Select Committee on Trade and Industry Ninth Report


VI MOX

General

  63. From the 1960s, it has been known that some reactors could operate on Mox fuel, using a mixture of baked uranium and plutonium oxide pellets. Mox fuel was produced at Sellafield for the UKAEA Fast Breeder Reactor programme. When this programme was abandoned, BNFL developed a programme for fabrication of Mox fuel, which was by then in use in a number of commercial reactors overseas. Those countries owning separated plutonium in the UK as a result of reprocessing — principally Germany, Japan and Switzerland — see the use of plutonium in Mox fuel as the most acceptable way of returning it.[101]

Mox Demonstration Facility

  64. In 1993, BNFL opened its Mox Demonstration Facility (MDF), as a small pilot plant, to provide its customers with Mox fuel elements, and to satisfy both customers and regulators of its ability to manufacture Mox safely and efficiently. Over the past six years, it has supplied fuel elements to German, Japanese and Swiss customers. Operations at MDF were suspended in September 1999 following the discovery that data from secondary quality checks of sample Mox pellets destined for Japan had been falsified. The HSE reported on this data falsification in February 2000. In April 2000 BNFL produced its response, in a document entitled Rebuilding Trust. A number of the HSE's fifteen recommendations have already been implemented: the remainder are targeted for completion by the end of July 2000. BNFL can thereafter be expected to seek HSE's permission to restart the MDF.[102]

65. The HSE Report into the Mox data falsification provides a full account of the matter.[103] It has had grievous consequences — for the individuals directly concerned who have been dismissed, have been transferred or have resigned: and for the company which has forfeited the confidence of its most important customers in Japan and elsewhere.

  • Mox imports to Japan have been temporarily suspended. Discussions continue on Japanese demands for the return to the UK of fuel elements already there.[104] Despite visits by the DTI's Director-General for Energy, the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations and by a high-level BNFL team, much remains to be done to restore confidence.[105] Ministers stand ready to go to Japan if necessary.[106] There is no indication of a reversal of the Japanese national commitment to recycle their separated plutonium as Mox fuel, a possibility identified in the 1997 PA Consulting Group Report as the only significant threat to the wider commercial case for Mox.[107]
  • In Germany, following the discovery that lost computer data from secondary checks on a batch of Mox pellets had been copied from another batch, the related fuel elements were removed from the reactor. There is now in place a temporary suspension of Mox imports. It has been made clear to BNFL that the German authorities would not be likely to grant the required import licence for a further Mox shipment until and unless satisfied of the safety of the fuel. There is, however, no good reason to doubt that Mox deliveries to Germany can and will be restarted in due course, once the MDF is re-opened with HSE authorisation.[108]

66. The checks carried out on the sample of pellets selected at random from each batch were required by BNFL's customers.[109] They should have been scrupulously carried out. In the main plant due to open soon, however, they will be in effect replaced by fully automated secondary checking of all pellets. The weaknesses revealed in the management and workforce in the Demonstration Facility, which have been identified in the HSE Report and duly rectified, have therefore no immediate significance for operations in the main plant, although they do raise wider questions on the safety culture at Sellafield.

67. We sought some further information from BNFL in order to establish the quality of the Mox pellets produced at the SMP. BNFL told us in response that the checks carried out had led to a handful of batches being returned for fresh automatic diameter checks. In every case these batches had been cleared at a second check. None of the approximately 5000 fuel rod full length radiographs had led to rejection of rods as a result of the pellets being too small. There is no separate record kept of pellets rejected as a result of being too large to pass through the insert into the neck of the fuel rod, but BNFL described the pellet blockages that had occurred as "isolated occurrences".[110] The evidence we have procured confirms that the falsification of data casts doubt, not on the safety of the fuel elements supplied, but on the process of quality assurance management at the Sellafield Demonstration Facility.

Sellafield Mox Plant

  68. The Sellafield Mox Plant (SMP) was planned during the 1980s. Planning permission was granted in 1994, and the plant was completed in 1998, at a cost of over £300 million. It has a planned annual capacity of 120 tonnes a year. Its opening has been delayed by the need to obtain a variation in its authorisation from the Environment Agency for discharges, although any change in discharges attributable to the plant are, in the estimation of the EA, likely to be negligible. Following BNFL's original application in November 1996, supplemented in January 1997 by further information sought, the EA held public consultations, and commissioned an examination by PA Consulting Group of the economic justification for the plant. PA Consulting Group produced its Report in December 1997. Following a further round of consultations, in November 1998 the EA forwarded to Ministers its proposed decisions in favour of full commissioning. DETR and MAFF Ministers took a further nine months to consider this. In June 1999 they decided to permit uranium commissioning of the plant, a relatively low-cost and readily reversible process; published a fuller version of the PA Consulting Group Report than that previously published; published an updated assessment by BNFL of the market for Mox fuel, endorsed by DTI; and opened a yet further round of public consultation. This further round of consultation closed in July 1999.

69. The delay in full commissioning has been costing BNFL £1.5 million per month. Uranium commissioning, begun on the day permission was given, is not yet complete. It had been estimated to require around nine months. If the plant is opened, it will take around five years to reach full output. The recent loss of customer confidence in BNFL will inevitably have affected BNFL's Mox sales in the short-term. The policy of the German Government towards future nuclear generation, and therefore German demand for Mox, is relevant. There are uncertainties over the state of public opinion in Japan on Mox fuel use, and the degree of urgency in implementing plans for a Japanese Mox plant on a similar scale to the Sellafield plant. It has been reported that the plans briefed to us in March 1998 for licensing further Japanese reactors to use Mox have been modified. BNFL told us of the announcement on 15 March 2000 of the approval by the Japanese Government of a further reactor to load Mox fuel.[111] There is no overwhelming reason why the current problems should affect the likely demand for Mox fuel from BNFL's potential customers in Germany, Switzerland and Japan in the medium-term. Those operators who have made the necessary investment in equipment and training, and have obtained the requisite regulatory permission, to enable power stations to use Mox fuel are likely to want to buy such fuel. If they do not buy it from BNFL they will do so from BNFL's French competitors. Those with plutonium in the UK must receive it back in one form or another.

70. Ministers' hesitation in granting permission for full commissioning of the SMP is understandable, especially in the light of the data falsification incident. The public would in the end pay if the facility were to be opened for full production and then prove a white elephant. The PA report estimated it would cost £85 million to commission and £50 million to decommission. Mox production and sale represents a small but significant slice of BNFL's anticipated future turnover and profit. Ideally, it could be left to a more commercially attuned Board to decide if it were prudent to press ahead with opening the Sellafield Mox Plant and to assess whether the low level of assured customers is such as to make the risk of opening worthwhile. The PA Report identified risks as well as opportunities. There are for example uncertainties on the opening up to competition of the market for Mox fuel in France; over possible demand in Korea; and so on. It is, however, unrealistic to expect investors in BNFL to buy into the company in uncertainty as to whether full-scale Mox production can proceed and with a large capital investment potentially to be written off.[112] The 1997 PA Consulting Group Report emphasised the importance of early operation of the SMP to maximise its potential profitability. It warned that "any significant delay to the commissioning start date" could affect customer confidence and "place BNFL at a competitive disadvantage".[113] A decision to allow full commissioning does not presuppose continuation of reprocessing beyond levels already contracted. We understand that overseas utilities have a sufficiency of plutonium already separated or contracted for. 18 months ago the PA Report found that full commissioning was justified on economic grounds. While the Report has proved useful and instructive, it is a curious quirk that it is left to Environment and Agriculture Ministers to decide on what is admitted to be a matter of commercial judgement rather than environmental significance. The delay in deciding on whether to permit full commissioning of the Mox plant has gone on long enough. A decision should be made before BNFL submits its Corporate Plan to Ministers later this year.


101  For general account, see POST Note 137, April 2000, on www.parliament.uk/post/home.htm  Back

102  Rebuilding Trust, p 8: Q 286 Back

103  See also Qq 59ff Back

104  Qq 279-280 Back

105  Qq 279ff: Qq 59ff Back

106  Qq 340ff: HC 261-i, Q 63  Back

107  Para 2.4.2 Back

108  Qq 345-8: Ev, p80, Answer B: p 111-112 Back

109  Qq 64-5 Back

110  Ev, p 81, D Back

111  Ev, p 80 Back

112  Q 276 Back

113  PA Report, 2.6.1 Back


 
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