Key Escrow
12. Much of the debate about cryptography policy
has focused on the possibility that the Government might mandate
or encourage key escrow, whereby users of encryption deposit their
private encryption keys with a TSP, or related technologies.[25]
We welcomed the Government's announcement in March 1999 that it
was no longer proposing that TSPs would need to provide key escrow
or key recovery in order to be accredited, but we cautioned that
the draft accreditation criteria proposed by DTI still seemed
based on the previous key escrow policy and expressed disappointment
that the Government remained keen to promote key escrow and key
recovery technologies.[26]
In reply to our Report the Government said they accepted that
"the widespread adoption of key escrow and key recovery is
unlikely in the current climate" and that "a mandatory
link between approved providers of services and key escrow would
not support the Government's twin objectives on e-commerce and
law enforcement".[27]
13. We are concerned that the Government has yet
to rid itself of its previous attachment to key escrow and related
technologies. Rather than rule out key escrow because of the
wide range of criticisms made about it by industry, civil liberties
campaigners, computer experts and others, the Government has simply
admitted that its widespread adoption is unlikely at present.
We recommended that powers should not be taken in the forthcoming
Bill to permit the introduction of key escrow or related requirements
in future, for instance by an addition to the accreditation criteria
for TSPs if a statutory regime were in force, but the Government
chose not to answer this point. We are also concerned that although
a mandatory link between approved TSPs and key escrow
has been ruled out, the Government might encourage a voluntary
link instead.[28]
The Government is likely to make use of TSPs in its electronic
communications with firms and individuals and might seek not only
to deal with accredited TSPs but with TSPs which offered key escrow
or related services as well. A recent report by the Performance
and Innovation Unit of the Cabinet Office suggested it was likely
that the authentication and encryption standard adopted by the
Government would "become the de facto UK standard".[29]
By working only with those TSPs which can provide key escrow or
related services, the Government could encourage the widespread
use of such services throughout the UK.
14. Following on from the Government's welcome announcement
that key escrow would not be proposed as an accreditation criterion
for TSPs under a statutory regime, but in the light of the concerns
we have outlined above, we recommend that:
- the legislation should explicitly exclude
the use of key escrow as a criterion for accreditation under a
statutory regime
- key escrow, key recovery or related measures
should not be accreditation criteria under an industry-led regime
- if it were decided to seek to introduce key
escrow, key recovery or related measures in future then the accreditation
scheme should be placed on a statutory basis, if it were not already
so, and there should be provision for a full public consultation
exercise and parliamentary decision on the issue
- an unequivocal commitment be made that key
escrow, key recovery or related measures will not be introduced
through the back door as a result of the Government's participation
in electronic commerce.
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