Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons Second Report


APPENDIX 4

Memorandum by Mr Paul Tyler and Mr Andrew Stunell

Programming of Legislation

1.  We accept the pre-eminence of the first three "essential requirements of a reformed system" for the management of legislation scrutiny:

a)  The Government of the day must be assured of getting its legislation through in reasonable time (provided that it obtains the approval of the House).

b)  The Opposition in particular and Members in general must have a full opportunity to discuss and seek to change provisions to which they attach importance.

c)  All parts of a Bill must be properly considered.

2.  The "trade-off" we suggest, must be as follows: the Government must be certain that all those Bills which are the subject of agreement will emerge from their Commons process on time. In other words, the "out date" must be agreed. The Opposition Parties, on the other hand, must be given the opportunity—even the responsibility—to prioritise the different issues arising out of different parts of these Bills, in order to ensure that their scrutiny is as effective as possible.

3.  This really extends the principle already adopted in both existing Programme motions, and agreements within Standing Committees, to a more general application.

4.  In the best traditions of Commons reform, we suggest a cautious, experimental and evolutionary approach. Let us see whether a Legislative Business Committee (along the lines of the proposal in M53) could identify at least SOME Bills in the 2000 — 2001 Queen's Speech legislative programme which could be the subject of the such agreed procedures. Part of that agreement might extend to appropriate candidates for prior scrutiny in the House of Lords, and others for later introduction and possible "carry over".

5.  Such a step could facilitate another important "trade-off". If the Opposition agrees to forfeit its capacity to sabotage the Government's day, the Government needs to forfeit its capacity to sabotage the year. In other words, certainty of the daily and weekly time table needs to be balanced by certainty of the annual timetable. The Legislative Business Committee could agree (or endorse a Government proposal for) a fixed number of business weeks in the Session, bearing in mind its decisions on programming. The timing of these weeks in the calendar would then be fixed and announced early in each Session (as in Canada and other Legislatures modelled on Westminster).

6.  Even if only a minority of Bills could be handled in this way it would be a useful experiment. However, linking these issues could improve the chances of a wider agreement.

7.  The programme of Standing Committee scrutiny should be left to the internal negotiation of the Committee, within similar constraints. Again, only a minority may succeed in agreement, but that is better than none.

8.  Both in the annual programme of the whole House and in specific Standing Committees, the safety valve will always be such that Programme Motions or Agreements — if opposed — will cease to be agreed, and the Government will have to fall back on Guillotine motions. Hopefully, normally trust and good sense will make this a rare event.

9.  There will still be occasions when "road rage" happens. Procedures which allow for deeply-felt anger to be expressed forcefully have to be respected. Under these proposals that would still include:—


1)Full use of time on any debatable motion
2)Divisions on the above
3)Votes on orders and SI motions
4)Points of order
5)Private Business Motions


However it would be significantly reduce the possibility of extended or discursive speeches being used as a vehicle for protest.

10.  Without some movement — and some give and take on both sides — continuing frustration is inevitable.

May 2000


 
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