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Mr. Deputy Speaker: Order. May I say gently to the right hon. Gentleman that I have heard these points made many times this evening already?
Mr. Maclean: I accept that point entirely, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but at least you have not heard them from me before. This time, you have heard them in a different accent. Nevertheless, I will push on with other points, which I hope have not already been raised by any of my right hon. or hon. Friends. When one speaks late in a debate, there is inevitably a danger that the great points of principle have already been aired.
If this is an important Bill, we must ensure that the measures in it will make a difference to world peace. We have certain concerns about clause 5, which have already been touched on; we also have concerns about the protocol--the agreement signed by the British Government, and now awaiting ratification and implementation.
Article 4 of the protocol says that "any location" must be inspected by members of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or by authorised officials of the British Government. The term "any location" is very broad, and I suspect that it will be interpreted broadly in English law. Article 5 states:
- The United Kingdom shall provide the Agency with access to . . . Any place in a facility or part thereof in the United Kingdom designated pursuant to Article 78(a) of the Safeguards Agreement
- Any location identified under Article 2.
Article 5.c., however, states that this can also include
- Any location specified by the Agency, other than locations referred to in paragraphs a. and b. above, to carry out location-specific environmental sampling.
Article 6 states that the agency may carry out activities including:
- For access in accordance with Article 5.c., collection of environmental samples and, in the event the results do not resolve the question or inconsistency at the location specified by the Agency
- pursuant to Article 5.c. utilization at that location of visual observation, radiation detection and measurement devices, and, as agreed by the United Kingdom and, as appropriate, the Community, and the Agency, other objective measures.
Mr. Maclean: I do not want to discuss breaches of the Official Secrets Acts, because I think that they fall under clause 2. I want logically to deal first with the protocol, and then with the Bill. I am not as clear-headed as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, who can speak with the Bill in one hand and the protocol in the other, and deal with both simultaneously. I think, however, that part of the Bill will allow the Secretary of State to serve notices on any person giving assistance or information that would be in breach of the Official Secrets Act.
I fear that article 6 would widen access to a range of places and activities that might have nothing to do with nuclear power, nuclear energy or nuclear research, so that location-specific environmental sampling could be carried out. My only knowledge of that relates to what happened in the Lake district after the Chernobyl incident. Many people thought that it was to do with Sellafield, but it was not. Inspectors from the Environment Department and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had to visit various sampling spots all around the area of nuclear fallout from the Chernobyl reactor and take samples. In the main, people were willing to participate and to allow the inspectors on to their land--land that was dozens of miles from Sellafield, and thousands of miles from where the incident happened. However, they had to provide access.
I can only assume, unless the Minister tells me otherwise, that the location-specific environmental sampling mentioned in the protocol actually means that. Let us suppose that the Government give the agency information about a location such as those specified in article 2. Let us suppose that they say, "We have a nuclear facility at location X." In that event, under articles 5 and 6, in order to check that material is not leaking out, or that it is the stuff that it should be--strontium 90, for instance--the agency would carry out environmental sampling at points within the vicinity of the location. It might be half a mile out, two miles out, five miles out or 50 miles out. I do not know; it is not clear.
It is obvious, however, that the experts who drafted the scientific part of the protocol have a clear idea of what location-specific environmental sampling is. I should be delighted if someone told me that I had got it wrong and told me exactly what it meant, but, unless I am challenged, I assume it means that within certain distances of certain research facilities and nuclear facilities inspectors can sample the air or the soil, or stick radioactive meters in the air, to find out whether there is any radiation about.
No doubt the agency will operate according to a set plan or a set map. That means that inspectors can say to United Kingdom citizens, "We want to monitor a nuclear facility that is five, 10, 50 or 100 miles down the road, and we want to carry out sampling from this point on your
land, on your hillside, on your mountain or in your back garden." They will then have all the powers that the protocol gives them.Perhaps it should be possible to move to someone else's mountain or back garden--someone who may be happy to co-operate or give permission. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we have built into the protocol and the Bill powers to allow agency officers to say to British citizens who have nothing to do with the nuclear industry, nuclear research or any scientific research, "We are coming on to your land for the purposes of article 5.c. of the protocol, as implemented in the Nuclear Safeguards Bill." I, for one, would like an assurance from the Minister that I am entirely wrong, because that would help to persuade me that the Bill is not as draconian as I think it is.
I would have liked to make a number of other points about the protocol, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst has covered them comprehensively, I will content myself with some that he did not make in detail. Article 11 concerns the appointment of agency officials to act as safeguards inspectors. My right hon. Friend elicited from the Minister the answer that yes, the British Government have the right of veto--if we do not like Inspector Snooks from a certain country, we can reject him.
The other point that I hope the Minister will cover in his winding-up speech is: can we do that indefinitely? Can we have a large number of vetoes? Is it open-ended? Can our veto be such that we will never accept an inspector who is appointed by a certain country? We do not care how good or honest the person is. We may be certain that he is not a spy, or espionage officer appointed by that country. We may nevertheless say that we will not take inspectors from certain countries.
It may be a small point, but it would be nice to know that, unlike with juries, we can carry on objecting to inspectors from certain countries if we have reason to suspect, irrespective of how many different inspectors they give us, that they are paid officers of the intelligence services of that member state, or have connections to their own military that we might find unacceptable.
Mr. Fabricant: May I probe my right hon. Friend a little further? Does he suspect, like me, that a perfectly honourable person from a specific country, when he returns to his country, if it is non-democratic or, furthermore, has not even signed the protocol, may be blackmailed--as my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) says--or, to go further, tortured to give such information?
Mr. Maclean: My hon. Friend makes some good points, which I am sure that the Minister has heard and will wish to deal with in his reply. There were allegations that one of the inspectors--in fact, the chief inspector--a United States citizen inspecting the Iraqi facilities, was improperly passing information to the United States Government. The allegations were perhaps even worse: he was working in cahoots with the CIA, or some other organisation.
Considering the circumstances of that case and the trust that I have for our American allies, I would be happy if America were clever enough to place a good operative to do that job. Nevertheless, that is probably one of the few countries that I would trust to do such a thing.
If that allegation were true, other countries and Governments might try the same ploy: designating as inspectors people who have impeccable links to their equivalent of the CIA, internal security forces, espionage or spying agencies. We wish to reserve the right--I hope that the Minister will confirm that we have it--to carry on ad nauseam rejecting inspectors from a country if we suspect that they are connected to their spy agencies.
I move to article 12 and a different point from that raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst; it occurred to me as he was making his speech. These people will get visas. The article says:
- The United Kingdom shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas.
That person has his multiple entry and exit visas. Is he free to enter this country without telling the British Government? Is he free to come on holiday to the Lake district? Is he free to go for a sightseeing tour around Sellafield? Is he free to indulge in private activities, shall we say, and to look around, as close as he can get, research facilities and nuclear installations in this country, without wearing the official hat of the designated inspector?
We need to know. If I were trying to run a spying operation in any foreign Government, that is the sort of chap whom I would want to send to this country. The problem arises not when he comes here with an official team, not when he tells the British Government, "I am arriving within 24 hours. Please tell the people at your nuclear installations that I will inspect X, Y and Z," and not when the Government are officially informed, but when he comes back with his multiple entry and exit visas to do some private work on his own, or with the connivance of the host Government.
If the Minister says that, on every occasion, those people must notify the British Government that they have arrived in this country, I will be pleased. I cannot see it anywhere in the legislation. It is not in the protocol. Perhaps it is built into some operating instructions that we do not have before us tonight. If that is not the case, I should like amendments in Committee or on Report saying that any of the people who have been designated as inspectors must tell the host Government on any occasion that they come to this country. That is the only way in which we can ensure that, if there are any inspectors of whom we are slightly suspicious, our security services can be notified, so that those people can be kept under proper observation, if we think that they are doing, shall we say, freebies.
As I say, I have concerns about other provisions of the protocol, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, in his customary thorough manner, has explored them in considerable detail, so I will not need to go down that route.
It is legitimate to allude to the countries that have signed up to the protocol already. We are being urged to pass the Bill rapidly, so that Britain can carry out its obligations. It has been pointed out--I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will not consider it tedious repetition to say it--that the list is not very great.
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