111. The Government has stated that "the proposed legislation will not, in itself, affect the current export controls on cryptography products" but that "it is likely that it will be possible to streamline the procedures for the export of cryptographic products which facilitate legal access through a third party...One way of doing this might be to permit the export of such products which met set criteria under an open licence after a one time review".[369] Such a development would follow the recent change in US export controls on cryptographic products and was opposed by several respondents to DTI.[370] Some witnesses and respondents to DTI advocated the total relaxation of export controls because of the ready availability of cryptographic products of all kinds over the internet, although this might contravene the UK's international commitments in this area.[371] Racal Telecom urged the Government to follow the example of other signatories to the Wassenaar Arrangement which operated more relaxed export control regimes than that of the UK.[372] Brokat AG emphasised that any relaxation in export controls should be made in step with EU partners.[373]

112. Regardless of the export controls in place, concerns were expressed about the inefficiency of the procedures by which controls were implemented in the UK. The Post Office told us of their experiences applying for export licences in connection with their Viacode product. They characterised the process as "laborious", complained of a lack of communication from DTI, and compared UK procedures unfavourably with procedures elsewhere. They concluded that "UK's existing export control procedures would harm the UK's chances of being the electronic commerce base of the future".[374] The complaints made to us by the Post Office were all too familiar, following our recent Report into strategic export controls.[375] The delays, expense and obfuscation experienced by the Post Office in applying for export licences for cryptographic products seem entirely unacceptable, particularly when compared to procedures abroad and given the status of the Post Office as a public corporation owned by DTI. We recommend that the Government consider the case for a review of the rationale for the continuation of export controls on cryptographic products, in the light of their widespread availability, and the procedures by which such controls are implemented.

370   See paragraph 24; and responses to Government from Brokat AG section E, Racal Electronics paragraph 2.4 , Reuters p3, QMWC paragraph 4.4, Intel p4; also see CommerceNet UK pp10-11 Back

371   Response to Government from Paul Johnson p5; also see responses from Dr. B.Gladman p2, Reuters p3; and Ev, pp231, 260-1 Back

372   Ev, p242 section 3.4; also responses to Government from NatWest p1, Hewlett Packard (main submission) p2 Back

373   Ev, p241 paragraph 2.1.4 Back

374   Ev, pp305-6; and see their response to Government, paragraph 2.3 Back

375   Trade and Industry Committee, Second Report, 1998/99, Strategic Export Controls, HC65, especially paragraphs 61-65; also see Ev, p241 paragraph 2.1.4 and p242 section 3.4; also responses to Government from Marconi p3, Alliance for Electronic Business paragraph 5.8 Back