Annex (continued)
AIRLIFT ASSETS: HERCULES ROLLING REPLACEMENT
TRANCHE 2 HRR2
It was decided in 1994 to replace a first tranche
of the Hercules air transport fleet with 25 new C-130J aircraft.
We are now seeking, through a collaborative competition, both
to replace the capability provided by the remainder of our ageing
air transport fleet and to procure for the long term a dedicated
outsize strategic lift capability which will be provided in the
near term by "short-term strategic airlift", see separate
memorandum.[2]
We hope to be able to announce a decision soon and to replace
the existing aircraft in the second half of this decade.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The Staff Requirement to replace the
RAF's ageing fleet of Hercules transport aircraft was originally
endorsed in the summer of 1993. The roles and characteristics
sought for both tactical and strategic airlift were essentially
similar to those of the existing aircraft. They included the ability
to deploy troops or freight between theatres or within a theatre
of operations either by parachute or landing on short, semi-prepared
strips. Emphasis was placed on solutions that offered significant
improvements in reliability and maintenance and operating costs
over the existing RAF Hercules. In December 1994, the decision
was announced to buy 25 C-130J as tranche 1 of a Hercules Rolling
Replacement Programme, HRR1.
2. In July 1997, with a view to informing
decisions on tranche 2 of the Hercules Rolling Replacement programme,
HRR2, we announced our intention to rejoin the collaborative European
Future Large Aircraft, FLA, programme and to endorse the related
European Staff Requirement, ESR. The ESR was prepared to meet
the future air transport requirements of eight participating nationsBelgium,
UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Spain and Portugalbut,
in the event, Portugal decided not to participate formally in
subsequent stages of the FLA programme. The ESR matches, and in
some cases exceeds, the UK requirement for a Hercules replacement.
In particular, it specifies a larger cargo carrying volume, a
greater maximum payload and a higher cruise speed.
3. The Strategic Defence Review confirmed
the need to replace the capability provided by the Hercules and
concluded that an outsize airlift capability was required to support
the deployment of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force, JRRF. The latter
requirement is to move items such as the Attack Helicopter and
certain engineer equipment but not, for example, Challenger, AS90,
or armoured bridge layers. This outsize lift capability was consistent
with the requirements for FLA set out in the ESR and thus required
no change to the procurement strategy to meet the longer-term
HRR2 requirement agreed in July 1997.
TRADE-OFFS
4. Studies were carried out in March 1993
to examine various Hercules refurbishment and replacement options,
including C-17, C-130J, and FLA, using projected costs. Further
studies were conducted in 1994, based on Lockheed Martin's response
to the HRR1 Invitation to Tender. Since FLA would not be available
within the prescribed timescale, these studies included consideration
of refurbishment of the existing Hercules, followed by procurement
of C-130J or FLA, as well as early procurement of the then current
C-130H production model or its planned replacement, the C-130J.
the conclusion was that procurement of C-130J would provide best
value for money, earliest maximum increase in availability and
a significant increase in capability compared with refurbishment
options.
5. Studies in 1996 examined various options
to meet the HRR2 requirement, including procurement of
C-130J, FLA, C-17, and a mixed fleet of C-130J and
C-17. These studies indicated that none of the options could be
ruled out, but it was not possible to draw definitive conclusions
in the absence of firm costs. Further studies have been carried
out on the basis of the priced proposals received from Airbus,
Boeing and Lockheed Martin in preparation for a procurement decision
in early 2000.
NUMBERS
6. Requests for Proposals have quoted a
potential UK requirement for up to 45 FLA and have sought prices
for stated equivalent numbers of C-17, and mixed fleets of C-17
and C-130J. final numbers will be decided in the light of further
operational analysis of the requirements, and cost-effectiveness
trade-offs between the solutions.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
7. As already noted, the SDR confirmed the
need for HRR2 and for an outsize airlift capability.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
8. The aircraft that meets the HRR2 requirement
will provide tactical and strategic mobility to all three Services
in peace, crisis and war. In crisis or war HRR2 will be employed
on inter- and inter-theatre air transport tasks, primarily in
support of the JRRF.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
9. Of the existing fleet of 55 Hercules
C130, which entered service in the 1960's, 25 will be replaced
by HRR1. The capability provided by the rest of the fleet, and
by that provided in the short term by STSA, will be replaced by
the aircraft procured as HRR2. Depending on the option chosen,
the aircraft selected could enter RAF service as early as 2005,
as is our aim, with existing aircraft replaced progressively from
that date.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
10. On 4 September 1997, the seven collaborating
European nations issued a Request for Proposals for FLA to Airbus
Industrie against the agreed ESR. Each nation specified its required
in-service date, expected off-take, support needs and other variables.
The aim would be to place a fixed price contract for acquisition
and elements of support for the first ten years. The contract
would be placed by the Organisation Conjointe de Cooperation en
Matiere D'Armement, OCCAR, and embrace many aspects of the Airbus
Industrie's proposed commercial approach.
11. A second Request for Proposals was issued
to Airbus Industrie, the Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin Aeronautical
Systems on 31 July 1998 by the UK on behalf of Belgium, France,
Spain and the UK, seeking tenders at prime contractor level against
the ESR. Securing best value for money through competition was
a condition of our willingness to remain involved with the FLA
programme. Tenders for this Future Transport Aircraft, FTA, competition
were received on 29 January 1999, coincident with those for the
STSA. Tender assessments were conducted jointly with other nations
and in more detail on a national basis.
ALTERNATIVE
PROCUREMENT OPTIONS
12. Contenders in the collaborative Competition
include the Airbus A400M (as the Future Large Aircraft is now
known), and the existing C-17 and C-130J aircraft both available
as a commercial off-the-shelf purchase. Germany, a non-participant
in the four-nation competition, is also considering the Antonov
An-7X, (a customised version of the Russo-Ukrainian An-70) along
with France, Spain and Italy, as further alternative to the A400M.
The UK would have been prepared to assess a compliant tender for
AN-7X offered by a Western prime contractor. The C-130J cannot
fulfil the "outsize lift" element of the ESR and would
only be considered as part of a mixed fleet solution.
COLLABORATION
13. There are two collaborative dimensions
to the UK's HRR2 programme. On the one hand, there is the four-nation
FTA competition, whilst on the other, the seven-nation A400M.
The assessment of bids has been undertaken jointly on the common
elements of the requirement; national requirements have been dealt
with by each nation individually. The UK has undertaken a Combined
Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal to evaluate
solutions in the wider context of UK air and sealift capability,
and to assist our own procurement decision.
14. There has also been a seven-nation assessment
of the collaborative A400M. When the Request for Proposals was
issued, the A400M nations indicated potential requirements totalling
288 aircraft. Airbus have offered prices for the A400M based on
this and a number of other off-takes, but final numbers will not
be known until each partner reaches its own national decision.
To date, none has done so.
15. There would be no collaborative opportunities
in respect of the purchase of C-17 or C130J, except perhaps in
the field of shared support.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
16. Airbus Industrie believes that there
is a market for the A400M beyond the European collaborative partners,
though estimates for the scale of this market vary.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
17. For all potential solutions, we shall
expect to secure industrial participation or work-share arrangements.
For the A400M, the aim is to ensure broadly equitable work-sharing
arrangements, without detriment to overall value for money. For
BAE Systems, the UK industrial partner in Airbus, a key element
of A400M work-share would be wing design leadership. For C-17
and C-130J solutions, 100% industrial participation has been sought.
SMART PROCUREMENT
18. The four-nation competition will help
to achieve a cost-effective solution. We made clear in the Request
for Proposals our willingness to consider proposals for elements
of the HRR2 support package to be funded through a Public Private
Partnership arrangement. For the A400M, we favour a commercial
approach along the lines of civil aircraft development and procurement.
There would be no separate development contract. Airbus Industrie
would be contracted to deliver aircraft, and would be responsible
for the risk management associated with development. The final
price of the A400M will reflect the extent to which Airbus Industrie
will have to carry costs pending production deliveries. In respect
of aircraft certification, the UK would expect to capitalise on
the existing certification of the C-17 and C-130J, as far as possible.
For the A400M, the intention is to adopt an approach based on
civil Joint Airworthiness Requirements, supplemented by military
requirements where appropriate.
ACQUISITION
PHASES
19. The A400M project is in the later stages
of Project Definition, with design feasibility work mature. Over
50 of a total order of 120 C-17 aircraft are already in service
with the US Air Force. Although C-17 procurement would be commercial-off-the-shelf,
COTS some modification might be needed to optimise the aircraft
for the RAF. The MOD would expect C-130J to be of the same, or
a very similar, standard as the aircraft that is now entering
service with the RAF, as HRR1.
20. Both A400M and C-17 contain risk. For
A400M, the risks associated with a collaborative programme, and
the need to achieve favourable commercial terms would combine
with technical risks. The C-17, the key risks would be those relating
to achieving a satisfactory Military Aircraft Release, defining
UK specific options and negotiating acceptable commercial terms
and conditions.
MILESTONES AND
COSTS
21. Key milestones are:
|
| FLA Request for Proposals issued | 4 September 1997
|
| Competitive Request for Proposals issued |
30 July 1998 |
| Tenders submitted | 29 January 1999
|
| Decision | early 2000 |
| Contract let | 2000-01 |
| ISD | depending on the chosen solution.
|
|
22. Total estimated costs for the acquisition and initial
support of the solution chosen for HRR2 are of the order of £2-2.5
billion over the next 10 years. No significant costs have so far
been incurred.
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
23. The bidders provided a range of in-service support
options, with the options mainly differing in the level of contractor
support offered. The in-service support strategy selected by the
UK requires that all first line maintenance and on-aircraft second
line maintenance be carried out by RAF personnel. Third line on-aircraft
maintenance and second and third line maintenance of off-aircraft
components will be undertaken by industry. This strategy will
ensure flexible and responsive support to operations, especially
deployed operations, whilst making best use of industry experience
and resources for the conduct of the more specialised and resource
intensive tasks.
24. Potential problems during any change-over period
include the scope for dual utilisation of Service support resources,
such as equipment or manpower. Such problems will be minimised
through controlled delivery/disposal contracts and manpower planning;
as a new aircraft is delivered, old equipment will be removed.
FRONT LINE,
STORAGE AND
RESERVE
25. No decision has yet been taken on the exact size
or make-up of the HRR2 fleet, which will be considered in our
assessment of the bids.
INTEROPERABLILITY
26. Existing customers for the C-130J include the RAF,
US forces, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Italian Air
Force. C-17s are currently operated by the USAF and the US Air
Force Reserve. Potential customers for FLA include Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the UK. It is not possible to
quantify the operational effectiveness implications of different
air forces using the same type of transport aircraft, but all
of these aircraft can, or are expected to be able to, carry the
universal cargo pallet, as can the existing Hercules. Savings
in support costs could be expected if several nations operate
the same type of aircraft.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
27. The 25 Hercules C-130K aircraft which are being replaced
by C-130J will be returned to Lockheed Martin as part of the HRR1
procurement package. No decision has yet been made on the subsequent
disposal of the remainder of the C-130K fleet.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
28. The Staff Requirement assumes an in-service life
of 30 years.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
29. No specific options are being considered at this
stage for long-term development. Improvements to avionics and
other systems are likely to be required over the life of the aircraft.
SEA LIFT ASSETS: ROLL-ON ROLL-OFF (RORO)
SHIPS
The Strategic Defence Review identified a need for four additional
Roll-on Roll-off vessels, making a total of six, to support the
deployment of the Joint Rapid reaction Forces, JRRF. After Initial
Gate in March 1999 an Invitation to Negotiate, ITN, was issued
to 4 consortia. Assessment of the bids received in July 1999 indicated
that a Private Finance Initiative, PFI, solution was likely to
provide value for money. After optimization of the bids to reflect
commercial and capability trade-offs, final bids were received
on 14 January 2000. From these bids it is intended to place a
contract this year.
The bids have confirmed that any service provider will have
to build new, or convert, existing ships to meet the operational
requirement. The target date for such ships to be available is
2005. Until the full service can be available a provisional service
to meet the operational requirement from October 2000 will be
managed by MoD and give access to an enhanced level of sealift
compared to that currently available.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT
1. The requirement is for guaranteed, world-wide delivery
of JRRF early entry equipment, including containerised ammunition,
at sustained speeds of at least 18 knots. The vessels will be
of commercial design and will not be provided with warlike features
such as a self-defence capability and military communications,
although design aspects will permit their operational use. Ship
size will depend on balancing optimum load carrying capacity against
the need to operate to small ports without specialist facilities,
such as craneage and limited "no deep draught" berths,
whilst manoeuvrability will be built into the design to assist
with berthing in the absence of tug support.
TRADE-OFFS
2. Trade-offs between operational risk and value for
money has been tested in negotiations.
NUMBERS
3. The long-term requirement is for a capability of six
vessels in total.
STRATEGIC DEFENCE
REVIEW
4. Operational analysis in the SDR subsumed earlier studies
of strategic lift to identify the number of RoRo vessels, and
aircraft, required.
MILITARY CAPABILITY
5. The RORO service can be used across a full range of
missions and military tasks that require deployment of UK forces
into theatre through a seaport of disembarkation. It is not the
intention to use the service in "battle conditions"
but the ships may need to transit warlike zones and maybe under
escort as part of a task force.
EQUIPMENT TO
BE REPLACED
AND IN
-SERVICE DATE
6. The current RORO (Crusader/Centurion) are "bareboat"
chartered vessels which are manned, operated and maintained by
the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. The contracts for these hulls are due
to complete January and April 2001 respectively, providing the
maximum possible contract extension is agreed. The 6-ship RORO
package is intended to provide the increased capability identified
by the SDR.
PROCUREMENT APPROACH
7. Under the PFI arrangements, the service provider will
be responsible for the design, finance, manning, operation and
maintenance of the service. PFI is inherently Smart in that it
looks at whole life costs, harness commercial skills and opportunities,
and seeks to place risk in the hands of the parties best placed
to manage it. The opportunity for commercial trading of capacity
under-used by MoD will reduce the cost of the service to the MoD.
CREWING
8. The service provider must provide a guaranteed service,
which includes the possibility of transiting warlike zones as
well as limiting the possibility of interference from other nations.
Furthermore there is also a clear operational requirement to man
these vessels with British seamen, as a minimum, for security
considerations when JRRF operations and major four yearly exercises.
Bids on the basis of Sponsored Reserve crewing have been submitted.
ALTERNATIVE PROCUREMENT
OPTIONS
9. An Investment Appraisal has considered a wide range
of options including: do nothing for 20 years, short and long
term charter options, and conventional design and construction.
EXPORT POTENTIAL
10. The issue of export potential does not arise directly
in the circumstances of this project.
INDUSTRIAL FACTORS
11. Both the interim and long-term requirements are being
addressed through competition. The long-term requirement may involve
a new build by the selected PFI contractor. In such circumstancesthe
build of commercial, non-warlike vessels to be owned by a PFI
contractor, rather than procured by the MoDthe competition
has not been restricted to UK yards.
SMART PROCUREMENT
12. The programme will be managed using a Smart Procurement
approach.
ACQUISITION PHASES/KEY
MILESTONES/COSTS
13. Key milestones as currently planned:
|
| Initial Gate | Approving issues of Invitation to Negotiate assuming PFI.
| March 1999 |
| Assessment of bids | | Late 1999/Early 2000
|
| Main Gate | To approve selection of preferred bidder for PFI solution
| April 2000 |
| Announcement of preferred bidder |
| Late Spring |
| Contract Award | | July 2000
|
| Provisional Service | |
October 2000 |
| Full Service | | By 2005
|
|
14. The capital cost of the asset element of the service
will be around £200 million. The annual service cost to the
MoD is related to usage but might amount to £40 million per
annum for commercial charter (fuel excluded).
IN -SERVICE
SUPPORT
15. Under a PFI arrangement the service provider is responsible
for the operation and maintenance of the service and is paid against
performance.
"FRONT LINE"
NUMBERS
16. The intention is that all six ships, under a PFI
arrangement, with optimum risk transfer, should be at the graduated
readiness required for JRRF operations.
INTEROPERABILITY
17. The service supports the NATO Defence Capabilities
Initiative in a number of areas but full commitment is limited
by contractual limitations appropriate to a PFI contract.
DISPOSAL OF
EQUIPMENT REPLACED
18. The contract for the currently chartered RORO ships
will end in Spring 2001. The capability gap until the availability
of the full service will be met through long term charter.
IN -SERVICE
LIFE
19. The contract will be 20 years from the introduction
of the full service and the contractor will be responsible for
the disposal of the assets at the end of the contract. The 20-year
period is related to value for money, financing and ship life.
DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL
20. A change procedure will allow, for example, technical
upgrades offering value for money to the introduced by agreement.
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