APPENDIX 4
Memorandum submitted by the General Consumer
Council for Northern Ireland
CONTENTS
ROLE OF
THE GENERAL
CONSUMER COUNCIL
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
TRENDS
Deteriorating financial results.
PROPOSED FINANCIAL
PROVISION FOR
NIR
IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSUMERS
CASE FOR
GREATER GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT
Northern Ireland/Great Britain comparison.
Missing opportunities.
CONCLUSION
Tables
1. NIR Financial Indicators.
2. NIR Punctuality on the Bangor and Larne
Lines from 13 September to 6 October 1999.
3. Passenger Ratings of Selected Aspects
of NIR Services.
Annexes
I Improving Translink's Services for Passengers.
II Priority to improve trains arriving/departing
on time.
ROLE OF
THE GENERAL
CONSUMER COUNCIL
The General Consumer Council has a statutory
remit to speak up for consumers; it also has special responsibilities
for food, energy and public transport.
These comments focus on the implications of
the NIR funding provision for rail passengers and potential passengers,
as the Council has worked on behalf of public transport users
since its inception in 1985.
PUBLIC TRANSPORT
TRENDS
Gap between policy statements and commitment
Since February 1995, Governments have extolled the
importance of improving public transport.
For example Moving Forward, published
in November 1998 by the then DoE, proposed "the development
of a fast, efficient and accessible public transport network".
The planning strategy drafted by
DoE highlighted the importance of public transport. Indeed the
panel conducting the public examination of that framework recommended
in February 2000 that "New approaches to and greater investment
in public transport should be a high priority."[2]
Unfortunately better public transport is not
being delivered. Evidence of a commitment to a modern rail system
is largely confined to the new Enterprise service to Dublin, the
cross harbour bridge, Great Victoria Street and Bangor stations
and the work underway on the Bleach Green line. The bulk of passengers
continue to be served by old trains, communications systems and
other facilities. The last brand new train for use on local services
was purchased in 1978, some 20 years ago.
In 1999 the Council submitted to Translink an
extensive list of improvements that we considered necessary to
ensure good service. (See Annex I)
Translink accepted almost all of them as sound
proposals but explained that in many cases they required investment
for which funds were unavailable.
Worsening passenger perceptions
In the early 1990s the operating companies now
comprising Translink developed their "Passenger's Charter".
NIR's commitment to good service is described in it, including
punctuality and reliability targets and automatic compensation
arrangements should performance fall far short.
The Council was involved in the negotiation
of the charter provisions and has a place on the committee overseeing
performance. A key aspect of the charter monitoring is the twice-yearly,
independent survey of passengers to find out about delivery "on
the ground".[3]
The surveys plot a marked downward trend in
passenger ratings of the quality of NIR service.
By the last survey, in the autumn
of 1999, the overall NIR score had fallen to an all-time low of
63 (out of 100) from the high of 74, achieved in 1994.
NIR passengers gave even lower ratings
than did their counterparts on Ulsterbus and Citybus. Citybus
scored 65 in the autumn 1999 survey while Ulsterbus scored 73.
This is an astonishing situation
where the railway was outperformed by the buses even though it
would have been regarded formerly as a premium service.
Passengers did not regard NIR service as giving
good value for money, scoring only 63 out of 100. The low score
is unsurprising given the series of fare increases in excess of
inflation. The last increase in commuter fares, effective April
2000, averaged 4.5 per cent although prices generally were rising
by only 2.3 per cent.
Increasing complaints
Increasing customer dissatisfaction is reflected
in the Council's own complaints statistics. The numbers are small
because the Council only sees complaints where the passenger,
having not got a satisfactory response from the company, decides
to take the matter further and asks us to intercede. However the
count has been rising rapidly, from 29 in 1996-97 to 59 in 1999-00.[4]
Serious delays in services and poor information about the delays
contributed to the increase in complaints coming to the Council.
Losing customers
The number of passengers using NIR's commuter
services has been declining as people vote with their feet. During
1997-98 and 1998-99 the total number of journeys on local NIR
services (ie, excluding the Enterprise) fell by 9.8 per cent.
Deteriorating financial results
Table 1 shows that NIR has been experiencing
losses, associated with limited revenue growth and declining Government
contributions in real terms.
PROPOSED FINANCIAL
PROVISION FOR
NIR
In 1999 the Council's Chairman participated
in a Department-led working party that analysed transport funding
in Northern Ireland. While the group did not consider safety matters
as such, it was evident that long-term under-investment in bus
and rail would necessitate substantial spending over and above
the existing Comprehensive Spending Review baseline to ensure
adequate services.
More recently the Arthur L D Little rail safety
review of NIR involved a thorough examination of the rail system.
Their report stated: "However, a long history of limited
availability of funds for renewals and upgrades contributed significantly
to many of the inadequacies identified, particularly those relating
to infrastructure and rolling stock condition." The consultants
recommended about £183 million be spent over ten years. An
expenditure of £27 million was proposed for 2000-01, £15
million for track and structures and £7 million for rolling
stock.[5]
Our understanding is that NIR is likely to receive
far less funding than either of these expert analyses suggest.
The provision would only allow some corroded rail carriages to
be withdrawn and treated to extend their working lives for a few
years.
IMPLICATIONS
FOR CONSUMERS
The anticipated stringent financial provision for
NIR will adversely affect consumers.
Punctuality and reliability are likely to worsen
as the company relies on ageing equipment that is prone to break
down, as the availability of rolling stock diminishes due to withdrawals
on safety grounds, and as train speeds are reduced due to poor
track. Faced with equipment shortages, the company will have to
cut back services, reducing frequency and increasing over-crowding.
High staff morale and keeping passengers informed about delays
will be even more difficult to achieve.
In the autumn 1999 survey only 86
per cent of services on the short haul routes arrived within five
minutes of their scheduled times (instead of the 95 per cent promised
in the Charter). Moreover Citybus passengers rated punctuality
performance higher than did NIR passengers, despite the fact that
trains use a dedicated track while Citybus uses busy Belfast streets.
Table 2 illustrates the unsatisfactory
service delivery already being experienced by passengers.
Rather than receiving the signal that public
transport is an alternative to the car, consumers will get the
opposite message.
The train carries only a small fraction
of the people travelling from Bangor to Belfast each week day
in the morning rush. This is hardly surprising when only four
services are offered between 8 and 9 o'clock and two out of the
four take more than half an hour to make the 13 mile journey.
Many consumers will face more restricted transport
choices. The deteriorating quality of service means that few car
owners see a real transport alternative to driving. A recent survey
revealed that only 18 per cent of rail passengers could have made
their trip by car instead.[6]
The potential for attracting people out of their cars on to rail
is being ignored.[7]
For those without a car, the ability to get
to work, leisure or other ordinary pursuits will be further curtailed,
especially if services are cut back.
Treatment of the corroded chassis of the 80
class trains will prolong the lives of slam door trains. This
move contrasts with DETR's actions to remove these carriages from
Great Britain on safety grounds by 2005.[8]
CASE FOR
GREATER GOVERNMENT
SUPPORT
The Government's support for the rail system
should reflect the wider social benefits obtainable from a high
quality, integrated public transport system. While the "pay-off"
would take place over many years, the investment funding is needed
now.
The problems of urban congestion,
already a feature for many commuters to Belfast, as well as noise
and air pollution, can be addressed by strengthening public transport.
It is passengers travelling to work,
school or college who are extremely concerned about improving
punctuality while those on leisure or shopping trips are less
concerned. (See Annex 2) As commuters shift to private cars to
escape the frustrations of rail travel, the problems of congestion
will worsen.
Better services would increase access
to opportunities for the socially and economically disadvantaged.
No developed country is closing its
railways.
Northern Ireland/Great Britain funding comparison
Public expenditure on rail in Northern Ireland
for both running and capital costs has been at lower levels in
relative terms than on the privatised system in Great Britain.
The audit report of the Northern
Ireland Transport Holding Company, referred to DoE-sponsored research:
"in 1995-96, revenue subsidies to NIR were 5.59 pence per
passenger mile compared to 12.99 pence in Great Britain. On capital
funding, the grant amounted to £101,000 per route mile compared
to £117,000 in Great Britain."[9]
The consultants, Steer Davies Gleave
compared the 1997-98 results for Translink. They found that "public
[rail revenue] funding per capita is about a sixth of the GB level,
whilst funding per passenger mile is about one third less than
the GB level."[10]
Given the lower level of car ownership in Northern
Ireland compared with Great Britain, public transport ought to
play a larger role in the transportation system here.
In 1998 there were 468 cars per 1,000
persons over 16 years old in Northern Ireland, 14 per cent lower
than in Great Britain.[11]
Missing Opportunities
Under-investment in rail has forced NIR into
a vicious downward spiral whereby poor service discourages custom
and reduces revenue. The scenario could be different.
The investment in rolling stock, track and related
equipment on the Belfast-Dublin service demonstrates how customers
and market demand can be expected to respond to up-grading.
Table 3 compares passenger ratings of service
on the Enterprise with those across the entire NIR system. It
reveals the very much better perceptions held by passengers travelling
on the Enterprise than by all passengers, the vast majority of
whom use NIR commuter services. In particular, the punctuality
ratingthe key test for travellersis far superior
for the Enterprise.
The favourable perception of the quality of
the rejuvenated Belfast-Dublin service has translated into rapid
growth in custom. The Enterprise carried 32 per cent more passengers
during the twelve months ending September 1999 than had been carried
during the twelve months ending September 1997, ie, just prior
to the modernisation of the Belfast-Dublin service.
CONCLUSION
The General Consumer Council considers the current
funding plans for NIR to be inadequate. They represent a continuation
of a trend that undermines the rail service and lets down users.
A major investment to provide a frequent, fast, attractive and
affordable commuter rail service is needed urgently.
Table 1
NIR FINANCIAL INDICATORS, 1995-96 TO 1998-99
Total contribution
£000
| Turnover
£000
| Loss
£000
| Government contribution
| Concession fares
£000
| PSO
£000 |
| 1995-96 | 21,171
| 747 | 1,092
| 7,419 | 8,511
|
| 1996-97 | 21,596
| 1,012 | 1,408
| 9,492 | 10,900
|
| 1997-98 | 21,496
| 1,166 | 1,257
| 7,307 | 8,564
|
| 1998-99 | 23,531
| 24,070* | 1,241
| 8,857 | 10,098
|
*Includes £22,895 provision for impairment (Financial
Reporting Standard 11).
Table 2
NIR PUNCTUALITY OVER FOUR WEEKS: 13 SEPTEMBER AND 6 OCTOBER
1999
| | Number of services
| % of scheduled |
Number not NIR's responsibility
|
| Estimated scheduled* | 1,360
| 100 | |
| 1-5 minutes late | 54
| 4 | 9
|
| 6-10 minutes late | 201
| 15 | 17
|
| 11-20 minutes late | 116
| 9 | 7
|
| 20+ minutes late | 28
| 2 | 1
|
| Cancelled | 30
| 2 | 18
|
| Total late or cancelled | 429
| 32 | 52
|
| Total 5+ minutes late | 345
| 25 | 25
|
| Total 10+ minutes late | 144
| 11 | 8
|
| Larne Line | | | |
| Estimated scheduled** | 1,024
| 100 | |
| 1-5 minutes late | 44
| 4 | 13
|
| 6-10 minutes late | 178
| 17 | 52
|
| 11-20 minutes late | 108
| 11 | 28
|
| 20+ minutes late | 23
| 2 | 2
|
| Cancelled | 14
| 1 | 0
|
| Total late or cancelled | 367
| 36 | 95
|
| Total 5+ minutes late | 309
| 30 | 82
|
| Total 10+ minutes late | 131
| 13 | 30
|
*Count from timetable of Bangor to Belfast services multiplied
by eight.
Note: Scheduled travel time between Bangor and Belfast
Central is 21 to 31 minutes. Thus a 10 minute delay increases
the journey time by 48 per cent to 32 per cent.
**Count from timetable of Larne to Belfast services multiplied
by eight.
Note: Scheduled travel time between Larne Town and
Belfast Central is 53 minutes. Thus a 10 minute delay increases
the journey time by 19 per cent.
Table 3
PASSENGER RATINGS* OF NIR TRAIN SERVICE
AUTUMN 1999
| | Enterprise service
| All NIR services |
Difference |
| Punctuality | 81
| 55 | 26
|
| Information on delays | 80
| 62 | 18
|
| Value for money | 76
| 63 | 13
|
| Seat availability | 89
| 73 | 16
|
| Cleanliness of train | 93
| 61 | 32
|
| Staff helpfulness/attitude | 88
| 76 | 12
|
*Rating is out of 100; it is not a percentage.
Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Public transport
monitoring report, Autumn 1999; W S Atkins survey of the Enterprise
service in September and October 1999.
2
Report of the Panel Conducting the Public Examination of Shaping
our future: Draft Regional Strategic Framework for Northern Ireland,
February 2000, page 106. Back
3
The survey, conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers, also includes
service observations by trained field staff. Back
4
The 1999-00 figures are provisional. An increasing proportion
of passenger complaints coming to the Council concerned rail service;
the percentage climbed from 24 per cent in 1996-97 to 39 per cent
in 1999-00. Back
5
Arthur D Little, Strategic Safety Review of Northern Ireland
Railways, Executive Summary, March 2000, pages 5, 11-12. Back
6
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Spring 1999 survey. Back
7
Rail is failing to compete with motor vehicles as a mode of transport.
While the licensed motor vehicle stock in Northern Ireland grew
by 39 per cent over the ten years between 1988-98, the number
of rail passenger journeys was the same in both years. The number
of locomotives decreased from 46 to 43 and the number of carriages
only increased (from 83 to 96) because of the introduction of
the Enterprise. See Northern Ireland Transport Statistics. Back
8
DETR statement, End of the Line for Slam-Door Trains-Prescott,
20 July 1999. Back
9
Northern Ireland Audit Office, May 1999, pages 56-57. Back
10
Translink-Update of Key Funding Indices, mimeo, February 2000. Back
11
DoE, Transport Statistics 1998-99, page 9. Back
|