Select Committee on Trade and Industry Fourth Report


IV FUNDING

1997 Proposal

40. It may be thought that there is likely to be more confidence in a commercial vehicle if , in the event of failure, it is backed by some sort of capital maintenance requirement or a guarantee of a certain amount from those taking part in the business. It is then a question as to how best to set the limit of that liability. The 1997 paper proposed, as one of its series of safeguards, what it called "a package of measures to ensure the availability of funds on liquidation (so as to achieve the same purpose as companies' capital maintenance requirements)".[60] Having considered and turned down the idea of a bond, such as the £5 million bond required under the Jersey LLP legislation, or other forms of compulsory insurance, the paper proposed a personal guarantee by members to contribute, within a specified limit, to making good any deficit of assets below a specified sum on liquidation.[61] The paper suggested that this would give creditors the assurance that at least a guaranteed sum would be available on liquidation, and that members would be able to cover the guarantee by insurance. It recognised difficulties in setting such an individual sum at a level high enough to be worthwhile but not so high as to penalise members with lower drawings: and that the sum guaranteed would necessarily be in addition to any capital which the individual member had put into the firm.

41. The proposal of a guarantee was not generally popular among those likely to be attracted to LLP status. Many pointed out that members in most professions would already be paying professional indemnity insurance premiums, that a bond or capital maintenance rule would be simpler and more practical and that the existence of such guarantees might encourage creditors to seek compulsory liquidation rather than a voluntary settlement.[62] Other respondents doubted the logic behind compulsory insurance or a bond. Coopers & Lybrand , however, suggested detailed capital maintenance requirements, and KPMG felt that a bond underwritten by insurance might be appropriate, linked to turnover. In any event, many of those responding to the 1997 paper accepted that some form of additional reassurance to creditors was advisable, while accepting that the effects of a "mega - claim" could not readily be protected against, and that capital maintenance requirements in limited liability companies - the obvious point of comparison - were indeed slight.

1998 Paper

42. The 1998 paper concludes that there is no justification for making greater demands for creditor protection of LLPs than is made of companies. On the understanding that —

the latest proposals contain neither capital maintenance provisions nor members' guarantees.[63] This has left a number of respondents distinctly uneasy.

Capital maintenance

43. It is by no means universally accepted that capital maintenance is unconnected with the availability of funds for potential creditors. Professor Morse of the University of Nottingham noted the basic principle that "share capital will be available at all times, first of all for creditors ..... the law is intended to ensure that companies have the capital which their published accounts say they have and not to return it to the members."[64] KPMG noted the existence of "stringent capital maintenance rules" and the requirement for court permission to reduce capital, and accepted that it might be desirable to have some form of restriction on reductions in an LLP's core capital.[65] Professor Sikka suggested that in practice a company's capital was "a kind of reserve fund" out of which creditors could be protected.[66] The most trenchant criticism came from the Association of British Insurers, who noted that an LLP's liability would now be limited neither by guarantee nor by capital, and that a firm should have a capital base appropriate to its work -

    "If it is auditing a £600 million firm or a £6 billion firm, then it should be of adequate size, it should have adequate capital backing".[67]

44. It must be accepted that the minimum share capital requirements of a public company of £50,000, of which only a quarter has to be paid up, are of largely technical significance, and that the £1 minimum share capital required of a private company is, at first blush, pointless.

    "The existence of paid-up share capital means simply that the company, on issue, receives money from its members which must subsequently be accounted for as prescribed by the Companies Acts and which cannot be distributed, or reduced except under the supervision of the Companies Court. It does not reflect the net worth of a trading company (which depends on profits) or its trading capital (which may be supplemented by borrowing ....".[68]

The 1980 Companies Act which brought in these minimum requirements was in response to the EC Second Company Law Directive. While the constraints on reduction of this capital may act as a safeguard to creditors in some circumstances, the levels at which the minima are set does not suggest that they are primarily intended for their benefit. Firms in some areas of regulated financial business are and will continue to be required to meet specified levels of capital adequacy. Partnerships however have no capital maintenance requirements. Partners can indeed be men of straw, and few creditors would wish to regard partners' personal assets as a potential fund for the settlement of claims.

Creditor protection

45. We are none the less uneasy at the prospect of introduction of this new vehicle destitute of either minimum capital requirements or guarantees from members, and dependent on the perceived likelihood — or hope — that there will be some LLP assets available to creditors. As the Association of British Insurers put it , a regime under which liability is limited neither by shares nor by guarantee " would appear to provide not for "limited liability entities" but "no liabilities " entities....entities availing themselves of a regime of the type proposed in the consultation document are unlikely to command the confidence of their clients and other interested parties."[69] In 1997 the 100 Group, the British Bankers Association and others raised similar doubts: not repeated in response to the 1998 consultation. The extent to which informed professionals and corporate clients, and potential creditors such as banks and landlords, will choose to enter into commercial relationships with an LLP is of course for them to determine. In the provision of some services, they may not in reality have much choice, if for example the majority of accountants were to take up that status. The appropriateness of the capital base of a firm for particular tasks is primarily a matter for a client to determine, not the law.[70] There is however a public interest in protecting the less well-informed consumer of the services or goods offered by an LLP who does not expect to become a creditor when purchasing goods or services. There is therefore much to be said for making levels of creditor protection in relation to an LLP better, rather than merely no worse, than those in partnerships or companies.

Voluntary minimum funding

46. The "guaranteed solvency margin" proposed in 1997 no doubt raised many difficulties, not least in determining the appropriate level. Set too low, and it is evidently worthless: too high, and it would unduly discourage less prosperous partnerships from taking on LLP status.[71] The best solution may be a permissive regime for an LLP to declare either a guaranteed minimum capitalisation or a process of guarantee within the membership agreement, which can be published as part of its incorporation process. In that way, a client, customer or creditor can at least make an informed choice. We recommend consideration of the introduction of a voluntary scheme of minimum funding in the event of insolvency, to be disclosed as part of the incorporation process in the first instance and thereafter in the annual returns to be made.


60  1997, 3.2(d) Back

61  Ibid, 3.17(c) Back

62  1998, VI, 15 Back

63  1998, 1, 3.6 - 3.8: see Q15 for longer exposition of this view Back

64  1998, 14 Back

65  KPMG, 1.2 - 1.3 Back

66  Qq114 - 116 Back

67  Qq222, 223, 227 Back

68  Cmnd 8171, 1981, 7.6 Back

69  Ev,p 93 &Q224ff Back

70  See eg Qq 223,227,232 Back

71  Qq 145-152 Back


 
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