Employment Relations Bill

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Mr. Wills: I shall be brief, as the amendments look forward. Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 would ensure that when considering what is known as ``automatic recognition''—recognition without a ballot when the union has more than 50 per cent. membership—only genuine and current members should be counted. Union membership is a matter of fact—the rulebooks lay down who is a member. Unions are bound by their rulebooks, which specify that membership is terminated after arrears of subscriptions reach a specified level. They must not try to claim people as members who do not satisfy their own criteria. That would be deceitful.

The Government has no desire to meddle in the internal affairs of trade unions, which are perfectly capable of dealing properly with their own affairs. However, we accept that in their enthusiasm to recruit new members and gain recognition, unions might—I put it no higher than that—market themselves to people who do not wish a union to bargain on their behalf. It is precisely for that reason that we have included paragraph 14(4)(c), enabling the CAC to take into account membership evidence that may cast doubt on the wish of members of the bargaining unit to be represented by a union. If, for example, the employer can show that a significant number of union members have recently cancelled their check-off authorisations and appear to be leaving the union, that might prompt the CAC to hold a ballot.

We have already dealt fully with the concerns addressed by amendments Nos. 15 and 16. On amendment No. 17, to help the hon. Member for Daventry, I shall say simply that a ``significant number'' is a number capable of affecting the result. There is no reason for the CAC to take account of a small number of workers who do not wish to be represented if it is clear that a majority do so wish. But if the number who oppose recognition means that the majority is in doubt, then there should be a ballot. That sensible and practical approach underlies the wording of the clause. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

4.45 pm

Mr. Boswell: Those seem satisfactory assurances. My only slight concern is on circumstances in which there was doubt about the evidence of union membership; apart from the CAC activity laid out in 14(4)(c), to which the Minister referred, or the possibility of the certification officer taking an interest in the proceedings, particularly if a complaint were made about the number of members, what safeguards exist? However, the Minister is obviously looking at the same kind of potential problems as I am and in the light of his response, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 194, in page 24, line 12, after `13', insert `or 13A'.—[Mr. Wills.]

Mr. Boswell: I beg to move amendment No. 18, in page 24, leave out line 30.

The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 19, in page 24, leave out line 32.

20, in page 24, leave out lines 33 to 38.

21, in page 24, line 35, leave out from `malpractice' to end of line 36.

22, in page 25, leave out lines 4 to 7.

Mr. Boswell: We now move to the conduct of ballots. The amendments probe how ballots will take place and why one action should be preferred to another. It is fair to say that they are not uninformed by the experience of the 1960s and 1970s, when some trade union members prevented democracy by misusing mass meetings—I hasten to say that that did not always happen, but the potential for misuse existed. From what he has just said and from the provisions of paragraph 16(5)(a), it is clear that the Minister is aware that misuse can occur, although we hope that it will not, and can influence the result of a ballot. Nothing would discredit the Bill more, in the Minister's book—and, to put it cynically, make the Opposition's point for him—than a ballot being seen to be overtly influenced by malpractice. We do not want that to happen and want to ensure that the arrangements are sensible.

Amendment No. 18 would effectively delete the provision for a workplace ballot. That might not be absolutely necessary, but it would be helpful—not least because I am sure that the Minister and his officials are considering an approach to the CAC to establish ground rules on how that should operate. The other amendments are probing; amendment No. 19 would remove the reference to the preference of the CAC, which implies that the CAC will decide how to operate a ballot by tossing a coin. Amendments Nos. 20, 21 and 22 follow from amendments Nos. 18 and 19. It is conceivable that circumstances would arise in which not holding a postal ballot is economical—an important factor—efficient, sensible and unlikely to cause malpractice. I do not mean that the ballot should be held ``down the pub'', but that it might be appropriate to hold a ballot perhaps in a village hall adjacent to the site. I am thinking of a works—sadly, it is about to close—in my constituency, outside of which there are several public locations where it would probably be better to hold a ballot than on the site itself. The Bill might not be too restrictive about that—the Minister might tell me that it is possible to stretch the point—but it is at least worth discussing the safeguards that might be provided to avoid workplace malpractice and the circumstances in which workplace ballots will be preferred.

Mr. Ian Stewart (Eccles): Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Opposition want to withdraw the option of holding workplace ballots? Does he accept that all balloting procedures, from an open show of hands to secret ballots and postal ballots, have their strengths and weaknesses and that it would be inappropriate to say that one sort is wholly unacceptable?

Mr. Boswell: We can debate that in different contexts. We can agree that, at one end of the spectrum, it is unacceptable to have the heavy mob standing at the back, or possibly more typically at the front, trying to rig a meeting and influence the decision, especially when open outcry is involved. I know the hon. Gentleman to be a genuine man, so I suspect that he is concerned about democratic participation. If he were to think that, for example, a better turnout would be achieved if a workplace ballot were held at the end of a shift, he would probably have a good point. I am not arguing absolutely for the ending of workplace ballots, but I know people, whose opinions I respect, who would do so.

It is for the Minister to show that the Government have considered such matters carefully and that they will give sensible guidance, or have a dialogue with the CAC, on how ballots should be undertaken. Ballots should preferably be carried out with the agreement of both sides of industry and should be appropriate to local conditions. Perhaps—I do not rest on this point; I just fling it out—a workplace ballot would be appropriate if all parties, including the employer, agreed to it.

Mr. Stewart: I was seeking to highlight the point that my hon. Friend the Minister made. All the possible systems are implicit within most trade union rule books. The members themselves will determine the most appropriate system in normal circumstances.

Mr. Boswell: I largely agree with the hon. Gentleman. I certainly agree with what he says about trade union rule books. However, we are discussing ballots which are a public activity prescribed by statute. That is not quite the same as an internal trade union ballot, although there is some affinity. It is important that ballots retain their credibility with the employer, who must be absolutely satisfied with them; with the CAC, which is an independent quasi-judicial body; and with employees, who might not be union members. In certain cases, the employees might be violently opposed to the union, but they must see that justice is being done.

Mr. Woolas: I draw the hon. Gentleman's attention to paragraph 15(2), which clearly states:

    ``The CAC must arrange for the holding of a secret ballot''.

Does he agree that, in certain circumstances, it is impossible to hold a workplace ballot, rather than a postal ballot, which normally means that the ballot papers are sent to the employees' homes? For example, gang labour in the building trade is often transferred around the country.

Mr. Boswell: Such practical considerations are important. The purpose of the amendment is to flag up the fact that problems could arise, which none of us wants, and to try to persuade the Minister to establish the right modality for delivering an acceptable result. Several players are involved. Like all members of the Committee, he knows that it is a sensitive issue. Nothing would make the Government's subsequent life more difficult than a row about how a ballot was conducted. Nor would a major row about conduct be good for the CAC, especially in the early days. We want to try to avoid that. We want the most practical way of doing it.

I should probably have supporters on both sides of the Committee if I said that I should also like the highest possible democratic participation. We do not want such decisions to be made by a very small majority either way, with many people abstaining. As we shall debate later, other criteria relating to the hurdles come into play on that point.

Mr. Wills: I recognise the probing nature of the amendments, and very much appreciate the anxieties that the hon. Member for Daventry has expressed. With your permission, Mrs. Dunwoody, I hope that I can reassure him by taking some time to explain the thinking behind the proposals.

If a union and an employer cannot agree that the union should be recognised, a ballot may be necessary to determine whether a majority is in favour of the union's conducting collective bargaining. The question of where the ballot should be held is left to the CAC, which has two possible choices, both of which have advantages and disadvantages, as my hon. Friends the Members for Eccles (Mr. Stewart) and for Oldham, East and Saddleworth have pointed out.

A workplace ballot may be cheaper than a postal ballot, and may lead to a higher turnout, although neither is necessarily the case. In the case of split sites or shift working, a workplace ballot can be more expensive and more difficult to organise than a postal ballot. However, workplace ballots may lead to victimisation of workers who vote against the employer or to intimidation or workers who vote against the union.

On the other hand, a postal ballot is relatively difficult to interfere with and is less obtrusive than a workplace ballot. It may, therefore, be more appropriate in the case of a highly emotive dispute over recognition. It is said that postal ballots produce lower turnouts than workplace ballots, but, again, that is not always true. Some evidence suggests that turnout is higher in postal ballots if the issue is one that directly affects workers, rather than a national issue such as an election or a political fund.

The amendments would remove the possibility of holding a workplace ballot, for all its advantages and disadvantages. That would be unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, as a general point, it tends to be better to err on the side of providing more options rather than fewer in statutes. If postal ballots turn out to be the best option, I am sure that the CAC will employ them in preference to workplace ballots. However, it would be foolish to deprive the CAC of the power to choose the more appropriate method in any particular case.

Secondly, some evidence suggests that workplace ballots can lead to larger turnouts. Other evidence suggests that they may not. I appreciate that from the point of view of those who oppose statutory recognition, preventing workplace ballots might be a good thing. However, it would obviously be a retrograde step in encouraging good industrial relations. As I am sure all members of the Committee agree, the greater the turnout in a ballot, the more convincing the result, even if the result is not in one's favour. A low turnout will tend to foster feelings of dissatisfaction. A union might believe that it could have won in a workplace ballot. A higher turnout would allow an employer to say with greater confidence that workers did not support recognition.

Thirdly, the same argument applies to derecognition ballots. The chances of achieving derecognition through a ballot may be reduced by not allowing a workplace ballot. Again, a low turnout will tend to foster dissatisfaction.

I hope that the convincing argument in persuading the hon. Member for Daventry to withdraw the amendment is that we have discussed the balloting provisions with the Electoral Reform Society and Unity Security Balloting Services, which are among the bodies most likely to carry out the ballots. Given that our proposals reflect their views, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw the amendment.

 
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