The recruitment challenge
23. The recruitment challenge the Services will face
over the next 10 to 20 years is a fundamental one. They will need
to recruit around 25,000 people a year for the foreseeable future.
This will be in the context of an employment market which is not
working in their favour. Unemployment levels are low and current
predictions are that they will stay that way. The number of young
people in further education has doubled compared with 10 years
ago. The number in the target age group is shrinking: there are
a third fewer 17-18 year-olds today compared with 20 years ago
and the number of 16-24 year-olds has also fallen by a sixth in
the same period, and is still falling.[41]
The alternative to reaching their targets is that the Armed Forces
will have to confront the limits on their capacity to recruit
the right kind of people, and then adjust their ambitions accordingly.
Whatever happens, they cannot afford to limit their access to
people by appearing to exclude any group of fit, young people.
24. We have discussed above the problems arising
from the reduced visibility of the Armed Forces in society, which
must have an effect on the likelihood of young people joining
the Services. The type of careers the Services offer are less
attractive to today's young people, many of whom find the idea
of being tied into a job for a number of years too restrictive
a prospect.[42]
Nor do the Services have the appeal they once did in providing
an opportunity to travel which civilians might not enjoy.[43]
25. Professor Christopher Dandeker, Head of the War
Studies Department at King's College, London, believed that reluctance
to join the Armed Forces does not result from the Services being
held in low esteem by wider society
... it is perfectly possible
for members of the civilian community to value the armed services,
and indeed trust the armed services ... It is also the case that
the armed services are seen as doing a good job ... That does
not mean that those same people would wish to join themselves
or would necessarily recommend their children should join.[44]
Professor Strachan put this in an historical context:
he believed the Armed Forces have had good public perceptions
but low recruiting levels since the nineteenth century and 'the
fact that the armed forces are below establishment is a normal
condition of life'. The failure to meet manpower targets had not
previously caused many difficulties. Relative undermanning, when
operational tempo is not very high, can seem only to be a theoretical
problem. Real problems are arising now, though, because the proportion
of personnel deployed on operations creates a greater need for
the Services to be at their full establishment levels.[45]
26. The Table below shows intake figures for the
Armed Forces for the last 5 years.
Table 3
Intake to the Regular Forces 1995-96 to
1999-2000
| | 1995-96
| 1996-97 | 1997-98
| 1998-99 | 1999-2000
|
All Services
Officers
Other Ranks
| 17,672
1,390
16,282
| 22,165
1,491
20,674
| 23,507
1,675
21,832
| 25,976
1,506
24,470
| 25,533
1,551
23,594
|
Naval Service
Officers
Other Ranks
| 2,337
221
2,116 |
3,959
364
3,595 | 4,602
375
4,227
| 4,767
383
4,384 |
4,953
408
4,545 |
Army
Officers
Other Ranks
| 12,911
891
12,020
| 15,522
804
14,718
| 15,379
903
14,476
| 16,963
696
16,267
| 16,483
1,047
15,436
|
Royal Air Force
Officers
Other Ranks
| 2,424
278
2,146 |
2,684
323
2,361 | 3,526
397
3,129
| 4,246
427
3,819 |
4,097
484
3,613 |
Source: Defence Analytical Services Agency, UK
Regular Forces Strengths and Changes at 1 October 2000, TSP
1, 2 November 2000
In 1999-2000 Royal Navy and Royal Marine recruitment
reached 99 per cent of target; Army recruitment was at 95 per
cent of target; and RAF was at 96 per cent.[46]
The Minister told us that this year the Services had had their
best recruitment year for 10 years, despite low unemployment,
but acknowledged the need to look further ahead.[47]
Although the Navy's recruiting figures had improved over the last
five years, the Second Sea Lord too was aware that meeting recruitment
targets would be more difficult in the medium to long term.[48]
Intake figures on their own do not tell the whole story: they
need to be viewed in the context of the Services' manning requirements
and with the numbers leaving the Services. Figures 1-4 show that
there has been a net outflow from the regular forces in the last
five years.
Source: Defence Analytical Services Agency, UK
Regular Forces Strengths and Changes at 1 January 2001 (Revised),
TSP 1, 6 February 2001
The most recent data, for the six months to October
2000, [see also Table 4 below] shows an increase in net outflow
against the previous year.
Table 4
Intake against outflow for financial year 2000-2001
(6 months to October 2000)
| | Intake
| Outflow | Net Change
|
All Services
Officers
Other ranks
| 13,426
1,162
12,264
| 14,728
1,488
13,240
| -1,302
-326
-976
|
Naval Service
Officers
Other ranks
| 12,646
317
2,329
| 2,889
333
2,556
| -243
-16
-227 |
Army
Officers
Other ranks
| 8,686
569
8,117
| 9,077
752
8,325
| -391
-183
-208 |
RAF
Officers
Other ranks
| 2,094
276
1,818
| 2,762
403
2,359
| -668
-127
-541 |
Source: Defence Analytical Services Agency, UK
Regular Forces Strengths and Changes at 1 November 2000, TSP
1, 4 December 2000
Assessing the Services individually, the Army disappointingly
shows a net outflow for the first half of 2000-01, having improved
its performance in the previous few years. The RAF net outflow
remains fairly constant. The Navy, while still sustaining a net
outflow, has at least continued to show an improvement for the
first half of this year. Despite the healthy state of recruitment,
it is clear that the manning problem is worsening rather than
improving. The Table below demonstrates that this is the case
for the trained strength against the trained requirement,
as well as for total numbers in the Services.
Table 5
Strengths and Requirements of UK Trained
Regular Forces 1998-2000
| |
| Trained Requirement
| Trained Strength
| Shortfall
|
| Naval Service |
April 1998
| 41,900
| 40,400
| 1,600 (3.8%)
|
| | April 1999
| 40,900
| 39,000
| 1,900 (4.6%)
|
| | April 2000
| 39,863
| 38,877
| 966 (2.4%)
|
| |
December 2000
| 39,921
| 38,604
| 1,317 (3.3%)
|
| Army | April 1998
| 105,800
| 101,000
| 4,700 (4.4%)
|
| | April 1999
| 105,300
| 99,700
| 5,600 (5.3%)
|
| | April 2000
| 106,396
| 100,334
| 6,062 (5.7%)
|
| |
December 2000
| 106,133
| 100,442
| 5,691 (5.4%)
|
| RAF | April 1998
| 54,500
| 52,700
| 1,800 (3.3%)
|
| | April 1999
| 53,000
| 51,800
| 1,200 (2.7%)
|
| | April 2000
| 52,160
| 51,208
| 952 (1.8%)
|
| |
December 2000
| 51,989
| 50,272
| 1,717 (3.3%)
|
Notes:
Figures for 1998 and 1999 are taken from the Ministry of Defence
Performance Report 1999/2000, p 23, and are rounded to nearest
hundred.
Figures for April and December 2000 are taken from Defence Analytical
Service Agency, UK Armed Forces Strengths and Requirements,
TSP 3, 9 January 2001.
The Army requirement for 2000 if the post-SDR requirement is included
is 108,300.
Army figures include Gurkhas and for 2000 Full Time Reserve Service
personnel
27. It takes time for improvements in the net inflow/outflow
figures for overall force numbers to filter through to the trained
strength and therefore contribute to meeting the trained requirement
targets. We discuss below what the Armed Forces are doing and
what should be done to stop the trained strength leeching out.
However, a steady supply of new recruits will always be necessary
and all the more with a disproportionate outflow. Given the negative
aspects of the recruitment market, the Armed Forces need to use
all means at their disposal to secure sufficient recruits of the
right calibre now and for the foreseeable future.
The need for a more radical approach
28. In their recruiting policies, the Armed Forces
must steer a difficult course. For practical, moral and political
reasons they must aim their recruiting strategies at the widest
possible pool of people. But they also need to ensure they are
concentrating on areas where the return for investment is good.
They must ensure that their marketing techniques fully exploit
the range of media and do the utmost to promote the exciting and
varied nature of the careers on offer in the Services. Drawing
from the widest pool of potential recruits means recruiting more
women and people from ethnic minorities. But it should also involve
increasing the profile of the Services across society as a whole.
The view of the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) was that
the Services could no longer rely on young people with Service
connections and family traditions to provide the bulk of their
recruits,[49]
and that there was a need to broadcast much more widely what was
available in the Services
... the Armed Services have
got to go out to the wider community and describe the jobs better
... the marvellous, exciting, stimulating careers which are available
in the Armed Services for women and for men.[50]
As MoD witnesses stressed to us, this is particularly
important if the Armed Forces want young people to come to them
as a career of first choice.[51]
Substantial sums are being spent on recruitment advertising: in
1999-2000 the Navy spent £6.7 million, the Army £18.4
million and the RAF £6.0 million.[52]
29. Appealing to the broadest spectrum in society
is clearly linked to the visibility and civil/military links issues
which we discuss above. In the context of recruitment, it needs
to be specifically addressed by refining and developing the recruitment
techniques the Services have at their disposal. The Internet is
a key tool which the MoD is already exploiting. All three Services
have careers websites. The Army launched an on-line recruiting
office in May which allows users to have an on-line conversation
with a recruiting officer. The RAF careers website reported 1.5
million visits between October 1999 and April 2000. The Royal
Navy site received 2,488 officer and 5,710 rating and Royal Marine
other ranks requests for careers information in 1999-2000.[53]
The MoD tells us that it is too soon to assess how many of these
enquiries and applications translate into actual recruits. It
is important that research in this area is initiated soon so that
these valuable recruitment tools can be further enhanced and refined.
30. There are other measures which could be exploited
to a greater extent to draw young people into the Services at
crucial times in their lives when they are deciding on their careers.
School-leavers are the most obvious target, and the Army has taken
the initiative in appealing to those seeking a career at 16 by
setting up the Army Foundation College at Harrogate. The College
offers 16 to 17 year-olds 23 weeks of military training combined
with adventurous training and 14 weeks of vocational education
in numeracy, communications and problem-solving. Both the Adjutant
General and the Defence Training Review team told us what a success
the College has been and the Army Training and Recruiting Agency,
which is responsible for the College, says there is no doubt that
its establishment has been instrumental in improving the Army's
recruitment performance.[54]
We recommend that the plans to open a second Army Foundation
College should be realised as soon as possible.
31. Another crucial point at which to catch the attention
of young people is at university, particularly for officer recruits.
Professor Strachan emphasised the very direct way in which the
Services can reach university students through the Officer Training
Corps, and believed more use could be made of financial incentives
to encourage OTC membership, which might then lead on to a career
in the Armed Forces.[55]
University cadetships, where students intending to join the Armed
Forces are assisted with funding while at university, provide
one obvious incentive for those going to university to decide
in advance on a Service career. More effort could be made in marketing
the Armed Forces to the growing numbers of students seeking careers
while they are still at university: the Second Sea Lord told us
of an initiative last year which involved every university engineering
student receiving a mail-shot highlighting the career opportunities
available in the Royal Navy. It resulted in a huge increase in
applications.[56]
The impetus for this was the Royal Navy failing to meet its recruiting
targets for engineers for the previous five years.[57]
We welcome the Navy's proactive response to a difficult recruitment
market and expect to see more of this type of targeted initiative
in the future. If the results from a mailshot can be so good,
more directed marketing might produce even more impressive results.
32. One of the greatest recruitment incentives the
Armed Forces can offer is the excellence of their training, which
also offers them a way of increasing their leverage in specific
shortage areas. We have already commented that young people today
are much less willing to be tied into a 'job for life'. The Armed
Forces could make much greater use of the offer of the best skill
training available to attract young people, with the knowledge
that military training will prepare them for a second career when
they leave the Services, provided of course that the Services
can ensure that the recruit stays for long enough to give them
the return they need on the cost of training. The Director General
of the Army Training and Recruiting Agency told us
... what we are doing is
completely changing the way that we are doing our marketing so
that what we are saying to young people today is, 'Look: there
are 143 different trade groups you can get into in the Service
context and you will get superb training in excellent facilities.
You will get paid and you will also get adventure training and
so on to go with that.' That is a superb offer. The problem in
the past has been communicating that and we are having a major
campaign to do that.[58]
33. Attracting young people to the Armed Forces on
the basis of its being excellent preparation for a second, civilian
career relies on military training and qualifications being recognised
by the civilian sector. The Defence Training Review (which we
discuss in more detail below) is looking at the whole issue of
how to ensure that Armed Forces personnel obtain qualifications
which are marketable in civilian life. We trust that the Review's
report (expected in the spring) will take full account of the
importance transferable qualifications have as a recruitment incentive,
as well as being a key driver for improving retention.
34. However, we have to recognise the dilemma the
Armed Forces facethe more marketable they make their personnel,
the greater level of 'churn' they risk inducing. There is a ratchet
effectas they make their people better trained and educated,
so they must increase their own attractiveness in order to retain
them. But this is a virtuous circle. It is clear that 'niche marketing'
of the opportunities offered by the Armed Forces is an effective
way forward, and we endorse this approach. The Armed Forces have
to be able to compete against the commercial sector across the
waterfront of pay, training and career satisfaction.
41 Ev p 27, para 2.2 Back
42 Q
381 Back
43 Q
61 Back
44 Q
44 Back
45 Q
44 Back
46 Ministry
of Defence Performance Report 1999/2000, Cm 5000, December 2000,
para 36 Back
47 Q
713 Back
48 Q
248 Back
49 Q
161 Back
50 Q
157 Back
51 See
QQ 376, 420 Back
52 Ministry
of Defence Performance Report 1999/2000, Cm 5000, para 147 Back
53 Ev
p 31, para 8.5; see also Q 113 Back
54 QQ
84 and 395; Army Training and Recruiting Agency Annual Report
1998/99, p 12 Back
55 Q
34 Back
56 Q
248 Back
57 Naval
Training and Recruiting Agency Annual Report and Accounts 1998/99,
p 14 Back
58 Q
691 Back