House of Commons - Trade and Industry

Select Committee on Trade and Industry Sixth Report

III AREAS OF CONCERN

23. The greatest area of concern for us, and for the Secretary of State,[43] is that of consultation, resettlement and compensation of the people likely to lose their homes, their lands and their livelihood as a result of the dam. The report commissioned by ECGD from Dr Morvaridi makes worrying reading. Its recommendations do not purport to do more than "mitigate some of the negative impacts identified" in the report.[44] While a major project of this sort is bound to displace people, this situation has a number of special features.[45]

It seems to be common ground that there has been little or no consultation of those affected at an early stage of planning, as is required by OECD and other international guidelines on best practice, notably those of the World Bank; or even provision of information. Within the currently envisaged programme of construction it is now already too late for such preliminary consultation; the KHRP claimed that as a result a resettlement programme could quite simply not reflect internationally accepted practice.[46] The failure to consult even the mayor or other elected representatives of the community over the many years since the project was first conceived is lamentable.
There have been very varied estimates of the numbers of people likely to be displaced. The area has been subject in recent years to forced evictions and the destruction by security forces of villages and hamlets. Land ownership is complex and contested. Land tenure and land title problems have not been addressed. Much of the local Kurdish population, whether or not actively supporting the insurgency of the KPP, is evidently disaffected from the Turkish Government.
Although there is in place, at least on paper, a standard scheme of compensation for loss of land — although not so clearly of livelihood — past experience suggests that its implementation may be far from perfect: that its principal result will be the movement of yet more people from the land to the overcrowded cities of Batman and Diyarbakir; and that the absence of remedies in the courts for those aggrieved will leave many people without access to justice.[47]
The fraught political situation makes the prospect of effective monitoring on the ground of the implementation of a resettlement and compensation programme particularly difficult, even with a high level of human and financial resources.[48] There will inevitably be limits to which the Turkish authorities are likely to tolerate outside intervention in the administration of a resettlement programme.

24. The Zurich December 1998 accord noted the need for proper compensation and resettlement. The ECAs offered the services of an international expert to assist DSI in drawing up a resettlement plan, and of an international panel to assist and oversee implementation of the plan. In the intervening year, the process of drawing up a plan has indeed begun: an expert has been identified and, we understand, has now been appointed: the principle of an international panel has been accepted and a group appointed:[49] and the first steps are said to have been taken on consultation, on 22 December 1999.[50] The Secretary of State's condition referred to the need to "draw up a resettlement programme which reflects internationally agreed best practice and includes independent monitoring". In evidence to us the Secretary of State agreed that there were indeed "fundamental problems" over resettlement, and emphasised in particular the need to ensure that all those affected were covered by the programme, including those normally resident but displaced. He emphasised that —

We share the view of Ministers that the greatest remaining obstacle to granting export credit for the dam is the prospect of a programme of displacing thousands of local residents without proper consultation, compensation and resettlement. Before considering approval of export credit, the Secretary of State must ensure that there are satisfactory and open mechanisms for monitoring the effects of any resettlement programme, including the effectiveness of local legal remedies in the case of dispute. As a member state of the Council of Europe, Turkey may consider that some involvement of the Council would be appropriate in this task.

Upstream

25. Environmental assessment of the potential impact of the dam upstream has concentrated on the risk of "eutrophication" — the excessive growth of nutrients leading to significant depletion of the oxygen content of the water. This was apparently recognised in the original EIAR. The December 1998 ECAs Zurich agreement called for the construction of new sewage treatment plants for the main towns upstream, and an acknowledgement from the Turkish authorities of the linkage between such plants and the dam, so that they would be built in time for commissioning. Balfour Beatty state that financing for the largest plant has already been agreed by the EIB and the German agency KfW, and noted that "there is plenty of time available":[52] they expressed great confidence that these plants would be built.[53] The second condition raised by the Secretary of State refers to the need to make provision for upstream water treatment plants capable of ensuring that water quality is maintained. While the implementation of this must be closely monitored, there is no reason to doubt that it can and will be fulfilled.

Downstream

26. Concerns have been expressed by and on behalf of the nations downstream of the proposed dam that it might be used to interrupt the flow of the Tigris, which is essential for drinking water, irrigation and, as respects Iraq's Mosul Dam, the generation of electricity.[54] It has been suggested that Turkish officials have in the recent past publicly threatened to cut off water supplies to nations supporting Kurdish insurgency. Syria has suggested that the dam would be in breach of bilateral treaties and of multilateral agreements In response to our informal invitation, the Syrian Embassy in London forwarded a long paper on recent developments on the Turkish-Syrian dispute over the Euphrates.[55] Syria's direct interest in Ilisu is limited by the fact that the Tigris constitutes its boundary with Turkey for only around 30 kms before entering Iraq. It is apparent that much of the concern expressed by Syria arises from unresolved disagreements over equivalent projects under the GAP programme which have led to interruptions in the flow of the Euphrates to Syria , notably in 1990 at the time of construction of the Ataturk dam. In a further paper forwarded to us by the Syrian Embassy it is strongly argued that the failure of Turkey to consult the downstream states on the Ilisu dam is in breach of international law.[56]

27. Balfour Beatty has emphasised that the Ilisu Dam is a hydro-electric dam and not an irrigation project. Once operational, it will be dependent on a flow of water through its turbines. If the outflow through the turbines were blocked, the water would "within days or weeks" simply flow over the top, there being nowhere else for it to go. During impounding — the process of filling up the reservoir once the dam is completed — it is accepted that a formula must be found for determining a minimum regular flow of water downstream.[57] It is also pointed out that in any event half of the flow used by the Mosul dam enters the Tigris downstream of Ilisu.[58] The 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of Transboundary Waterways frequently referred to has not entered into force, since several nations have not ratified it.

28. The third UK condition for grant of export credit is the need to "give assurance that adequate downstream water flows will be maintained at all times," reflecting the third key area identified in December 1998 by the ECAs.[59] Balfour Beatty told us that it had already been recommended that —

The Minister of State noted in the Westminster Hall debate -

The Secretary of State told us that —

Judgement as to the adequacy of the flows produced by the agreed formula is of course crucial. It is unlikely, given the degree of mutual suspicion, that the two downstream nations will be willing to ratify the proposed flows as adequate. The assessment will have to be made by the ECAs involved, acting on technical advice. While the "assurance" sought can only be the firm indication of an intention, there is room for objective technical analysis of the formula proposed. We recommend that the Government, preferably in conjunction with other ECAs, publish an independent expert assessment of the formula for maintenance of downstream flows.

29. We also note the Secretary of State's reference in oral evidence to us to "seeking assurances from the Turkish authorities that they will consult neighbouring states" about the issues involved, and his statement that "there is a requirement that the Turkish authorities should consult neighbouring states."[64] Objections from neighbouring states, however charged the political context, deserve to be taken seriously. While the evidence suggests that the fear of negative downstream impacts may be exaggerated, it does demonstrate genuine anxiety at the overall effects of the GAP Project on the flow of the Euphrates into Syria as well as the Tigris into Iraq. We recommend a published assurance that the required consultation of neighbouring states has indeed been carried out by the Turkish authorities.

Hasankeyf

30. In addition to flooding around 313 square kilometres, including many villages and hamlets, the reservoir will flood the ruined early medieval city of Hasankeyf. Although the citadel will be above the water level, the cave dwellings lower down will be flooded, and the possibility of archaeological investigation of the site lost for ever. Only a few key buildings can be moved to a position of safety. There is some dispute over the exact cultural significance of Hasankeyf. It is plainly not, as has been claimed, the only town of its period left in Anatolia. The Turkish Embassy asserted "almost every town in Turkey is a major archaeological site. If the 65 million people of Turkey are to be enabled to enjoy a modern lifestyle, there will be occasions when the interests of archaeology have to be subordinated to those of economic development."[65] Although long ago designated as a site of historic importance , it has never been excavated or properly investigated, presumably because of its remoteness and the other priorities of the authorities. The view has been expressed that it is at least now likely to benefit from thorough examination, after years of neglect, thanks to the proposed dam.[66] There is however no doubt that its flooding would be destructive of a significant part of the cultural heritage of the area; nor that it has a special cultural significance for the Kurdish people.

31. The fourth UK condition for the grant of export credit was the need to "produce a detailed plan to preserve as much of the archaeological heritage of Hasankeyf as possible", reflecting the December 1998 ECAs' reported endorsement of the plans of the Turkish authorities to undertake a full survey and preserve as much as possible of the ruined city. Balfour Beatty told us that an international team funded by DSI had been at work "for well over a year", and that a presentation on progress was due to be made on 28 January 2000 in Ankara.[67] The Secretary of State confirmed on 15 February 2000 that there had been a detailed technical survey, but that the department had not yet seen details of the presentation.[68] The Minister of State stated the same day that "full details" were still awaited.[69] A note from the Turkish Embassy emphasised that Turkish and overseas (although not UK) archaeologists "were at work on a project to excavate, record and preserve as much as possible."[70] An article in the Independent of 4 February 2000 quoted Professor Arik, head of the archaeological dig, as saying "If the dam is built Hasankeyf will be destroyed ... All you can move is a few minarets." A witness from the KHRP who visited Hasankeyf in September 1999 told us that "what is happening at the moment is a certain amount of looting..... . There is no proper dig programme .....".[71] In view of the diversity of views on the adequacy of the archaeological and conservation programme underway at Hasankeyf, we recommend that an independent expert evaluation of the adequacy of the rescue plan be made publicly available before export credit is decided.