Annex (continued)
AIRLIFT ASSETS: SHORT TERM STRATEGIC AIRLIFTSTSA
The Strategic Defence review identified an urgent
need to improve out strategic air transport capability and concluded
that in the short term pending the introduction of Hercules Rolling
Replacement tranche 2, HRR2, see separate memorandum[3]we
should acquire four C-17 aircraft or their equivalent. Proposals
are being considered in parallel with those for HRR2. We hope
to be able to announce a decision soon.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. Based on operational analysis which modelled
a range of scenarios in which UK forces might be deployed, the
Strategic Defence Review identified a requirement for additional
strategic lift assets, including four C-17 aircraft or their equivalent.
The Staff Requirement, endorsed in September 1998, describes the
capability equivalent to four C-17s in terms of:
(a) those individual equipment considered
likely to drive the minimum acceptable payload or cargo-box dimensions,
drawn from a list of equipment assessed as likely to have to be
transported in the early stages of a deployment of the Joint Rapid
Reaction Force; and
(b) theoretical overall maximum out-load
capability over a 7-day period, derived from the operational analysis
supporting the SDR work and expressed in terms of the maximum
potential payload, floor area, and volume to be transported.
2. Other characteristics sought include
the ability to:
a. operate world-wide from the widest possible
range of airfields, including poorly maintained runways, with
the minimum of ground handling support;
b. carry wheeled and tracked vehicles, palletised
freight (including ammunition), troops, or stretchers, or a combination
of all four, using integral equipment;
c. load and unload the aircraft without specialist
ground equipment, including the ability to drive wheeled and tracked
vehicles onto and off the aircraft without an intermediary loading
vehicle or platform; and
d. rapidly re-role the aircraft between the
different load configurations when away from base.
TRADE-OFFS
3. Trade-offs between cost and capability,
including in relation to the characteristics described above,
are being considered in the light of the bids received to meet
the requirement.
NUMBERS
4. The SDR established a short-term requirement
for four C-17 aircraft or their equivalent. The number of aircraft
acquired to meet this requirement will depend on the solution
selected.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. This requirement arises directly from
work carried out during the SDR.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. STSA will provide a strategic lift capability
in peace, crisis and war.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
7. STSA is being procured to meet a new
requirement and does not directly replace any existing equipment
or capability. The planned in-service date is defined in terms
of a "goal" of June 2001 and a "threshold",
ie the latest acceptable date, of December 2001, for the achievement
of the operational capability.
PROCUREMENT
APPROACH
8. An invitation to tender was issued on
30 September 1998 to eight potential bidders for open competition
at prime contractor level. The deadline for tenders was 29 January
1999, the same as that for the four-nation collaborative competition
which will identify the solution for the Hercules Rolling Replacement
tranche 2, HRR2, requirement, see separate memorandum.[4]
The two competitions were linked and assessed in parallel, both
to consider the most cost-effective solution overall and to ensure
that the solution chosen for STSA does not prejudice the HRR2
competition. Innovative tenders for STSA have been encouraged.
For example, combined tenders for both STSA and HRR2 requirements
have been compared with the preferred individual solutions to
assess overall cost effectiveness.
9. At the bidders' conference in October
1998, potential bidders raised concerns that the requirement could
only be met by one aircraft type, the C-17. They were therefore
asked to identify those areas of the requirement where relaxations
would be needed to allow significant cost/capability trade-offs.
None of the relaxations identified was ruled out as unacceptable
in broad terms for consideration of the bids.
10. In January 1999 five bids were received
from Boeing (C-17), Air Foyle (Antonov An124-210), IBP (Antonov
An124-100), Airbus Transport International (Beluga and a mix of
freighters) and Rolls Royce offering a fleet management service
of MoD acquired assets. The STSA competition was subsequently
terminated in August 1999, because none of the bids offered the
right combination of capability and cost. Since then the DPA has
continued to work with industry in seeking an off-the-shelf solution
to meet the requirement. This work culminated in a Request For
Proposals being issued on 14 October 1999, from which three proposals
were received on 29 October. Boeing (C-17); Air Foyle (Antonov
An 124-100); and heavylift (Antonov An 124-100).
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
11. A variety or procurement options have
been under consideration, including charter, lease and purchase.
COLLABORATION
12. STSA is not a collaborative project.
Our European partners for FTA are aware of our need for STSA and
of our procurement strategy.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
13. The STSA requirement is most likely
to be satisfied by the lease or purchase of commercial off-the-shelf,
COTS, aircraft. Export potential is not therefore an issue.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
14. The number of potential contractors
for STSA is limited to those who can provide a solution in the
required time-frame. The invitation to tender and subsequent RFP
were sent to all potential suppliers who had expressed an interest
and had a realistic chance of meeting the requirement.
SMART PROCUREMENT
15. The procurement strategy includes key
elements of Smart Procurement. Industry has been closely involved
in the project from the earliest possible stages. The project
is managed by a multi-disciplinary team. The solution to the requirement
will be acquired on a firm price basis.
ACQUISITION
PHASES
16. STSA is not following a conventional
procurement programme. The aircraft ISD goal is June 2001; the
short time-scale precludes the consideration of a solution other
than a COTS aircraft. Bids were received on 29 January 1999 and
we expect to reach a decision soon.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
17. Key milestones are:
|
| ITT issued | 30 September 1998
|
| Bids received | 29 January 1999
|
| Competition terminated | 5 August 1999
|
| RFP issued | 14 October 1999
|
| Proposals received | 29 October 1999
|
| Decision | early 2000 |
| ISD goal | June 2001 |
| ISD threshold | December 2001
|
|
18. We have been assuming costs in the region of £500
million but the costs of the different options vary widely; the
actual cost will depend on the solution chosen. No significant
expenditure has so far been incurred.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
19. The ITT requested priced proposals for three levels
of contractor support and maintenance, ranging from total contractor
support to limited RAF servicing and rectification. The in-service
support arrangements will differ markedly, depending on the chosen
solution.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVE
20. Aircraft would not be owned by the MoD under any
of the charter or lease options. All aircraft would be put into
front line service.
INTEROPERABILITY
21. We expect that our chosen STSA solution will make
a vital contribution to improving the airlift capabilities for
NATO and European operations.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
22. STSA is being procured to meet a short-term requirement,
pending the introduction into service of HRR2. The ITT sought
proposals for a four-year lease plus annual options for up to
a further four years and monthly options thereafter for up to
another year. Bidders were also required to quote for a seven-year
lease, with the option of a further year, plus monthly options
thereafter for another year. Current proposals offer solutions
over a minimum seven-year period, with the possibility of further
extension.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
23. The original ITT encouraged bidders involved in both
competitions to submit combined proposals to meet both the STSA
requirement and the UK's long-term airlift needs.
TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE ARMOURED COMBAT
EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENT (TRACER)
TRACER is the name given to the land-based component of the
information, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance,
ISTAR, capability required to meet the land commander's critical
information requirements. We are currently conducting a series
of parallel studies into manned land-based and air-based unmanned
systems to help determine the optimum balance of investment into
these complementary capabilities. No decisions have yet been made
on the specification or numbers of each type of platform. As part
of the parallel studies, we are conducting a project definition
study on TRACER in collaboration with the US. This memorandum
covers not just TRACER, but the current position in land and unmanned
air vehicle, UAV, elements of the wider ISTAR programme.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The original requirement for Tactical Reconnaissance
Armoured Combat Equipment Requirement, TRACER, was as a direct
replacement for the ageing Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked),
CVR(T), vehicles to provide a high resolution, real time information
gathering capability at extended ranges in all conditions. Since
then, however, the development of UAV technology promises to deliver
a significant portion of the required capability without the risk
to life associated with deploying troops far forward into enemy
territory. Operational analysis and military judgement show that
manned reconnaissance is still required, however, and studies
are currently planned into the sensors required to deliver the
capability and the most appropriate platform, manned or unmanned,
on which to deploy them.
2. The US has a requirement for a land-based, manned,
armoured reconnaissance vehicle, known as the Future Scout and
Cavalry System, FSCS. We decided, therefore, to participate in
a joint project definition study to further define the TRACER/FSCS
requirement and to provide the information necessary to inform
the UK's balance of investment decision. A UK/US Combined Operational
Requirement Document was agreed in December 1997 and contracts
signed with two competing consortia on 29 January 1999. The UK
element of the requirement included two possible variants in addition
to the basic Scout, out of which would be equipped with a long-range
anti-tank guided weapon, LRATGW, to provide overwatch protection
for vehicles deployed far forward without protection from tanks.
The US does not currently have a requirement for the LRATGW or
Engineer variants, since its armoured cavalry regiments are normally
supported by main battle tanks, and their combat engineers are
differently employed.
TRADE-OFFS
3. The principal trade-offs are between a manned, land-based
capability and an unmanned, air-based capability, which can only
be determined once the parallel TRACER and UAV studies have reported.
Within TRACER, possible trade-offs will be studied in depth in
the operational analysis conducted as part of the programme. There
will be an affordability review 24 months into Project Definition,
which will review capability against cost and further refine the
TRACER requirement. Studies are also being conducted into the
viability of unmanned land vehicles, which will be taken into
account in the wider decision on balance of investment studies
due in 2002.
NUMBERS
4. No decision has been taken on the number of TRACER
or UAVs to be procured, pending the outcome of the balance of
investment studies.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
5. The Strategic Defence Review emphasised the importance
of ISTAR intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
capabilities. It confirmed the importance of a continued ability
to conduct high intensity conflict, which TRACER and/or the UAV
capability would be designed to support.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
6. TRACER and/or the UAV capability would be used in
all phases of war and in operations other than war, where they
would be able not only to provide intelligence, but also to act
as a deterrent, monitor opposing forces, help maintain freedom
of movement and provide a credible offensive capability by directing
direct and indirect fire onto enemy forces. Any equipment would
need to be transportable by strategic transport aircraft.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
7. The current capability is provided by the Scimitar,
Striker and Sabre variants of the CVR(T) vehicles and by the Phoenix
UAV. The CVR(T) vehicles were introduced in 1972 and proved to
be inadequate during the Gulf war in the areas of sensors, stealth,
survivability, mobility and lethality. CVR(T) is undergoing a
life extension programme, which will improve, to a limited extent,
its sensors and mobility, but is inadequate to meet the requirements
of the modern battlefield. The out-of-service date for all members
of the CVR(T) family of vehicles is about 2015. An ISD will only
be confirmed for TRACER and UAV once a decision has been taken
on capability and numbers to be procured. Currently none of the
funds allocated to this programme beyond Project Definition has
been allocated to a specific platform, land-based or air-based.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
8. The initial feasibility study for TRACER, jointly
funded by the MOD and industry, was conducted by three UK industrial
consortia and reported in 1994. A further cost and risk study
allowed the consortia to propose concepts and prices, address
areas of risk and consider candidate technologies for downstream
integration. As the cost and risk study neared completion in 1996,
it emerged that the US had a similar requirement. The UK and US
decided, therefore, to collaborate on Project Definition studies
and subsequently signed an "umbrella" Memorandum of
Understanding in July 1998.
9. We are currently investigating opportunities for similar
collaboration with the US and other countries on the UAV elements
of the wider ISTAR programme. It is assessed that there is currently
no opportunity for a European collaborative programme on TRACER
owing to different national doctrines concerning the use of reconnaissance
forces and the force mixes that are employed.
10. Two UK/US industrial consortia have been formed to
participate in the competitive TRACER Project Definition phase.
SIKA International is a joint venture company formed by BAE Systems
and Lockheed Martin, and including Vickers Defence Systems, with
General Dynamics Land Systems as sub-contractor. LANCER is a consortium
headed by BAE Systems, at the time of contract signature Marconi
Electronic Systems, acting as prime contractor, and including
Alvis Vehicles, United Defense LP & Raytheon. The recent merger
of British Aerospace and Marconi Electronic Systems has presented
challenges to the programme, but a series of "firewalls"
have been put in place by the company to ensure that effective
competition continues.
11. An invitation to tender for two firm price Project
Definition contracts was issued to the two consortia on 9 July
1998. These proposals were evaluated jointly by teams from both
the US and UK. The limited competition meant that NAPNOC, no agreed
price, no contract, procedures were applied. Contracts were awarded
on 29 January 1999.
12. In order to inform the Balance of Investment study
due in 2002 (para 3 refers), proposals relating to the first stage
of an assessment phase for SENDER, a unit level UAV, have recently
been received from Industry. These proposals are currently being
assessed and contracts are scheduled to be placed in June. Further
work associated with SPECTATOR, a formation level UAV, is also
being established in order to inform the same Balance of Investment
work.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
13. Alternative procurement options include the extent
to which the capability could be provided by UAVs. As far as the
possible vehicle element is concerned, two alternatives to the
development of a new vehicle were considered in 1992 and again
in 1997. A market survey of off-the-shelf options revealed that
no commercially available solutions to the requirement existed,
or would be likely to exist in the relevant timescale. The possibility
of modifying a number of existing or proposed armoured vehicles,
including the Challenger 2 main battle tank was also considered.
As it was estimated that the platform itself would only account
for around 20% of the system cost, and there was a high risk of
failure to meet the full requirement, this course was not assessed
to be cost-effective. Procurement options for the UAV element
are being investigated through a series of studies with Industry
and DERA (para 12 refers).
COLLABORATION
14. The TRACER project is directed by a UK/US Steering
Committee and administered by a Joint Project Office, JPO. The
UK has assumed the lead of the JPO for Project Definition, and
was responsible for placing the contracts on behalf of both nations.
The JPO is led from the Defence Procurement Agency's office at
Bristol. It has a permanent staff of about 35 military and civilian
acquisition professionals covering a wide range of disciplines
and can also call on the expertise of the Defence Evaluation and
Research Agency. The estimated cost of the UK offices for Project
Definition is some £4 million a year, funded by the MoD.
A satellite project office, funded by the US, has been set up
at the US Army's Tank Automotive and Armaments Command in Warren,
Michigan. All decisions relating to the progress of the programme
must be agreed jointly. There is no commitment by either nation
beyond the current Project Definition stage.
15. The MoU commits both the US and UK to an equal cost
share during Project Definition and Full Development, although
the latter would be the subject of further national approvals.
Supplements to the MoU, taking account of national off-take, would
be negotiated for the production phase if a decision were taken
to proceed with production.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
16. It is impossible to assess the market potential for
TRACER or the UAV elements until the projects are better defined.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
17. Collaboration provides an opportunity for UK companies
to forge links and share technical expertise with US companies.
The TRACER/FSCS MoU with the US sets a goal of equitable work-share,
which is reflected in the proposals received from industry. The
two industrial consortia participating in Project Definition were
the only industrial groupings to come forward after briefings
on the collaborative programme.
18. The industrial factors for the UAV element have yet
to be determined, although a wide sphere of interest has been
received from industry, both from within Europe and the USA. Industry
is already showing positive signs of forging links and sharing
technical expertise with a view to positioning itself for the
potential UK UAV programme. Collaboration at Government level
is regarded as unlikely due to the advanced state of the technology
associated with UAV products but levels of co-operation, such
as the information exchange agreement signed with the USA, will
be central to the achievement of a successful UAV programme.
SMART PROCUREMENT
19. The TRACER programme embraces several Smart Procurement
features. Greater emphasis is being placed on risk reduction during
Project Definition. The JPO is liaising closely with all stakeholders,
including industry, to reduce timescales and achieve a better
understanding of a complex programme. The benefits of this approach
have already been realised in the evaluation of tenders for Project
Definition-a process which would traditionally have taken six
to eight months has been completed in four. Increased emphasis
is being placed on through-life costs, with challenging but achievable
targets for reliability and in-service availability. A similar
approach will be adopted for the UAV element. The TRACER Integrated
Project Team was formed in January 2000.
20. Smart procurement principles are being applied to
the UAV programme. Emphasis is being placed on driving down through-life
costs by reviewing the levels of operating and maintenance costs.
The current work associated with establishing information to input
the Balance of Investment studies is focused on determining through-life
cost drivers and will be used to establish cost effective UAV
systems. The tactical UAV Integrated project Team was formed in
February 2000.
ACQUISITION PHASES
21. The initial feasibility study and the subsequent
cost and risk study allowed TRACER to be defined by mid-1996.
The planned progression to a national Project Definition phase
was delayed because of the emerging possibility of collaboration
with the US. Following detailed negotiations, two Project Definition
contracts were awarded on 29 January 1999. They will last for
42 months. Each consortium is to produce a detailed specification
for Full Development and Initial Production in accordance with
the agreed pricing strategy; an assessment of training requirements;
a range of demonstrators, including an integrated demonstrator
vehicle; a risk management plan, supported by an updated risk
register, a software integration plan; a trials and acceptance
plan, a project management plan; a quality plan; a safety plan;
and an integrated logistic support plan. This will then be considered
in parallel with similar plans for the UAV element before deciding
whether to proceed to the next phase.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
22. Reporting in January 2001, the TRACER Affordability
Review will further refine the requirement following consideration
of a number of options. Project Definition should be complete
by mid-2002 and the outcome will be used in the TRACER/UAV Balance
of Investment Study.
23. A reliable estimate of the total cost of the project
is not possible in advance of decisions on the balance of investment
between platforms. Some £10 million has been spent by the
UK on the Feasibility Study phase. The UK costs for TRACER Project
Definition is £120 million, at updated 1999-2000 prices.
For the UAV elements, it is planned to invest a total of around
£50 million on the concept phase for SPECTATOR and assessment
phase for SENDER UAVs.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
24. During TRACER Project Definition, contractors will
deliver costed options for contractor logistic support for the
first two years in service, the following five years and subsequent
periods. Options may include direct supply of spares to the field
force, and Public/Private Partnership type arrangements for major
spares components, as well as contractorised maintenance support.
A Training Needs Analysis will also be undertaken during Project
Definition. A similar approach will be adopted for the UAV element.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVES
25. To be determined during the balance of investment
considerations in 2002.
INTEROPERABILITY
26. Project Definition will cover TRACER's compatibility,
interoperability and commonality with other systems. A similar
approach will be adopted for the UAV element.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
27. CVR(T) will have been in service for over 40 years
when it is replaced. Options for disposal are likely to be limited.
Disposal options for Phoenix have yet to be determined, as the
equipment has only recently entered service.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE AND
FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
28. It is anticipated that TRACER and all the UAV elements
will remain in service for a long period of time. The consortium
have been instructed to prepare to carry out through life improvements
to the system in order to fulfil emerging capability gaps and
to capture the advantages of novel technology. Such an approach
will add to the useful life of the system.
3
p 64. Back
4
p 64. Back
|