Debate
(a)	Given the relative paucity of debate in the House in recent years, we recommend a debate on this Report and the Government's Response. We also recommend the publication of an annual report to Parliament from British National Space Centre (BNSC) on its work, as a means of providing the material necessary for the proper exercise of accountability to Parliament. This report should set out in comprehensible form what BNSC does and why (paragraph 4).
UK funding
(b)	We understand that the DTI is undertaking an evaluation of civil spending on space programmes over the last decade. We trust that the results of this will be published. Unless it is suggested that funding has achieved an abnormally low rate of return, it is evident to us that if the UK is to play a significant role in global space activities, there will need to be an increase in the UK Government's expenditure on civil space over the next planning period (paragraph 12).
European Space Agency
(c)	Any withdrawal from ESA programmes would have serious detrimental consequences for the UK space industry. However, if the UK space budget is increased by a significant amount, careful consideration should be given as to whether this increase should redress the current balance of national as against ESA spend (paragraph 16).
(d)	We would be concerned if the obvious technical expertise and commitment to space science in ESA were to be diminished as a consequence of new ESA/Commission working arrangements. The UK must continue to participate fully and comprehensively in the strategy discussions and to ensure that the UK's interests in science, and its particular security concerns, are reflected in the outcome. We look forward to the publication of the joint space strategy by the end of the year (paragraph 18).
UK funding policy
(e)	Whilst we appreciate that the Government is pursuing a policy of public private partnerships, we were concerned to discover that such decisions taken unilaterally in an international project had been to the detriment of UK companies. We hope that the lessons of funding the EGNOS project have now been learnt and that the Government and BNSC will ensure that common ground rules for participation in such projects are agreed amongst all participating countries at the earliest stage, and implemented in the UK (paragraph 21).
'Juste retour'
(f)	We detect a degree of hesitancy on the part of the Government in its policy of opposing 'juste retour', possibly based on the absence of any independent authoritative study. We recommend an independent study to ascertain the effects of ESA moving away from 'juste retour', particularly on UK SMEs (paragraph 24).
Export controls
(g)	Given that DTI is responsible for the operation of the UK system of export controls, we expect joined-up Government within as well as between departments to ensure a smoother passage for space exports requiring licensing, and that Ministers will convey to their US counterparts concerns at the unintended consequences of recent changes in the administration of US export licensing (paragraph 28).
Higher education and space
(h)	The next UK space strategy must explicitly address the question of the supply of appropriately qualified graduates, so that the space industry can be sustained in the years ahead. We would hope that in the review of the next UK space strategy, due weight is given to the support of higher space education, both to promote space to future students and to ensure the maintenance of centres of excellence (paragraphs 29 and 30).
Telecommunications
(i)	It is important that the UK remains involved in the field of satellite telecommunications, at both the pure and applied levels of research (paragraph 35).
MOSAIC
(j)	The Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC) expressed disappointment that they were unable to support bids for one of the DTI's key initiatives, MOSAIC, due to timing problems. Given the low number of space-related initiatives, this raises questions over the effectiveness of the lines of communication between the DTI and other BNSC partners. We hope that if, in the future, DTI provides such seedcorn funding the programmes are better managed. We will follow the outcome of the MOSAIC programme with interest and trust that the programme will be fully evaluated (paragraph 41).
GALILEO
(k)	We are concerned that there is an apparent lack of leadership of the UK's participation in Galileo. We recommend that a sustained effort is undertaken by BNSC to ensure joined-up thinking across Government, particularly between DTI and DETR, on the Galileo programme. In the absence of any clear indication of how income may be derived from Galileo, we recommend that, once the definition phase is concluded, the Government discuss with industry the commercial potential for raising income from Galileo and make that assessment publicly available before committing further public funds (paragraph 46).
Earth observation
(l)	Despite more than a decade trying to stimulate commercial markets for Earth observation data, provided at public expense, it is universally accepted that the take-up has been unsatisfactory. It is widely agreed that the market for Earth observation data has not increased as rapidly as was initially anticipated. It appears to us that some of the EO missions of the last decade have suffered from insufficient prior discussion with those who may have wished to use the results. As a consequence they did not provide the high quality real-time and continuous information which users demand (paragraphs 51, 52 and 55).
(m)	We welcome the news that the first low cost opportunity mission in the Living Planet programme is to be UK-led, and one of such self-evident practical significance (paragraph 54).
(n)	Expenditure on EO is one of the areas currently being evaluated by the DTI. Further EO expenditure at current levels must be driven by more than an expression of general but unsubstantiated hope that commercial markets will be generated. It must also be accepted that there are good public policy reasons to gather EO data which cannot be expected to generate a commercial return (paragraph 55).
Beagle 2
(o)	Beagle 2 is an example of an innovative approach to funding and of a project which seems to have won funding despite, rather than because of, the system. It now has the full support of PPARC and the space community. It would be a sad comment on the seriousness of the UK contribution to space science if the necessary funding could not be found. The project is entitled to expect Government support in finding ways to fill the funding gap which we understand has yet to be filled (paragraph 60).
Launchers
(p)	The general perception among all those involved is that the Government and BNSC are following a policy of no involvement in launchers. It is our strong impression that in BNSC there is a less than open mind on the case for Government assistance to launcher development. If Ministers do indeed have an open mind on the use of public funds for launcher research and development, they should make this explicit (paragraph 67).
(q)	We recommend that a review is undertaken of the UK's participation in launcher development programmes. Since no partner in BNSC is likely to be fighting for UK involvement in reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), we also recommend that this evaluation be undertaken by a body independent of BNSC (paragraph 69).
(r)	The decision has now been made not to participate in the Future Launch Technologies Programme (FLTP). The UK has, however, technical expertise in the area worthy of maintaining and developing. We recommend that consideration should be given to ways of fostering existing UK expertise in technical space infrastructure in the UK outside the normal avenues of space technology funding (paragraph 69).
Civil/military overlap
(s)	We recommend that, within the framework of the recently agreed US/UK partnership on defence equipment and industrial co-operation, vigorous efforts be made to provide for a level playing field for the US and UK space industry with a presumption in favour of reciprocal removal of barriers to trade (paragraph 74).
(t)	We recommend that the Government take the opportunity of its response to this Report to set out how it is envisaged that the changes in DERA's status and role will impact on UK space policy, and in particular on (a) the availability to BNSC of expert, impartial, and free advice on space technology, and (b) on the extent to which UK firms offering technology potentially in competition with DERA will be able to bid for MoD contracts (paragraph 75).
BNSC
(u)	BNSC's main role is one of co-ordination. If BNSC is to continue in anything like its present form, it must be encouraged to take a more proactive stance and to provide firm and clear leadership in co-ordinating policy across Government departments (paragraph 80).
(v)	BNSC was set up as an ad hoc arrangement in 1985. It is now time to review the role, status, and organisation of BNSC. We recommend that following the completion of the DTI's evaluation of spending on space, the Government undertake a public review of BNSC along the lines of the quinquennial reviews of Government bodies. This review should also consider the possibility of giving BNSC or its successor body its own budget, in addition to the existing budgets of BNSC's partners, in order to ensure that the UK space programme reflects the long term public policy interests of the UK. Full attention should also be given to co-ordination between military and civil applications. We also recommend that the next Director-General of the BNSC or its successor body is recruited on a fixed term contract through open competition (paragraph 81).
UK space strategy
(w)	UK space strategy must be sufficiently flexible to be able to react to potential future applications of space technology (paragraph 82).
(x)	The latest space strategy document is admirable in many respects but limited in ambition. We hope that its successor will be able to announce something beyond a modest continuation of existing programmes, and that the civil space programme will be funded on a less cautious basis (paragraph 83).