Memorandum submitted by Terry Palfrey,
Leeds Business School
Concerning White Paper, Strategic Export
Controls Cm 3989
Further to my response to BMARC, HC of
1995-96 and to Cm 3989 (attached)
The difficulties encountered in Cm 3989 are
caused partly by the transfer of technology by intangible means
which creates problems both for the substantive law and enforcement.
These are discussed in my submission to Cm 3989. It is argued
that the create problems for two partly linked liability regimes.
Cm 3989 is narrowly focused on Strategic Export
Controls and addresses only part of the problem. It does not consider
the leakage of information from UK companies or the transmission
of sensitive information by facilitators. The issues fall into
the current debate concerning Economic Crime (the term to be construed
widely). That debate encompasses money laundering, tax evasion,
smuggling, arms exports, illegal trade, counterfeiting. That debate
encompasses issues of globalisation, communications technology,
international policing co-operation, the role of business and
the professions, state and business ethics and policing in a "borderless
world". We cannot expect law or legal responses alone to
confront these problems others have responsibilities. So far as
legal initiatives are concerned they should be undertaken. However,
because of the problems they need to be part of a wider package
of integrated policing which ties in not only commerce but also
Internet Providers and possibly others involved in transmitting
information. There is a need for intermediate laws dealing with
theft of information.
There are six potential stages for the prevention
and control of the dissemination of strategic information. My
submission to Cm 3989 (and Cm 3989 itself) deals with the last
1. COMPANY SECURITY
A company (or the directors thereof) may be
involved in exports without a licence (or in breach of its terms).
This is the primary concern of Cm 3989. The Sierra Leone Arms
Investigation emphasises in Lesson 11.9 the problems posed by
private military companies.
It was acknowledged that "private military companies are
in a business which can have a direct and sensitive impact on
Government policy and international relations . . ."
The problem is wider. Large companies may themselves have information
taken and therefore be victims. Theft of propriety information,
financial fraud etc all cause commercial loss and it may well
relate to sensitive information (see point 3). A company that
is negligent and allows a leak may be exposed to civil liability
for subsequent down stream loss. They have direct commercial interest
in security issues.
Many types of information which are of concern
in Cm 3989 can be thought of as intellectual property. Indeed
literature in the US draws the analogy. To give one examplea
disgruntled employee working on a sensitive government funded
weapons related research program tendered to a private company,
has access to information which he take and sells abroad. This
may be nothing to do with DTI licensing systems at all, but is
related to the general problemthe dissemination of sensitive
information of use to a foreign power or other engaged in the
production of weapons of mass destruction.
Note that the scale of the problem is large.
In 1998 a US Report (520 company responses to 3,890 requests)
recorded attack/insider abuse of net access in 353 cases, theft
of propriety information 82, unauthorised access by insides 203.
The evidence suggests (in the USA) that companies are poor about
protecting intellectual property . . . 54 per cent of respondents
did not have any propriety information protection program (PIP)
in place, potentially exposing their organisation to an intellectual
property loss incident.' There are a range of potential security
measures designed to receive information. This is not the place
to go into detail but consider the following; Formal policies
and procedures, communicating the program, training, pre-employment
screening, due diligence, using need to know principle, use of
physical security measures, employee identification and visitor
control, valuing confidential information, classification and
marking protection, information systems, bag search, storage and
destruction of sensitive information, photocopying restrictions,
use of encryption, monitoring e-mail and internet, non disclosure
agreement, due diligence checklists. Risk analysis, fraud prevention
These should be part of any companies own risk
If there is concern with the transmission of
electronic information then consideration should be given to regulating
the facilitator? The starting point for a broader perspective
is the Financial Action task force (FATF) "the fight against
money laundering is not the sole responsibility of governments
and law enforcement agencies".
The FATF recommendations contain reference to Customer identification,
and increased diligence. Recommendation 7 contains reference to
the criminal culpability of corporations. This perspective has
influenced a range of issues outside money laundering which loosely
can be described as economic crime. Amongst these issues are the
problems concerning the transmission of intangible property encountered
in Cm 3989. Extending these controls to ISP's is problematical
concerning the internet.
However, other intermediate facilitators may have more control
over what is transmitted. It would seem appropriate to impose
some controls even if based on due diligence and reporting to
3. STATE IMPOSED
Business may have both commercial and public
interest responsibilities to control leakage.
These cannot be left to the voluntary measures indicated in 1.
There may be a layer of legislation (see in money laundering)
requiring due diligence, especially if a private company is working
under contract for government with sensitive information/and or
perhaps funded research.
The range of problems is wide. Consider the
dangerous insider. It could be an act of sabotage or a spy attempting
to access a data base for which he wasn't authorised. In one example
of company undertaking sophisticated work for NASA has information
unlawfully transferred out of the jurisdiction. The company may
suffer economic loss but there are security implications. Where
does the information go? to a commercial competitor or government
(and are they linked in any event). The
financial loss could be considerable, and in the US it has been
said that "crimes of state have begun to translate into computer
crime." Note the problem of freelancers hacking into the
network, as one report states "increasingly, as the global
economy heats up, national security and corporate security dove-tail."
Whilst question of government, citizen and company
ethics in this area should be seen as convergent we should not
overstate this. There are tensions between legitimate commercial
activity and the public interest. It is a sensitive relationship,
as evidenced by recent disclosure problems for the DTI. This
illustrates tensions with the Code of Practice on Access to Government
information (exemptions therein) and the problem of disclosure
which involves third party confidentiality. The DTI and manufacturer
may take a different view on what is commercial harm. Further
the bona fides of a company cannot be assumed. The situation can
also involve corporate corruption whereby a company seeks to use
confidential information to win contracts. It
should be noted that within large Corporations important individuals
may use the Corporation to divert the benefits of contractsit
can become problematicalwhere does the activity of the
company end and a director or employee abuse his/her position?.
We have been considering the problem from inception,
moving towards the export stage. The problem may be a specialist
company seeking in some way to remove sensitive information. Far
more likely it will be an employee, industrial saboteur, agent,
or other opportunist taking information which does not belong
to him/her. If subsequently it is transmitted and or exported
this is further evidence that the information was stolen in the
In my original submissions there was reference
to theft of information. I pointed out the difficulty, that electronic
information could not be stolen under the Theft Act because it
is not deemed to be property (see my response to Cm 3349). The
last thing that is wanted with strategic arms control is that
reform becomes subsumed under a general problem with a modern
definition of property under the Theft Act although it is an extremely
It is not an impossible problem to address.
A recent study in the USA indicated that theft of trade secrets
cost US business $2 billion per month. On 11 October 1996 The
Economic Espionage Act 1996 was signed into law. The law created
federal jurisdiction regarding both state-sponsored and the commercial
theft of trade secrets. Misappropriation or theft of both intangible
and tangible property became a crime under the act. A trade secret
is defined as all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technological, ecomomic or engineering information including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, phototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, complied,
or memorialised physically, electronically, graphically, photographically
or in writing . . . 
5. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
ACT 1996 (AND
My response to Cm 3989 refers.
CEMA AND EXPORT
See attached comments on Cm 3989. Consider the
analogy of the export or import of drugs. Customs is the first
line of defence on an import its role is to prevent the drugs
entering and the last line of defence on an export.
If stage 4 is in place there is a choice. The
focus can be on the theft, probably evidenced by a subsequent
transmission which may or may not involve an export. If there
are problems with transmission and export you may still have an
offence of theft of information within the juridication. If stage
5 is in place the regime is supported by conduct which may or
may not involve theft from a company. It is particularly useful
if the company itself is suspect.
Both stage 4 and 5 may establish liability without
reference to licensing. They may also be a useful option if there
are problems with licenses and the position of the DTI and FCO.
In particular where, on the facts, employees can be distinguished
from the company. If theft is problematical and in particular
where the facts suggest clear breaches of licensing by the company
the case can be dealt with by Customs. Customs are probably better
equipped to deal with offences linked out of the jurisdictionthat
is not to say that stages 4 and 5 could not used.
Layering lines of responsibility brings state,
law enforcement agencies, and legitimate business more into line.
In particular it may be easier to develop ethical policies for
all concerned if they are all seen to share responsibilities.
This is consistent with current thinking in the area of economic
6 October 1998.
Response to White Paper on Strategic Export
Controls, Cm 3989
(With reference to my response to
The main focus of this submission is in addressing
Section 3.1 and 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, with reference to Annex A: 2,
Objective (c) and points 7 and 9 of Cm 3989. The recommendations
as stand involve two different and arguably alternative liability
and policing regimes. Cm 3989 has opted for a Customs policing
regime. The emphasis is on altering or replacing the Import, Export
and Customs Powers (Defence) Act 1939 (IECP) and the Chemical
Weapons Act 1996 (CWA). Reforms concerning controlling intangible
transfers of technology are important. With reference to the IECP,
CEMA and the CWA there is a need for a clear direction as to what
exactly the law should be controlling the transmission of. In
particular is the focus to be on the transmission or exportof
technology or information or documentation? It seems that various
combinations of these are envisaged and there are potential legal
difficulties. The relationship between the IECP, CWA and CEMA
is complex. There is a problem as to whether section 170 of the
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) also requires amendment.
Further whether the CWA should be further drawn into a Customs
policing and liability regime.
There are a number of technical legal difficulties
with the outline proposals in Cm 3989. Of most concern is a fundamental
problem concerning exactly what it is that the law should be regulating.
Before we address this problem we need to identify two overlapping
1.1 CUSTOMS LAW
The vires of the IECP is framed in terms of
carriage of goods. (1.3.1 and 1.4.1 of Cm 3989). Power is given
in the primary legislation for control to be by secondary legislation.
The legislation was passed two days before the outbreak of the
Second World War and was formed in terms of attempting to prevent
trade with the enemy. The principle is that specified goods are
prohibited by the DTI from being exported without a license. Categories
of goods are specified and further defined by SI's. The onus is
on the exporter to establish whether goods are, or are not subject
to a licence requirement.
If a breach occurs then Customs can use a strict
liability offence under section 68(2) CEMA or a more serious offence
under Section 170 CEMA.
Section 170(1)(a)(iii) of CEMA refers to "goods
with respect to the importation or exportation of which any prohibition
or restriction for time being in force under or by virtue of any
enactment. Section 170(1)(b) states ". . . is in any way
knowingly concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring,
keeping or concealing or in any manner dealing with such goods
. . . with intent to defraud . . . commits an offence. Section
170(2) CEMA broadens the categories of participation to those
being knowingly concerned in a fraudulent evasion or attempting
The Customs liability regime directly links
the prohibition (via the primary tariff of goods by type in the
1939 Act) plus further SI's which from time to time stated what
is prohibited without a licence. It should be remembered that
Customs used section 170 and strict liability offences under section
68(2) CEMA in the Arms to Iraq export cases which were subsequently
investigated in the Scott Inquiry. In
these cases the breach of prohibition related to control orders
originating in 1987 (ML4/ML16 (4)) of Group 1 of Part 11 of the
Export of Goods (Control) Order 1987. The control list also contains
the Dual-User and related Goods (Export Control) Regulations 1995.
The point being that the control, licence, prohibition regime
should use consistent terminology in so far as this is possible.
As I understand the White Paper Customs would
also enforce this legislation. There is nothing to prevent Customs
doing so but it should not be confused with CEMA. It should also
be remembered that in the Iraq export cases one of the problems
was perceived to be the use, by Customs, of their discretionary
power to compound, which is contained in CEMA. Whilst they are
available for use outside CEMA offences (and Customs would be
very unlikely to use them for offences under section 170 of CEMA
or the CWA) it remains the case that the CWA is outside the normal
prohibition regime but also that it overlaps with it.
It is of a fundamentally different nature to
CEMA. Whilst it can be linked to the 1939 Act because of the nature
of what is being controlled, and it may involve licensing issues
it is far wider in scope.
To draw an analogy the relationship between
CEMA and CWA is similar to the one between the Misuse of Drugs
Act (MDA) and CEMA. They overlap. Comparing the CWA and the MDA
and the latter with CEMA assists. Under section 3 of the MDA a
prohibition is created, but it does not expressly create an offence.
Consequently evasion of the prohibition is charged as an offence
under section 170 of CEMA. Normally Customs prosecute under section
170 CEMA and enhanced penalties come into effect. In most other
cases the offence sections of the MDA (dealing with possession
and supply) are dealt with by the police. 
The point to make is that the CWA offence is
not a standard Customs offence based on prohibitions and their
breach. The enforcement powers of Customs, the mens rea requirements
of a prohibitions and breach regime may not be imputable into
the CWA and any alterations to it.
2. THE TRANSFER
2.1 The general problem
It would be better to think of these liability
regimes separately. Leaving aside for the moment, the question
of criminal culpability and policing under each, there is a need
to consider what it is intended to prevent.
Reference Cm 3989, 3.1.4 goals indicates "action
against anyone found to be deliberately helping in any way a weapon
of mass destruction programme . . . also concerned that a UK person
or Company, might, without being directly involved in an attempt
to produce a weapon of mass destruction, nevertheless, provides
a service or information which could assist such a programme.
The existing end-use control is intended to prevent the export
of equipment which might be used in such programmes but the Government
considers that; it would be desirable to introduce measures to
prevent other ways in which such programmes might be given assistance,
such as the transfer of technological information by intangible
means or provision of technical services. In view of this, it
proposes to make it an offence to do something that would promote
or facilitate the development or production of weapons of mass
destruction either if the Government has informed someone that
what he is doing poses such a risk or if someone knows by other
means or has grounds for suspecting that a particular course of
action might assist such a programme".
In Cm 3989 point 3.2.1 it is stated that the
Government proposes to provide that documents transferred abroad
containing controlled technology should be subject to export licensing
requirements, whether exported physically or in electronic form.
It is made clear that the concern is the "ever increasing
ease with which information can be transferred across national
boundaries by electronic means, ie by fax or e-mail". In
the next section we have reference to "information can be
passed in non-documentary form." Under Cm 3.2.2 "intangible
technology transfers. Under point 3.2.3 "possible controls
on the publication of controlled technology on electronic networks"
and "publication of controlled technology." Later under
Annex A:2, Objective (c) there is "To enable the Government
to impose controls on intangible transfers of technology."
It is then explained that "whatever the means by which the
transfer was effected, secondary legislation would provide that
all technology in documentary form that was currently controlled
when exported tangibly, should be controlled when exported intangibly."
Why technology? is technology the same thing
as scientific? or engineering? chemical? It is not intangible
technology that you are transferring it is information with a
scientific, technological, economic or sensitive content. In point
3.2.3 why publication? It
is intended to try and control exports across a border or transmission
across a border or both? The
term "intangible transfer of technology" is surely incorrect.
It is not technology which is transferred it is information with
a technological content. Transmission may be a better term than
transfer. These comments are not a criticism of Cm 3989! The problems
are common when trying to deal with law and technology issues.
Focusing on the information/technology first.
A part of this problem is resolved in the US Economic Espionage
Act 1996. The law created federal jurisdiction regarding both
state-sponsored and the commercial theft of trade secrets. Misappropriation
or theft of both intangible and tangible property became a crime
under the act.
Ignore the context for the moment and consider
A trade secret is defined as all forms and types
of financial, business, scientific, technological, economic or
engineering information including patterns, plans compilations,
program devices, formulas, designs, phototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether tangible or
intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialised
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically or in
writing if . . . 
This may provide a helpful starting point. The
framework needs extending to include secret information appertaining
to various end use situations. You may not want a emphasis on
"Economic" it could be sensitive only. However, the
link between strategic arms and economic crime may be strong.
The US legislation is not dealing with transfer/transmission.
The problem of transmission needs to be tackled. Transfer is a
term that I would associate with theft not Customs laws. It is
the language of Preddy and Slade, theft and of bank account transfers
(see my submission to Cm 3349). Assuming there is a sufficiently
broad definition of the information, the word transmission (and
you can specify across borders) seems sufficient.
The IECP needs to be altered to include the
export of information by its transmission overseas. The tariff
categories can be further defined by reference to chemical, nuclear
and biological by SI. However, CEMA also may need alterationespecially
section 170 so that it covers this situation. The position is
broadly analogous with the pornography problem alluded to in may
submission to Cm 3349 and is not repeated. You may need to amend
the IECP to widen "goods" and "export" to
capture what is required. As the original rationale was to be
repealed. You are making a large leap from goods to intangible
propertyit is a fundamental shift in emphasis.
The wording of CWA uses the phrase participate
in the transfer. If the word participate came before develop(ment)
and participate was referenced to transmitting information by
intangible means, further defined as in 2.1 you may have a working
In point 3.3 of Cm 3989 trafficking and brokering
deals with controlled goods " . . . an emerging problem is
the brokering of sensitive information." Most commonly trade
secrets in intangible form. They are every bit as valuable as
the goods themselves. If you are to alter the law (as indicated
in point 3.1 of Cm 3989) because of 3.2, (the transfer of technology
by intangible means) it is worth considering 3.3 as well. There
is a second reason. What about the individual who simply sells
the information for profit. It is subsequently brokered to third
parties who use it to develop a chemical weapon. Under the CWA
you have to establish in the first part of the offence direct
knowledge of the purpose and apparently a direct link between
supplying the information and a consequence. Money launderers
get round liability by involving chains which distance themselves
from the eventual result.
It is noted that the prohibition regimes for
chemical, nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction are
to be brought into line. Consider something like the following
alteration to the CWA (the italics are mine, they are intended
to focus some initial thoughts and ideas nothing more!); a possible
offence dealing with the above concerns might look as follows.
An offence for any person in the UK or any UK
person overseas to . . . participate in the develop(ment), produc(tion),
use, possess(ion) or participat(ion) in the transfer of a chemical,
nuclear or biological weapon, or to provide, by way of transmission,
either directly or indirectly, whether within the UK, outside
the UK or by way of cross border, information, financial, scientific,
technological, economic or engineering in nature, including patterns,
plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, phototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled,
or memorialised physically, orally, electronically, grapically,
photographically intended (or having grounds to suspect) to promote
or facilitate the development, production, use or possession of
a chemical, nuclear or biological weapon, or to indirectly provide
information to a broker having grounds to suspect that such information
may be used in the development, production, use of a weapon of
mass destruction . . . or to engage in the military preparations
or preparations of a military nature, intending to use a chemical,
nuclear or biological weapon anywhere in the world.
It is possible that an offence could occur under
both and that licence issues could arise under CEMA and CWA. CEMA
and the CWA are primary legislation. Any new legislation to repeal
or replace the IECP which provides by SI's to extend export requirements
and cover the transfer of technology by intangible means should
consider using language similar to that which may be adopted in
both CEMA and the CWA. Amending both CEMA and the CWA should have
regard to this tripartite relationship.
Reference point 3.4 Cm 3989, the new legislation
is to be given to Customs. An offence under CWA may be committed
without reference to the licensing system although it will no
doubt, often be a relevant consideration. Whilst the offences
overlap those under CEMA are entirely tied to the licensing system.
However if you keep one prosecuting authority you may have problems.
3.1 CUSTOMS PROSECUTING
In Customs law the mens rea requirement is generally
expressed as "intentionally", "recklessly"
or "knowingly concerned." It is a subjective test with
court jurisprudence well tested and understood in the context
of decided Customs cases. Knowingly concerned in Customs effectively
operates as an alternative to aid, abet, counsel or procure. It
creates chains of liability in the context of a continuing offence.
Knowingly concerned is more commonly associated with imports.
It requires that there is a willingness to assist or participate
in an enterprise and would take place even if there was uncertainty
as to whether an import had occurred. It is a continuing offence
after import. It
has been used in a small number of export cases. I
can see no objection in principle to reversing this logic and
applying it after the export. It may enable Customs to prosecute
a UK citizen overseas but there may well be jurisdictional problems
3.2 CUSTOMS (OR
The difficulty is that the Customs liability
regime does not easily transfer across to enforcement under the
Note points 3.1.1. and 3.1.2. Cm 3989 and consideration
of using aid, abet, counsel or procure. It is doubtful that the
law concerning secondary parties could be applied. The CWA legislation
is not in a traditional Customs form. Concerning aid, abet, counsel
and procure, you need a principal offence. If
the perpetrator is outside the jurisdiction, you will have problems
prosecuting a secondary party. It
is possible, you may not need the perpetrator provided that you
have an offence. But note that the mens rea requirement overtakes
the substantive offence an intent has to be proved for a secondary
party whatever the primary legislation says. (that
said the test is flexibly interpreted!). The prepetrator will
have to have committed an offence under UK law. I am not certain
that you can rely on secondary party liability to support the
CWA in the way that Cm 3989 envisages. You may not have to.
The offence under the CWA is largely focused
on three categories of principle defendant. The developer (1),
the transferor (2) and someone engaging in military preparations
(3). In the second category the person who does the transfer (and
he probably engages as well) is the principal offender. This is
the category of person likely to be caught by the introduction
of "transfer/transmission of technology by intangible means".
He could be a secondary party to either 1 or 3 but in respect
of 2 he is the perpetrator. You may not need secondary party liability.
3. ABSENCE OF
I am concerned about the absence of these considerations
in 3.4 if you are going to extend the offence to include intangible
information etc. It
is not the time to go into detail but the problems of definitions
moves across to difficulties in obtaining warrants ie to seize
what? and the subsequent use of what is seized as evidence in
court. This needs to be considered in the context of types of
intangible property (in one sense it never leaves the UK!). Of
course Customs and other law enforcement agencies are well aware
of these problems in any event.
Hardware searches are not difficult. The problems
are in the software and any intangible information. It may be
in two places at once! Where is property located? Is is property?
(not unless you define it as such in the offence section). What
about defendant illegally appropriating a tangible item containing
an intangible component, such as a chemical formula written on
a stolen piece of paper. The paper has no value the overall value
the formula. The paper which record it is irrelevant apart from
on the warrant, unless you want to seize the formula!
In any offence regime is considered with some
reference to these problems. My previous point about the importance
of adopting consistent language in terms of offences is relevant
to these issues also.
4. SOME DOUBTS
The arguments which have been developed have
emphasised difficulties but they are not reasons which would justify
not altering the law. There is a further aspect to legislation.
One of the lessons contained in chapter 11 "Report Of The
Sierra Leone Arms Investigation" is a reference to understand
the importance of domestic British legislation, not as a technical
matter for experts, but capable of significantly affecting policy
and operations. Whilst the context is different, one observation
is that "all officials need to have the facts well within
consciousness" . . . practical significance of both national
and international legal measures." (11.8). Arms control and
licensing continues to cause problems for different Departments.
is important therefore for law enforcers and administrative civil
servants, and I would add commerce, to understand exactly what
is being controlled.
5 MINUTE TO
What these comments are getting at is that technology
related issues create difficulties in using CEMA and or the CWA.
Annex A of Cm 3989 point 7 (which refers back to BMARC) says "some
doubts were expressed about the practicalities of enforcement".
Practicalities of enforcement start with the substantive law.
The issues raised are familiar in current debate on economic crime.
the limitations attached to legal responses, increasingly the
participatory role of business and professions is coming into
focus. These themes are developed in my memorandum to the Trade
and Industry Committee (which I was asked by the Committee to
supply). Initiatives should be thought of as in layers. 1. Company
security measures. 2. State imposed or self regulation of transmission
intermediaries. 3. Enforced company regulation because of dual
interests. 4. Espionage/theft legislation. 5. CWA and similar
5. Customs. In this framework Customs is the last line of defence!
6 October 1998
1 Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation (HMSO,
1998), pp 115-116. Back
Ibid, p 115. Back
Ibid, p 5. Back
Gilmore, W C, Butterworths Guide to Money Laundering, FATF
Recommendations (Butterworths, London, 1995), pp 313-323,
influenced Council of Europe EU Money Laundering Directive (1991)
and Sect 52 DTOA 1994. Back
Palfrey, T, "Policing the Transmission of Pornographic Material"
(1996) Information and Communication Technology Law, Vol 5, No
3, 197. Back
Computer Security Issues and Trends, 1998 CSI/FBI Computer Crime
and Security Survey, Vol No 1, Winter 1998, p 3. Back
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS Intellectual Property Loss Survey Report
August 1998, Part 5, What is being done to protect intellectual
property? and Issue Update Vol 2, No 7 (1997) Investigative Due
Computer Security Issues and Trends, Vol. IV, No 1, Winter 1998,
pp 3-8. Back
Computer Security Issues and Trends, 1998 CSI/FBI Computer Crime
and Security Survey. Back
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration Fourth Report, Session
1997-98 Volume I Access To Official Information pp 148-149. Back
Ibid, p 148, note that the Freedom of Information Bill may have
a significant impact. Back
See Zeldin, M, Bullock, J and DiFlorio, C, Transparency, Integrity
and Good Governance: The Foreign Corrupt Practices and Related
International Initiatives to Combat Corruption, September 1997. Back
Ibid, p 13. Back
The complexity of legal issues is vast! see Federal Prosecution
Of Violations Of Intellectual Property Rights (Copyright, Trademarks
and Trade Secrets) May 1997 (Computer Crime and Intelligence section,
Criminal DIVISION, US Dept of Justice). Back
Inquiry Into Exports Of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods
To Iraq And Related Prosecutions (Scott Inquiry) Part 3, Section
H, chapter 5 The Dunk case Customs used section 170 CEMA, Part
4, Section J, related Supergun matters Customs used section 68(2)
CEMA, and subsequently section 170 CEMA, see Appendix A, Part
B(ix) Customs memorandum to Scott for explanation of powers. Back
Blackstones Criminal Practice 1998, pp 688-699. Back
Not printed. Back
See section 10 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985. Back
Not printed. Back
Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1998): CA, (1998)
Law Society Gazette 30 September 1998, p 34. Back
The prohibition is framed as "bringing to a place"
Dixon v McAllister  NILR 38, attempts, Pickett v Fesq 
2 All ER 705, intention to return with goods, R v Berner and Levine
(1953) 37 Cr App R 275. Back
A problem area, Thornton v Mitchell  1 All ER 339, an issue
would be can someone overseas commit the actus reus of an offence
triable in the UK. Back
AG Reference (No 1 of 1975). Back
Smith, KJM, A Modern Treatise on the law of Complicity (Clarendon
Press, 1991) p 37, note awareness of the possibility that act
will encourage may ground an intent, see NCB v Gamble  1
QB 11, but note that there must be knowledge as to relevant circumstances,
as in R v Bainbridge  1 QB 129 and Johnson and Youden 
1KB 546. Back
See Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers (US
Dept of Justice) June 1998, Definitions Section, and generally
treatment of seizing hardware and soft ware, drafting warrants
and use of information as evidence. Back
Report of the Sierra Leone Arms Investigation (HMSO, 1998), p.
It was not within the remit of Cm 3989 (Strategic Export Controls)
to consider these wider issues. Back