1.  The MoD welcomes the interest that the House of Commons Defence Committee has shown in the UK's contribution to coalition operations in the Gulf and the balanced, thorough nature of their report. We wholeheartedly agree with the Committee's overall conclusion that the UK is making a valid contribution to stability in the Gulf, to protecting the minority people of Iraq from Saddam Hussein and containing Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbours. We are very proud of the professionalism and determination displayed by our armed forces personnel and warmly acknowledge the tribute paid to them by the Committee and the recognition that they are fulfilling a very important role. We recognise the Committee's reservations about some of the equipment available to our armed forces but can confirm that we are working hard to address those issues and would highlight their conclusion that neither these, nor any other constraint, has prevented our forces from making an effective contribution to the mission. We shall continue to work hard to boost our already good relationships with the countries of the region still further. The MoD addresses the Committee's specific comments and recommendations below:

Legal basis for the no-fly zones (Para 31). We have no doubt that UK participation in the no-fly zone operations over Iraq is justified on moral and humanitarian grounds

2.  The Government welcomes the Committee's endorsement of the continuing need for the no fly zones and in particular their recognition that the zones are justified on moral and humanitarian grounds. We welcome in particular the Committee's recognition that military action is only ever undertaken in response to direct threats from Iraqi forces against coalition aircrew carrying out their humanitarian patrols. The Government remains satisfied that the no fly zones are legally justified as a measure to prevent a humanitarian crisis.

Appropriateness and serviceability of equipment (Para 47). We expect the MoD to provide all RAF air-crew undertaking dangerous missions in the no fly zones with upgraded F3 aircraft as soon as possible and to ensure the highest levels of serviceability on all aircraft participating in the mission

3.  The MoD recognises the Committee's concerns about the performance and serviceability of the Tornado aircraft. As the Committee acknowledges the Tornado F3 was designed in a different era when we envisaged a different threat and a very different operational environment. The MoD has done much, however, to ensure that these factors have not prevented the UK from achieving the goals of the mission. As the Committee concludes the restrictions imposed on Tornado F3 operations by engine performance limitations do not expose it to an unacceptable level of risk or prevent it from making an effective contribution to the mission. In part this reflects the continuing development of our tactics and training and the integration of the Joint Tactical Instrumental Distribution System which greatly improves the operational effectiveness of the Tornado F3. In order to combat the problems associated with operating in high temperatures, the aircraft assigned to Operation BOLTON have been modified with an upgraded cooling system which significantly decreases the mean time between avionics equipment failures.

4.  Throughout their deployment, Tornado F3s in the Gulf have maintained a satisfactory level of serviceability with an average of 4/5 of the 6 aircraft being available for operations. Where aircraft have not been available, it has mainly been due to ongoing rectification work or the availability of spares. The MoD is mindful of the need to continuously improve the supply of spares and Operation BOLTON is given a high priority and now holds at least twice the level of critical items such as engines and radar line replaceable units as UK front line units. As the Committee recognises, given the dangerous nature of these missions, aircraft are not made available for sorties if the fault is deemed to be safety or mission critical and this will naturally affect the availability of aircraft. The Tornado F3s operating in Operation BOLTON have, for serviceability reasons, been withdrawn from only one mission over Iraq since mid April 2000.

5.  The MoD can confirm that it is fully committed to providing upgraded Tornado F3 aircraft in order to ensure that the highest levels of serviceability are maintained on all those aircraft patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zones. The Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP) provides the Tornado F3 with a sustained operational capability to counter emerging threats until the introduction of Eurofighter. So far 58, with the final aircraft due in May 2002, of the Tornado F3s from the 100 being upgraded have been delivered to the RAF and the RAF draws Tornado F3s exclusively from the pool of upgraded aircraft for deployments to the Gulf.

6.  As detailed in the Committee's report, the CSP gives the Tornado F3 the capability to fire the advance short and medium range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAM and ASRAAM). AMRAAM is a significant capability enhancement over Sky Flash with improved aerodynamics and a fire-and-forget capability afforded by its active seeker. This gives an improved ability to destroy hostile targets, more tactical flexibility and a reduced risk for Tornado F3 operations. A successful test firing from an F3 took place in December last year. ASRAAM is a fast, highly agile, fire-and-forget missile for short range air-to-air combat, able to counter intermittent target obscurity in cloud and sophisticated infrared countermeasures. It is expected to enter service next year and, once fully operational, will improve significantly the Tornado F3's short-range combat capability compared with that provided by Sidewinder. Once the appropriate clearances are in place ASRAAM will be considered for deployment on the Tornado F3s operating in support of Operation Bolton. Future upgrades to the Tornado F3 include a new NATO-Successor Identification Friend or Foe (SIFF), enabling the pilot to discriminate between friendly and hostile forces in the operational area with confidence. This programme has an in-service date of April 2002.

7.  The AI24 Foxhunter radar, is under-going an operational enhancement programme which will reduce its susceptibility to interference and improve serviceability. In order to achieve some of the operational advantages early, the radar is being modified in two phases, with 54 already through Phase 1 and both phases complete by March 2002;

8.  A new laser inertial navigation system(LINS) with integral Global Positioning System cards and a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) will shortly be introduced to service. These units will improve mission reliability and will help to provide accurate data on the position of the aircraft and its targets. Again, the importance of early operational enhancement has been borne in mind; the systems will be in place with an initial GPWS capability by the end of this year, with further improvements to optimise the GPWS due in September 2001.

VC10 Tanker (Para 48). We do not challenge the benefits of the decision to withdraw one of the VC10 tankers from the region, but we conclude that the MoD view that this has had no effect on operations is an overstatement.

9.  As Mr Hoon said in his evidence, on a very small number of occasions, either through crew sickness or aircraft unserviceability, planned sorties have had to be cancelled. Given the very small number of occasions on which this has happened and that there remains sufficient flexibility in theatre from the available coalition assets to make good any short term gap, we do not judge that there has been any significant impact on coalition operations over the southern no-fly zone as a result of the withdrawal of one of the two VC-10s. The MoD retains the ability to quickly deploy an additional VC-10 to lend support to operations in theatre should the need arise and indeed have done so recently. The MoD constantly reviews the forces deployed on Operation Bolton to ensure that they are sufficient to carry out the mission.

Other possible restrictions on operational effectiveness (Para 53). We conclude that these considerations do place constraints on the manner in which coalition air operations are conducted but do not prevent our forces from making an effective and valuable contribution to the goals of the mission.

10.  The MoD welcomes the Committee's view that our forces are not prevented from making an effective and valuable contribution to the goals of the mission.

Reinforcement (Para 54). We are also concerned that the capacity rapidly to reinforce air presence in the region, either in terms of maritime forces or land and HQ elements is at best limited.

11.  The MoD has the ability to reinforce maritime and sea-based air forces in theatre within the capabilities of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force: this has been exercised on a number of occasions. The extent to which potential host nations place restrictions on further forces being deployed ashore in the Gulf region will clearly depend to a certain extent on the circumstances in which we wish to reinforce. Having said that, the UK maintains good relations with the vast majority of countries in the region. We have no reason to believe that, in the event circumstances arose in which we wished to reinforce our forces in the region at very short notice, there would be any particular difficulty in doing so.

Operational Welfare (Paras 57 & 58). We expect the MoD to be able to tell us in response to this Report that the required improvements to the accommodation at Ali Al Salem airbase have been completed.

12.  The MoD acknowledges the Committee's concerns and we are working hard to improve the accommodation at Ali Al Salem in close concert with our Kuwait allies. The Kuwaiti authorities have been co-operative in their efforts to meet our requirements for our personnel at Ali Al Salem (AAS). We recognise the very harsh climatic conditions under which our people in Kuwait have to operate. Detailed plans were agreed in June and much maintenance work has been done by both Kuwaiti as well as UK Engineers to improve conditions at the base and this has been well received. The Kuwaitis have explored a range of contractual options as their financial and parliamentary oversight procedures duly demand and they tell us that the full-scale work on the improvement programme is scheduled to begin during November, with a completion date of March 2001 for refurbishment and May 2001 for new build. The MoD will continue to monitor progress very carefully and remain in close touch with the Kuwaiti authorities. We are pleased with the Kuwaiti plans and are confident that once this programme of work is complete, our personnel at AAS will be provided with the standard of accommodation that they deserve.

Telephones (Para 58). We hope that the MoD, in response to this Report, will be able to tell us that an efficient welfare telephone system is now in place for the personnel deployed in the Gulf and indeed elsewhere. The MoD also needs to continue to respond to the rapidly increasing popularity of e-mail as a way for personnel to keep in touch with their families, by supplying an adequate number of computers.

13.  The MoD acknowledges the recommendation made by the Committee and has done much to address this problem. The limited availability of civilian satellite facilities in the Gulf region had meant that the welfare telephone system provided under project WELCOME, the new welfare telephone service was not to an adequate standard. The problem has been resolved by allowing personnel to access the project WELCOME system via the military network and by installing additional handsets. This does not apply to the Gulf region alone. The introduction of project WELCOME is addressing the concerns with the adequacy and reliability of the welfare telephone system deployed elsewhere in the world.

14.  All personnel serving on Operation BOLTON in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are permitted access to the US NIPRET system for Internet access and sending e-mails, while personnel serving on Operation BOLTON in Bahrain have access to the Internet and e-mails using the local Internet Service Provider funded by the MoD. We are doing much more and recently MoD has initiated the procurement of additional computers for Internet and e-mail access for our forces in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, whilst additional computers for personnel in Bahrain have already been provided.

Force protection (Para 59). The region is not a benign or safe environment in which to operate. There are military threats, terrorist threats and other threats inherent in the nature of the deployment. Although this was not raised as an issue of particular concern during our visit, we would welcome reassurance that these risks have been adequately assessed and that the necessary thinking about preventative measures has been done.

15.  The MoD currently has a large number of personnel around the world on a wide range of missions and we place the utmost importance on their safety and security. The MoD is fully cognisant of the potential threats to UK forces in the Gulf region and has fully worked up contingency plans. We continue to work closely with the US and other allies and friends in the region to ensure that we have as accurate a picture as possible of potential threats to our forces.

Increasing the level of UK assistance. (Para 67). We recommend that the MoD examine very carefully the balance between the financial benefit it receives by charging for military assistance and training and the less evident but real benefits which might accrue from offering such services at lower or no cost to those countries with whom it is in our interests to retain good relations.

16.  The provision of military assistance and training plays a very important role in the development of bilateral defence relations, the promotion of British influence and standing overseas, and in support to wider British interests including defence sales. Charges for defence training generally seek to recover the cost to the UK exchequer of providing the training. UK defence training is recognised as being of the very best quality and our customers are generally prepared to pay for that. Subsidy from the Defence Assistance Fund (DAF) is applied in some cases, in accordance with defence objectives and priorities, to help countries in meeting the costs of training.

17.  We are aware that some countries heavily subsidise training provided to foreign students in a seemingly indiscriminate manner. There is some risk that such competition may lead to a drop-off in the take-up rates for certain types of UK training by some countries, including amongst countries in the Gulf region who generally do not qualify for subsidy on the basis that they can afford to pay for defence training. Whilst there is little evidence that this is happening at present, we are alert to the possible implications for UK interests in the region should such a trend develop. MoD policy on the application of charges for foreign students and the use of subsidy from the DAF is kept under regular review.

(Para 68). Decisions about defence procurement, in the gulf countries as elsewhere, are frequently political decisions. The MoD should be prepared, on occasions, to be more direct in linking the promotion of UK equipment to military assistance. Otherwise it risks the UK defence industry being disadvantaged to the benefit of our less coy allies and competitors.

18.  The MoD is fully committed to lending its support to potential British defence export prospects. Military assistance to overseas governments is provided in accordance with the MoD's objectives as set out in the Departmental Plan. These include encouraging the competitive strength of British defence suppliers and, within the framework of the Government's defence export controls, supporting British defence exports. There is therefore already a link between the UK's military assistance programme and support for British companies competing for defence export orders. The extent to which that linkage should be made explicit is inevitably a matter for judgement in individual circumstances. Our conclusion is that, in the context of our efforts to demonstrate continuing commitment to the region and to strengthen bilateral relations, some care must be taken to avoid giving the impression that our relationship is purely based on defence export marketing opportunities. But the MoD agrees that, on occasions, it is appropriate to draw attention to MoD military assistance programmes in support of British interests and to promote the competitive position of UK industry.

(Para 69). We believe that contacts of this kind are a vital part of the work of select committees and that through visits of this kind we are able to make a significant contribution to defence diplomacy.

19.  The MoD acknowledges the work of the Committee and pays tribute to its contribution to defence diplomacy. We recognise the importance of enhancing our bilateral defence relations, at all levels, towards the countries of the region and agree that the Committee has an important part to play in strengthening links with those countries further.

The UK's continuing commitment (Para 81). We have expressed in this Report some reservations about the equipment available to our forces but our overwhelming impression is that UK forces are fulfilling a very important role. Although the numbers of personnel and aircraft which we are able to contribute in comparison with the United States, our contribution is nevertheless important, in both operational and diplomatic terms.

20.  The MoD welcomes the Committee's acceptance that the cost of military operations in the Gulf has been money very well spent in terms of inhibiting Saddam Hussein's ability to threaten his own people, and his ability to threaten regional security.

12 October 2000

Ministry of Defence