APPENDIX 4
Memorandum by Mr Paul Tyler and Mr Andrew
Stunell
Programming of Legislation
1. We accept the pre-eminence of the first three
"essential requirements of a reformed system" for the
management of legislation scrutiny:
a) The Government of the day must be assured
of getting its legislation through in reasonable time (provided
that it obtains the approval of the House).
b) The Opposition in particular and Members in
general must have a full opportunity to discuss and seek to change
provisions to which they attach importance.
c) All parts of a Bill must be properly considered.
2. The "trade-off" we suggest, must
be as follows: the Government must be certain that all those Bills
which are the subject of agreement will emerge from their Commons
process on time. In other words, the "out date" must
be agreed. The Opposition Parties, on the other hand, must be
given the opportunityeven the responsibilityto prioritise
the different issues arising out of different parts of these Bills,
in order to ensure that their scrutiny is as effective as possible.
3. This really extends the principle already
adopted in both existing Programme motions, and agreements within
Standing Committees, to a more general application.
4. In the best traditions of Commons reform,
we suggest a cautious, experimental and evolutionary approach.
Let us see whether a Legislative Business Committee (along the
lines of the proposal in M53) could identify at least SOME Bills
in the 2000 2001 Queen's Speech legislative programme
which could be the subject of the such agreed procedures. Part
of that agreement might extend to appropriate candidates for prior
scrutiny in the House of Lords, and others for later introduction
and possible "carry over".
5. Such a step could facilitate another important
"trade-off". If the Opposition agrees to forfeit its
capacity to sabotage the Government's day, the Government needs
to forfeit its capacity to sabotage the year. In other words,
certainty of the daily and weekly time table needs to be balanced
by certainty of the annual timetable. The Legislative Business
Committee could agree (or endorse a Government proposal for) a
fixed number of business weeks in the Session, bearing in mind
its decisions on programming. The timing of these weeks in the
calendar would then be fixed and announced early in each Session
(as in Canada and other Legislatures modelled on Westminster).
6. Even if only a minority of Bills could be
handled in this way it would be a useful experiment. However,
linking these issues could improve the chances of a wider agreement.
7. The programme of Standing Committee scrutiny
should be left to the internal negotiation of the Committee, within
similar constraints. Again, only a minority may succeed in agreement,
but that is better than none.
8. Both in the annual programme of the whole
House and in specific Standing Committees, the safety valve will
always be such that Programme Motions or Agreements if
opposed will cease to be agreed, and the Government will
have to fall back on Guillotine motions. Hopefully, normally trust
and good sense will make this a rare event.
9. There will still be occasions when "road
rage" happens. Procedures which allow for deeply-felt anger
to be expressed forcefully have to be respected. Under these proposals
that would still include:
| 1) | Full use of time on any debatable motion
|
| 2) | Divisions on the above
|
| 3) | Votes on orders and SI motions
|
| 4) | Points of order
|
| 5) | Private Business Motions
|
However it would be significantly reduce the possibility
of extended or discursive speeches being used as a vehicle for
protest.
10. Without some movement and some give
and take on both sides continuing frustration is inevitable.
May 2000
|