** Denotes classified information

ON SECURITY POLICY

  1.  The current state of play in the development of the ESDI. A chronology of decisions or announcements made since the Washington Summit would be welcome, together with a description of the anticipated timetable for further key decisions about the nature of the WEU's future, progress in building the CFSP since the Amsterdam Treaty came into force, and progress in the Defence Capabilities Initiative.

  1.1  Work on European defence continues to be focused on means to strengthen Europe's defence capabilities, for use in NATO operations or in EU-led operations. The final report of the WEU audit of assets and capabilities for European operations was presented at the Luxembourg WEU Ministerial meeting in November. It highlighted the need to improve collective capabilities and operational forces, placing a particular emphasis on the need to improve availability, deployability, strategic mobility, sustainability, survivability, interoperability and operational effectiveness. At the British/Italian Summit in July, we proposed the establishment of a European wide goal, and national goals, for enhanced military capabilities to undertake crisis management operations; while at the British/French Summit in November, we called on the Helsinki European Council to set a concrete headline goal. At Helsinki EU leaders agreed that "by the year 2003, co-operating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades of 50,000 to 60,000 persons)." Specific targets for readiness and sustainability were also set, and the European Council agreed to develop collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence, and strategic transport, shortfalls that had been identified by the WEU audit. Finally the Council agreed to develop a method for reviewing progress against all of these goals, which will capitalise on existing defence planning procedures, including those available in NATO and, for non-Allies, in the Planning and Review Process of the Partnership for Peace. The incoming Portuguese Presidency was invited to take this work forward.

  1.2  European access to NATO assets and capabilities will address some of Europe's collective capability shortfalls, for example in planning and command and control. At Washington, NATO welcomed the new impetus given to strengthening the common European policy on security and defence and agreed to the further development of European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) within NATO. It signalled its readiness to "define and adopt arrangements for the ready access by the EU to the collective assets and capabilities of the Alliance, for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance" building on procedures already agreed between WEU and NATO. This is in line with the UK's approach to develop within the EU a capability to support decision making on military matters (including the means to take political control of crisis management operations), while the bulk of military capacities for planning and conducting any EU-led operation would be drawn from the resources available to NATO. NATO has started work to elaborate the practical implications of the Washington agreement. Ministers received a progress report at their meetings in December.

  1.3  At the European Council in Cologne, the EU identified the politico-military elements that might be required to support defence decision making. It agreed to work towards the inclusion of those WEU functions necessary to "fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks" with an aim of taking key decisions by December 2000 at which time "the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose". At Helsinki, the Council agreed to establish new permanent political and military bodies within the Council; a standing Political and Security Committee; a Military Committee; and a Military Staff. Furthermore it agreed that as of March 2000, until such time as the new permanent bodies can be established, interim political and military bodies would be set up. The Portuguese Presidency was invited to take work forward.

  1.4  Key events over the next few months are the WEU Ministerials in May, and the NATO Ministerials and European Council in June. These Meetings will review progress and set the agenda for the coming months.

  1.5  The Amsterdam Treaty came into force on 1 May 1999. Its key provisions on CFSP included provision for the appointment of a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and for the introduction of common strategies, defining the objectives, means and duration of the EU's external policies. A declaration attached to the treaty provided for the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) within the General Secretariat of the Council. The PPEWU role is to monitor and analyse developments relevant to the CFSP: providing assessments of the EU's interest; to provide timely assessments of events and situations which may have significant repercussions for the EU; and to produce argued policy option papers.

  1.6  EU Heads of Government agreed to appoint Javier Solana as High Representative at the Cologne European Council (he has also been appointed Secretary General of the WEU). They also adopted the first EU Common Strategy on Russia. Further Common Strategies on Ukraine, the Mediterranean and the western Balkans are now in preparation.

  1.7  Since the Washington Summit, work on the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) has been taken forward by a temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG), made up of representatives from capitals, and chaired by NATO's Deputy Secretary General. The HLSG has met four times since the Summit. Its chairman produced a report on the implementation of the DCI, which formed a basis for discussion at the meeting of the NAC (Defence) on 2 December. He noted that the initial results had been encouraging, and that there were good prospects for further substantial capability improvements.

  2.  Developments since the Washington Summit in the PfP and in NATO's policy towards further enlargement.

  2.1  Significant progress has been made since Washington in putting the Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP) initiatives endorsed at the Summit into practice. In particular, the Operational Capabilities Concept, when implemented, should not only make Partner forces more effective through objective assessment mechanisms, but should also enhance the force generation process by making likely Partner contributions more predictable and easily identifiable. Training and education has been enhanced too, with a view to targeting efforts more carefully to Partner's needs, following the theme of interoperability for operations. Developments in simulation and distributed learning will be taken into account. Such an intensification of activity will inevitably lead to strengthening of working relationships between Allies and Partners in peacetime. The end result of all these initiatives will undoubtedly be a further step forward for the operational Partnership, and a significant boost to our ability to conduct NATO-led PfP operations.

  2.2  As the Washington Summit confirmed, the Alliance expects to extend further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the Alliance and enhance overall European security and stability. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched at Washington to reinforce this commitment to the "open door" and to enable aspirants to work more closely with NATO and better prepare themselves for the next round of enlargement.

  2.3  Work to establish programmes of activities tailored to assist aspiring countries' membership preparations through the MAP is now well underway. The aspiring countries are taking advantage of the opportunities available to them to receive advice and feedback on the development of their own individual MAP through established bilateral channels and direct from NATO in workshop and committee fora. The North Atlantic Council will review progress formally with each aspirant individually in Spring 2000 and annually thereafter. NATO remains committed to review the enlargement process at its next Summit which will be no later than 2002.

  3.  Steps taken within government in the last 12 months to develop the integration of cross-departmental approaches to security policy.

  3.1  The Ministry of Defence already has extensive links with both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. A feature of the way business is done between the Departments is that officials will usually discuss possible approaches to issues with their colleagues in other Departments.

  3.2  Ultimately a coherent and cross-departmental approach is ensured through the work carried out by the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat, which runs a number of interdepartmental committees and groups to address key issues.

  3.3  However, we are taking a number of steps to ensure that we are more joined-up in our working with other Departments with whom we share common goals. At the highest level the new Defence Mission reflects a broadened perspective in that it states that our purpose is to "defend the United Kingdom, and Overseas Territories, our people and our interests; and "to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and security."

  3.4  Defence Diplomacy represents the most high profile area where we are now working more closely with both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development. Progress made on Defence Diplomacy is set out in the answer to question 5.

  3.5  The Government has announced 13 cross-cutting studies as part of the 2000 Spending Review. These will look at key issues across departmental boundaries, and MOD is directly involved in four of them: Conflict Prevention; Science and Research; Nuclear Safety in the Former Soviet Union; and Drugs. The Department is also carrying out an exercise on the back of the Modernising Government initiative to look for areas where we can build stronger links with other Government Departments.

  4.  Progress made over the last 12 months by our European Allies in developing force structures to meet NATO's new missions.

  4.1  Significant progress has also been made in implementing NATO's revised Command Structure. The new structure is designed to enable the Alliance to perform the whole range of its roles and missions more effectively and flexibly. All European Allies have been actively involved in this work. Ministers agreed the detailed plan for the implementation of the new structure in December 1998 (which, amongst other things, cleared the way for Spanish integration into the NATO military structure in January 1999). The new Command Structure was activated in September, and the lengthy process of detailed implementation has begun. Work is now underway in NATO, in the context of the revised Strategic Concept, leading to a review of the Force Structure. Specific measures in the Defence Capabilities Initiative also address developments in force structures, including those of European Allies, required to meet NATO's new missions.

  4.2  Progress on the European Defence Initiative, which will also improve European Allies' ability to respond to NATO's new missions, is reported in response to Question 1.

  5.  The implementation in practical terms of the Defence Diplomacy Mission, and evidence to measure its effect.

  5.1  As both the SDR White Paper and the Defence White Paper 1999 explain, Defence Diplomacy is not a new idea, but it was decided during SDR to encapsulate a number of tasks into a single mission to ensure that our efforts are well-focused, better managed and effectively co-ordinated across the MOD and properly linked to Britain's wider security and foreign policy objectives. Chapter 6 of the Defence White Paper gives specific examples of how the mission is being implemented and activities that are being conducted under each of the three Military Tasks that comprise the mission.

  5.2  A framework for the implementation and management of the Defence Diplomacy programme is currently being taken forward by a management cell. We are enhancing our reporting systems through which we can monitor the effectiveness of Defence Diplomacy activities to ensure that available resources are used to best effect and that our contribution remains focused, effective and consistent with Departmental objectives.

  6.  The impact of developments in Northern Ireland in the last 12 months on the demands placed upon the armed forces there.

  6.1  Whilst the Armed Forces continue to provide valuable support to the RUC, the cease-fires of the main terrorist groups have enabled them to adopt a lower military profile. This includes reduced patrol frequency, an end to military patrolling in many parts of the Province (including Belfast and Londonderry), and a reduction in helicopter flying hours.

  6.2  The reduction in Army activity levels has led to a number of units and assets, including three roulement infantry battalions, being rear-based to Great Britain. Rear-basing has eased the overstretch on those units concerned. Troop levels in the Province remain around 15,000, (the lowest level since 1970). Rear-based units remain under control of the General Officer Commanding (GOC), to be brought into the Province when required. This year's marching season saw over 2,000 soldiers recalled to the Province (including the United Kingdom Standby Battalion), but their presence was brief and temporary. The period passed off relatively peacefully and the substantial deployment of both RUC and Armed Forces personnel was a major contributory factor in deterring those who were intent on violence.

  6.3  Subsequent to the continued political progress in the Province, the Northern Ireland Secretary announced a review of specific security arrangements and, if the situation allows, the GOC would expect to further reduce the military profile. The GOC will continue to maintain sufficient capabilities to counter the activities of those continuing to threaten violence.

ON FORCE STRUCTURE

  7.  Progress made in implementing the new joint forces: the Joint Helicopter Command, the Joint Force 2000, the enhanced CJO organisation and PJHQ, the JCSC, the Joint Doctrine Development Centre and the new Defence Logistics Organisation. What targets have been set?

  See Chapter 3 of the Defence White paper 1999.

  8.  Progress made in the restructuring of the Army and the implementation of the new training cycle. What targets have been set? What are current readiness levels?

  8.1  Paragraphs 23-26 of Chapter 3 of the Defence White Paper 1999 answer the first two parts of this question.

  8.2  The Formation Readiness Cycle will deliver the first high readiness Brigades once they have completed the training phase of the cycle. Other units are held at the readiness appropriate to the tasks that they might be called upon to perform.

  9.  What has been done to enhance training for operations other than war?

  9.1  Training for what are now termed "Other Operations" (OO) is kept under review and constantly updated and, wherever possible, improved, in the light of operational experience, but since our methods have been validated by experience in Peace Support Operations, the fundamental approach to this training has not changed since 1992. A key characteristic of this training is that its foundation lies in preparation and training for warfighting. Training for OO is additional to this, and depends on it. It is necessary for personnel to be trained for their warfighting roles for training for OO to be fully effective.

  9.2  Formation exercises now regularly employ scenarios based on Peace Support Operations. While not specific to particular theatres or even to units about to be deployed on OO, the use of such scenarios means that the overall level of training and preparation among all units for PSO and OO is raised (and is certainly higher now than it was five years ago).

  10.  Your best estimate of the total and the current additional annual cost of forces stationed in Germany. What forces are now stationed there?

  10.1  The total annual cost, for financial year 1999-2000, of the Army's presence in Germany is expected to be some £1,020 million, and the additional cost—in terms of overseas allowances—is some £65 million. This excludes other less quantifiable additional charges, such as the cost of movements between the UK and Germany. On a similar basis, the full budget for 1999-2000 for RAF units in Germany is some £110 million, of which about £7.5 million relates to overseas allowances. These direct additional costs are offset by the provision of a number of commodities purchased in Germany free of tax and the provision of land and buildings free of charge by the Federal German Government.

  10.2  British Army units stationed in Germany are as follows:

  10.3  RAF units stationed in Germany (all at RAF Bruggen), as at 1 July 1999, were:

  11.  The allocation of secondary tasks to the four Trident submarines.

  11.1  The SDR announced that Trident SSBNs (Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear) would be at a reduced state of alert which would enable them to carry out a variety of secondary tasks "without compromising their security". The range of secondary tasks considered included the following:

—  increased hydrographic and oceanographic surveys;

—  additional training exercises, both of the SSBN crews themselves, and with other UK units;

—  equipment trials.

  11.2  In the past year, SSBNs on patrol have achieved an increased number of hydrographic and oceanographic surveys, and also increased the proportion of patrol time engaged in self-training exercises whilst amending their modus operandi to meet the changed strategic environment. A recent patrol successfully incorporated an advanced exercise with another UK submarine, and planning for further exercises is under way. Since the SDR, SSBNs on patrol have conducted some trials on communications equipment, both shore and sea based systems, which will benefit both SSBNs and SSNs. Equipment trials have also been conducted which will help the development of future Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) systems.

  11.3  All additional tasks will continue to be carefully assessed to ensure that the SSBNs conduct these secondary tasks without compromising their security. Maintaining through-life invulnerability of the SSBN force requires a careful assessment of how this might be affected by any secondary activity. This process will continue to be taken forward.

  12.  Changes implemented in the numbers, capability and deployment patterns of the attack submarine flotilla.

Numbers

  12.1.  To date, no change in numbers has taken place, but the SDR concluded that the SSN (Ship Submersible Nuclear) should be reduced in size from 12 to 10 over the next few years.

Capability

  12.2  We are seeking to increase the capability of the SSN force to match emerging threats and keep pace with the changing maritime and joint warfare environments. In particular, all SSNs will be TOMAHAWK Land Attack Missile (TLAM) capable from 2008, once the steady state of 10 SSNs had been achieved.

  12.3  The SSN is a proven force protection asset, in both Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti Surface Warfare (AsuW). Our future procurement plans are predominantly aimed at maintaining the SSNs' proven protection role while enhancing expeditionary roles.

Deployment Patterns

  12.4  Traditional SSN deployment during the Cold War were in the Atlantic Ocean, North Norwegian Sea and Arctic Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War SSNs (and SSKs (Ship Submersible Kilo) while we still had them) have deployed east of Suez, and beyond.

  12.5  Post SDR, and the advent of TLAM, SSNs will increasingly bias their activities towards the Mediterranean (HMS SPLENDID utilised her TLAM capability during the recent Kosovo campaign) and eastwards, and will continue to deploy east of Suez.

  13.  Implementation of the new flexible deployment of the frigate and destroyer flotilla and its effect.

  13.1  The Surface Flotilla escort force is now at its post-SDR force level of 32 ships and the revised Military Task deployment patterns agreed in the SDR have been introduced. These are as follows:

  13.2  The Atlantic Patrol Task (APT). This replaces the permanent guardship deployments to the West Indies and South Atlantic. We still provide a guardship on station during the winter months in the South Atlantic and throughout the Caribbean hurricane season. For the remainder of the year, units are at extended notice for operations in these theatres (for example the West Indies Guardship can be in UK waters conducting other routine tasks). This allows APT units to conduct a wider range of activities, including operational training, support of wider British interests and bi-lateral training with our regional allies. Significantly, it has provided sufficient flexibility to facilitate an increased presence in the West African littoral (usually by the unit allocated to the South Atlantic). In the West Indies, the focus of activity has shifted to Counter Drugs, though disaster relief and commitment to overseas territories remains the priority. APT (North) has this year seized cocaine with a street value in excess of £1.2 billion.

  13.3  The ARMILLA Patrol. One ship and a tanker remain permanently stationed in the Gulf to support UK interests in the region with a second unit at six weeks notice for operations in the Gulf. Activities in the Far East, hitherto conducted by the second ARMILLA unit, are now conducted by a single ship deployment to the region except in those years when a larger deployment is planned. During 1999 HMS GLASGOW deployed to the Far East and Pacific, supporting UK industry and diplomatic interests in the region and playing a major part in Five Power Defence Arrangement Exercises as well as participating in the multi-national response to the East Timor crisis. While deployed the Far East deployment ship will normally be earmarked as the second ARMILLA unit.

  13.4  The commitments to NATO's Standing Naval Force are unchanged. The Royal Navy maintains a permanent presence with the two ocean-going forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.