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Mr. Garnier: I do not have much quarrel with the intention behind the clause, although I am concerned about the way in which it is drafted. It was not easy to anticipate what the Minister would say. Words such as ``proportionality'' do not jump out from clause 42, albeit that it is entitled:
``Power to prescribe alternative destination''
of any given appeal.
The Minister said that the backlog in the Court of Appeal is addressed by the Bill and the Bowman report, which we debated as long ago as November 1997 I am sure that he remembers that day. The Government need to control the flow of cases by turning the tap one way or the other. All I ask is that we should have an idea of how the Lord Chancellor envisages using the orders that are presaged in clause 42(1). I see what the Bill says, but I should like some examples to take home with me tonight to help me sleep more easily.
Mr. Hoon: I apologise to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and other Committee members if, in an effort to keep our proceedings as brief as possible, I did not go into enough detail. The hon. and learned Gentleman has prompted me and I shall provide him with some examples. I recognise that it is important to give an idea of how the Lord Chancellor envisages using the order-making power.
In July 1998, the Lord Chancellor issued a consultation paper, ``Reform of the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Proposals for Change to Constitution and Jurisdiction'', which set out his proposals for implementing the recommendations of the Bowman review team. The intention is to introduce the routes of appeal identified in that paper for civil non-family cases. Appeals will, in general, be heard by a judge who is immediately superior to the judge who heard the case at first instance.
Appeals against fast-track cases that are heard by a district judge will be made to a circuit judge, and those that are heard by a circuit judge, to a High Court judge. As for multi-track cases, it is proposed that appeals of interlocutory decisions that are made at first instance by a district judge, will be made to a circuit judge, by a master or circuit judge to a High Court judge, and by a High Court judge to the Court of Appeal. It is also proposed that in multi-track cases, appeals of final orders, regardless of the court of first instance, will be to the Court of Appeal.
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Mr. Grieve: Again, I have no reason not to welcome the proposals, which will do a great deal to streamline the system of appeals. I hope that they will shorten the time that people have to wait before appeals are heard. I assume that some thought will be given I appreciate that this may fall outside the Minister's remit as to how the development of our common law will be affected by precedent and the reporting of cases as a result of the proposals.
This is an important issue. The trend of recent years has been to move cases from the High Court to county courts. Cases that involve important legal decisions and which have a bearing on subsequent cases are not being reported. Unless a system is established to get round that, the problem will become more acute. Where will the important appeals that are heard by a High Court judge appear in the hierarchy of reported decisions on which people subsequently rely? I hope that the Minister will give that some thought. No doubt the Lord Chancellor will also consider it in conjunction with the judiciary.
Mr. Hoon: The hon. Gentleman is identifying one aspect of the problem. Potentially important cases may go unreported because they are dealt with too low in the system. However, he should concentrate on the other side of the problem. Too many cases that are of no great legal significance are reaching the Court of Appeal. The most distinguished judges are dealing with matters that should be dealt with lower down the system. Sir Jeffrey Bowman reached that conclusion. The recommendations are designed to filter out the cases that should be dealt with at an appropriate level and, consistent with his concerns about the development of common law, should be reported to provide appropriate precedent in our system. However, it follows that cases that should be dealt with lower in the system should be kept at that level and should not provide the illumination in the law that concerns the hon. Gentleman.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43
Assignment of appeals to Court of Appeal
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Hoon: Consistent with what I have said, it is important that appeals should be heard at a level that is most appropriate to the nature of the case. The principle of proportionality runs through the civil justice reforms. Proposed changes to the routes of appeal and the introduction of the principle of one level of appeal aim to achieve that proportionality. Some cases that previously would have reached the Court of Appeal will no longer do so. However, it is not the Government's intention to prevent individual appeals, which, due to their weight and complexity, require the attention of the Court of Appeal, from reaching that court.
The clause allows flexibility by enabling appeals to be directed to the Court of Appeal even where they would not normally lie to that court the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon. That will be achieved by permitting the court that made the decision that is being appealed, or the court to which the appeal would usually lie, to refer a case up to the Court of Appeal. The clause provides for that procedure to be governed by rules of court, which will ensure that there is a framework for the exercise of the power so that only cases that merit the consideration of the Court of Appeal are directed to that court.
The clause will also invest in the Master of Rolls the authority to call up certain appeals to the Court of Appeal. It is envisaged that the Master of the Rolls would exercise his authority to settle a point that is giving rise to a large number of appeals or affecting a large number of cases. The Court of Appeal would therefore be able to set a precedent to be filtered down to the lower courts or to call up appeals so that they can be heard together. It may also be appropriate, perhaps because of the publicity that is generated by a high-profile case, for a Court of Appeal judgment to be requested.
The provisions of the clause ensure that the drive for proportionality does not result in an appeal system that compromises the fairness and quality of appellate decision making.
Mr. Garnier: Again, briefly, how much time will be spent on this administrative exercise by the Master of the Rolls, who, as head of the civil division of the Court of Appeal, spends a great deal of time listening to arguments and giving judgments? Will it increase the time that he is out of court? Will he be doing the job of the registrar of civil appeals, which is abolished by clause 47? What will happen under clause 43(1)(b) if a lower court decides that a case should go before the Court of Appeal, because it represents a matter of legal or public interest, and the Master of the Rolls decides that it should be heard by a lower court instead?
Let us take the example of a district or county court judge saying that a case should go before the Court of Appeal, and the Master of the Rolls responding that similar cases have been dealt with 115 times before and that it could be speedily dealt with by a high court judge in chambers.
Mr. Hoon: Obviously, I cannot quantify precisely how much time the Master of the Rolls might spend on these provisions, but I believe that such circumstances will be relatively exceptional. Problems may arise, especially procedural ones, and a number of cases may build up which require the Court of Appeal's judgment on points of law or procedure. This is a means of ensuring that those cases reach the Court of Appeal as quickly as possible.
However, I expect that that will be a relatively exceptional occurrence, like a reference to the European Court of Justice, and not one that will involve the Master of the Rolls day to day in determining which cases should move quickly to the Court of Appeal. It is not suggested that the Master of the Rolls should replace the functions of the registrar, who will continue to have a distinctive position within the system.
On the final point, paragraphs (a) and (b) are alternatives, in the sense that it will be open for the court from which an appeal is made to direct the case to be heard instead by the Court of Appeal. However, the hon. and learned Member for Harborough has put his finger on a matter of potential difficulty. What would happen if the Court of Appeal were to decide that a case before it did not warrant such a high degree of consideration on what may be a routine point? We shall look into that matter.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Appeals against orders to serve remainder of sentence
Mr. Hoon: I beg to move amendment No. 153, in page 26, line 26, at end insert
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 154 to 156.
Mr. Hoon: The amendments are minor, technical and, I hope, uncontroversial. They correct defects in the drafting of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. The changes have been identified, in consultation with the Law Commission, as being necessary to facilitate the consolidation of certain enactments relating to appeals against sentence. They will be needed before a consolidation Bill can be introduced in a future Session of Parliament.
The amendment to section 8(1)(b) will make it clear that the Court of Appeal has power to set aside the order for retrial when directing the entry of a judgment and verdict of acquittal. This was clearly the intention of the legislation.
The amendment to section 9(2) is to correct a defective consequential amendment in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. That Act amended the 1968 Act to enable the Court of Appeal to deal with appeals against Crown Court convictions for summary offences related to indictable only offences transferred to it. The proposed amendment would correct the omission of a reference to the relevant paragraph in schedule 3 to the 1998 Act.
The amendment to section 10(4) is to correct a missed consequential amendment when youth custody was introduced, so as to include a reference to ``detention'' in addition to ``imprisonment''. Section 10 provides a right of appeal against sentence in the case of Crown court convictions for summary offences and subsection (4) deals with two or more sentences passed on the same day or forming substantially one sentence.
Amendment agreed to.
Amendments made: No. 154, in page 26, line 27, leave out
`the Criminal Appeal Act 1968'
and insert `that Act'.
No. 155, in page 26, leave out line 30 and insert `to (5)'.
No. 156, in page 26, line 38, at end insert
`(5) In subsection (4) (calculation of length of term of imprisonment), after ``imprisonment'' insert ``or detention'' '. [Mr. Hoon.]
Clause 44, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 45
Composition
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
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