Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence


APPENDIX 4

Memorandum submitted by the General Consumer Council for Northern Ireland

CONTENTS

ROLE OF THE GENERAL CONSUMER COUNCIL

PUBLIC TRANSPORT TRENDS

    —  Gap between policy statements and commitment.

    —  Worsening passenger perceptions.

    —  Increasing complaints.

    —  Losing customers.

    —  Deteriorating financial results.

PROPOSED FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR NIR

  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS

CASE FOR GREATER GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

    —  Northern Ireland/Great Britain comparison.

    —  Missing opportunities.

CONCLUSION

Tables

1.  NIR Financial Indicators.

  2.  NIR Punctuality on the Bangor and Larne Lines from 13 September to 6 October 1999.

  3.  Passenger Ratings of Selected Aspects of NIR Services.

Annexes

  I  Improving Translink's Services for Passengers.

  II  Priority to improve trains arriving/departing on time.

ROLE OF THE GENERAL CONSUMER COUNCIL

  The General Consumer Council has a statutory remit to speak up for consumers; it also has special responsibilities for food, energy and public transport.

  These comments focus on the implications of the NIR funding provision for rail passengers and potential passengers, as the Council has worked on behalf of public transport users since its inception in 1985.

PUBLIC TRANSPORT TRENDS

Gap between policy statements and commitment

Since February 1995, Governments have extolled the importance of improving public transport.

    —  For example Moving Forward, published in November 1998 by the then DoE, proposed "the development of a fast, efficient and accessible public transport network".

    —  The planning strategy drafted by DoE highlighted the importance of public transport. Indeed the panel conducting the public examination of that framework recommended in February 2000 that "New approaches to and greater investment in public transport should be a high priority."[2]

  Unfortunately better public transport is not being delivered. Evidence of a commitment to a modern rail system is largely confined to the new Enterprise service to Dublin, the cross harbour bridge, Great Victoria Street and Bangor stations and the work underway on the Bleach Green line. The bulk of passengers continue to be served by old trains, communications systems and other facilities. The last brand new train for use on local services was purchased in 1978, some 20 years ago.

  In 1999 the Council submitted to Translink an extensive list of improvements that we considered necessary to ensure good service. (See Annex I)

  Translink accepted almost all of them as sound proposals but explained that in many cases they required investment for which funds were unavailable.

Worsening passenger perceptions

  In the early 1990s the operating companies now comprising Translink developed their "Passenger's Charter". NIR's commitment to good service is described in it, including punctuality and reliability targets and automatic compensation arrangements should performance fall far short.

  The Council was involved in the negotiation of the charter provisions and has a place on the committee overseeing performance. A key aspect of the charter monitoring is the twice-yearly, independent survey of passengers to find out about delivery "on the ground".[3]

  The surveys plot a marked downward trend in passenger ratings of the quality of NIR service.

    —  By the last survey, in the autumn of 1999, the overall NIR score had fallen to an all-time low of 63 (out of 100) from the high of 74, achieved in 1994.

    —  NIR passengers gave even lower ratings than did their counterparts on Ulsterbus and Citybus. Citybus scored 65 in the autumn 1999 survey while Ulsterbus scored 73.

    —  This is an astonishing situation where the railway was outperformed by the buses even though it would have been regarded formerly as a premium service.

  Passengers did not regard NIR service as giving good value for money, scoring only 63 out of 100. The low score is unsurprising given the series of fare increases in excess of inflation. The last increase in commuter fares, effective April 2000, averaged 4.5 per cent although prices generally were rising by only 2.3 per cent.

Increasing complaints

  Increasing customer dissatisfaction is reflected in the Council's own complaints statistics. The numbers are small because the Council only sees complaints where the passenger, having not got a satisfactory response from the company, decides to take the matter further and asks us to intercede. However the count has been rising rapidly, from 29 in 1996-97 to 59 in 1999-00.[4] Serious delays in services and poor information about the delays contributed to the increase in complaints coming to the Council.

Losing customers

  The number of passengers using NIR's commuter services has been declining as people vote with their feet. During 1997-98 and 1998-99 the total number of journeys on local NIR services (ie, excluding the Enterprise) fell by 9.8 per cent.

Deteriorating financial results

  Table 1 shows that NIR has been experiencing losses, associated with limited revenue growth and declining Government contributions in real terms.

PROPOSED FINANCIAL PROVISION FOR NIR

  In 1999 the Council's Chairman participated in a Department-led working party that analysed transport funding in Northern Ireland. While the group did not consider safety matters as such, it was evident that long-term under-investment in bus and rail would necessitate substantial spending over and above the existing Comprehensive Spending Review baseline to ensure adequate services.

  More recently the Arthur L D Little rail safety review of NIR involved a thorough examination of the rail system. Their report stated: "However, a long history of limited availability of funds for renewals and upgrades contributed significantly to many of the inadequacies identified, particularly those relating to infrastructure and rolling stock condition." The consultants recommended about £183 million be spent over ten years. An expenditure of £27 million was proposed for 2000-01, £15 million for track and structures and £7 million for rolling stock.[5]

  Our understanding is that NIR is likely to receive far less funding than either of these expert analyses suggest. The provision would only allow some corroded rail carriages to be withdrawn and treated to extend their working lives for a few years.


  IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS

The anticipated stringent financial provision for NIR will adversely affect consumers.

  Punctuality and reliability are likely to worsen as the company relies on ageing equipment that is prone to break down, as the availability of rolling stock diminishes due to withdrawals on safety grounds, and as train speeds are reduced due to poor track. Faced with equipment shortages, the company will have to cut back services, reducing frequency and increasing over-crowding. High staff morale and keeping passengers informed about delays will be even more difficult to achieve.

    —  In the autumn 1999 survey only 86 per cent of services on the short haul routes arrived within five minutes of their scheduled times (instead of the 95 per cent promised in the Charter). Moreover Citybus passengers rated punctuality performance higher than did NIR passengers, despite the fact that trains use a dedicated track while Citybus uses busy Belfast streets.

    —  Table 2 illustrates the unsatisfactory service delivery already being experienced by passengers.

  Rather than receiving the signal that public transport is an alternative to the car, consumers will get the opposite message.

    —  The train carries only a small fraction of the people travelling from Bangor to Belfast each week day in the morning rush. This is hardly surprising when only four services are offered between 8 and 9 o'clock and two out of the four take more than half an hour to make the 13 mile journey.

  Many consumers will face more restricted transport choices. The deteriorating quality of service means that few car owners see a real transport alternative to driving. A recent survey revealed that only 18 per cent of rail passengers could have made their trip by car instead.[6] The potential for attracting people out of their cars on to rail is being ignored.[7]

  For those without a car, the ability to get to work, leisure or other ordinary pursuits will be further curtailed, especially if services are cut back.


  Treatment of the corroded chassis of the 80 class trains will prolong the lives of slam door trains. This move contrasts with DETR's actions to remove these carriages from Great Britain on safety grounds by 2005.[8]

CASE FOR GREATER GOVERNMENT SUPPORT

  The Government's support for the rail system should reflect the wider social benefits obtainable from a high quality, integrated public transport system. While the "pay-off" would take place over many years, the investment funding is needed now.

    —  The problems of urban congestion, already a feature for many commuters to Belfast, as well as noise and air pollution, can be addressed by strengthening public transport.

    —  It is passengers travelling to work, school or college who are extremely concerned about improving punctuality while those on leisure or shopping trips are less concerned. (See Annex 2) As commuters shift to private cars to escape the frustrations of rail travel, the problems of congestion will worsen.

    —  Better services would increase access to opportunities for the socially and economically disadvantaged.

    —  No developed country is closing its railways.

Northern Ireland/Great Britain funding comparison

  Public expenditure on rail in Northern Ireland for both running and capital costs has been at lower levels in relative terms than on the privatised system in Great Britain.

    —  The audit report of the Northern Ireland Transport Holding Company, referred to DoE-sponsored research: "in 1995-96, revenue subsidies to NIR were 5.59 pence per passenger mile compared to 12.99 pence in Great Britain. On capital funding, the grant amounted to £101,000 per route mile compared to £117,000 in Great Britain."[9]

    —  The consultants, Steer Davies Gleave compared the 1997-98 results for Translink. They found that "public [rail revenue] funding per capita is about a sixth of the GB level, whilst funding per passenger mile is about one third less than the GB level."[10]

Given the lower level of car ownership in Northern Ireland compared with Great Britain, public transport ought to play a larger role in the transportation system here.

    —  In 1998 there were 468 cars per 1,000 persons over 16 years old in Northern Ireland, 14 per cent lower than in Great Britain.[11]

Missing Opportunities

  Under-investment in rail has forced NIR into a vicious downward spiral whereby poor service discourages custom and reduces revenue. The scenario could be different.

  The investment in rolling stock, track and related equipment on the Belfast-Dublin service demonstrates how customers and market demand can be expected to respond to up-grading.

  Table 3 compares passenger ratings of service on the Enterprise with those across the entire NIR system. It reveals the very much better perceptions held by passengers travelling on the Enterprise than by all passengers, the vast majority of whom use NIR commuter services. In particular, the punctuality rating—the key test for travellers—is far superior for the Enterprise.

  The favourable perception of the quality of the rejuvenated Belfast-Dublin service has translated into rapid growth in custom. The Enterprise carried 32 per cent more passengers during the twelve months ending September 1999 than had been carried during the twelve months ending September 1997, ie, just prior to the modernisation of the Belfast-Dublin service.

CONCLUSION

  The General Consumer Council considers the current funding plans for NIR to be inadequate. They represent a continuation of a trend that undermines the rail service and lets down users. A major investment to provide a frequent, fast, attractive and affordable commuter rail service is needed urgently.

Table 1

NIR FINANCIAL INDICATORS, 1995-96 TO 1998-99

Total contribution
£000
Turnover
£000
Loss
£000
Government contribution
Concession fares
£000
PSO
£000
1995-96
21,171
747
1,092
7,419
8,511
1996-97
21,596
1,012
1,408
9,492
10,900
1997-98
21,496
1,166
1,257
7,307
8,564
1998-99
23,531
24,070*
1,241
8,857
10,098


  *Includes £22,895 provision for impairment (Financial Reporting Standard 11).

Table 2

NIR PUNCTUALITY OVER FOUR WEEKS: 13 SEPTEMBER AND 6 OCTOBER 1999

  
Number of services
% of scheduled
Number not NIR's responsibility
Estimated scheduled*
1,360
100
 
1-5 minutes late
54
4
9
6-10 minutes late
201
15
17
11-20 minutes late
116
9
7
20+ minutes late
28
2
1
Cancelled
30
2
18
Total late or cancelled
429
32
52
Total 5+ minutes late
345
25
25
Total 10+ minutes late
144
11
8
Larne Line   
Estimated scheduled**
1,024
100
 
1-5 minutes late
44
4
13
6-10 minutes late
178
17
52
11-20 minutes late
108
11
28
20+ minutes late
23
2
2
Cancelled
14
1
0
Total late or cancelled
367
36
95
Total 5+ minutes late
309
30
82
Total 10+ minutes late
131
13
30


  *Count from timetable of Bangor to Belfast services multiplied by eight.

  Note: Scheduled travel time between Bangor and Belfast Central is 21 to 31 minutes. Thus a 10 minute delay increases the journey time by 48 per cent to 32 per cent.

  **Count from timetable of Larne to Belfast services multiplied by eight.

  Note: Scheduled travel time between Larne Town and Belfast Central is 53 minutes. Thus a 10 minute delay increases the journey time by 19 per cent.

Table 3

PASSENGER RATINGS* OF NIR TRAIN SERVICE

AUTUMN 1999

  
Enterprise service
All NIR services
Difference
Punctuality
81
55
26
Information on delays
80
62
18
Value for money
76
63
13
Seat availability
89
73
16
Cleanliness of train
93
61
32
Staff helpfulness/attitude
88
76
12


  *Rating is out of 100; it is not a percentage.

  Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Public transport monitoring report, Autumn 1999; W S Atkins survey of the Enterprise service in September and October 1999.


2   Report of the Panel Conducting the Public Examination of Shaping our future: Draft Regional Strategic Framework for Northern Ireland, February 2000, page 106. Back

3   The survey, conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, also includes service observations by trained field staff. Back

4   The 1999-00 figures are provisional. An increasing proportion of passenger complaints coming to the Council concerned rail service; the percentage climbed from 24 per cent in 1996-97 to 39 per cent in 1999-00. Back

5   Arthur D Little, Strategic Safety Review of Northern Ireland Railways, Executive Summary, March 2000, pages 5, 11-12. Back

6   PricewaterhouseCoopers, Spring 1999 survey. Back

7   Rail is failing to compete with motor vehicles as a mode of transport. While the licensed motor vehicle stock in Northern Ireland grew by 39 per cent over the ten years between 1988-98, the number of rail passenger journeys was the same in both years. The number of locomotives decreased from 46 to 43 and the number of carriages only increased (from 83 to 96) because of the introduction of the Enterprise. See Northern Ireland Transport Statistics. Back

8   DETR statement, End of the Line for Slam-Door Trains-Prescott, 20 July 1999. Back

9   Northern Ireland Audit Office, May 1999, pages 56-57. Back

10   Translink-Update of Key Funding Indices, mimeo, February 2000. Back

11   DoE, Transport Statistics 1998-99, page 9. Back


 
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