Memorandum by British American Tobacco
THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND THE HEALTH RISKS
OF SMOKING (TB 28)
THE ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT
325. Given such a widespread awareness of
the risks involved in smoking, the question is what approach should
the Government take to issues of smoking and health. The alternatives
range from a laissez faire approach (ie, given the level
of available information, leave it to the market to sort out)
to a social engineering approach (where the Government intervenes
in the personal lawful lifestyle choices of its citizens and drives
them to make lifestyle choices that the Government believes are
worthy). British American Tobacco does not believe that such "nannyism"
is the proper role of the Government; however, neither do we believe
that Government should have no role and leave it to the market
alone. A scientifically based, soundly supported and proportionate
response by the Government is fundamental in a democratic society
where what is at issue is the restriction of the freedom of individual
citizens to choose a particular lifestyle activity or the freedom
of corporate citizens to conduct their lawful business.
326. We think that it is instructive to
look at the conduct of previous Governments when dealing with
cigarettes as a consumer product. Beginning in 1956, when the
Minister of Health announced the association between smoking and
lung cancer, and continuing up to the present day, each successive
Government has been involved in discussions with the cigarette
industry and others about how to address concerns about smoking
and health. The relationship between State and the UK tobacco
manufacturers that has resulted has been constructive and co-operative
on both sides, recognising that the State does not wish to prohibit
the sale to adults of cigarettes, and that it is in the interests
of both sides to do whatever can reasonably be done to address
the legitimate concerns of public health authorities.
327. Governments have been willing to allow
the products to be manufactured, advertised, and sold, subject
to a number of important restrictions. Some of these restrictions
have had statutory backing (eg excise tax and the requirement
that retailers only sell to those aged 16 or over) and some have
been the subject of self-regulation (such as the advertising codes).
328. This Government has made two important
commitments that suggest that in principle it supports a continuation
of its co-operative and constructive relationship with the industry.
329. First, the White Paper has made it
clear that the UK Government, whilst wishing to see consumption
drop further, will not interfere with an adult's right to choose
to smoke.
". . . we recognise that Government action
in areas of personal choice like smoking is a difficult and sensitive
issue. Tobacco is a uniquely dangerous product. If introduced
today, it would not stand the remotest chance of being legal.
But smoking is not against the law. We do not intend to make smoking
unlawful. We are not banning smoking.
Currently, well over a quarter of the people
of Britain smoke. The Government fully recognises their right
to do so. We will not in any of our proposals infringe upon that
right." ("Smoking Kills. A White Paper on Tobacco",
CM 4177, p 11, 1998).
330, Secondly, as Prime Minister Blair stated
in the foreword to the Better Regulation Guide, this Government
will only regulate where there is a good case for regulation,
an approach we support.
"It is vital that Government regulates wisely.
If our regulatory framework is excessive or poorly conceived,
we all suffer from the resultant red tape. The intended benefits
of regulation disappear, often to be replaced by less choice,
higher prices and lower employment and investment." (Cabinet
Office Regulatory Impact Unit, p 1, 1998).
331. We fully support the Government's efforts,
driven by the Cabinet Office's Regulatory Impact Unit, to ensure
that any regulations are fair, transparent, evidenced-based and
proportionate.
332. In spite of these statements, the current
Government seems intent on implementing a number of measures,
principally taxation and regulating where people can smoke, to
make it very much more difficult for adults to choose to smoke.
A tax policy which is driven by the object of reducing consumption
by making cigarettes prohibitively costly is not consistent with
the Prime Minister's statement that people should be free to choose,
quite apart from the serious smuggling problem that this policy
has already caused. Further, to adopt regulations restricting
where people can smoke on the pretext that they are necessary
to protect non-smokers from ETS is a classic example of unsound
regulation, when the primary intention appears to be to ostracise
smokers and to make it more difficult for them to find opportunities
to smoke.
333. We fully accept that it is the role
of government to ensure that its citizens understand the risks
involved in certain choices, and to protect those deemed underage
from making choices that should not be available to them. We think
that more can be done on underage smoking and would like to play
our part in addressing this problem. One clear initiative to tackle
this issue would be to raise the legal age for sale of tobacco
products from 16 to 18, and we encourage the Government to take
this step. Another helpful approach is the CitizenCard which assists
retailers in identifying the age of persons to whom they sell
tobacco products.
334. We also encourage the Government to
consider more education, for those who continue to choose to smoke,
on how those risks differ by various choices. Epidemiology clearly
shows that groups of people who start smoking earlier, smoke for
longer and smoke more cigarettes per day have much higher risks
than those who smoke less. Science does not suggest a "safe"
level of smoking, and such studies typically report higher risks
in all groups that smoke compared to non-smokers.
335. We take the view that all Government
information should be accurate, including that aimed at public
health. Bad science, for what might be seen by some as a good
cause, is poor policy. For example, a comparison of the consumption
trends in countries with or without advertising bans does not
indicate that there is a correlation between tobacco advertising
and consumption. Such a ban will, though, clearly infringe on
the rights of the manufacturers of cigarettes and those who choose
to smoke by prohibiting the provision of information on the choice
of brands.
336. Similarly, any change in public policy
on low tar cigarettes should only be made on the basis of a serious
consideration of the science. We would be pleased to play our
proper role in this.
337. We believe that there is a danger at
the moment, particularly given the recent apparent reluctance
to consult with the tobacco manufacturers, of public policy being
unduly influenced by pressure groups, such as ASH, who make smoking
policy recommendations to the Government, not always soundly based
in science or the experience of the past.
338. We certainly hope for a return to proper
consultation and open discussion between the Government and the
manufacturers and other interested groups on matters related to
smoking, and for our part, are very willing to go forward on that
basis.
October 1999
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