Access to Justice Bill [Lords]

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Mr. David Kidney (Stafford): The hon. Gentleman has mentioned his pamphlet several times, and I am truly interested in it. Can we see a copy?

Mr. Grieve: I shall send the hon. Gentleman a copy. I am afraid that I do not have one with me. I am sure that there are several copies in my Room in the House and in all sorts of nooks and crannies in my chambers. There are probably several copies mouldering away on my shelves at home. It was produced in 1994 or 1995, but—like most pamphlets—there are a few remaindered copies, and I shall happily distribute them to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Hoon: Signed, I hope.

Mr. Grieve: It might be argued that unsigned copies are more valuable.

I welcome the new clause, but it is difficult to understand—I look forward to the Minister's comments—how it can work in competition with other systems, because the problem of cherry picking, which concerned us on conditional fee agreements, will apply. If the CLAF is to work, it is important that the funding mechanism ensures that the capital is built up from successful cases.

The proposal could have succeeded on its own but, inserted into a set of rules that provide alternatives for easier cases, it will not do so. I regret that. One benefit, however, may be that the provision will be in statute and if, as I fear, there are problems with legal aid and the operation of conditional fee agreements, perhaps someone—along the lines set out in my pamphlet—will dust down the clause and think creatively about how it could be expanded to replace the edifice created by the Government for legal aid.

Mr. John Burnett (Torridge and West Devon): I welcome the new clause, which was introduced at the behest of my noble and learned Friend, Lord Goodhart. We pressed the Government to proceed with a contingency legal aid fund in preference to conditional fees because it does not suffer the same conflicts of interest that are so rife in conditional fees arrangements. Conflicts of interest not only manifest themselves between the solicitor and the client, but between the solicitor, client and the insurer.

Unfortunately, for the reasons given by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I do not hold out great hope that a contingency legal aid fund will be a success because conditional fee agreements will take the best and most winnable cases. As a result of what the hon. Gentleman described as cherry picking, a CLAF will not prosper. It would have been in the interests of justice and of the public if a CLAF had been used in preference to conditional fee agreements.

The conditional legal aid fund is in direct conflict with conditional fee agreements and, regrettably, the Government have not sought to promote CLAF over CFAs. Nevertheless, I welcome the fact that the Lord Chancellor has honoured his undertaking, and I also welcome the introduction of the clause.

Mr. Hoon: The hon. Member for Beaconsfield described the clause as a golden nugget, but who is supposed to provide the gold? He has always argued that it is for the taxpayer to provide the underpinning for any fund, but the Government are not persuaded that that should be the case. The new clause leaves it open for the Bar Council or any other organisation that wants to fund a CLAF to be able to do so. I have made that offer to the Bar and I repeat it today: if it wishes to run the risk of seeing whether its confidence in such a fund is merited, it has the opportunity to do so—assuming that the new clause is accepted.

The hon. Members for Beaconsfield and for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Burnett) sounded logical when explaining the benefits of a CLAF, but they are not seeing their logic through. If they are really saying that the only way in which a CLAF could operate successfully is by eliminating the use of conditional fee agreements, they should say so. The hon. Member for Torridge and West Devon implied that conditional fees would have to be made illegal, so that everyone would be forced to use a CLAF.

Our objection to a CLAF is that good cases will be taken on conditional fees and bad cases will be left to go through a CLAF. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield conceded that point, but why should the taxpayer fund such a scheme when there is a proper way of dealing with cases through CFAs?

Mr. Burnett: The point of our putting forward a CLAF as a suitable alternative is that the system should be self-funding.

Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman needs to apply his mind a little further and think about the problems that could arise. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield began to spell them out, saying that the good cases would be taken on conditional fee arrangements and the less strong cases would be put through the CLAF. The Government have some doubt as to whether a CLAF would be financially viable. If the Bar or any other organisation, perhaps even the Liberal Democrats, thinks that such a CLAF can be made to work successfully, the clause enables them of doing so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 39

Power of High Court to vary committal in default

    ``Power of High Court to vary committal in default

    `. In the Supreme Court Act 1981, after section 43 insert—

    43ZA.—(1) Where the High Court quashes the committal of a person to prison or detention by a magistrates' court or the Crown Court for—

    (a) a default in paying a sum adjudged to be paid by a conviction; or

    (b) want of sufficient distress to satisfy such a sum,

    the High Court may deal with the person for the default or want of sufficient distress in any way in which the magistrates' court or Crown Court would have power to deal with him if it were dealing with him at the time when the committal is quashed.

    (2) If the High Court commits him to prison or detention, the period of imprisonment or detention shall, unless the High Court otherwise directs, be treated as having begun when the person was committed by the magistrates' court or the Crown Court (except that any time during which he was released on bail shall not be counted as part of the period.''.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Solicitor-General (Mr. Ross Cranston): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 235.

10.45 am

The Solicitor-General: New clause 39 and amendment No. 235 amend the Supreme Court Act 1981 to enable the High Court to set an appropriate penalty when a magistrates court or the Crown court has unlawfully passed a sentence of imprisonment or detention on a fine defaulter. The change is required because of a loophole in section 43 of the 1981 Act, which came to light in a recent judgment by Lord Justice Brooke and Mr. Justice Sedley in the case of Regina v. St. Helens Justices, ex parte Marlene Ann Jones and others. Section 43 of the 1981 Act stipulates that, instead of quashing a conviction that has wrongfully been imposed by a lower court, the High Court may amend it by substituting any sentence that the lower court has the power to impose.

Prior to a number of judicial reviews in October 1998, the Treasury Solicitor, who represented the justices in fine-default cases, had been relying on section 43 to give the High Court the jurisdiction to quash the invalid committal sentence and to substitute another sentence. In the St. Helens case, that was held to be wrong; but Lord Justice Brooke reached that decision with regret. He concluded that the position that had been uncovered should be remedied at the earliest practicable moment. I understand that a number of similar cases in the Crown Office remain to be resolved.

The new clause will allow the High Court to quash the incorrect committal and reconsider the case, in the light of the present circumstances, of the wrongfully committed offender. The High Court will be able to remit the original fine, or if it does not consider it right to remit all of it, to remit part of the fine and to make a further order. Any sentence imposed by the High Court will, unless it otherwise directs, be treated as having begun when the person was committed by the lower court, except that the High Court will be able to disregard any time during which the offender was released on bail. Amendment no. 235 ensures that the provisions will come into force two months after Royal Assent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 40

Law Society's powers in relation to conduct of solicitors etc.

    `. Schedule (Powers of Law Society) (which extends the powers of the Law Society in relation to the conduct of solicitors and their employees and consultants) has effect.'.—[The Solicitor-General.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new schedule 2—Powers of Law Society—and Government amendments No. 226 and 227.

The Solicitor-General: New clause 40 inserts new schedule 2 into the Bill. The purpose of the schedule is to extend the powers of the Law Society in relation to the practice, conduct and discipline of solicitors and clerks.

The Immigration and Asylum Bill currently before Parliament establishes an Immigration Services Commissioner. The commissioner will have certain powers to investigate persons registered with him. Solicitors will not have to register with the commissioner; the Law Society will continue its regulatory function and investigate solicitors suspected of professional misconduct. We aim to give the Law Society similar powers to those given to the Immigration Services Commissioner and to bring its investigative powers up to date. It is in the public interest that the Law Society should have those increased powers, so that it can deal effectively and efficiently with complaints, not only about immigration cases but across the whole spectrum of cases dealt with by solicitors.

I shall explain some of the key paragraphs in the new schedule. Paragraph 1 amends section 31 of the Solicitors Act 1974, which gives the Law Society the power to make rules on professional practice, conduct and discipline. The change will give the Law Society the power to monitor compliance by solicitors with those rules.

 
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