105. The UK participates in several informal but well established "supplier groups". These are designed to harmonise the national export controls of the member states with the goal of denying countries, deemed to be potential proliferators, access to the technology and expertise required for the development and manufacture of WMD and their means of delivery. These groups include the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in the nuclear field, the Australia Group in the biological and chemical sphere, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. Each of these groups maintains a list of sensitive items, including 'dual-use' goods in the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. If such items are to be exported to non-member states, certain conditions must be met, such as good non-proliferation credentials on the part of the recipient and its provision of end-use guarantees. Dr Hopkinson indicated argued that "as technologies become more widespread the difficulties of control, especially when as in Russia and China central authorities may only have imperfect knowledge of what is going on, and where there are major financial incentives, become greater. The [export control] regimes have been very useful but need to be supplemented by good intelligence activity."[210]

Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee

106. The Nuclear Suppliers Group currently consists of 35 nuclear (almost all civil nuclear) supplier countries[211] and Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia are set to join in the near future.[212] The member states seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through export controls. We recommend that the Government encourage and assist Belarus, Turkey and Slovenia, which are about to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and other future candidates for membership to implement, at the earliest possible opportunity, effective nuclear export control legislation and mechanisms. Moreover, in light of the IAEA Additional Protocol, introduced to strengthen verification procedures following the discovery of a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, we recommend that the Government lobby for acceptance by the other Nuclear Suppliers Group members of this Protocol as an extra condition of civil nuclear supply in the future.[213]

107. The Zangger Committee currently consists of 34 nuclear supplier countries that are States Parties to the NPT.[214] The Committee publishes and updates a "Trigger List" of items that require certain safeguards and assurances as a condition of supply. Unlike the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Committee does not maintain a dual-use list, but the FCO believes that the Committee "continues to be an effective instrument in non-proliferation."[215]

Australia Group

108. Thirty countries and the EU Commission currently participate in the Australia Group[216] and all members are States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).[217] Each country within the Australia Group has introduced licensing measures on the export of certain dual-use chemicals, biological agents, and chemical and biological manufacturing facilities and equipment. These measures have been introduced with a view to preventing the spread of chemical and biological weapons. The Australia Group has been criticised by China, India, Iran and Pakistan, which view its existence as contrary to the CWC and BTWC. They argue that the Australia Group should not deny exports to States Parties to these conventions because they have made legally binding commitments not to acquire these weapon types. According to the FCO, "neither the conventions nor the Australia Group would be wholly effective on their own but a joint approach to stopping proliferation is the most effective." However, the Australia Group members have accepted that the workings of the group would need to be reviewed once the CWC becomes fully operational and the BTWC has in place an effective verification mechanism.[218]

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

109. Ballistic missiles are the delivery vehicles of choice for most states which possess or are seeking to develop some form of WMD capability. This preference stems from the ballistic missile's unique characteristics as a delivery vehicle, including its ability to deliver ordnance over long ranges in relatively short periods of time, and its almost assured penetration of defences because of this high speed of delivery. In the view of Dr Chalmers:

"Concerns over WMD proliferation have been reinforced by concerns over the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Primarily because of the large-scale export of Scud missiles during the Cold War, as many as thirty-eight countries may now possess operational ballistic missiles with ranges over 100km. The main focus of NATO concern, however, is the possibility that several potentially hostile states may soon acquire ballistic missiles with much longer ranges."[219]

The Foreign Secretary acknowledged that "the proliferation of delivery system technology is every bit as much a matter of concern as the weapons of mass destruction themselves."[220]

110. The Missile Technology Control Regime is the only multilateral means of constraining the horizontal proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. This is achieved by controlling the transfer of complete missile systems and unmanned air vehicles capable of carrying any payload over a range of at least 300km, as well as transfers of components and related technology that could contribute to such systems or the ability to develop and produce them.[221] The Missile Technology Control Regime is the only supplier group that does not relate to a corresponding multilateral treaty.[222]

111. According to the FCO, the major accomplishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime to date has been to "prevent or constrain ballistic missile programmes heavily dependent on imported Western technology." However, the FCO notes that indigenous missile programmes in India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea are a cause of growing international concern.[223] Indeed, long-range missile programmes in these countries have made significant progress in recent years. In 1998 alone, Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile, Iran tested the Shahab-3 and North Korea tested the Taepo Dong. This progress has been made possible through infusions of technology and expertise from non-Western sources. Though China is not a member of the MTCR we welcome the Foreign Secretary's statement to the Committee that "I shall continue to do all I can to encourage China to adhere to it."[224] We recommend that the Government play an active role in exploring new and enhanced measures to constrain the development of WMD-capable ballistic and cruise missiles in countries of proliferation concern. These measures should be multilateral and bilateral in nature and should target non-western suppliers (China, Russia, North Korea) of missile technology and assistance, as well as the countries developing the missiles themselves.

211   See Annex V for membership. Back

212   Ev. p. 101. Back

213   Ev. p. 13. Back

214   See Annex V for membership. Back

215   Ev. p. 101. Back

216   See Annex V for membership. Back

217   Ev. p. 102. Back

218   Ev. p. 102. Back

219   Ev. p. 146. Back

220   Q227. Back

221   Ev. p. 102. Back

222   See Annex V for membership. Back

223   Ev. pp. 102-103. Back

224   Q227. Back