APPENDIX 26
Memorandum by the All-Party Parliamentary
Beer Group
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES: ALCOHOL TAXES,
TAX REVENUES AND THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET
INTRODUCTION (PAGE
288)
The figures for loss of indirect tax revenue
in 1996£185 milliongrew to £240 million
in 1997 and neither figure includes the £290 million lost
via bootlegging of alcoholic drinks. The bootlegging figure itself
does not include losses from duty diversion fraud nor large scale
commercial smuggling. The data is generally rather out of date.
LONG TERM
TRENDS IN
ALCOHOL SPENDING
(PAGE 289 ET
SEQ)
The FES is not a sufficiently robust data source
for this exercise and all the calculations of price elasticities
and their interpretation must be considered doubtful. For example
how does the statement that "real spending on beer has remained
fairly constant, with an average real increase between 1979 and
1996. . . " reconcile with the Consumer Expenditure data
which shows that real spend on beer fell by 20 per cent between
1979 and 1996 and the volume of beer sold in the UK fell by 14
per cent in this period? Moreover 40 per cent of the breweries
operating in 1979 have closed and 25 per cent of brewing companies
have closed, merged or given up brewingthis is not a state
of affairs that might be expected in a stable market. In the same
vein Consumer Spend data shows that the average annual decline
in spending on spirits has been1.3 per cent (almost half
the rate of decline in the IFS study). Indeed the "long-term
decline in spending on spirits" is itself a questionable
statement since Consumer Spend on spirits has shown year on year
growth in '93, '94, '96, '97 and is ahead in the first six months
of '99.
Footnote 5 states that "our analysis is
concerned only with the impact of legitimate cross-border shopping".
Since HM Customs & Excise estimate that over 70 per cent of
cross-border shopping for beer is not legitimate is this not a
significant omission in the analysis?
Page 290 the duty-free allowance for spirits
was effectively doubled after the start of the Single Market (purchases
thereafter could be made on both legs of the journey). . . could
this account for the slower growth in UK domestic spending on
spirits after 1993? Should this have been taken into account in
the analysis?
TAX RATES
AND REVENUES
(PAGE 290 ET
SEQ)
Page 291 Table 1. This table is heavily biased
against beer! Thus while take-home prices are used to calculate
the Duty + VAT percentage of the retail price for wine and spirits
the IFS use on-trade prices for beer. This is clearly not comparing
like with like and if an average take-home price was used for
average strength beer (4.1 per cent) then the beer percentage
would be 42 per cent (not 30 per cent). Similarly, using average
take-home prices and strengths for wine and spirits from AC Neilsen
gives wine at 40 per cent (not 51 per cent) and spirits at 53
per cent (not 62 per cent). The implied duty per litre of pure
alcohol figure for wine (£14.56) is based on an average alcoholic
strength of only 10.25 per cent: the correct average is 11.55
per cent which gives a duty rate of £12.92 which is similar
to the beer figure.
The IFS set out some possible economic justifications
for taxing alcohol including "adverse health effects".
In the interests of achieving a proper balance it should be noted
that there is plenty of evidence of the beneficial effects of
alcohol consumption in moderation which might argue against high
alcohol taxation. Most "adverse health effects" are
associated with alcohol abuse and taxation is not an effective
tool to combat this.
Page 292 says that the "externality"
is linked to the quantity of alcohol and a sensible system would
tax alcohol on a uniform basis. "To justify taxing alcohol
in different forms in different ways it needs to be shown that
consuming alcohol in different forms is associated with different
levels of social cost". It should be noted that the disproportionately
higher tax per percentage alcohol on spirits in the UK at 1.7
is less than the international norm of c 3:1 (the average of 19
countries). Some Scandinavian countries base their duty system
on research which they claim does show that social costs increase
as alcohol concentration increases.
The Crawford & Tanner work took no account
of the impact of cross-border shopping and the relative pricing
between the UK and France in their elasticity calculations. The
current IFS study looks at cross-price effects between different
UK alcoholic drinksbut again not the impact of cross-price
effects between the UK and France. Since cross-channel shopping
now accounts for some 15 per cent of UK take-home beer and wine
consumption post the Single Market this would seem to be a significant
omission. The calculation of elasticities in relation to tax revenue
only take into account duty and VAT: no account or mention is
made of the impact on other tax streams which in the case of beer
are very substantial because most beer is sold in the labour intensive
on-trade rather than the self-service take-home trade which accounts
for the most wine and spirit sales. This would seem a significant
omission.
It is not clear what price, volume and spend
data is used in the calculations. In the case of beer it is important
to use separate data for on and off trade consumption since they
are in effect different markets, moving in different directions
and impacted differently by cross-border shopping.
As stated earlier the FES is not a robust data
source for this type of exercise and does not reconcile with Consumer
Expenditure nor with market volume data. Thus any subsequent analyses
or conclusions based on this data have to be dubious.
The standard errors quoted on page 298
are also particularly high for wines and spirits (eg 0.904 on
an elasticity of -0.86) which surely makes it difficult to say
with any confidence that spirits are more price elastic than beer
(-0.74). It is also noted that the SPIT model developed by IFS
and used by HM Customs & Excise shows significantly different
own price elasticities: beer -0.985 (vs -0.74 in current IFS paper),
wine -1.145 (vs -1.85), spirits -0.941 (vs -0.86). Note that the
SPIT model shows spirits to be less elastic than beer in
contrast to the current IFS study.
Page 300 the conclusion that "tax
rates (for beer) are below their revenue maximising levels"
is interesting in the context that beer duty receipts fell substantially
below the level forecast in both 1997-98 and 1998-99 despite duty
rates only rising with inflation. Indeed the receipts were unchanged
at £2.7 billion despite two increases in duty rate.
4 November 1999
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