— s6(2) is badly drafted [CyberNotary Association (UK) p2, ICL p9, EURIM p4, British Phonographic Industry paragraph 2.4].

— s6(3) is unclear and should exclude from the statutory accreditation scheme non-commercial provision of cryptography services [British Telecommunications paragraph 6, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland paragraph 1.2.2].

— unclear how the existence of multiple international accreditation schemes for TSPs would affect decisions on whether or not part I were invoked [C. E. Sundt p2].

— exempt TSPs creating electronic cash from the legislation [Mondex p2].

— clause 4 prescribes more stringent penalties for disclosure of information than are prescribed under the Data Protection Act 1998 [EURIM p4, the Post Office p2].

— clarify definitions of "persons", especially in relation to use of word later in draft Bill [Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland paragraph 1.2.1, Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales p3].

— information held on a register established under s1(4)(a) should be freely available to citizens [Liberty paragraph 7].

Electronic Signatures

— the intent and practical effect of s7(3) is unclear [C. E. Sundt p3].

— possible need for guidelines for Judges on the evidential weight to attach to electronic signatures [C. E. Sundt p4].

— clarification is required of whether the Government intends s7(1) to supersede or supplement the rules of evidence which are peculiar to information recorded in electronic form [British Computer Society, individual's submission, paragraph 15].

Electronic Writing

— s8 should be capable of being applied to common law [Licensing Executives Society pp4-5].

— s8(4)(a) may allow Ministers to prescribe forms of electronic communications and storage which are not technology neutral [British Bankers' Association p3].

— does the Government intend for deeds to be created electronically? [Law Society p3].

— Judges require guidance on the degradation of cryptography over time [British Computer Society paragraph 21].

Decryption Notices

— there is a need for higher approval of written notices, particularly in cases where encrypted material comes into the possession of the law enforcement agencies without judicial authority [EURIM p7, the Post Office p7, Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties UK p3, C. E. Sundt p5, Association of Payment Clearing Services p5].

— service of a written notice may need to precede the obtaining of encrypted material by lawful means not involving the exercise of statutory powers [National Criminal Intelligence Service p2].

— extend s8 and schedule 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to cover less serious offences in cases where access to encrypted material has been granted, thus facilitating access to plain text [National Criminal Intelligence Service p3].

— s10 does not adequately cover situations in which more than one key could unlock encrypted material [Internet Service Providers' Association p6, Charles Lindsey p7].

— secrecy conditions should not be routinely attached to s10 notices and should be time-limited [Internet Service Providers' Association pp7-8].

— s10 notices should include time by which they should be satisfied [Internet Service Providers' Association p10, Association of Private Client Investment Managers and Stockbrokers p3, Charles Lindsey p5].

— legislation should respect the relationship between key disclosure and firms' liabilities under civil or criminal law for the disclosure of confidential information; and should cover the situation in which key disclosure would result in a breach of overseas confidentiality laws [London Investment Banking Association p5].

— how can firms prove that signature keys have not been used for confidentiality, under s10(5)? [London Investment Banking Association p5, Law Society p8, Charles Lindsey p6].

— would the Financial Services Authority be authorised to issue s10 notices? [London Investment Banking Association p6].

Tipping-Off

— concerns about the "legal adviser" defence in s13(4) [National Criminal Intelligence Service p4].

Failure to Comply

— make the offence of failure to comply with a written notice arrestable [National Criminal Intelligence Service p5].

Safeguards

— no statutory requirements for protecting divulged plain text included [Thus Ltd p6].

— need for penalties in relation to unauthorised access to protected electronic information [Data Protection Registrar p7].

— Tribunal must be able to co-opt cryptography experts [Thus Ltd p7].

— Tribunal should address complaints about scenarios in which senior police officers have authorised decryption [Thus Ltd p7].

— consequences of excluding the provisions of s9 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 from applications before the Tribunal need careful consideration, especially in relation to the anonymity of TSP staff undertaking decryptions [Post Office p11, Liberty paragraph 33].

— need for an appeals process before application to the Tribunal [Institute of Chartered Accountants in Scotland paragraph 2.3.1].

Miscellaneous

— make reference to steganographic material in s19 [National Criminal Intelligence Service p5].

— definition of electronic communication in clause 23 is too broad and should explicitly exclude voice telephony [One2One p6, British Telecommunications paragraph 8, R. I. Howland p4, British Computer Society, individual's submission, paragraph 21].

— clause 23 should fully reflect the consequences of the recent Victor Chandler International v. HMCE, Lightman J court case concerning the status of Teletext broadcasts [British Computer Society paragraph 10].

— where less than six firms operate in a particular telecoms market, then any objection to a licence modification should be regarded as significant [One2One pp2-3].

— ensure the law is capable of accommodating autonomous trading activities by computers in future [Centre for Law and Computing, Durham University].

— Bill should make reference to international police co-operation [British Computer Society paragraph 4].