1.  BACKGROUND TO THIS SUBMISSION

  Professor Nigel Norris was a member of a team of academics and police officers who reviewed police probationer training in England and Wales. The review was occasioned by Lord Scarman's report on the Brixton disorders of April 1981. Scarman asked for a much longer period of initial probationer training, for training in the prevention and handling of disorder and in an understanding of multi-ethnicity. In its immediate response to Scarman's report and acknowledging concern about prejudice and lack of community understanding the Police Training Council implemented minor changes to probationer training (called Stage One). This was, however, a temporary measure until a fundamental review of the probationer training system could provide the necessary research-based documentation of training practices for more informed policy making. This fundamental review was called the Stage Two Review. It took place between January 1984 and December 1985 and covered all 43 forces in England and Wales, including the London Metropolitan Police (Met). The review also included comparative studies of other police training systems in the English speaking Commonwealth, North America and northern Europe. It culminated in the HMSO publication Stage Two Review of Police Probationer Training. The review produced 143 recommendations ranging from the politics, governance and organisation of national training to classroom practices, curriculum and training roles. Recommendations covered both Foundation and Post-Foundation training—all training, that is, up to attestation.

  Subsequently Professor Norris helped with the initial design of a new assessment system for probationer constables.

  From 1985 until 1989 Professor Saville Kushner was part of a development team based at the University of East Anglia. Our commission was extended to work in further collaboration with the police service (national training at Harrogate and regional training centres) for the development of a training curriculum, organisation and quality assurance system; to train police personnel in various aspects of new training system roles; to pilot the new training programme; to evaluate the pilot and to secure full implementation across the country. Shotley Police Training Centre was opened specifically to trial the new programme and we worked closely with trainers there over a ten year period. The Metropolitan Force opted out of the development and did not, thereafter, participate in national probationer training. From 1989 we continued to have an extensive consultancy role in respect of the ongoing development of probationer training and this extended into consultancy and advice for national detective training, race awareness training, training of trainers and (in individual forces) for force reorganisation.

  In 1990 we were commissioned by the government of New South Wales, Australia to review their recruit training programme. The Stage II approach to probationer training had attracted considerable interest in some parts of the world and in New South Wales training managers had sought to style their aspirations for development on it. Shortly thereafter, one of the University of East Anglia Team was invited to conduct a review of recruit training in Queensland.

 2.  THE AIMS AND RATIONALE OF STAGE TWO TRAINING

  2.1  The training system we put in place in partnership with the police and the Home Office was underpinned by a rationale which was set out in the Stage Two Review. Key to the rationale was an understanding that change in policing at a cultural level was best tackled through training, ie to introduce new ideas and practices to operational policing by substitution rather than by confrontation. Each recruit is a potential innovator; policing becomes responsive to new ideas and emerging values. In this way, the cycle of repeated external reviews of policing might be broken and policing rendered self-monitoring, self-critical and generative of its own change strategies. Key elements of the training rationale included:

2.1.1  Police officers are part of a disciplined service, but this cannot control their everyday actions and judgements on the street. There, officers are independent judges of the situations they confront. There is a real sense in which each officer is a policy maker of policing. This means we have to educate officers to be capable of analysing situations, recognising their salient features and being confident and competent in the exercise of independent decision making. It is counter-productive to train officers simply to follow orders, apply the law, comply with indicators or meet limited sets of competency requirements. What is at a premium is independent professional and ethical judgement. The Stage Two Review argued that any form of training for professional policing must concentrate on developing an officer's ability for ethically informed situational decision-making.

2.1.2  The best way to accomplish this is to give each probationer opportunities to observe policing and the community, to share their observations with others in a systematic way and in a safe environment and to arrive at an informed view of what professional policing means to them.

2.1.3  A key problem with this is the typically quick socialisation into the "canteen culture". This was to be avoided by moving probationers between in-force training and regional training—between the world of practice and the world of theory. Each was used as a source of informed critique of the other. At college, the probationer could critically reflect on and analyse situations they were exposed to on the beat, attending incidents, in-force, working with their tutor Constable, the probationer could test out the "theory" of policing being developed in college. We implemented a modular system in which probationers moved between in-force and training centre modules.

2.1.4  The central feature of the modular system was Module Four. This happened immediately after probationers had spent 4-5 weeks in-force attached to tutor constables in an operational setting. Module Four aimed to draw together the knowledge, skills and attitudes developed throughout the foundation course in terms of their relevance to the essential role of the police in maintaining peace through law enforcement and social interaction. From time to time probationers would be expected to return with accounts of malpractice, prejudice and incompetence, as well as aspects of policing which they were learning to admire. Without this capacity to distance themselves from such experiences, probationers stood little chance of making their own decisions about practices and, hence, finding strategies for avoiding or embracing them independently.

2.1.5  These principles make demands on organisations and the governance of training and we made specific recommendations for reform here. These involved the creation of new training roles, resourcing structures and policy structures. For example, if probationers were to return to training centres with accounts of malpractice they had seen, there needed to be special forms of protection and support for trainers who were listening to them and special protocols to guarantee the anonymity and confidentiality of forces involved (so probationers were not cast as "spies"); if the training curriculum was to be based on experience it would, to some extent, be unpredictable and so demanded tolerant, confident and facilitative forms of management; if training was to play a role in introducing change to policing and avoiding cycles of external review there needed to be a separation of training management from the evaluation of training.

 3.  THE FATE OF STAGE TWO TRAINING

  3.1  Stage Two training was piloted and evaluated by national police training in partnership with the University of East Anglia in 1988. It was amended and implemented across the country (other than the Metropolitan Force) in 1989. Broadly, what was implemented were the recommendations dealing with training curriculum (including the Modular System) and training roles. The politics and governance of training was left virtually untouched. Probationer trainers in the training centres by and large, came to embrace the new training programme, led by a cohort of modernising managers. Stage Two training, as it became known, spawned new classroom practices, new roles (eg curriculum development, monitoring and evaluation) and a spate of training seminars at which training and its impact on policing was roundly discussed. Force trainers were less consistently enthusiastic, but were persuadable. Operational officers (eg beat supervisors mainly at sergeant level) were highly resistant—since they were alleged to be the main bearers of the "canteen culture" and, therefore, a main target for change. The new system had virtually no impact on Post-Foundation training where it received almost no resources or attention. A quality assurance system was put in place, but one which all but excluded police authorities from the process of scrutiny and debate.

  3.2  We had held, at the close of the Review, discussions with the Home Office regarding implementation of our recommendations, during which we had made clear the level of resourcing required to put this plan into action. To change a national system, a culture, structures of governance and control and a resource base required substantial financial resources and political commitment. Neither were forthcoming. Development and implementation of the new system was conducted on a shoestring—something equivalent to two university salaries for three years. This was never going to be sufficient to make a substantial impact on police training, let alone on the culture of policing.

  3.3  ACPO were never happy with the new training system. There were a number of reasons for this. First, the Modular System was seen to be costly to forces since chief officers had to fund their probationers to attend training centre on two occasions (albeit for no substantially additional time). The trend has been—and continues to be—away from national probationer training and to the practice of opting-out of national training wherein chief officers can control their own training costs. Secondly, Module four, they felt, exposed them to critical and uncontrolled scrutiny. Chief officers are always unnerved by the idea of their probationers being under the influence of any but their own officers. Next, and connected to that, the whole rationale of taking a realistic view of policing and of training probationers to be independent decision makers requires (understandably) a leap of faith on the part of chief officers and few were prepared to make it. In addition chief officers are the strongest advocates of the notion that police officers need to know the law (what is called "knowledge") and, though there was a role for broader professional education (what is called "skills") it is subordinate. This is highly questionable (see 3.6 below) but was virtually unassailable. Finally, policing came under increasing pressure from politicians dissatisfied at the failure of their investments to deliver the much-needed return in higher crime clear-up rates and so tolerance for long-term solutions like Stage Two eroded.

  3.4  A key source of legitimisation and potential support for probationer training and for Stage Two in particular was the (national) Police Training Council which had political oversight of the reform process. This was the body on which sat all stakeholders in police training—the police associations, representatives of the AMA and the ACC, HMIC and the Home Office. The role and influence of this body was diminished by the Home Office and they were effectively neutralised, taking away from Stage Two its democratic appeals forum. Oversight of the Stage Two reform was demoted in the Home Office. Funding dried up at a crucial moment in the development (ie implementation) which left the training system committed to the reform but unable to call on expert support.

  3.5  As a result, Stage Two Training, under-resourced and demoted in its level of bureaucratic and political support, was vulnerable. As Home Office policy shifted away from direct control of training and shifted the balance towards a voluntaristic system with validation from National Police Training, what little political value was left in Stage Two training withered. There was constant attrition from ACPO and regular challenges made to the leading advocates and providers of the new training system. Stage Two training, less than 10 years old (where we had always made clear that fundamental change was possible but would take something like 15 years to see major gains) was widely talked about as "out-of-date"—by which was actually meant "out-of-step" with contemporary reduced cost and opt-out values. When one of its most ardent critics assumed the post of National Director of Training there was little the training managers (all of them still highly committed—now having witnessed the benefits in terms of increased numbers of confident, independently-minded and competent recruits) could do to protect it. Module Four was terminated, effectively returning police probationer training back to the 1984, post-Scarman, Stage One model.

  3.6  Nonetheless, an Under Secretary of State at the Home Office told us in the course of an informal meeting that Stage Two training had produced the only example of cultural change they had seen in policing. Monitoring and evaluation exercises conducted on probationer training generated consistent findings that, though Stage Two probationers might know less law ("knowledge") they were more competent in applying the law (ie the "skills" of personal judgement) than those trained under the old system. It remains true that Stage Two training, as was acknowledged by the senior civil servant who shepherded it into existence, was probably the most sophisticated professional education programme in the country. This would be claimed by the authors of this submission who have experience in other areas of professional training, including for nurses, teachers, doctors, magistrates and performing artists. To reiterate, Stage Two was developed as a collaboration between the Home Office, the police service and the university sector.

 4.  LESSONS FOR AND FROM THE LAWRENCE ENQUIRY

  4.1  Public concern arising from the Stephen Lawrence enquiry is a virtual re-run of that which followed the Brixton and Toxteth riots. Macphereson has recommended "race awareness training", equivalent to what was recommended by Scarman. One of the authors of this submission was asked by Jonathan Dimbleby during a radio `phone-in exchange if things were not depressing, in this light, since nothing appears to have changed over the intervening 15-20 years. The answer is to the contrary. Stage Two training—anachronism or not—demonstrated in the most adverse of circumstances that fundamental—even cultural—change was possible. It was political will that failed, not the strategy.

  4.2  Macpherson is wide of the mark on this matter. Besides anything else the Home Office and the police service have tried every approach to race awareness training—short and long courses, training manuals, distance education, public and private sector involvement, initial and in-service training, training by white officers and black officers, the imposition of performance indicators, ethnic minority recruitment. The problem has not gone away but racism is the issue—it is not the problem. There may or may not be "institutionalised racism" in the police: what we certainly have is "institutionalised conservatism" in management. In what might be thought to be a strange thing to say, it is perfectly conceivable under Stage Two principles to have a racist officer who is highly effective, fair, competent and perfectly acceptable in the context of community policing, so long as he/she is self-aware, self-disciplined and committed to professionalism to allow fairness to override personal prejudice.

  4.3  The problem is the continuing failure of the police service to allow its recruits to adopt a constructively critical stance towards policing such that they are capable of freeing themselves up from historical values in policing and use the job to develop a more modern conception of police professionalism. Recruits from ethnic minorities are essential to the service, but they will be just as vulnerable to the canteen culture.

 5.  THE LESSONS OF THE STAGE TWO EXPERIENCE ARE THESE:

  5.1  Classroom-based race awareness training will fail again. Awareness is only a very small part of what is needed and race awareness training is easily undermined and dismissed by the occupational culture.

  5.2  It is possible to create a police training culture that is progressive, responsive and committed to social change in a way that operational cultures find harder to achieve.

  5.3  To secure fundamental change of the kind envisaged by the Lawrence Inquiry it is necessary to change the nature of the organisation. The power of Chief Officers and other senior ranks to block and undermine change must be offset by the greater involvement of lay people in the governance of policing and of police training.

  5.4  "Tough minded" approaches such as racism testing, covert monitoring and threats of expulsion and an ever-more punitive management of a command and control system will not work and are likely to exacerbate the problem. Officers will learn where management gaze will fall and they will devise their own evasion strategies.

  5.5  Police training needs high level political support (both will and resources) but also needs the countervailing, appeals route of democratic accountability. That democratic accountability needs to happen at the highest level—as with the Police Training Council and the Select Committee; at middle levels—as with quality assurance procedures for National Police Training and at local level—with properly representative Police Authorities or their equivalent. All need access to independent evaluations of training.

  5.6  There need to be two approaches to training for police reform. One is for probationer training, as we have shown, to produce young innovators; the other is for police managers, to inculcate in them a confidence in and a knowledge of how to use new skills and values. As in the best of private sector practices, police hierarchy needs to be "inverted"—which is to say that police managers should facilitate and support their officers at least as much as supervise them. Our experience suggests that the civilianisation of chief officers would be a worthwhile experiment.

  5.7  Whether as a commissioning, validating and evaluating body or as a first provider of training, there has to be a robust national training system which has unitary oversight of police training. The fundamental rationale has to be supported and propounded consistently across the country—even though it is perfectly acceptable if not preferable for there to be a diversity of practices. Diversity in practices comes as a trade for accountability.

 CONCLUDING COMMENT

  It must be recognised that there is no easy solution to this problem. There is no magic bullet and no quick fix which means that the necessary reforms will always be vulnerable to the failure of political nerve or a change of ministers and government. Such short-termism is the enemy of real reform, much more the enemy than the inherent conservatism of police organisations. This is why the solution to the problem of institutional racism in the police service requires a minimum of such as:

—  long-term political commitment to finding a genuine solution backed by the necessary resources;

—  investment in probationer training as a strategy for institutional change and development;

—  investment in the professional development of operational supervisors;

—  the direct involvement of the community in the reform;

—  a participative and experimental approach to addressing the problem;

—  long-term formative evaluation to monitor the effects and effectiveness of reforms and help improve implementation.

Professor Nigel Norris, Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of East Anglia

Professor Saville Kushner, Associate Dean, University of the West of England

March 1999