SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Overall reaction
(a) We welcome
the Government's acceptance of most of our proposals made in January
1998, and its response to our December 1998 requirements as to
the substance of the White Paper; we have however to record some
dismay at the time it has required to complete a review initiated
in May 1997. While a number of aspects of the White Paper require
critical scrutiny, we share the broad consensus that the White
Paper does at last provide what the Post Office and its millions
of clients and customers require. It is however questionable how
far either new borrowing facilities at commercial rates or the
Treasury foregoing the excessive level of dividend previously
taken can fairly be represented as "providing" vast
sums of extra money for the Post Office (paragraphs 3, 5, 27).
Strategic Plan
(b) We recommend
that the Strategic Plan be revised prior to approval by Ministers
so as to reflect as fully as practicable the effects of the Horizon
decision and the White Paper proposals, so that profit forecasts
and dividend figures are based on realistic forecasts (paragraph
6).
Legislation
(c) It is
desirable that a legislative slot be found as soon as possible
for Post Office reform, in tardy fulfilment of the UK's obligations
under the 1997 EU Directive, and in the light of repeated delays
to the programme of review. We note the Secretary of State's recent
remarks on the prospects. If it proves impossible to find time
in the 1999-2000 session, Ministers should consider the production
of a draft Bill, and a relatively faster passage in 2000-2001
(paragraph 7).
Structure
(d) Many
would now accept that there is indeed value in using the tried
and tested status of a plc. While tempting to use the forthcoming
legislative opportunity to create some theoretically admirable
hybrid structure, it could confuse those in the UK and overseas
likely to be commercially involved with the Post Office in future
years (paragraph 9).
Ownership
(e) The remaining
issue is fundamentally one of ownership. Given the potential
sensitivity of a limited sale or exchange of equity, particularly
with the likelihood of it involving an overseas post office or
postal services company, the definition of the proposed exemption
for limited sales or exchanges of shares is crucial and must be
openly addressed before the presentation of legislation. It is
at the subsidiary level that joint ventures and partnerships are
formed. Whether it is desired to exclude the possibility of sale
or exchange of even limited amounts of equity in subsidiary companies
without explicit Parliamentary consent, or indeed to facilitate
such deals without requiring that consent, the question of the
application to present and future Post Office subsidiaries of
the latest undertakings on equity sales or exchanges needs to
be explicitly and urgently addressed (paragraphs 10 to 12).
Monopoly threshold
(f) The purpose
of what is described as a "first step"[in lowering the
monopoly threshold] is evidently as a signal that there
will be more competition in a liberalised marketplace, and to
expose the Post Office to a foretaste of the chill winds of competition
and liberalisation to be introduced under a regulatory regime.
Ministers have in effect substituted their judgement for that
of the prospective regulator. Given that the regulator
may be in office by the autumn, we recommend that the Government
consider withdrawal of the Order so that the Postal Services Commission
can consider evidence put to them of the effect of a reduction
in the monopoly threshold, and recommend to Government an appropriate
monopoly threshold (paragraphs 17 and 18).
Draft regulations
(g) We welcome
the ready response of Ministers to our request for publication
for purposes of consultation of a draft of the Regulations to
establish the Regulator and to enshrine in UK law the terms of
the Universal Service Obligation, and the publication therewith
of a memorandum setting out in detail the proposed transposition
of the relevant EU Directive into UK law. We recommend that the
Cabinet Office ensure that in future an equivalent implementation
memorandum be made available to Parliament together with primary
or secondary legislation giving effect to EU Directives (paragraph
19).
Social and environmental guidance
(h) We hope
that the Secretary of State will draw on the experience of similar
social and environmental guidance to the utilities and use the
opportunity to go beyond pious generalities (paragraph 20).
Regulation and consumer representation model
(i) It would
be helpful for the Government to set out how the regulation and
consumer representation model proposed for postal services differs
from the reformed regime proposed for the privatised utilities,
together with the reasons for those differences (paragraph 21).
Information - gathering powers
(j) In drawing
up the primary legislation, we recommend that due weight be given
to requests from the regulatory Commission now established for
extensions in its powers to gather information (paragraph 22).
Devolved administrations
(k) While
we appreciate that postal services are a reserved matter, we recommend
that the Chairmen and members of the proposed POUNC country committees
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland be appointed following
consultation with the devolved administrations (paragraph 23).
Exemptions and privileges
(l) The pending
preparation of primary legislation offers a good opportunity for
a detailed revisiting and consolidation of the mixed bag of the
Post Office's statutory exemptions and privileges (paragraph 25).
Parcelforce
(m) An early
task for the regulatory Commission will be to reassure commercial
competitors of Parcelforce that they are not being subjected to
unfair competition (paragraph 26).
Borrowing
(n) We broadly
welcome the arrangements proposed for the introduction of at least
quasi-commercial borrowing by the Post Office, although of course
much depends on how they work out in practice. The 28 day period
[for reaching a decision] must be treated as a maximum and not
a standard period, given that any formal application from the
Post Office should have been preceded by substantial communication
at official level. We recommend that a degree of flexibility
be given to the Post Office to carry forward unused loan facilities
from one year to another and that the £75 million threshold
for Ministerial approval of borrowings be subject to formal review
after two years of operation of the scheme (paragraphs 28 to 30).
Transparency
(o) We recommend
the greatest possible degree of transparency compatible with the
genuine requirements of commercial confidentiality on this [German
Parcel] and future major purchases by the Post Office (paragraph
31).
Dividend
(p) We recommend
that the level of minimum fixed dividend to be taken from the
Post Office be set low rather than high, to give the Post Office
a reasonable level of retained profits in years of disappointing
results (paragraph 32).
Pay
(q) We look
forward to publication in due course of details of the pay regime
envisaged going beyond the "warm words" referred to
by the Chairman of the Post Office, and expect it to give the
Post Office some degree of genuine flexibility over pay settlements
(paragraph 35).
Network
(r) Given
the fragility of the network, only in part owing to the change
in benefit payment systems, it is time for Government to consider
whether it should continue to rely on income generated from a
range of postal and other services to maintain a national network
which it regards as necessary for broader social and economic
objectives: or whether it should accept that the network is a
national asset as recently demonstrated by its role in
providing more or less instant passport renewal services
which may require an appropriate level of national financial support
(paragraph 37).
Crown Offices
(s) We welcome
the prospect of additional Crown Offices, and in particular the
commitment to improved procedures on public consultation on conversion
of Crown Offices, following our earlier recommendations (paragraph
38).
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