APPENDIX 12
Memorandum by the Tobacco Manufacturers'
Association
1. The Tobacco Manufacturers' Association
(TMA) is the trade association for those companies which manufacture
tobacco products in the United Kingdom. The TMA represents the
industry as a whole in matters concerning trade and taxation.
It does not deal with matters which are features of competition
between manufacturers. It does not promote smoking but does defend
the freedom of adults to choose to smoke. The Principal Members
of the TMA are Gallaher Ltd., Imperial Tobacco Ltd. and Rothmans
(UK) Ltd; British American Tobacco, Philip Morris Ltd., R J Reynolds
Tobacco (UK) Ltd and Japan Tobacco Inc. are Associate Members.
2. The UK market for tobacco products is
in chaotic disorder, as a consequence of tobacco bootlegging and
smuggling which is being committed on a massive and ever increasing
scale. Estimates of the extent of bootlegging and smuggling are
made both by HM Customs & Excise (HMC&E) and the UK tobacco
industry. The TMA derives its estimates from a combination of
industry data, research and modelling and although the Government's
estimates each year have initially been lower than those of the
TMA, those estimates have subsequently been amended upwards (Table
1).
Table 1
ESTIMATES OF REVENUE LOST BY BOOTLEGGING
AND SMUGGLING
|
| Date | Industry
| Government |
|
| October 1992 | Predict that in the near future ". . . the total annual revenue loss could be in excess of £1 billion."1
| |
| October 1994 | ". . . a revenue loss from bootlegging of £175 million."2
| |
| July 1995 | ". . . a revenue loss of £250 million."3
| |
| June 1996 | ". . . UK Revenue lost. . . some £520 million. . . from smuggling"4
| |
| September 1996 | |
Press release details results of HM Customs first estimates of the scale of revenue loss£550 million in 1996.5
|
| September 1997 | |
Press Release presents results of HM Customs second survey. Loss of £690 million in 1997, and revision of 1996 figure to £640 million.6
|
| November 1998 | | Results of third survey are made available. 1998 revenue loss estimated to be £1 billion. Estimates for previous years are also revised. 1996 now £680 million, 1997 increased to £790 million.7
|
| January 1999 | ". . . Government revenue losses of over £1.5 billion annually."8*
| |
| March 1999 | | In his Budget Statement the Chancellor labelled tobacco smuggling "a £1½ billion a year racket".9*
|
| May 1999 | | The Paymaster General Dawn Primarolo accepts that 1998 revenue loss was "perhaps around £1.7 billion"10*
|
|
* These estimates include "other" forms of
smugglingnot just cross-Channel bootlegging.
1 Tobacco Advisory Council. Chancellor's Budget 1993:
Tobacco Industry Submission. October 1992.
2 Tobacco Manufacturers' Association. Chancellor's Budget
November 1994: UK Tobacco Industry Submission. October 1994.
3 Tobacco Manufacturers' Association Chancellor's Budget:
Tobacco Industry Submission 1995. July 1995.
4 Tobacco Manufacturers' Association. The Chancellor's
1996 Budget: Tobacco Industry Submission. June 1996.
5 HM Customs & Excise. Figures of Excise Smuggling.
Press Release 19 September 1996.
6 HM Customs & Excise. Smuggling of Alcohol and Tobacco.
Press Release 26 September 1997.
7 HM Customs & Excise. Estimates of CrossBorder
Shopping and Smuggling of Alcohol and Tobacco. November 1998.
8 Tobacco Manufacturers' Association. The Budget1999:
Tobacco Industry Submission. January 1999.
9 Hansard 9 March 1999 col 185.
10 Hansard 18 May 1999 col 335-336.
At the end of the day, there has been general agreement between
HM Customs & Excise and the TMA asto the extent of bootlegging
and smuggling and the consequent loss of revenue. The TMA estimates
that the "black market" now accounts for 80 per cent
of total UK consumption of hand-rolling tobacco and for over 20
per cent of cigarettes; more than 4 million people regularly purchase
non-UK taxed tobacco products from illegal sources. In terms of
revenue lost by the Treasury, this equates to a projected shortfall
of £3 billion in 1999.
3. The thriving and still growing "black market"
has most serious implications for UK manufacturers and for retailers,
many of whom have consequently been forced to close (the average
confectioner, tobacconist and newsagent relies on tobacco products
for 30 per cent of turnover). But the implications are arguably
much greater and more serious for government and society as a
whole. The Government no longer has the ability to exercise control
over the total size of the UK market, either in terms of the number
of people who smoke or the amount that they smoke; it lost, on
its won estimate for 1998, as much as £1.7 billion by way
of excise duty and and value added tax; the industry estimates
that the figure is likely to be close to £3 billion in 1999.
There are also serious social and law and order implications arising
from the cynical disregard which is being shown for the law, not
simply by illegal traders but by the buyers of their goods. Organised
crime with local and international tentacles is involved in large
scale smuggling and fraud operations.
4. The value of seizures of tobacco products by HM Customs
& Excise remains only the tip of the iceberg. The value of
tobacco product seizures alone are not published. In 1997/8 the
total value of tobacco and alcohol seizures was £62 million.
The tax revenue estimated to have been lost on tobacco alone in
1997 was £790 million, and in 1998 £1.7 billion. The
seizure rate, therefore, would seem to be no better than 5 per
cent.
5. The reaction of government has not been to deal with
the root cause. Instead, it has sought to deal with the situation
by attempting to increase the operational efficiency of HM Customs
& Excise, whilst at the same time imposing resource constraints
upon HM Customs & Excise that fail to recognise the spectacular
scale of the problem and the amount of lost revenue involved.
6. The root cause of the disorder in the market for tobacco
products is the ever-higher level of tobacco taxation in the UK,
which has driven both the tax burden and the real price of products
to the point where they are amongst the highest in the world.
The contrast with the levels applying in other Member States of
the EU is striking, as is the widening degree of divergence of
UK taxation from the rest of the world.
7. The Single Market came into being on 1 January 1993.
It was not accompanied by the approximation or harmonisation of
the level of tobacco taxation amongst Member States. The disparity
between the tobacco taxes in the UK compared with those in other
Member States has increased significantly since January 1993.
In his 1993 Budget Statement, the Chancellor introduced a minimum
3 per cent per annum real price escalator on tobacco taxation.
This escalator was increased to 5 per cent in 1997. No other EU
Member State has progressively increased its tax levels in the
same manner.

On 1 January 1993 (Chart A), the UK was the fourth highest
amongst current Member States as regards the tax per 20 cigarettes
in the most popular priced category (MPPC); by 1 July 1999, the
UK was far and away the highest (Chart B).

Since the advent of the Single Market, UK taxation has moved
significantly further away from the average of the rest of the
EU (Chart C). These difference in taxation provide highly profitable
incentives to anyone who is willingas many thousands clearly
areto flout the law or to abuse the freedom of movement
of goods which the introduction of the Single Market has brought
about.

8. The arrangements for the movement of tax paid goods
by individuals in the Single Market limited the powers of HM Customs
& Excise to control the flow of tobacco goods entering the
UK from other Member States. The indicative levels for the personal
import of duty paid purchases of tobacco (800 cigarettes; 1kg
of hand-rolling or pipe tobacco; 400 small cigars) were quickly
seen as a charter for illegal trade, at first on a small scale,
then developing into the "white van" and more organised
trade, usually involving tobacco outlets in Belgium. Whilst more
recently additional powers of seizure of vehicles have been afforded
to HM Customs & Excise, it is generally recognised that it
is simply not possible to ensure full compliance with the indicativelevels
of imports. In any event, they are indicative only and cannot
be applied as if they are limits laid down by law. The Financial
Secretary also announced earlier this year that the Government
did not propose to make any changes in the indicative levels.
9. Cigarette duty free prices were lower than duty paid
prices in both France and Belgium, and enterprising regular travellers
and criminal operators sought a share of the increasingly buyoyant
"black market" in cigarettes. Between 1993 and 1998,
duty free purchases doubled. Duty free allowances for intra-EU
travellers were discountinued on 1 July 1999. The industry anticipates
that purchases formerly made duty free will be replaced by duty
paid purchases to which the indicative levels of imports (i.e.
800 cigarettes) will apply, rather than the former vendor controlled
duty free limit (i.e. 200 cigarettes).
10. Organised crime did not take long to recognise and
realise the huge profit potential that was available from exploitation
of the thriving and rapidly growing "black market" in
the UK. During 1997 it became apparent that organised crime had
become involved in smuggling and fraud on a substantial, international
scale. The country of origin of some of the smuggled tobacco products
is not confined to the Member States of the EU. There is increasing
evidence of a proliferation of non-UK brands being sold on the
"black market" and smuggled cigarettes have been identified
as originating from such distant places as Eastern Europe, Asia,
South America and South Africa. Such products are often smuggled
into the UK by the container load or in cunningly concealed and
mis-described lorry loads. It is understood that HM Customs &
Excise are now giving their highest priority to large scale smuggling
and fraud. Given the limited resources available to HM Customs
& Excise, this has the inevitable consequence of more minor
crimes, such as the illegal sale of personal imports, receiving
less attention that they otherwise would. However, the TMA firmly
believes that further action against the grass roots distribution
level of tobacco bootlegging an smuggling is very necessary.
11. HM Customs & Excise are faced with a virtually
impossible task. No effort whatsoever has been made by the Government
to tackle the root cause of tobacco bootlegging and smuggling,
which is high taxation. Yet, as bottlegging and smuggling has
increased, so has Government revenue begun to decline, both in
actual and real terms. The UK Government's own figures predict
a futher substantial fall in tobacco tax revenue in the current
financial year (Chart D).

Such additional resources as Government has provided to HM
Customs & Excise to increase HM Customs & Excise's effectiveness,
have been very modest and wholly inadequate, particularly given
the earlier reductions in financial resources imposed by the Government,
In any event, the additional resources that have now been allocated
are dwarfed by the loss of potential revenue as a result of smuggling.
Furthermore, the scale of smuggling and the rate of growth of
the illegal market is likely to overwhelm any practical timetable
to introduce improved counter measures. The scope for the latter
is, in important regards, limited by the EU Treaty and internal
market commitments to certain trade and customs principles which
are inimical to optimum control. Public attitudes to the illegal
trade in tobacco products are also less censorious than is thecase
with other forms of crime. The view that there is nothing wrong
in buying cigarettes on which UK tax has not been paid has become
increasingly strongly rooted in the public's mind, as the illegal
market has grown and high UK tax rates have been perceived as
being wrong and unfair. Penalties for smuggling tobacco are lighter
than those for smuggling illegal substances and it is therefore
not surprising that highly organised criminal gangs have switched
to tobacco smuggling from activities which carry the risk of much
higher penalties.
12. The UK tobacco industry is being seriously damaged
by bootlegging and smuggling. That may not concern some, but it
is ultimately the interests of the UK which are harmed most. Significantly
for the government's health objectives, it is believed that total
tobacco consumption in the UK is increasing, as a direct result
of the availability of much cheaper smuggled products. It should
also be borne in mind that illicit traders have no regard for
the law concerning the sale of cigarettes to children. The banning
of tobacco advertising , which the Government intends to implement
before the end of this year, will further increase the disorder
in the UK market by diminishing the loyalty to established UK
brands and thereby increasing the propensity to purchase foreign
manufactured cheaper "black market" products.
13. Tobacco wholesalers and retailers are being deprived
of turnover, profitability and the ability to sustain jobs by
the increasing penetration of nonUK duty paid cigarettes
and other tobacco products. Since the introduction of the Single
Market, many thousands of jobs have been lost amongst tobacco
retailers as a direct result of illicit sales by illegal traders.
The job losses were relatively modest in 1996. They have risen
sharply since then following the spectacular increase in the size
of the "black market". Small shops, often providing
a most valuable service to local communities, have been closed
and all categories of tax revenue have been lost, as legal and
overt sales have been translated into illicit and convert sales
at street level, often conducted from households and car boots.
There is no evidence establishing or suggesting that legitimate
retailers have been or are engaged on any significant scale in
the sale of non-UK duty paid tobacco and cigarettes.
14. It is in the interests of the UK tobacco industry
as a whole to do everything it can to assist HM Customs &
Excise. Under the aegis of the Alcohol and tobacco Fraud Review
(ATFR), the manufacturing industry has intensified its long-standing
interaction with HM Customs & Excise. Quarterly meetings continue
to be held with the National Investigation Service (NIS) and athe
National Intelligence Division (NID), to monitor trends and to
provide a forum for the exchange of views. The industry has provided
HM Customs & Excise Economics and Statistics Division (ESD)
with market data and suggested means of modelling the growth in
the "black market " in cigarettes, based on the experience
of the market for hand-rolling tobacco. In addition, the methodology
of additional market research techniques has been submitted for
comment. The companies also provide intelligence to HM Customs
& Excise, much of which is acquired through "Crimestoppers",
which the industry has long supported. The manufacturers are generally
able to assist with the swift and accurate identification of illegal
imported products from their packaging marks and subsequent witness
statements from the companies allow successful prosecutions to
be made.
15. Within the population there is now a massive and,
it seems, ever-expanding market for smuggled tobacco goods. There
is virtually no corner of the country in which smuggled tobacco
and cigarettes cannot be bought at prices substantially lower
than legitimate retail prices. The products concerned are far
from always being well know brands which are on sale from legitimate
retailers in the UK. Increasingly, overseas brands new to Britain
are being smuggled and bought, "on the streets". It
appears that most of those sales take place in or from private
homes or from the boots of cars, and not through legitimate tobacco
retailers. So long as this grass-roots market for smuggled goods
is allowed to exist and flourish, it is most unlikely that the
trade will be stemmed. As one smuggling possibility might be closed,
another will be opened. The quick and substantial profit that
can be made by selling smuggled tobacco and cigarettes in the
UK is a huge incentive. It would appear that the effort, manpower
and costs that HM Customs & Excise requires to investigate
and institute proceedings against small-scale sellers and buyers
are prohibitive in terms of existing resources, albeit that hundreds
of leads are provided to HM Customs & Excise each year by
the industry and through "Crimestoppers".
16. The European Commission takes the view that it is
for individual Member States to deal themselves with the consequences
of their tobacco taxation policies. The prospect of tax harmonisation
is as distant as ever.
17. The only truly effective means of destroying the
"black market" and of reducing bootlegging and smuggling
is for the Government to have the courage to tackle root causethe
difference in tax levels between the UK and most other Member
States of the EU. Other countriesSweden and Canadahave
reduced tobacco taxation, thereby successfully reducing the levels
of tobacco smuggling and restoring tobacco tax revenue. Reducing
tax is not tantamount to condoning criminality. It gains respect
for the law and restores order to a market which is rapidly threatening
to undermine the Government's health and law and order policies.
The consequences of current UK tobacco tax policy are unintended
but inevitable. Measures taken to increase the effectiveness of
HM Customs & Excise can, in the current circumstances, only
be palliatives, with the distinct possibility that HM Customs
& Excise will be rapidly overwhelmed by the continued spectacular
growth of this illegal trade.
1 October 1999
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