The challenge
172. It is certainly a formidable task to co-ordinate
the activities of armed forces from 38 different countries and
police and administrators from even more different traditions.
For example, on 2 March 2000, there were police officers from
45 countries operating in Kosovo, and from traditions as diverse
as Benin and Sweden or Fiji and Kyrgyzstan.[457]
In our brief visit we encountered Swedish, Italian, Portuguese,
Egyptian, Finnish, Canadian, US and Mexican members of KFOR and
UNMIK, as well as Britons. There is also the potential problem
of co-ordination between the military and civil parts of the UN
mandate, though we were told in Kosovo by senior KFOR and UNMIK
officers that co-operation between the civil and military sides
was very good, and we were able to see practical examples of this
in policing.
173. An even more formidable challenge is presented
by the dire state in which KFOR and UNMIK found Kosovo. Under
the Milosevic regime, public services for Albanian communities
were run down and Albanians deprived of work in key industries
and the professions. The state education system was not used by
Albanians, who ran their own under-funded parallel system. This
was part of a complex alternative structure of government. Deprived
of civil rights by the Milosevic regime, the Albanian population
of Kosovo no longer had the sense of civil responsibilities, such
as the obligation to pay taxation.[458]
Once ethnic cleansing began, as well as the assaults on the population,
buildings and crops were destroyed and livestock slaughtered.[459]
All of this was exacerbated by the damage to the infrastructure
caused by the NATO campaign and by damage to economic assets deliberately
caused by retreating Serb forces. As the Serbs retreated, a further
problem was caused as the vacuum they left was often filled by
the KLA and by criminal elements from Albania. According to the
Foreign Secretary, "we took over a province which frankly
was a desert in terms of any public service"[460]
and he told us how exasperated he was by press articles "plainly
written by people who have no grasp or concept of how big the
problem was when we took over."[461]
In his words, Kosovo is "an impoverished province...further
ravished by the conflict."[462]
We agree with this assessment.
174. In this situation, KFOR has had to provide
the security, first against Milosevic's forces and then inter-communally
inside Kosovo, while UNMIK has had to operate as a sort of colonial
administration. The periodic reports of the UN Secretary General[463]
show the extent of the task, and the level of detail which has
had to be addressed. The nitty-gritty of public administration—establishing
a tax system, registering vehicles, paying civil servants, operating
a postal service, maintaining schools, colleges and health facilities—as
well as tasks often performed by the private sector—training
bank employees, maintaining electricity supply, re-starting enterprises,
operating bus and train services—have all fallen to UNMIK.
Regulations made by UNMIK have the force of law in Kosovo, and
UNMIK officials run central and local administrations.
175. The challenge is so enormous that it is
easy to find fault. The Foreign Secretary did not accept that
there was a danger that, having won the war, the international
community might now lose the peace.[464]
Instead he pointed to the magnitude of what had already been achieved.
However, we were told by KFOR and UNMIK staff that the danger
of failure was a real one. To an extent, this was recognised by
the Prime Minister in his statement to the House after the March
2000 Lisbon European Council when he promised that "we shall
see the peace through in the same way that we saw the conflict
through."[465]
We propose in this part of our report to examine a number of areas
of the UN's mandate, drawing attention to the problems which exist
and making recommendations about ways in which the United Kingdom
might help to deal with those problems.
176. The responsibility for solving the problems
of Kosovo does not rest with the British Government, nor is the
FCO responsible within the British Government for KFOR's contribution
or for the bulk of the United Kingdom's civil assistance. Nevertheless,
the FCO has stressed the United Kingdom's "key role in the
early stages of implementing the military aspects of the settlement
in Kosovo"; the fact that it "will continue to play
a major part in the stabilisation"; its "strong support
to UNMIK", and that "UK activity is a major part of
the international effort to restore normal life to Kosovo."[466]
These claims to occupy a leading position are borne out by the
level of contribution, both in terms of finance and manpower,
as we set out later. Politically, the Foreign Secretary has been
a driving force in policy towards Kosovo. Thus though it would
be wrong to imply that the FCO can alone take responsibility for
post-war Kosovo, we think it is appropriate to address our criticism,
praise and recommendations to the FCO.
Costs of UNMIK
177. UNMIK's job in Kosovo is enormous, but there
have been complaints that it has not been provided with the funding
necessary to perform its functions properly, and that there have
also been delays in disbursing money to the projects on the ground.
A contrast is often drawn between the money made available for
the military campaign and the money available for reconstruction.
Thus Dr Woodward told us that "the lack of resources to the
United Nations is really appalling given what we were willing
to do with the bombing campaign."[467]
Dr Kouchner is reported as having expressed a similar view forcefully
to the UN Security Council on 7 March. He said that "we must
allocate the necessary resources to accomplish the job" and
that it was "unacceptable" for UNMIK to have to beg
for the funds which had been pledged to it by the international
community. We were told in Kosovo that Dr Kouchner had had to
go round EU member states begging for money just to pay UNMIK
staff. In response to Dr Kouchner's remarks at the UN, Kofi Annan
said that support had been "very slow in coming", though
he noted that money had started to flow from the EU.[468]
178. The Foreign Secretary defended the contribution
to Kosovo of both the EU in general and the United Kingdom in
particular. He pointed out that £354 million of UNMIK's total
budget for 2000 of £529 million was being provided by the
EU, and that the United Kingdom was providing £57 million
of the total EU contribution in addition to its own bilateral
expenditure.[469]
He also told us that the United Kingdom was paying £475 million
for peacekeeping and reconstruction in the year from June 1999,
£370 million of which was for KFOR and the balance the contribution
to UNMIK and reconstruction. This balance of £105 million
was more than twice what was spent on the war (though written
evidence made plain that the costs of the war did not include
the costs of replacing munitions).[470]
179. We reproduce below as Table 1 a table based
on information received from the FCO.[471]
This sets out aggregate figures for EU Member States' bilateral
contributions to Kosovo for 1999-2000. The Table must be used
with great caution. First, it includes both pledged and donated
sums. Second, there are inconsistencies in coverage, with, for
example, some countries (such as Sweden and Luxembourg) appearing
to include spending by NGOs. Third, there may be some missing
data: for example, a Dutch budget for refugees in 2000 is yet
to be agreed—their contribution was a substantial _70m in
1999. However, taking into account these caveats, it is still
possible to calculate totals for the contributions of each EU
State, and to relate this to GDP in each case. These are the columns
in bold type in the table. This shows that the United Kingdom
is slightly below the weighted EU average, but higher than a number
of countries, including France and Spain. We recommend that
the United Kingdom should aim to provide bilateral assistance
at least at the average EU level.
449 Though the UN had a similar role, on a much smaller
scale, in Eastern Slavonia. Back
450
Report of the Secretary General on UNMIK, 3 March 2000, S/2000/177. Back
451
Annex 2.5. Back
452
QC104. Back
453
UNSCR 1244 (1999) para 9. Back
454
UNSCR 1244 (1999) para 11. Back
455
Ev. p. 49. Back
456
Ev. pp. 47-9. Back
457
See Table 2. Back
458
QC479. Back
459
QC424. Back
460
QC470. Back
461
QC479. Back
462
QC432. Back
463
E.g. 23 December 1999 (S/1999/1250) and 3 March 2000 (S/2000/177). Back
464
QC432. Back
465
HC Deb 27 March 2000 col 35. Back
466
Ev. p. 13-14. Back
467
QC291. Back
468
www.un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kosovo2.htm. Back
469
QC485. Back
470
QC453; Ev. p. 175. Back
471
Ev. pp. 374-378. Back
