Standing Committee C
Wednesday 12 May 1999
(Morning)
[Mr. Bowen Wells in the Chair]
Clause 1
Referendums Commission
Question proposed, [5 May], That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.
10.30 am
Question again proposed.
Mr. Oliver Letwin (West Dorset): On a point of order, Mr. Wells. Is it in order for us to remove our jackets?
The Chairman: Yes.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. George Howarth): Suitably attired, Mr. Wells, I welcome you to Committee. On behalf of all Committee members, I must say that your presence assures us that we will be treated fairly but firmly, which we all appreciate.
Clause 1 (5) states:
``The Commission shall advise the Secretary of State and may make reports both on referendums in general and in relation to any referendum proposed by a Minister of the Crown under any enactment''.
It goes on to state that the reports may deal with
``the wording of any question to be put''
and with
``any other matters which the Commission believe require to be regulated in order to ensure fair conduct.''
Subsection (6) states that the Secretary of State will lay the reports before Parliament and arrange for their publication.
Those provisions are somewhat vague and, I hazard to say, confusing. They appear, at least in part, to overlap with the additional provisions contained in clause 4. Clause 4(2) states that the commission should be
``afforded a reasonable opportunity to report''
on any legislative provision for a referendum before it is enacted. That appears to duplicate the provision in clause 1(5), which states that the commission
``may make reports ... in relation to any referendum proposed by a Minister of the Crown''.
It would be clearer if all such provisions were brought together in one clause.
The power that would be conferred on the commission to make reports on ``referendums in general'' is very open ended. I assume that the broad purpose of subsection (5) is to provide the referendums commission with a basis for advising the Government and for making proposals for legislative change in relation to the conduct of referendums. That appears to be fine in principle, but the provisions give a one-dimensional picture of the role of the referendums commission. The conduct of referendums cannot sensibly be detached from the conduct of elections because many of the same rules apply. Interestingly, the Neill committee's report also recommended that an electoral commission should have a duty to advise the Government on the modernisation and revision of electoral law and that it should consult the commission before making or proposing changes relating to electoral law. The Government are currently considering carefully the possible functions of an electoral commission in that respect. Of course, the Government and Parliament would remain responsible for legislation. However, several matters need to be considered. For example, are there areas where it would be right for the Government to legislate only on the recommendation of the electoral commission or the referendums commission? An example might involve proposals to increase or to reduce the maximum amount of core funding to be made available to designated referendum campaigns. On the other hand, it may also be appropriate to ensure that such a commission is placed under a duty to examine particular questions at the request of the Government.
Mr. Adrian Sanders (Torbay): The Minister appears to be saying that because referendums and elections are similar, there could be one overseeing body. Surely, however, referendums and elections are fundamentally different. An election is about electing an individual, and a referendum is about testing a proposition. There is no reason why the two processes should be regulated by one body. It would be quite easy to have two separate bodies overseeing two separate aspects of community involvement.
Mr. Howarth: The hon. Gentleman makes his point reasonably well. I was not trying to make out that the similarity between a referendum and an election was as extensive as he suggested. However, there are common features. For example, those who qualify to vote in a referendum presumably do so on the basis of registering to vote in a general election. The process of identifying who is eligible to vote is the same in both cases. For example, counting arrangements will be very similar, even though a referendum involves counting who says ``yes'' and who says ``no''. Aspects of that process are similar to electoral law and should be consistent with it, although I accept that the two are not the same.
Subsection (5)(a) makes provision for the wording of the question to be addressed by the commission. The Neill committee did not make recommendations about the arrangements for setting a referendum question. The Nairne committee, however, saw a role for an independent commission in advising the Government on the wording of the referendum question, but recognised that the Government of the day would have to introduce legislation for any referendum that might be held. It therefore concluded that the wording of a referendum question was a matter for the Government and Parliament to decide.
Of course, it is vital that any referendum question or proposition is clear, concise and free from bias. That has been the case with the four referendums that we have held to date and will be the case with any that we hold in future. Take, for example, the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum. What could be clearer than the two opposing propositions on the ballot paper? Those propositions were ``I agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament'' and ``I do not agree that there should be a Scottish Parliament''.
It is right that any proposed wording should be subject to proper debate and scrutiny by Parliament and the wider public. I would certainly welcome such debate and all contributors to it.
I have sought to make constructive observations on the clause, which is arguably the Bill's central provision. However, like the Bill as a whole, it is ill-conceived, seeking to establish a referendums commission for which there is no immediate role. Such a commission would operate in a vacuum and would soon be superseded by an electoral commission, so it would be kinder not to bring it into being.
Question accordingly agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, order to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 2
Designation of referendum campaigns
Mr. Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield): I beg to move amendment No. 35, in page 1, line 23, leave out `the introduction to Parliament' and insert--
`(a) in the case of a bill introduced by a Minister of the Crown, the first reading; and
(b) in the case of any other bill, the second reading
in the House of Parliament in which it is introduced'.
The Chairman: With this we may discuss the following amendments: No. 5, in page 1, line 23, leave out `introduction to' and insert `Second Reading in'.
No. 36, in page 1, line 26, at end insert--
`(1A) Nothing in subsection (1) shall prevent the Commission from inviting individuals or bodies to apply to be a designated referendum campaign in respect of a referendum before the second reading of any bill which provides for the holding of that referendum.'.
Before I call the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I should point out that matters raised by the amendments were debated at some length last week. However, I have decided, exceptionally, to allow a second debate, which I trust will be short.
Mr. Grieve: I take to heart your comments, Mr. Wells. Let me briefly welcome you to the Chair and proceed immediately to matters raised by amendments Nos. 5 and 36.
Following last week's debate and the exchange with the Minister that took place at 12.45 pm, I considered how to bring the commission into operation at different times via a Government Bill or private Member's Bill. Amendment No. 35 seeks to achieve that. It states that:
``in the case of a bill introduced by a Minister of the Crown'',
the commission could swing into action on First Reading; otherwise, it would be at the conclusion of Second Reading. That would prevent a hare-brained proposal with no prospect of going beyond Second Reading from being validated and would prevent the commission's time being purposelessly taken up with business that is unlikely to lead to a referendum. Amendment No. 36 is linked to amendment No. 35.
Mr. Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston): It was constructive of the hon. Gentlemen to go away and devise these amendments. In what circumstances does he envisage individuals triggering an application to the commission:
Mr. Grieve: It is unlikely that an application by an individual would excite the interest of the commission, but it is right to leave that option open. A referendum campaign body might not have been set up, but although it had no formal structure, some prominent individual politicians could be its spokesmen. In those circumstances, there could be some advantage in allowing an individual to approach the commission.
I remain open-minded on the issue. It could be the result of lawyers' jargon that bodies and individuals are so often lumped together. If the current wording does not recommend itself to the Committee, we could strike out the reference to individuals: I would not lose more than two seconds' sleep over that.
Mr. Miller: My concern is precisely the point that the hon. Gentlemen raised. Not being a lawyer, I cannot be accused of resorting to lawyers' jargon. Under the present wording, could an extremely rich person with a chip on his or her should--the late Mr. Goldsmith, for example--press hard for a referendum and claim, ``By the way, there will be no cost to the public purse because I am going to pay for it.'' Might not the commission feel slightly inhibited by such an approach?
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