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Mr. Grieve: As a result of the discussions at Rambouillet, there was a great deal of Anglo-French momentum to try to initiate operations in Kosovo, but it proved impossible to do so. Was not the reason the fact that, until the United States could be got on board, such operations were simply a non-starter? How would that problem be resolved when there is a growing split between the idea of getting the United States involved and the developments advanced as desirable by the right hon. and learned Gentleman?

Mr. Campbell: I have a copy of Strobe Talbott's speech, some passages of which, if fairly read, suggest that there is more support for the European security and defence identity on the other side of the Atlantic than some hon. Members might be willing to acknowledge.

Let me return to the financial and statistical information that I was about to outline. Europe spends £100 billion a year on defence--approximately two thirds of American spending, but for a fraction of the capability. The USA contributed 75 per cent. of aircraft in Kosovo and 80 per cent. of munitions. As the previous Secretary of State for Defence has pointed out several times, European forces struggled to put on the ground a force equivalent to 2 per cent. of all the men and women under arms in Europe.

The alliance will not hold if that imbalance between the USA and Europe continues. Which of us would confidently assert that the Americans would necessarily come to Europe's aid in similar circumstances in the future? I am not talking about collective defence, because I do not doubt that the Americans would come to Europe for that. However, there will be increasing reluctance in the USA, even to the point of refusal, to take part in operations such as Bosnia and Kosovo.

Europe must spend more wisely, but Europe may have to spend more. That is why the defence capability initiative that arose from the Washington summit is so important. Europe may need more than that--a

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European-wide defence review. The key to the European security and defence identity is capability. Architecture and command-and-control issues will be much more easily resolved when our capability is adequate.

The hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples) rightly referred to the three Ds--no duplication, no discrimination and no de-coupling. If what is produced at the end of what Strobe Talbott calls an iterative process does not conform to those principles, there should be no deal. Those principles were slightly differently described by the Secretary General of NATO when he addressed the North Atlantic Assembly in Amsterdam a fortnight ago. He talked of adding to Albright's three Ds Robertson's three Is: improvement in capability; inclusiveness, involving total transparency between NATO, the Europeans and the north Americans; and indivisibility, meaning collective defence uninfringed and undiminished by what is proposed.

When American politicians express reservations we should take account of their views. But there is a paradox: the United States calls on the Europeans to take greater steps in their own interests, but then claims that Europe is turning its back on its transatlantic partners. Some of those who expressed the strongest reservations were against intervention in Kosovo; they were against the ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty; they are in favour of the revisal of the anti-ballistic missile treaty; they are in favour of the Helms Burton resolution and the extra-territorial jurisdiction that it seeks to achieve. Until recently, many of those who are so vociferous about the ESDI were against the United States of America paying its dues to the United Nations. The transatlantic relationship is absolutely vital, but it must be a mature relationship in which the United Kingdom and Europe are partners of the United States, not satellites.

Furthermore, it is true that, so great are the resources and capabilities of the United States, nothing that Europe could do would ever detract from the overwhelming military capability of the United States and the political leadership that it gives to NATO in collective defence.

There have been references to Strobe Talbott's speech. I doubt if he expected it to be pored over like a conveyancing document, or a memorandum or prospectus from something like the south sea bubble. In relation to Kosovo, he stated:


He continued:


    "It did not take Kosovo for both Americans and Europeans to recognise that there is an asymmetry in the transatlantic relationship; that is unwelcome and unhealthy; and that we must find ways to rebalance our respective roles."

On the ESDI, he stated:


    "I'll start by reiterating what I hope is a clear, unambiguous statement of American policy. It's a policy of support: the US is for ESDI. It's in our interest for Europe to be able to deal effectively with challenges to European security well before they reach the threshold of triggering U.S. combat involvement."

That is quite right. As the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), the former shadow Foreign Secretary, pointed out, there are

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questions to be answered. That is perfectly right. However, if one reads the speech as a whole, Strobe Talbott's position on behalf of the American Administration is, "Yes, we are in favour, subject to these questions". His speech does not state that they are against the matter because of those qualifications.

Mr. Robert Key (Salisbury): Nor are we.

Mr. Campbell: It was notable that in commenting on the rebalancing of the relationship, the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples) did not have much to offer by way of constructive proposals. If he has such proposals, the House will be happy to hear them on some other occasion.

We have heard some exchanges about the single European currency. I realise that there will be a full-scale debate on Europe in a week's time and I do not want to dwell on European issues, apart from the fact that--rather like the Foreign Secretary--I find it difficult to understand that there is a principle of such importance that it is time-limited until the expiry of the next Parliament. If it is a matter of principle that one is against the currency, one will be against it for ever, no matter how many economic advantages might flow to the United Kingdom. One would be against it as a matter of principle. One cannot hold such a principle and say that it will lapse at the end of the next Parliament. I think it was the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) who, in analysing that policy, said that it was a bit like saying that one was against rape, but only until the end of the next Parliament. No doubt, he chose his example for some of the connotations that it might carry.

I am not a part-time member of the Government. The Government have been timid--continuously so--on the single currency. For our part, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ross, Skye and Inverness, West (Mr. Kennedy) pointed out in his response to the Queen's Speech, we believe that it would be right for the Government to declare in principle an intention to join, to work towards the convergence criteria that are necessary and then to hold a referendum, so that the people of the United Kingdom can pass judgment on what is not just an economic matter, but a political and constitutional one.

It would once have been unthinkable to ask whether a Conservative Government would withdraw from Europe. However, it is now no longer impossible to see circumstances in which they might do so. That would be profoundly against the interests of the people of the United Kingdom. If the Conservatives do get into power and they want to withdraw from Europe, will they pledge to hold a referendum so that the people of the United Kingdom can have the opportunity to pass judgment before that withdrawal takes place? To those who say that the North American Free Trade Agreement offers a sensible or viable alternative, what procedures within the agreement would compel the United States or Canada to accept British beef? I doubt if there is a commission, and I doubt very much if there is a court.

In relation to Kosovo, there are not only issues as to the requirement for better integrated defence, but questions as to the right of intervention. The hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon gave the impression--no doubt it was a slip--that the House somehow authorises intervention,

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but, of course, we do not. Intervention is an Executive prerogative. I agree substantially with the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn): when we send young men and, increasingly, young women from this country into circumstances in which they risk their lives, the House of Commons ought to have the right to pass judgment on that decision.

Does a right exist if no UN resolution allows it? That question is not new. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in the document "Agenda for Peace", published 10 years ago, argued for an extension of the right of intervention. I assert that such a right exists, but that it is subject to the following criteria, which might be swept up in the Foreign Office study that has been urged on the Government. First, force should always be the last resort. Secondly, all diplomatic efforts should have been exhausted. Thirdly, the intervention should be undertaken to deal with a systematic breach of international law, or the universal declaration of human rights. Fourthly, regional stability should be threatened by the mass movement of refugees, or there should be a risk of severe environmental damage. Fifthly, applicable United Nations resolutions should have been flouted. Sixthly, the intervening powers should be willing to make a commitment to make good damage and to restore democratic institutions. Seventhly, will the intervention diminish conflict, rather than escalate it? Finally, as a matter of principle, rather than of pragmatism, can the intervention be made effectively? Those are the type of criteria that justify intervention.


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