INTRODUCTION

  1.  The global nuclear non-proliferation regime is now at a cross-roads. The 1990's saw several important successes for this regime, most notably the renunciation of nuclear weapons by several key states (including Brazil, South Africa and Ukraine), the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreement by all recognised nuclear weapon states to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

  2.  In recent years, however, a number of setbacks have substantially eroded the benefits obtained from these achievements. Nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 have been followed by the US Senate's 1999 refusal to ratify the CTBT. Intensive efforts to contain the WMD programmes of Iran, Iraq and North Korea have been only partially successful, further eroding confidence in global WMD regimes.

  3.  Concerns over WMD proliferation have been reinforced by concerns over the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Primarily because of the large-scale export of Scud missiles during the Cold War, as many as 38 countries may now possess operational ballistic missiles with ranges of over 100 km. The main focus of NATO concern, however, is the possibility that several potentially hostile states may soon acquire ballistic missiles with much longer ranges. According to a recent CIA estimate.

"during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq".[1]

  4.  US concerns over the proliferation of ballistic missiles to so-called "rogue states" are sufficiently serious that they are now calling into question the survival of existing strategic arms control treaties, first agreed between the US and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s. In the near future (and possibly as early as summer 2000), the US President is likely to order work to commence on construction of a National Missile Defence (NMD) site in Alaska, with the intention of providing defence of the continental US against limited missile attack by 2005 or shortly thereafter. Such a deployment would be in breach of the ABM Treaty in its current form. The US administration has made clear, however, that it is prepared if necessary to withdraw from the Treaty in order to go ahead with NMD deployment.

  5.  US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would be a major, and perhaps terminal, blow to international non-proliferation norms. The indefinite renewal of the NPT in 1995 was based on clear commitments by existing nuclear weapon states to continue the processes of disarmament that were under way, albeit belatedly, in the early 1990s. If existing bilateral US / Russian treaties are repudiated, however, the NPT is also likely to come under increasing pressure. Regional nuclear-weapon-free zones—for example in Latin America, South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa—have a good chance of surviving, even if the NPT collapses. The strong security guarantees provided by NATO, and increasingly perhaps in future by the EU, may also help to prevent proliferation within Europe (though questions might arise for Turkey, given its particular vulnerability). Over time, however, the erosion of the normative basis of the NPT will make it increasingly difficult to mobilise international opinion against states in the Middle East and the rest of Asia that seek to withdraw from the NPT in future. The collapse of the START and ABM Treaties will also increase the likelihood of arms racing between the US, Russia and China, increasing international tension and wasting considerable economic resources that might better be deployed for more useful purposes.

  6.  If such a dismal prospect is to be avoided, efforts to save the ABM and START Treaties will have to be intensified. At present, the likelihood of a successful conclusion to such efforts does not appear high. Much time has been lost due to both the Russian Duma's refusal to ratify the START 2 Treaty and the US government's refusal to start START 3 negotiations until START 2 ratification takes place.[2] The probable election of Putin as Russian President in March will present a new opportunity for START 2 ratification. Yet the conditions attached to such ratification are likely to make clear that Russia will no longer be bound by the Treaty if the ABM Treaty collapses due to US withdrawal. START 2 ratification, therefore, would provide an opportunity rather than a solution.

  7.  The key to the future of nuclear arms control, therefore, lies in whether Russia and the US can reach agreement on a "grand bargain", in which Russia agrees to modify the ABM Treaty in return for US concessions on the content of a START 3 treaty.[3] With domestic pressure for NMD deployment in the US growing, the window of time in which such an agreement could be reached is already narrowing sharply. Even if there are no further major international upsets to the bilateral political relationship (as have occurred recently over Iraq and Kosovo), the negotiation of a new ABM/START package deal will require a sustained commitment of energy from the political leadership of both countries.

  8.  Yet a convergence of interests between Russia and the US means that a deal is still possible. For Russia, there are several reasons why a deal would be in its interests.

—  Russia cannot afford to maintain the arsenals it is permitted under the START 2 Treaty. Because of the Treaty's insistence on the dismantlement of multiple-warhead land based ICBM's, Russia is unlikely to be able to afford to deploy more than 1,500-2,000 strategic warheads by 2010, compared with the 3,500 permitted by the START 2 Treaty. It is in Russia's interests—military and political—that the reductions it will be forced to make as a result of START 2 are matched by the US. Russian military planners are concerned that a combination of US numerical superiority (as a result of START 2) and deployed national missile defences (made possible by the collapse of the ABM Treaty), together with acknowledged US superiority in anti-submarine warfare, will give the US real "first strike" opportunities in a future crisis. By locking in substantial reductions in US warhead numbers, a START 3 Treaty would help to limit the extent to which the US could obtain such an advantage.

—  In the absence of a deal, it is now almost certain that the US will withdraw unilaterally from the ABM Treaty, leaving it free to deploy whatever NMD systems it believes are necessary. A "grand bargain", by contrast, could allow Russia to maintain some degree of control over the shape of US NMD programmes. Negotiations on ABM Treaty modification would give Russia an opportunity to argue for measures to confine US NMD systems to a limited anti- "rogue state". This could include, for example, new limits on testing, increased verification measures, and a lengthened notice for withdrawal from a modified treaty. Russia might also use negotiations as a means of securing US financial assistance for the modernisation of its own early warning systems, currently in a state of increasing disrepair.

  9.  The US could also gain considerably from a new strategic arms control deal:

—  The US and its allies have a strong interest in repairing its strategic relationship with Russia, seriously undermined in recent years by conflicts over NATO enlargement, conflict in former Yugoslavia and policy towards Iraq. As part of a strategic arms control deal, the US will also be in a strong position to insist that Russia refrain from exporting nuclear and missile technology to countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and China. Without such a deal, by contrast, there must be a real risk that Russia will react by renouncing other existing strategic arms control agreements, withdrawing from co-operative approaches to proliferation, and putting its own nuclear forces on higher levels of alert.

—  The US has a strong political interest in ensuring that it does not have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to allow future NMD deployment. Russian consent to ABM Treaty modification would neutralise what is otherwise certain to be fierce criticism from the US's NATO and other allies. Even if negotiations for Treaty modification result in some delay in an NMD deployment timetable, this delay can be justified as a means of creating a wider alliance consensus behind US actions.

—  The US continues to spend around $35 billion a year—roughly 14 per cent of its total defence budget—on its nuclear forces.[4] A deal would allow the US to make significant savings in these costs. In response to unilateral US renunciation of the ABM Treaty, by contrast, Russia is likely to withdraw from both START 1 and 2, and possibly the CTBT also. In these circumstances, the US could well be faced by the substantial costs involved in a reinvigorated nuclear arms race, with strong pressure for increased investment in new generations of warheads and missiles.

—  Not least, a "grand bargain" would be a credible demonstration of a joint US/Russian commitment to fulfil their commitments under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would ensure that levels of strategic arms continue to fall over the next decade as they have done since the late 1980s. In the absence of such a deal, by contrast, both the existing ABM Treaty and START regimes are likely to collapse.

  10.  Yet many issues will have to be settled before a START 3/ABM Treaty bargain can be finalised. Amongst the key problems that will be confronted are the following:

—  In the START 2 protocol signed at the 1997 Helsinki summit, the US and Russia agreed in principle that a subsequent START 3 agreement, to come into force by 2007, would reduce the arsenals of both countries to a maximum of 2,000 to 2,500 deployed strategic warheads (from 3,500 in START 2). The US continues to be reluctant to go below the 2,500 level, in part because the Joint Chiefs are committed to the maintenance of a strategic "triad" (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles (based in both Atlantic and Pacific Oceans) and strategic bombers). In 1999, by contrast, Russia proposed that the limit be reduced to 1,500. Russia may be prepared to settle for a higher ceiling, but only if the US is willing to amend the START 2 ban on the deployment of multiple warhead (MIRV) ICBM's. If Russia were permitted to deploy three warheads on each of its new SS-27 Topol-M missiles, for example, it could deploy an additional 800-1,000 warheads over and above currently planned levels. Such a deployment would have the additional advantage, from a Russian point of view, of providing additional assurance of being able to overcome US strategic missile defences.

—  Russia will press for the inclusion of US nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's) in a future agreement. The US, for its part, is anxious to bring the large (but unknown) arsenal of Russian tactical nuclear weapons within a START 3 accord. Both types of weapons will become more important as the number of limited weapons decreases. Demands to expand the scope of an agreement to include them are therefore entirely understandable. But the inclusion of either SLCM's or tactical weapons would also have to confront considerable resistance from the forces most directly affected, as well as raising considerable practical verification problems.

—  Under current START treaties, both sides can "break out" quickly, and in a potentially destabilising fashion, by returning warheads to their missiles. As the number of deployed strategic warheads declines as a result of future agreements, however, there is a growing need to limit the ability to do this by agreeing limits on the number of warheads (both strategic and tactical) held in reserve stockpiles. Yet warhead limits will require agreement on new verification regimes that go far beyond those currently in place for START. Unless postponed for negotiation in a separate protocol, agreement on the details of warhead verification measures could provide a further obstacle to rapid movement towards a START 3 deal.

  In the interests of rapid progress towards a deal on ABM Treaty modification, it might be possible to postpone agreement on some of these issues into future rounds of talks. The US may be prepared, for example, to concede some limited Russian re-MIRVing in return for US NMD deployment. The issues of SLCM's and warhead numbers might initially be tackled through confidence-building and transparency measures, with a view of agreeing limits in future. Such an agreement could meet the Russian desire to maintain strategic parity, together with an affordable capacity for assured retaliation. It would allow the US to deploy an NMD force capable of providing some degree of protection against North Korea, but not against Russia.

  13.  The wider international community also has considerable interests in a new US / Russian arms control deal:

—  It would help smooth the way for Russia's long transition to medium-power status, a process currently at a very fragile and potentially destabilising stage. Recognition of Russia's leading role in strategic arms control would provide an important symbol of its indispensable role in global security, going some way to repairing the damage done to East/West relations by NATO enlargement and the 1999 Kosovo war.

—  It would guarantee further sharp reductions in both US and Russian arsenals, bringing closer the day when genuinely multilateral nuclear disarmament talks (including the small nuclear weapons states) becomes a possibility. If bilateral arms control collapses, the US is soon likely to become the world's single nuclear superpower, with clear "superiority" in both offensive and defensive systems, and therefore likely to be more tempted to pursue its security unilaterally. By constraining US and Russian forces within a treaty framework, by contrast, the possibility of future "minimum deterrent" agreements, also involving China, France and the UK, would be kept open.

—  A new strategic deal would buy time for benign political change in those countries that provide the main rationale for US NMD programmes. At present, US global security policy is preoccupied by the potential threats posed by Iraq and North Korea, states that are poor and insignificant in every respect except their possible future WMD and missile capabilities. Other states of concern may also acquire such capabilities in future. Yet political change in North Korea, in particular, would enable much of the political heat to be taken out of the US's current obsession with NMD.

—  With new defensive technologies becoming available, and the nuclear "balance" becoming more multipolar in character, the forms that strategic arms control take in the 21st century are likely to be very different from those adopted in the special circumstances of the Cold War. A START 3/ABM Treaty "grand bargain" does not provide a model for the future. But it could provide a bridge between the two "generations" of arms control, helping to ensure that the whole attempt to bring nuclear forces under international control is not abandoned.

BEYOND START 3: THE ROLE OF CHINA

  14.  The immediate priority is for a US/Russia settlement. Yet such a deal cannot be agreed without considering the potential impact on what may already be the world's third nuclear power, China.

—  According to current US plans, the deployment of 100 ground-based interceptor missiles in Alaska, together with associated early warning radars, is designed to provide defence of all 50 US states against the launch of "a few tens of warheads accompanied by simple penetration aids"[5] This force would be incapable of providing defence of the US against Russia, even if further sharp reductions in its strategic force take place over the next decade. It could, however, substantially reduce the effectiveness against the US of China's ICBM force, currently estimated to consist of only 20 CSS-4 missiles. Chinese officials have made clear their concern that such a development might weaken China's leverage in future East Asian crises (for example over Taiwan). In response to US NMD deployment, therefore, it is possible that China may seek to deploy a larger ICBM force of its own.

—  Some Russian commentators have expressed concern that future bilateral agreements with the US might leave Russia vulnerable to China's large, but unconstrained, force of medium-range missiles. In draft START 2 ratification instruments discussed in 1999, moreover, Duma deputies insisted on the right to withdraw from the Treaty in the event of "large-scale build up by a third nuclear-weapon state".[6] The country most likely to fall into this category is China.

—  Substantial Chinese investment in building up its nuclear forces, in response to an erosion of the ABM Treaty regime, would raise considerable concerns for the US and its allies. It would not only make it more difficult for the US and Russia to agree further reductions beyond any agreed START 3. It might also revive concerns amongst the US's East Asian allies regarding the credibility of US security guarantees, perhaps encouraging those in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan who favour the acquisition of national nuclear forces.

  15.  The SALT, START and ABM Treaties were all based on the unrivalled superpower status of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Ten years later, however, the US is the world's single military superpower, with a defence budget at least five times greater than that of Russia.[7] Both the START and ABM Treaties continue to be useful as a means of managing the rundown of the massive arsenals acquired by the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. But future agreements will also have to take into account the arsenals, and interests, of other nuclear weapon states such as China.

BEYOND START 3: EUROPE'S RESPONSE

A.  Arms Control

  16.  EU member states have no direct involvement in ABM /START negotiations. Both as custodians of the NPT and as permanent UN Security Council members, however, Britain and France have a particular responsibility to ensure that the outcome of these talks is consistent with wider international concerns.

  17.  If a START 3 Treaty is successfully negotiated, moreover, Britain and France could play an important role in pressing for a five-power nuclear transparency regime.[8] Such a regime could play an important role in allaying US and Russian concerns about third-country nuclear build-up and help to verify European "no increase" commitments, while postponing the fraught question of how to set ceilings in a five-power reduction agreement. Five power discussion might also play a role in persuading the US and Russia to adopt a more European approach to defining "how little is enough?" for minimum deterrence.

B.  European Strategic Defences

  Europoean Union states also have an interest in ensuring that future versions of the ABM Treaty do not exclude the possibility of US NMD technologies being used in future for the defence of Europe. If countries such as Iran and Iraq do obtain long-range missiles, and the US is building its own defences against these potential threats, it will be hard for European governments to resist domestic pressure for preparation of their own. If the US were to agree to a Treaty that allowed it to deploy its own national defences, but forbade it from helping Europe to do the same, the effects on NATO cohesion could be extremely damaging.

  Deployment of European strategic defences is still some time away, and is unlikely to become a serious possibility until a much greater consensus on the threat is reached. No such defence can be leak-proof, so vulnerability to coercion will remain even after deployment. The more quickly that EU states move towards deployment, moreover, the more expensive it is likely to be. While there is a good argument for the UK and other EU governments to commission precautionary research on NMD options, therefore, proposals for more substantial investments will have to be weighed against other, arguably more pressing, defence priorities. European states should keep their options open, while postponing hard decisions for as long as possible.

CONCLUSION: A THREE TRACK APPROACH

  The dangers posed by nuclear weapons to human survival have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War. The UK, as one of five recognised nuclear weapon states, has a particular responsibility for ensuring an adequate response to these dangers:

Arms Control

  The top nuclear arms control priority over the next year is to ensure that the US and Russia reach agreement on a START / ABM Treaty "grand bargain" before the US carries out its threat to pull out of the ABM Treaty unilaterally. The UK should do everything in its power to encourage both sides to make the necessary compromises, while urging the US to avoid precipitate actions which could have serious consequences for wider international non-proliferation efforts. In parallel with these efforts, the UK government should also make clear its support for five-power nuclear talks, commencing after a successful START 3 accord. Such talks would bring all five nuclear-weapon states into formal negotiations for the first time, and would help to fulfil their collective NPT commitment to actively pursue nuclear disarmament.

Politics

  The UK, along with its allies, should continue to give a high priority in foreign and security policy to efforts to contain, and if possible reverse, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Recent setbacks in efforts to persuade Iraq and North Korea to abandon WMD programmes should not be used to justify an abandonment of these efforts, and it should not be pessimistically assumed that proliferation is inevitable.

Defence

  Yet there remains a substantial possibility that these anti-proliferation efforts will not be successful. As a result, Western Europe (including the UK) could soon be vulnerable to WMD-armed ballistic missiles, fired from potentially hostile states in the Middle East. As long as such deployments remain a real possibility, the UK and its NATO allies should not rule out the long term option of European strategic defences. Given their likely cost and partial effectiveness, however, European governments should not seek to replicate US efforts at rapid deployment of such defences.

2   The START 2 Treaty was signed by Presidents Yeltsin and Bush in January 1993. It was ratified by the US Senate in January 1996. The Treaty was submitted to the Russian Duma in June 1995, but progress was halted by Russian opposition to NATO air strikes in Bosnia. It was resubmitted to the Duma in April 1998, but then postponed by the international political crisis (in August) and US-led attacks on Iraq (in December). NATO operations against Yugoslavia in March 1999 led to a further delay in Duma consideration of the Treaty. Alexander Pikayev, "The Rise and Fall of START II: The Russian View", Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No 6, September 1999, p 7. Back

3   Sam Nunn, Brent Scrowcroft and Arnold Kanter, "A Deal with Russia on Arms Control?", Boston Globe, 13 September 1999. Back

4   Stephen I Schwartz (ed), Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940, Brookings Institution, 1998 p 31. Back

5   Walter B Slocombe, US under-secretary of defense for policy. "Testimony to the House Armed Services Committee", 13 October 1999 Back

6   Alexander Pikayev, op cit p 29. Back

7   USS, The Military Balance 1999-00, 1999 estimates Russian defence spending at $55 billion in 1998. Estimates by Russian analysts suggest a much bigger gap. Alexei Arbatov, for example, estimates Russia's 1997 defence budget at only $25-30 billion. Alexei Arbatov, "Milatary reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles and Prospects", International Security, Spring 1998-97 Back

8   For further discussion, see Malcolm Chalmers, "Bombs Away"? Britain and nuclear weapons under New Labour", Security Dialogue, Vol 30, No 1, 1999 pp 61-74; Malcolm Chalmers, "UK nuclear weapons policy after the SDR", Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1999, 1999, pp 253-266. Back