda is inordinately complex as, indeed, are the sources of
law governing military affairs in the United Kingdom. They include
statutes, subordinate legislation issued by the Secretary of State;
subordinate legislation issued by the Defence Council under statutory
authority; Orders in Council issued under statutory authority
or under the prerogative; the (prerogative) Queen's Regulations;
prerogative Royal Warrants regulating pay and promotion; Defence
Council Instructions (that is, specific administrative instructions
issued by the Defence Council and applicable either jointly or
to a particular service); general and administrative instructions
or orders authorised by the Defence Council and covering instructions
and information of a permanent nature not appropriate for inclusion
in other permanent publications such as instructions on Military
Aid to the Civil Ministries,2 Letters of Policy Guidance; standing
orders; standing operating instructions; standard operating procedures;
protocols and service codes of practice.3
It may also be helpful, in conceptualising military
law within the wider society, to ask why civilians should at this
time address their minds to military law? Apart from the obvious
response that in some circumstances military law is also applicable
to civilians, a simple explanation is that over the past few years,
academics and legal practitioners in the United Kingdom have become
increasingly aware that military law is ceasing to be the narrow
preserve of military lawyers and of a handful of civilian lawyers
who occasionally appear before courts martial. Whether prompted
by the demands of European law, by a reduction of deference to
authority, by higher educational standards within the armed forces,
by a "compensation culture", or by a pronounced human
rights discourse, military law and "civilian" law are
intersecting on a wider front in domestic law and at greater frequency
than hitherto.4 One need only consider, in respect to the armed
forces of the United Kingdom, topics such as equal opportunities
legislation and litigation,5 sexual harassment claims,6 legal
challenges to the prohibition on homosexuals serving in the armed
forces,7 various tort claims against the Ministry of Defence relating
to, for example, post-traumatic stress disorder,8 or to the duty
of care of commanders in respect to conduct during combat,9 or
to bullying,10 or to potentially fatal drinking bouts,11 or to
a failure to provide adequate medical care;12 judicial review
challenges such as regarding a refusal to award sums from an overseas
service injury compensation scheme;13 claims for compensation
for career loss following the dropping of serious charges against
an Army Officer,14 the saga of challenging, before the European
Court of Human Rights, the perceived lack of independence of courts
martial;15 appeal court sentencing guidelines for courts martial;16
the criminal consequences of the use, by service personnel, of
lethal force against civilians;17 claims in respect to "Gulf
War Syndrome";18 and many other heads of claim too numerous
to mention here.19
INTERNALLY OR
EXTERNALLY DRIVEN
LEGAL CHANGE?
While the corpus of domestic law impacting on
the armed forces is thus expanding rapidly, with a further measure,
the Armed Forces (Discipline) Act 2000 bringing armed forces summary
disciplinary procedures into line with European human rights law,
a broad understanding of the dynamics of military law change over
the past 20 years or so may be helpful to the Committee.
Thus we can distinguish between internally driven,
that is, militarily-prompted changes; and, on the other hand,
externally driven, that is, economically, socially or politically
prompted changes.
Internal factors might include the military
requirement for improved operational efficiency, enhanced military
discipline or better recruitment and retention performances. But
they might also derive from a positive services commitment to
emulate civilian legal norms where appropriate; a process of consensual
civilianisation of military law as well described by the Commons
Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, 1995-96, at paragraph
4, with which the Committee is presumably acquainted.20
In contrast, external factors might be societal
demands to expand equal opportunities, or political demands to
give wider effect to freedom of information principles, or economic
demands to make savings on deployments or to dispose of redundant
assets such as the Royal Naval College, Greenwich (whose disposal
required an amendment to the Greenwich Hospital Act 1869 before
the sale could be effected).21
External legal rulings might alternatively be
adverse judgments in the domestic courts (not necessarily relating
to European , or to European human rights, law) which will directly
inhibit operational effectiveness unless corrective legislation
is enacted as rapidly as possible.
Thus both internal and external factors prompting
military law change can be divided into operationally-inspired
changes, which self-evidently are designed to enhance military
capacity and effectiveness; and, on the other hand, "civilianised"
changes which will respond to wider policy considerations. However,
it should be stressed that the services' adoption of civilian
legal norms which are perceived by them as "appropriate,
practical and desirable" (in the words of the AFB 1995-96
Select Committee) indicates that the civilianisation of military
law is not exclusively an external imposition on the armed forces
but can be driven by the services themselves (must notably in
respect to incorporating civilian criminal justice procedures
into the court-martial system).
It may further be noted that the division between
internally and externally driven military law change may be difficult
to draw in some cases (for example, in respect of certain court
martial reforms in the Armed Forces Act 1996; though I would argue
that those changes were primarily externally driven). In other
cases, it does not seem possible to this writer to distinguish
between internal and external factors, for example, in relation
to recent provisions regarding reserve forces and new SOFA arrangements
(see later).
In sum, therefore, I submit there are five categories
of military law change which can be identified and which are illustrated,
below, by representative examples.
FIVE CATEGORIES
OF MILITARY
LAW CHANGE
A detailed breakdown of the five categories
of military law change proposed here can be found in the full
version of the paper from which this presentation is derived.
But for the purposes of this submission to the Select Committee,
the following summary (with apologies for the prolix sub-titles)
is offered.
(1) (PEACETIME)
OPERATIONAL INTERNALLY
DRIVEN MILITARY
LAW CHANGE
Here, legal changes are promoted by the service
authorities themselves as being required for operational effectiveness
or enhancement, and in order to sustain the personnel base of
fighting power. Examples include updating military offences and
punishment options, changing recruitment rules such as provision
for the military local service engagement (MLSE) or a recent technical
amendment to the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 allowing civilians
to "try out" MoD weapons without MoD certificates on
Defence property.
(2) (Peacetime) Civilianised Internally Driven
Military Law Change
The second category reflects military law changes
to service discipline law, introduced at the behest of the service
authorities themselves, but shaped by, and to some extent dictated
by, societal influences rather than by the practical need of operational
and disciplinary effectiveness. It is here where the policy commitment
to the civilianisation of military law, a consensual process,
is most pronounced, As distinct from the updating (or modernising)
of military offences and punishments in the previous category,
such as a new military offence of interfering with computer programs,
introduced in 1986, this second category particularly reflects
the proactive endeavour of the service authorities themselves
to incorporate as closely as practicable civilian criminal law
rules on evidence, procedure and punishment tariffs into court
martial jurisdiction. Examples include provisions on child video
evidence, inferences from silence, abrogation of corroboration
warnings and stated reasons for custodial sentences. The gap between
civilian and military justice is thereby reduced accordingly.
(3) (Peacetime) Operational Externally Driven
Military Law Change
The limited number of examples in this category
reflects the practical requirement (in order to maintain operational
effectiveness) to correct by legislative means any adverse court
ruling on a technical point of evidence, procedure or jurisdiction.
Such changes would not be prompted by the services obligation
to comply with an external social, economic or political agenda
or with European or European human rights law. The Northern Ireland
Act 1972, s 1, was enacted in just seven hours 10 minutes to reverse
the decision in Hume [1972] NI 91 which had held that the
legal powers apparently conferred by the Northern Ireland legislature
on the armed forces to arrest, search and detail civilians were
ultra vires the Government of Ireland Act 1920.
(4) (Peacetime) Civilianised Externally Driven
Military Law Change
In this detailed category we are addressing
externally prompted legal changes which will tend to reflect social,
economic or political agendas, and deriving from a diversity of
sources. These are changes which the services are in many if not
all cases unlikely to welcome (some may argue that the court martial
reforms in the Armed Forces Act 1996 reflected the "internal"
influence of the Judge Advocate General and of the Ministry's
Service Discipline Acts Review Working Party. I explain in the
full version of this paper why I believe these changes were external).
The headline-attracting legal changes, such as those relating
to pregnancy dismissals, and to recruitment and retention of homosexuals
in the armed forces come into this category.
The diversity of external sources of pressure
for change will include adverse ruling of European courts, or
compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 or European Union directives;
the possibly linked activities of pressure groups which might
(for example, the British Nuclear Test Veterans' Association,
or Stonewall and Rank Outsiders) seek to identify a European human
rights law deficit, or, in other cases (the Leale and Lane
and Sirdar rulings), a European law deficit for which court
proceedings the institutional support of the Equal Opportunities
Commission might be available. Other pressure groups such as the
now-disbanded (because successful) Section 10 Abolition Group
in regard to lifting of Crown immunity in certain circumstances
involving the armed forces would focus exclusively on the domestic
law of the time. Service charities would of course draw attention
to welfare or pensions issues affecting service and ex-service
personnel where the law might need reforming; though charities
cannot of course, engage in political campaigning.
Finally, military law change might be prompted
(and possibly "imposed") as a result of parliament's
(or in some cases the executive) giving effect to the recommendations
of royal commissions or committees of inquiry such as the Lewis
Committee (Cmd 7608, 1949) from whose report the Courts Martial
Appeal Court eventually emerged in 1951 (a similar proposal was
rejected by the Oliver Committee (Cmd 6200, 1939-40) before the
war.
(5) (Peacetime) Operational Internally and
Externally Driven Military Law Change
In regard to operational enhancement, does the
expanded recruitment of women into combat roles in fast-jet aircraft
or serving on warships, or into Army regiments such as the Royal
Artillery, from which they had hitherto been excluded, reflect
both pragmatic, that is, internal considerations, and also a commitment
to the wider societal value of equal opportunities? It is suspected
that the appropriate answer is, "Perhaps".
However, in other cases, it is suggested that
both internal and external factors have indubitably driven the
resultant legal changes. For example, the wider call-out powers
of reservists for peacekeeping and peacemaking operation in the
Reserve Forces Act 1996 or the promulgation of the Visiting Forces
etc Order 1998, affirming the extension of Status of Forces Agreements
to new NATO members and to other countries under the NATO Partnership
for Peace Initiative reflect the impact of both international
realignments (external factors) and of manpower and service discipline
(that is, internal) factors. It is also strongly arguable that
any reconsideration of matters relating to the controversial issue
of fraternisation will disclose both internal and external influences.
It is because of the impossibility (in our view)
of separating internal from external factors prompting military
law change in such cases that this additional fifth category of
change has been identified.
ANALYSIS OF
MILITARY LAW
CHANGE: TOWARDS
JURIDIFICATION?
It is apparent that explanations for military
law change over the past 20 years disclose a mixture of pragmatism,
positive ideology and negative coercion. This is hardly to be
wondered at, given that the pressures for change have been generated
both internally by the services themselves, and externally, and
that legal changes have reflected both the operational needs of
the armed forces and also social, economic, political or juridical
programmes which, depending on the subject-matter, have attracted
either support or disdain from the services.
Some retired military commentators have regretted,
in particular, the adoption of civilian legal norms which they
see as inimical to "Sustaining the Will to Fight"22
(such norms may indeed reflect an "occupationalist"
rather than an "institutionalist" or "vocationalist"
perspective in respect to the armed forces). A developing culture
of litigiousness and of liabilities limited by civilian legal
norms, they believe, strikes at the military ethos of self-sacrifice,
mutual trust and unit cohesion which underpins a unique legal
obligation on the part of service personnel to assume physical
risks not encountered in civilian society and indeed, to obey
orders posing a threat to their (and to others') lives.23
Indeed, some may claim that what we may be seeing
emerging in the wake of the increasing civilianisation of military
law (especially of the "coercive" variety) is a slow
and gradual, indeed a barely perceptible, juridification of military
law. It may be comparable, to a limited extent, with the process
of juridification of industrial relations occurring in the early
1970s and involving the legal resolution of disputes hitherto
the province of voluntary or unilateral industrial relations settlement.24
For our purposes, juridification may be viewed not in the narrow
sense of the "monopolisation of the legal field by legal
professionals"25 but as a limited colonisation by explicitly
legal norms (such as an accused's right to legal representation,
evidence to be presented on oath, the rules of evidence in English
law to be applied, agreements to be legally enforceable, and an
independent judicial element at various points in disciplinary
proceedings) of territory previously unoccupied by legal criteria.
It is not the purpose of this submission to
enter into the debate on whether the incorporation of civilian
legal norms will debilitate operational effectiveness. It may,
however, be noted that the Director of Personal Services (Army)
has recently stated (in regard, primarily, to welfare provision
for service personnel rather than to positive legal rights) that,
". . . it is important to view soldiers'
aspiration in terms of a series of interlocking needs: the needs
of the individual, the needs of the team and the needs of the
task. We have been out of balance in recent years, and the needs
of the individual have become subordinate, to a greater degree
than is acceptable, to the needs of the team and to the needs
of the task."26
However, whether a distinction between welfare
"needs" and social and economic "rights" transplanted
from civilian legal norms can or ought to be maintained remains
problematic. Indeed, it would be erroneous to assume that the
debate is exclusively between civilian and military society. Not
only is the pressure by service families for instrumental change
within military communities recognised officially. There are also
internal military voices arguing that the British Army ought not
to "insist upon, and to express, a different set of values
from those that are widely accepted within civil society".27
Perhaps few would quarrel with the proposition that wide divergences
may be unacceptable in a western liberal democracy, though the
view may controversially be expressed by some that the armed forces,
to be effective, must necessarily be "undemocratic".
However, recent challenges have focused on how rather than on
whether the services ought to accommodate non-operationally damaging
diversity within institutions characterised by their unique cultural
ethos vis-a-vis civilian society.28
MILITARY LAW
CHANGE: CIVILIAN
SUPREMACY?
What, then, does this analysis tell us about
civil-military relations in the United Kingdom with particular
reference to law applicable to the armed forces? In law creating,
are the armed forces adequately subordinate to civilian authority?
Do they require for operational or combat effectiveness a greater
degree of autonomy from legal and democratic accountability than
currently enjoyed?
We have noted how much of the agenda of military
law change emanates from within the military community itself,
whether to further borrow rules of evidence and procedure from
the civilian criminal justice system (in the spirit of civilianisation
of military law) or to address particular operational needs, which
might relate to creating new military offences, to fostering a
more congenial legal environment for recruitment and retention,
or to counteract anticipated or delivered hostile judgments from
the civilian courts, whether domestic or European.
Nonetheless, in regard to whether civilian supremacy
in respect to military law change is "real", parliamentary
scrutiny of the defence sector is becoming increasingly specialised.
Select Committee expertise is rising, notwithstanding that military
experience among its members has declined.29 Indeed, the spectacle
of focussed and well-informed bodies such as Stonewall (for the
first time in 1990-91) and Rank Outsiders (1995-96) appearing
in person before a defence-related select committee does represent
a level of access by pressure groups to legal policy-making not
hitherto experienced in this sphere. For example, at the 1980-81
committee, only Ministry witnesses were called to give evidence
in person. At the 1985-96 hearings, the committee voted to decline
to question the Campaign for Homosexual Equality, though the AT
EASE organisation was permitted to raise the issue of homosexuality
during its appearance before the Committee.30
A COMPARISON WITH
THE UNITED
STATES
Thus the argument pointing to a wider democratic
input to the process of military law change in the United Kingdom
is attractive. Some have argued that globalisation has prompted
the decline of mass militarism, mass armies and mass military
culture, with the latter, in particular, being refashioned to
embrace non-nationalistic principles of gender, race and cultural
equality.31 The pattern of such changes globally is, of course,
uneven, and it may bypass some societies. While this is scarcely
the case in the United States, a brief glance at the country's
procedures for effecting military law change suggests weaker democratic-institutional
input than we enjoy in the United Kingdom, though indications
pointing to greater transparency in American military law-making
procedures have recently been observed.32 There is no equivalent
to the Commons Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill, one
obvious explanation for which being that the United States Uniform
Code of Military Justice does not periodically expire and require
renewal.33 Major Congressional revision of the Code has occurred
only twice since its creation in 1950, that is, in 1968 and again
in 1983. Moreover, many observers believe that the Department
of Defense effectively controls the process of introducing changes
into military law, and most such changes are effected under delegated
authority granted by the Department of Defense Authorisation Act.
Where primary (not subordinate) legislative changes occur, they
do not generally generate congressional debate. As Fidell observed
in 1989, "[United States] military lawyers . . . continue
to bear unique responsibility for the development of military
legal doctrine. There are relatively few trials or appeals in
which civilian counsel play any role, and the civilian bar has
not been notably aggressive, independent or effective in troubling
itself with respect to military justice".34 There has, in
effect, been little public or civilian professional participation
in this process, and any civilian influence on policy, for example,
in respect to judicial tenure in military courts, has been barely
discernable by the time that changes, often after a long delay,
have been made. American civilian practitioners in military law
have complained that the President's rule-making power for courts
martial,
". . . does not provide for an advisory
group with broad representation from the professional bench and
bar. It does not provide for a broad public rulemaking method
designed to instil public confidence in the rules proposed. Finally,
it does not provide for meaningful congressional oversight".35
Whether United States military law-making procedures
are moving closer to those in the United Kingdom remains to be
seen. It should not, however, be forgotten that regulations for
courts martial in the United Kingdom share some of these characteristics,
and it is also the case that much of military law, especially
in regard to the Royal Navy, is prerogative-based (and therefore
does not require prior parliamentary approval).36 Indeed, this
is also the case in respect to pre-Armed Forces Discipline Act
2000 provisions concerning summary dealing in the Army and summary
trials in the Royal Navy. In those cases, the relevant regulation
is issued by the Defence Council under statutory authority, and
not by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument. In contrast,
however, regulations for courts martial are statutory instruments
subject to Commons and Lords oversight, albeit by negative resolution
procedure. A parliamentary procedure therefore does at least exist,
though its efficacy in respect to military law will obviously
be dependent, to a degree, on informed understanding of the issues
on the part of members of each House. Similarly, the Armed Forces
Act 1996, s 4, provides that regulations in respect to enlistment
and terms of service will henceforth be made by statutory instrument
subject to the negative resolution procedure. This replaces regulation
by Defence Council and enhances the transparency and democratic
accountability of such important rule-making procedures. Thus
while much of service law in the United Kingdom remains prerogative-based,
parliamentary oversight is more favourably placed than its counterpart,
congressional oversight, in the United States.
Moreover, in the United States, the Supreme
Court has tended to adopt an extremely deferential approach to
the service authorities when determining the outcome of constitutional
challenges to military laws,37 whether in respect to freedom of
speech, or to privacy, or to searches and seizure. The concept
of "military necessity" when invoked in the Supreme
Court is thus widely interpreted.38 Admittedly, it is not difficult
to identify decisions affecting United Kingdom military law which
effectively have upheld "military necessity" doctrines,
such as the recent Sirdar ruling in the European Court of Justice
(see previously) or the determinations in the United Kingdom (not
the European) courts on the legality of the ban on homosexuals
serving in the British armed forces. On the other hand, the rulings
of "constitutional" courts binding on the United Kingdom
government in service-related cases (such as the previously cited
Findlay, Hood and Lustig-Prean and Beckett cases)39 are now matching
rulings, in Canadian and South African supreme or constitutional
courts, which established that major structural defects in the
court martial system had to be corrected.40
Measured against these seismic shifts, and in
the light of an admittedly limited comparison between the United
States and the United Kingdom in respect to military law-making
practices and procedures, a "democratic audit" of civil-military
relations in this specific sphere of United Kingdom activity would
suggest a reasonably healthy balance.41
AN OBSCURED
OR HIDDEN
MILITARY LAW
AGENDA?
Nonetheless, much of the military law agenda
remains hidden from public scrutiny (as one would anticipate in
respect to policy or administrative guidance, especially within
security-related organisations). Whether military documents such
as the various Provost Manuals should have a restricted classification,
given that they prescribe, inter alia, legal procedures
for the exercise of arrest powers; or whether, for example, the
Army Commissioning Regulations 1999, which of course derive from
the Royal Prerogative (as does much of military law) should continue
similarly to be so classified, cannot easily be answered in the
abstract. Solicitors or barristers representing service or ex-service
clients may, of course, require access to restricted documents
such as the Military Secretary's Guide of Officers' Confidential
Reports; or to Army Form AF B9926, "Request for an Officer's
Premature Move to Termination of Service", or to the procedures
for dealing with enlisted or commissioned conscientious objectors,
as prescribed in Army General and Administrative Instructions,
Vol 5, Instruction No 6 (which was prosecution evidence in the
court martial of Gnr Vic Williams who refused to serve in the
Gulf War).42 On occasions when full access, for example, to Board
of Inquiry reports, has been denied, there could of course be
resort to discovery proceedings by litigants seeking confidential
military material.43 Occasional glimpses of this "hidden"
world of military law do therefore emerge in a very small number
of cases (and, one suspects, others will be uncovered as the subject-matter
of litigation against the Ministry of Defence is expanded). Parliamentarians
have also made scathing reference in the past to obscure Defence
Council Instructions (now withdrawn) on medical examination, which
were prescribed for the detection of serving homosexuals.44 Again
the world of DCIs is one which is generally unfamiliar to most
lawyers.
SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS
In conclusion, we agree that parliamentary scrutiny
of military law is becoming more proficient; that European and
European human rights law are transforming legal relations within
the United Kingdom armed forces (the consequences of which, for
military ethos and for operational effectiveness, have yet to
be properly assessed); that the boundaries of litigation against
the Ministry of Defence are now regularly being tested; and that
United Kingdom military law-making procedures appear to enjoy
more transparency than comparable arrangements in the United States.
Yet our review of internally and externally driven legal changes
and of the relevance of civilianisation and of operational factors
on military law-making suggests that a considerable element of
the law making agenda remains within the effective control of
the service department itself (eg enlistment rules, Pay Warrant,
reserve forces, and rules of evidence in courts martial). Perhaps
most relevantly, the hidden (and sometimes closed) world of AGAIs,
FLAGOs, DCIs, Standing Orders, Rules of Engagement (whether in
respect to the United Kingdom or to overseas theatres), Local
Purchase Regulations, Road Transport Regulations, Military Flying
Regulations, and many others too numerous to mention,45 all testify
to a land of military law scarcely known to, or penetrated by,
the civilian world. In this respect, the democratic principle
of civilian supremacy over the military may have weak purchase
(but whether this should be a matter of concern to civilian society
in 2000 after the government unfolded its freedom of information
proposals in late 1999 is beyond the scope of this submission).46
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It would perhaps not be difficult to identify
a list of new "rights" to which service personnel might
lay claim in the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998. Restrictions
on active participation in trade union activities (in respect
to the freedoms of association and expression); remaining prohibitions
on fraternisation notwithstanding the new Armed Forces Code of
Social Conduct of January 2000 and its accompanying "Service
Test" (right to privacy and to family life); the "charges
raised" provisions following "marching out" from
married quarters (right to a fair trial) may all be potential
litigation generators (this list does not necessarily imply either
a justification for removing or likely legal success in removing,
existing restrictions). But a list of rights of this nature is
ad hoc and cannot settle the question of what rights in
principle should apply. One can, of course, advert to such conceptual
frameworks as "The Need to be Different" or "Sustaining
the Will to Fight", to which the Committee has already given
its attention. But that debate is still unresolved and arguably
cannot be resolved in an unequivocal fashion, if, for no other
reason than that circumstances differ between services, between
units, between persons, between war and peace, between social,
economic, political and cultural environments. But underlying
these conceptions is a sense of exception (a term used in preference
to "uniqueness", or "difference" or "distinctive
military ethos"). Therefore, in seeking to identify the substantive
provisions of military law which parliament approves, or the substantive
provisions of civilian legal norms which should not extend to
the armed forces, the focus should be on criteria for exceptions
or exclusions. This might mean, for example, that the rights listed
in the European Convention on Human Rights and now incorporated
in the Human Rights Act 1998 are, a priori, applicable
to members of the armed forces except where operational requirements
make this exclusion necessary (it assumes that military ethos
would discourage trivial or "barrack-room" claims from
emerging. If they do, then perhaps the serviceman or woman in
question is not "morally fitted" for such service. It
also assumes reciprocal recognition by the armed forces of the
broad human rights principles underlying the Convention and the
1998 Act; principles enduring in Western democracies (even if
not always in practice) since, arguably, the later eighteenth
century.
But what is especially pertinent is that in
most such cases, as is known, such rights, though fundamental,
are not absolute. Provisos apply, which may fit the armed forces'
circumstances in individual cases. Similarly, EU equal treatment
provisions are qualified by "combat effectiveness" exclusions
or by "general occupational qualification" exceptions.
From the legal point of view, therefore, it is difficult to formulate
any new legal principles to cast light on which broadly expressed
fundamental rights in the Human Rights Act era service personnel
should enjoy; that is, principles which cannot be extracted on
a case-by-case basis from the existing human rights, equal treatment
or military discipline codes where qualifications or exceptions
relating to, for example, combat effectiveness, general occupational
qualifications, national security, public order or territorial
integrity may be found (in express or implied terms).
Despite this possibly unadventurous conclusion,
it is hoped that the foregoing examination of the factors prompting
military law change; of the individuals, bodies or organisations
instigating the process of change; and of the degree of "democratic
participation" in this specialised process will lend a sense
of perspective for the Defence Committee to the more detailed
working out of future military law provisions.
1 G R Rubin, "Towards an Understanding of Change
in United Kingdom Military Law", September 2000.
2 In the Army, they are known as AGAI (Army General
and Administrative Instructions) and in the Royal Navy as FLAGO
(Fleet Administrative and General Orders). Though mainly classified
as "restrictive", some (such as those concerned with
equal opportunities or harassment) are widely available as unclassified
documents.
3 For further details, see the present author's annotations
to the Reserve Forces Act 1996, s 4, in [1996] Current Law
Statutes, ch 14.
4 This paper does not, in general, seek to address
issues of international law, though treaties are cited at appropriate
points in the text.
5 See, for example, Armed Forces Act 1996, ss 21-27;
Anthony Arnull, "EC Law and the Dismissal of Pregnant Servicewomen",
Industrial Law Journal, Vol 24, 1995, pp 215-34.
6 There are a number of unreported cases. See, for
example, Sunday Times, 4 January 1998; The Times,
25 May 1999. For the United States, see Lt Cdr J Richard Chema,
""Arresting Tailhook": The Prosecution of Sexual
Harassment in the Military", Military Law Review,
Vol 140, 1993, pp 1-64.
7 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom
(2000) 29 EHRR 493 and Lustig-Prean and Beckett v United
Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 548 European Court of Human Rights,
11 October 1999. Compensation payments totalling £324,875
were awarded by the court. See Guardian 26 July 2000. The
lifting of the ban and the introduction of a new code of service
conduct covering all personal relationships, both homosexual and
heterosexual, were announced in January 2000. See Guardian,
13 January 2000. The code is @ www.mod.uk/policy/homosexuality/code.htm.
8 Lawyer, Vol 13, No 24, 21 June 1999 (case
of John Callaghan).
9 Ann Lyon, "Negligence and the Field of Battle"
New Law Journal, 17 January 1997, pp 46-7; id, 24
January 1997, pp 104-6.
10 Guardian, 31 October 1996.
11 Barratt v Ministry of Defence [1995] 3
All ER 87.
12 Id. Whether criminal or other proceedings will
follow in the wake of findings regarding the conducting of nerve
gas experiments on national servicemen in the 1950s is awaited.
13 R v Ministry of Defence [2000] IWLR
806 (HL).
14 Lawyer, Vol 13, No 17, 3 May 1999: Guardian,
28 April 1999 (case of Maj Milos Stankovic). The Stankovic case,
among others, has drawn attention to whether the Ministry of Defence
Police have been exercising their powers (arrest, search etc)
without legal authority since 1987. See id, 7 August 2000:
also interview on Radio 4 "Today" programme, 18 September
2000.
15 The cause céle"bre is Findlay
v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 221. See also Moore
and Gordon v United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 728.
16 R v McEnhill, The Times, 4 February
1999 (CMAC).
17 R v Clegg [1995] 1 All ER 334 (HL);
[1995] 1 AC 452.
18 Guardian, 13 November 1996 ("MoD faces
1,000 writs from Gulf veterans over illness"); Lawyer,
30 September 1997.
19 Lest it be wrongly thought that a compensation
culture is one-sided, it may be noted that in February 1998, the
Ministry of Defence issued a writ for more than £8 million
against the estate of a pilot who died in a mid-air collision
with a Jaguar aircraft. See the Lawyer, 24 February 1998.
20 House of Commons, Session 1995-96, Special
Report from the Select Committee on the Armed Forces Bill
[henceforth AFBSC], House of Commons Paper 143, 30 April 1996,
para 4.
21 Armed Forces Act 1996, ss 30-31.
22 See General (ret'd) Sir Michael Rose, "Sustaining
the Will to Fight in the British Army", Officer, Vol
10, No 1, January-February 1998, pp 40-1.
23 Gerald Frost, "How to Destroy an Army",
in Gerald Frost (ed), Not Fit to Fight: The Cultural Subversion
of the Armed Forces in Britain and America, London: Social
Affairs Unit, 1998, at pp 15-16. A military periodical ran a series
of articles on "compensation claims and what commanders can
do to avoid them". See Nigel Brain, "The Army and the
Law", British Army Review, No 111, December 1995,
pp 64-66.
24 Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law
of Termination of Employment, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992,
pp 30-40, and references therein to Simitis and Teubner.
25 Penny Brooker, "The Juridification of Alternative
Dispute Resolution", Anglo-American Law Review, Vol
28, 1999, pp 1-36, at p 1. See also John Field and A Caiger, "Lawyers
and Arbitration: The Juridification of Construction Disputes",
Modern Law Review, Vol 56, 1993, pp 412-40.
26 Brig A S Ritchie, "Turning the Tide":
Addressing Army Personnel Issues", RUSI Journal, Vol
114, No 6, December 1999, pp 67-71.
27 Lt Col J D Beaumont, "Armed Forces Within
a Democratic Society", British Army Review, No 119,
August 1998, pp 35-8. Voices sympathetic as well as hostile to
Maj Eric Joyce's analysis and interpretation of deficiencies in
British Army personnel policies were also expressed in the columns
of the military press. See Eric Joyce, Arms and the Man-Renewing
the Armed Services, London: Fabian Society, 1997.
28 Christopher Dandeker, "On The `Need to be
Different': Recent Trends in Military Culture", in Hew Strachan
(ed), The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-first
Century, London; Frank Cass & Co, 2000, Ch 12.
29 A brief glance at AFBSC membership since 1970-71
will confirm this. The details are omitted here.
30 The Campaign for Homosexual Equality did submit
written evidence in 1980-81 and in 1985-86. The Conservative Group
for Homosexual Equality did so in 1985-86.
31 Cf, Martin Shaw, "The Post-Military
Citizen", paper to conference on "Redefining Society-Military
Relations from Vancouver to Vladivostok", Birmingham University,
April 1999.
32 See National Institute of Military Justice [Washington
DC], Military Law Gazette, No 77, 1 May 2000.
33 For this and subsequent points, see Dwight H Sullivan,
"Modalities of Change in Military Justice (a United States
Perspective)", in National Institute of Military Justice,
Sourcebook on Contemporary Comparative Military Justice,
prepared for Conference on Continuity and Change in Military Justice,
London, 12 December 1998, pp 460-1.
34 Eugene R Fidell, "The Culture of Change in
Military Law", Military Law Review, Vol 126, 1989,
pp 125-32, at pp 130-1.
35 American Bar Association, Standing Committee on
Armed Forces Law, Report to the House of Delegates, Court Martial
Rulemaking Procedures, February 1997, p 11.
36 The Royal Prerogative basis of much military law
may have surprising consequences. For example, while there may
be a statutory right to equal pay, there is no legally enforceable
right to pay, per se. Similarly, there is no legal entitlement,
on the part of officers at least, to leave the services prematurely.
37 Sullivan, op cit.
38 Maj Stanley Levine, "The Doctrine of Military
Necessity in the Federal Courts", Military Law Review,
Vol 89, 1980, pp 3-24. See also Col Frederic I Lederer and
Lt Col Frederic L Borch, "Does the Fourth Amendment Apply
to the Armed Forces?" Military Law Review, Vol 144,
1994, pp 10-25. Cf, United States v Scheffer
118 S Ct 1261 (1998), upholding the Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM) "per se" exclusion of polygraph evidence
in Rule 707(a).
39 See also Coyne v United Kingdom,
Case No 124/1996/743/942, European Court of Human Rights, 24 September
1997, in regard to Royal Air Force courts martial.
40 For Canada, see R v Généreux
[1992] 1 SCR 259, 88 DLR 4th 100 (1992); Lauzon v R
56 CRR 2d 30 129 CCC 3d 399 (CMAC, 1998). For South Africa, see
President of the Ordinary Court Martial v Freedom of
Expression Institute, No 5/99, 1999 (South African Constitutional
Court, 24 August 1999). See w.w.w.inc.co.za/online news 2/south-africa/law/comartial.html.
See, generally, Eugene R Fidell, "A World-Wide Perspective
on Change in Military Justice", paper to Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, October 1999.
41 So far as is known, the Bar Council and the Law
Society of England and Wales have not submitted written or oral
evidence to AFBSCs, though the Bar Council (at least) gave evidence
to the Lewis Committee in 1947. See Law Journal, Vol 97,
25 April 1947, p 208. There is a United Kingdom Group of the International
Association for Military Law and the Law of War in which military
lawyers, civilian practitioners, judges, civil servants and academics
participate. Unlike the United States' National Institute for
Military Justice (cf, note 33 above), it does not campaign
for changes in military law, though meetings of the Group will,
of course, discuss current issues and concerns, usually on a Chatham
House rules basis. Academic interest in military law in the United
Kingdom tends to concentrate on the international law of armed
conflict, with only a small number of academics specialising in
service discipline law.
42 Col [now Maj Gen] G Risius, "Conscientious
Objection and the Gulf War, The Case of Gunner Williams",
Military Law Journal, No 2, 1995, pp 25-40, at p 34.
43 The cause céle"bre regarding access
to "defence" documents is the Thetis case, Duncan
v Cammell, Laird & Co [1942] AC 624. More recent
"discovery" applications (unreported) include Barrett
v Ministry of Defence (prior to the trial of the action;
see note 8 above); Ferrante v Ministry of Defence, Independent,
30 March 1991; The Times, 5 March 1996; and R
v Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte Sancto (1993)
5 Admin LR 673 (DC).
44 HC Deb, 6th Series, Vol 227, 21 June 1991, Col
137 (Tony Banks).
45 In ex parte Walker (note 13 above) the
courts discussed AGAI and DCIs.
46 Matters of deployment of the armed forces tend
to be viewed as "non-justiciable" by the courts. See
China Navigation Co Ltd v Attorney-General [1932]
2 KB 197; Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions
[1964] AC 736; Council of Civil Service Trade Unions v
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. The facts
in The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77 might suggest a modification
to this doctrine, while the dicta therein suggest otherwise. Similarly,
the English courts did not decline jurisdiction in the "homosexuality
and armed forces" case, R v Secretary of State
for Defence, ex parte Smith et al [1995] 4 All ER 427 (Div
Ct); [1996] 1 All ER 257 (CA), on the ground that "operational
considerations" were not involved (see Simon Brown LJ [1995]
4 All ER, at p 446). For the United States, cf, The Committee
on Military Affairs and Justice of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, "Congressional Control of the Military
in a Multilateral Context", Military Law Review, Vol
162, December 1999, pp 50-131.
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