On 23 July 1999 the Government of Sudan (GOS) dropped 16 bombs in Lainya and six in the nearby town of Kaya in the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) held region of Eastern Equatoria. A local doctor working for the Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), reports that days after these bombs civilians in the area were vomiting blood. Since the bombing, a number of pregnant women in the area have either been severely ill or have undergone the "spontaneous abortion" of their babies. In addition large numbers of goats, sheep, dogs and birds have died.

  On 27 July 1999 a group of aid workers for the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) workers (Ugandan, Sudanese and British nationals) stopped for 45 minutes at a checkpoint in Lainya. The WFP workers felt a burning sensation and began vomiting. They were airlifted out of the area to Nairobi where they were treated in hospital.

THE SYMPTOMS

  Experts have said that some of the symptoms were similar to mustard gas but stress that these weapons would not retain their potency in the heat of Sudan.

  Three weeks after this event Damien Lewis, an investigative reporter with extensive prior experience of Chemical Weapons issues travelled with a private team of American aid workers with a military background to the area with logistical support from CSW. Although the area was now largely depopulated the team interviewed a number of the remaining eyewitnesses. The victims describe watching "sticks of black objects" dropping from the aircraft above their village. They describe thick white gas or smoke as "thick and choking". One described the smell as being like "rotting garbage burning"

  Mr Lewis and his team found that the craters were full of a viscous, bright red liquid and chemical scum. The soil immediately round the craters was black. Any animal in contact with the water in the crater died. Some 36 people had been hospitalised. Reports from the hospitals and a medical team with Norwegian People's Aid, who went into the area some six days after the bombing, confirm that the symptoms began after day two with severe irritation to the eyes, burning of the nose and the chest and throat. On day three there followed skin irritation and respiratory problems, then diarrhoea and vomiting of blood, followed by a body rash and general itching. The latter symptoms lasted up to nine days. The symptoms are typical of an arsenical blister agent called Lewisite. At that time there had been two deaths.

  From Oslo the Norwegian People's Aid issued the following statement:

(We) "have confirmed beyond doubt earlier reports that the government of Sudan used chemical bombs against the civilian population of the towns of Lainya and Kaya on the 23 July 1999".[9]

  One US nurse working with Norwegian Peoples Aid after the event commented that:

"I can think of no explanation other than a chemical attack that would result in so many people becoming ill simultaneously with these type of symptoms.[10]

NB Samples taken from the field during the August 1999 trip by Mr Lewis personally

delivered and are being processed at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment (CBDE) at Porton Down in the UK, and the Finnish establishment VERFIN in Helsinki. We await results.

THE NATURE OF THE WEAPONS

  Characteristics of the attacked site enabled three types of bombs to be identified:

1.  Two areas showed depression of one to two metres in diameter, two to three feet deep. Soon after the impact there was no obvious effect on the soil however after two days it reportedly turned black and the water in the pits turned red. There was a foul odour more prevalent soon after the attack. There was no damage to buildings, even in such close proximity as 1 metre away.

2.  The largest area was a crater three metres in diameter and three to four feet deep. There was no change in soil or water, however at least one piece of shrapnel 10 inches long and four inches wide was found. Surrounding the crater was an area 20-30 feet in diameter where all vegetation had been burned.

3.  Three sites consisted of craters less than 2 metres in diameter and two to three feet deep. There were no soil or water changes, however there was minimal damage to the grass nearby. A pungent odour present at the time of impact was still detectable nine days later.

  The UN responded by shutting down OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan) aid to the area. A UN WFP team was sent to the area in order to investigate evidence for the use of chemical weapons in the area. However before the team reached the area it was instructed, without explanation, to abandon the mission and was recalled to Nairobi. When the UN teams eventually arrived in mid August, they concluded that they could not confirm the above reports. Despite the fact that soil samples are vital to investigation of Chemical Weapons, the UN team took none. They then reported that they were unable to investigate the use of Chemical Weapons because it was outside their mandate.[11]

  There has to date been no official investigation and the Aid agencies have been pulled out of the area. To our knowledge local civilians have received no redress for their loss of cattle and damage to the land, let alone for their suffering and human loss. Without even an explanation, the international Community remains silent.

THE UK GOVERNMENT POSITION

  When Channel 5 made a documentary on the subject Foreign Office Minister, the late Derek Fatchett MP, issued a statement concerning the incident:

"The British government continues to be concerned by reports that Sudan may have, or may be attempting to procure or develop, a chemical and biological weapons capability, either for their own purposes or on behalf of another country | Our ambassador to Sudan has raised our concerns with the Sudanese authorities on a number of occasions. It would be helpful to Sudan in clearing its name if it was to sign these conventions."

The questions to be asked surrounding the Lainya and Kaya incident

  1.  The UN claims that it has no jurisdiction to investigate these allegations. However the UN has previously set up adhoc teams to investigate the use of Chemical Weapons in Mozambique, Azerbaijan and Angola when credible evidence was presented. Since the UN's own personnel were hospitalised as a result of this event why has there been no investigation?

  2.  Why has the OPCW in The Hague not carried out an inspection of the area? Within the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention a challenge investigation could be mounted by any member state.

FURTHER EVIDENCE

  When the SPLA troops captured GOS garrison in Yambio and Rumbek in October 1998 they discovered a supply of 500 gas masks indicating an expectation for them of work in a CBW (Chemical Biological Warfare) environment.

  In May 1998 at a location near Keli, approximately 70 kilometres from Kurmuk a civilian suffered two days of blistering having touched the soil where a GOS shell had exploded[12].

  In the Nuba Mountains Christian Solidarity Worldwide report that local military forces believe that there is a faction of the GOS manufacturing Chemical Weapons in El Obeid. Local sources suggested that a Chemical Weapon's factory was being built in Kadugli.

  In addition in the Nuba Mountains there have been eyewitness accounts of Antanov bombers dropping shells which produce smoke. Local doctors report that such bombs cause vegetation to shrivel up and die. They also suggest that after such an attack they have developed symptoms including respiratory difficulties, in many cases leading to death.

  US reports suggest that Sudan threatened Uganda with Chemical Weapon strikes if they supported Black rebels.

  In June 1999 a CSW team visiting Southern Blue Nile interviewed a Prisoner of War. He had previously fought in the GOS forces, having been press ganged into the army. He described having seen soldiers handling weapons with masks and gloves in government garrisons around Dore and Ulu. The team also spoke to a local medic who had treated SPLA soldiers wounded in fighting around Ulu and Dore by government artillery shells. They had suffered from severe nosebleeds, fever, diarrhoea and a cough. Without the appropriate laboratory facilities their condition could not be diagnosed.

SUDAN AND IRAQ—A DANGEROUS PARTNERSHIP

  The US Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare[13] points out that much of the concern for Iraq's chemical weapon should centre on Sudan and Libya where research suggests that much of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction are housed. This assertion formed the basis of a channel 5 documentary by Damien Lewis in September 1998 entitled "Exporting Evil: Saddam's Hidden Weapons". The credibility of his findings was substantially bolstered by the ITC's (Independent Television Commission) decision to uphold Mr Lewis's findings against a complaint by the British-Sudanese Public Affairs Council. (A copy of their report is available)

"The transfer of Iraqi WMD overseas started even before the outbreak of the Gulf War. Back in 1990 when Baghdad realised that Iraq would be subjected to intense bombing key sensitive elements were smuggled out. In Spring 1991 a second round of hasty smuggling took place. Essentially the core of the next generation projects of the Iraqi WMD programs was moved to safe havens . . . Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire. Hence Iraq found eager and willing partners for its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against WMD."[14]

  This report (a copy of which is available from CSW) by the above US intelligence group catalogues the Iraqi development of Chemical Weapons and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Sudan over the past 10 years. In addition to consistent exports of Chemical Weaponry and Weapons of Mass Destruction the report tells of the Factories which have been built with Iraqi intelligence and funding in the GOS held towns of Wau, Kadugli and, during 1999, Kafuri and Mayu.

"The Wau facility gave Khartoum the capability of using "home grown" mustard gas against the rebels, thus not implicating its allies in chemical warfare . . . towards the end of 1995 Iraqi technicians were able to develop a crude but reliable delivery system of mustard gas."[15]

"In May 1997 Iraq began to transfer to Sudan equipment and materials for the production of weapons of mass destruction."[16]

CONCLUSION

  This report coupled with the first hand evidence from CSW and other NGOs illustrates the dangers of the Chemical Weaponry within Sudan. This research suggests that the Kaya and Lainya incident may only represent the tip of the iceberg in Sudan. There is surely sufficient evidence to warrant an international investigation, particularly as peace remains illusive. May we take this opportunity to urge the Foreign Affairs Committee to pursue a comprehensive enquiry. The International Community must be vigilant.

10   Applied Science and Analysis, Inc Newsletter 99-6 31 December 1999 issue 75, Damien Lewis. Back

11   NB any UN investigation into this incident would have to be made by the Hague based organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) but such an investigation requires the request of a member state. Back

12   Christian Solidarity Report, May 1998. Back

13   Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515, The Iraqi WMD Challenge, Myths and Reality, Bodansky. Back

14   ibid Page 6. Back

15   ibid Page 6. Back

16   ibid Page ?. Back