APPENDIX 3
Memorandum by The National Association
of Cider Makers
SUMMARY
1. Seen by the UK consumer as an alternative
to beer, cider suffers from the indirect rather than the direct
effects of smuggling and fraud. NACM fully supports its fellow
trade associations and HM Customs & Excise (C&E) in efforts
to protect the UK's legitimate trade and to prevent the further
damage to our society that continued fraud will do.
2. Some parts of C&E's action following
the 1997 Alcohol & Tobacco Fraud Review bring more regulation
of, and expense to, legitimate traders. NACM proposes that resources
would be better directed towards more intelligence activity and
increased action against illegal importers and fraudsters.
3. Affiliated members of NACM, working at
the craft scale, report their concern that they effectively operate
unsupervised by C&E. Having to rely on their own interpretation
of C&E's Official Notices or on comment from C&E Advice
Centres, they have no direct contact at their cider mills with
officers and, rightly or wrongly, fear significant penalties for
any accumulated errors they may be making in their records.
4. There is also concern that unscrupulous
traders are tempted to make and sell cider without payment of
duty in the knowledge that the odds are against their being caught.
5. The National Association of Cider
Makers (NACM) NACM has been established since 1927 as the
representative body of the UK's cider making enterprises. In 1998,
its members and the members of affiliated associations produced
more than 80 per cent of all the cider and perry released in the
UK by C&E. The UK is the world's largest cider market and
its industry is also responsible for an awakening of interest
in cider across the globe. Apart from increasing export sales
year on year, the industry is actively developing markets both
within and outside the EU. NACM's direct and affiliated members
are typically small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) but the
full range is represented. The size of operation runs from the
smallest craft-scale makers producing perhaps 70 hectolitres (1,540
gallons) to the largest operators capable of producing more than
3 million hectorlitres (66 million gallons) each year, if market
conditions allow. NACM members are cider and perry makers; they
do not operate numbers of retail outlets.
6. In this Submission, NACM wishes to record
its views on two of the three topics to be examined by the Committee,
as set out in the Press Notice of 15 July 1999:
1. Custom's success in encouraging and enforcing
compliance across the range of its responsibilities and tackling
the shadow economy.
2. The impact of non-compliance on compliant
businesses (especially in relation to small businesses and the
bootlegging and smuggling of alcohol and tobacco).
7. NACM's comments may be taken to apply
equally to perry unless a distinction is made.
ENCOURAGING AND
ENFORCING COMPLIANCE
General
8. With some exceptions, regrettably few
in number, most UK cider consumers are beer drinkers who occasionally
choose cider. C&E agree that cider itself is generally not
smuggled into the UK and that instances of fraud involving cider
are few, if any. By its nature, the direct effect of fraud involving
cider would not be quantifiable and may be negligible. However,
if a significant and growing proportion of UK beer consumption
is being met by illegally imported or otherwise fradulently supplied
beer at prices significantly undercutting legitimate supplies,
then the opportunities to trade legitimately in cider are increasingly
constrained. Not only that, but illegitimate supplies of beer
are sold through wholly unregulated channels allowing potential
access to under-age children. NACM therefore works closely with
C&E and the Brewers' and Licensed Retailers' Association (BLRA),
together with the other alocholic drinks trade associations, in
seeking to stamp out duty fraud and smuggling.
Alcohol and Tobacco Fraud Review (ATFR)
9. NACM has contributed to this review since
its inception, as have all other alcoholic drinks trade associations.
NACM is concerned that the ATFR appears to have consolidated a
view at C&E that blanket controls are the only satisfactory
means of identifying fraudsters among the large population of
compliant traders. If so, NACM believes that this view has arisen
partly in response to a perceived legal doctrine that, in the
case of illegal imports, Single Market rules prevent overt action
at the point of entry to the UK against what are blatant movements
of exciseable goods. NACM members fully accept the principle of
allowing personal importation of duty-paid goods but feel that
a robust interpretation of the rules will allow more intelligence
to be gathered and used more actively the better to prevent illegal
imports and other fraud.
10. In addition to new regulation and the
risk of penalty involved, considerable time and resource is being
focused on exploring measures which would involve compliant traders
in very significant expense and which NACM feels fraudsters will
find ways of avoiding. C&E and trade associations are cooperating
in this work but it is clear that the likely cost of implementing
some ATFR recommendations will never be justified by cost-benefit
analysis and can only make UK industry less competitive.
11. Examples for matters currently being
examined with C&E include:
the new Warehousekeepers and Owners
of Warehoused Goods Regulations 1999 which concern those cider
makers who send out cider in duty suspense. While only a few may
be affected, the regulations will apply to potentially large volumes
of business and certainly introduce new obligations and penalties
in circumstances which are still unclear and may be beyond the
legitimate trader's power to control.
C&E wish to return to an earlier
regime of requiring guarantees or other financial security for
duty liability. Apart from the direct charges such securities
and their allied indemnities bring. NACM is concerned that a demand
for securities may act to prevent respectable traders from entering
what is a legitimate trade.
C&E wish to introduce systems
which would allow individual packages to be traced from production
to consumption and their duty status identified. Owing to the
highly developed nature of the UK's legitimate distribution systems,
this would require a wholly unprecedented degree of cooperation
and cost at all stages of the distribution chain and would require
many years to achieve. It is also possible that the degree of
certainty usually required of evidence may not be achievable.
Audit Control
12. Until the mid '90s, cider makers expected
at least one visit each year from a C&E officer who would
examine the Entry Bookthe official record of activity every
cider maker was then required to keep. This practice was phased
out by C&E from 1994 in their move to control by audit of
a trader's own accounts. While the medium-sized and larger cider
makers' own audit and financial control functions accept that
C&E audit is as effective as the earlier system, the craft-scale
cider maker finds otherwise. Cider duty itself was re-introduced
only as recently as 1976 and most craft-scale cider makers have
since relied on officer's visits to ensure that they are not in
error.
13. For many craft-scale cider makers the
audit system does not operate; some have not seen an officer since
the change was made. Consequently they must rely on correctly
interpreting C&E's Official Notices and on contact with C&E's
Advice Centres to make their duty declarations and payments. Overall,
the use of an audit system may still be justified in view of the
small volumes traded in this sector of the cider market but reputable
craft-scale cider makers report that they feel at threat of assessment
for duty not paid through error, even though they believe they
have fulfilled all their obligations.
14. Craft-scale cider makers also report
their belief that the lack of policing action by C&E allows
unscrupulous operators to make and sell cider without any duty
payment in the expectation of never being caught.
THE IMPACT
OF NON-COMPLIANCE
ON COMPLIANT
BUSINESS:
15. Apart from suspecting that non-compliant
makers of cider may be competing in local cider supply markets
(paragraph 14, above), the impact of non-compliance on
the cider industry is indirect in that the fraudulent supply of
beer in particular will reduce the demand for cider. It is not
possible to quantify the effect on the compliant cider industry
of non-compliance in the supply of beer but NACM believes that
it has contributed to the recent UK cider industry experience:
10 quarters (2.5 years) of declining
volume since 1996.
a resulting 40 per cent. reduction
in industry operating margin as prices were reduced.
It must be said that, following an extended
period of investment by cider makers and intended to maximise
productivity, the declining trend is now levelling off.
9 September 1999
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