Select Committee on Home Affairs First Report


THE WORK OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION

B The Commission's approach to its work

Overall approach

18. We were impressed by the overwhelmingly positive tone of the opinions on the Commission's work in the submissions received from lawyers who had had dealings with it, particularly when compared to the previous arrangements. Ms Kate Akester for example, giving oral evidence on behalf of 'Justice', suggested that many observers took the view that the Commission "is light years ahead of the Home Office in all sorts of ways"; and Mr Adrian Clarke, for Bindmans, said that once the Commission had begun investigating a case "then there is no comparison to the sort of work being done by the Home Office".[29] Graysons, a firm of solicitors in Sheffield, were impressed by the analysis of cases 'from the ground up'" and described as "outstanding" the readiness of caseworkers to liaise with professional advisers; they also spoke approvingly of the degree of independence the Commission was demonstrating.[30] Stephens & Scown, of Exeter, made similar comments and described their overall experience of working with the Commission as, in the main, "very favourable".[31] 'Justice' also described the Commission as "much more accessible than the Home Office" and credited them with a much more transparent decision-taking process.[32]

19. We note the good start which has been made by the Commission and its staff in those cases which it has examined, particularly as regards the professionalism, independence and openness which it has brought to bear on its work. We note that this view is shared by the Government, who stated in their evidence that "the Commission has crucially established early on a reputation for impartiality, professionalism and sound judgement and thus helped to enhance public confidence in the criminal justice system".[33]

The test for referral

20. The test for referral to the Court of Appeal is laid down in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. Sub-section 13(1)(a) provides that the Commission must consider "that there is a real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would not be upheld were the reference to be made". Sub-section 13(1)(b) requires that the Commission must come to such a view "because of an argument, or evidence, not raised in the proceedings...". Some difficulties arise from these tests.

21. One is the meaning of the words "real possibility". This is a phrase which could mean something different to the ordinary public from how it might be understood by a court. This gives rise to there being a range of possible interpretations by the Commission, a point which we discuss further below.

22. Lawyers to whom we spoke raised two further issues about the statutory test. First, it was argued by Mr Clarke for Bindmans that it was undesirable for the test to be based on requiring the Commission to predict what the Court of Appeal would do; he proposed that the test should instead be based on the possibility "that there had in fact been a miscarriage of justice", which he thought would give the Commission more freedom of action.[34] Secondly, it was suggested that there was still a danger that too much emphasis was placed on identifying 'new' evidence which the Court of Appeal could recognise.[35]

23. The Commission submitted some observations on the ideas for amending the statutory test for referral. They suggested that the phrase "miscarriage of justice" would itself be unclear as a test and that it made sense for the Commission's test to be based on the same concepts as the Court of Appeal's test, if the situation was to be avoided where cases were referred under one set of criteria but then had to be rejected by the Court on different criteria.[36] Sir Frederick Crawford indicated that the wording of the test had not in practice been a prominent issue in their consideration of the working of the Act.[37] Other members of the Commission whom we met in Birmingham suggested that it would be unhelpful for the test to be changed at such an early stage in their work, and that it might be appropriate to wait until a much greater number of cases had been dealt with by the Court of Appeal before a judgement is made as to whether the test needs amending.

24. It is important that proper opportunities for referral are available in all cases, and accordingly that the statutory test for referral is as effective as possible in allowing justified cases to be referred. While we conclude that it would not yet be appropriate, with so few cases having been considered by the Court of Appeal, to seek to change the actual test for referral, we think it is worth noting, even at this early stage, that there may be problems with the statutory test laid down in the Criminal Appeal Act 1995. We recommend that a formal review of the wording of the test in the Act take place after the Commission has been in operation for 5 years.

Interpretation of the test and depth of investigation

25. As just noted, the extent to which the Commission is required to be convinced that the Court of Appeal might overturn a conviction or sentence before deciding to refer the application is a question for debate. One of the original reasons for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice's recommendation for the establishment of the CCRC was that the Home Office had not in practice investigated cases in sufficient depth to identify possible miscarriages.[38] It was however put to us by several of the lawyers who had had dealings with the Commission that it was in danger of going too far in the opposite direction: it was investigating cases in more depth than was necessary.

26. Mrs Peirce, for Birnberg & Co, summarised this point of view as follows:

    "the concern is expressed that the CCRC is being meticulous to a fault in preparing and presenting a case that satisfies it that an appeal would be successful.... I wonder whether it would be appropriate for them to reconsider the basis on which they are deciding to refer a case; whether, if there is a clear feeling that something was wrong in a case and the CCRC can identify perhaps one or two features, it is not better to make the quantum leap and to refer it back and to consider that it is the duty of the defence thereafter to research, prepare and to complete the preparation of a case that will win on appeal."[39]

She went on to suggest that the concern was "that the CCRC is substituting itself for the Court of Appeal and in effect having to make a judgement on the case itself".[40] Mr Clarke and Ms Akester broadly supported this analysis.[41] Bindmans feared that the "Commission is adopting a restrictive and legalistic approach and that it is too concerned at the possibility that the Court of Appeal will turn down cases it refers".[42] The early track record of the Commission's referrals in the Court of Appeal—with the conviction or sentence being overturned in 10 out of the 13 referrals completed so far—suggests that the Commission has perhaps been cautious in its interpretation.

27. Sir Frederick Crawford in his oral evidence suggested that it was too soon to tell whether the Commission was setting too high a threshold for referral, and that he would need to see direct evidence for this before accepting the criticism at this stage. Nevertheless, he did accept that it was an issue which would have to be monitored closely and stated that the possible performance measures being examined included an assessment of how many cases had not been referred which should have been as well as how many were referred which should not have been.[43]

28. The Commission also submitted written evidence outlining possible problems in the way of leaving more of the work to defence lawyers. These included the fact that four-fifths of applicants were not legally represented at the stage they applied to the Commission, and that the standard of legal representation varied. In practice, it considered that many of the issues could not be identified and pursued to the point necessary to form a proper judgement without a degree of scrutiny going beyond what some of the lawyers might be suggesting.[44] It pointed out that it "does not review and investigate all issues raised or identified as a matter of course. It selects and investigates the issues that, singly or in combination, may have an impact on the outcome of the case."[45]

29. The Home Secretary emphasised that the issue was one on which the Commission itself had to make a judgement and that it was not his task to second guess their judgement; he agreed that the position should become clearer as the number of cases considered by the Court of Appeal increased.[46] The Government implicitly recognised the difficulty in assessing this aspect of the Commission's performance in stating that "one would not expect every referral by the Commission to lead to the quashing of the conviction or a reduction in the sentence" but also that "it is also to the Commission's credit that this has happened in all but one of the ten referrals which the Court of Appeal has heard to date".[47] It should be borne in mind of course that it would not necessarily be desirable for a higher number of cases to be referred from the Commission to the Court of Appeal if the only result was to create greater problems for that Court.

30. We note that it is already the case that where the Commission identifies that an application, while technically eligible for review, presents on an early examination no grounds for suggesting that it could be successful, then it already receives much less examination under the 'short form of review' procedure. The issue is whether it would be appropriate for the present threshold for examination and referral to be lowered in other cases, without risking injustice to the applicant or an irresponsible laxity in the Commission's discharge of its duties under the statute and to the Court of Appeal. Subject to monitoring of the outcomes of a larger number of decisions, we believe that there may be some force in the proposition that the Commission is interpreting the test too strictly. The statutory phrase "real possibility", however interpreted, clearly allows for a fair proportion of referrals not to lead to a quashing of the conviction.

31. It should be noted that we have come to this view on grounds of principle, rather than of convenience. Nevertheless, any move towards lowering the amount of work needed in each case would have a beneficial impact on the Commission's workload and the current delays. It is to these issues that we now turn.


29   Q10. Back

30   Appendix 5. Back

31   Appendix 6. Back

32   Appendix 3. Back

33   Appendix 10, para 1. Back

34   Q4; see also Q7 (Ms Akester) and Q34 (Mrs Peirce). Back

35   See Q26, Q34 (Mrs Peirce), though 'Justice' suggested in their written submission (see Appendix 3) that the statutory test was in this respect more satisfactory than the previous test used by the Home Secretary; see also Q58 (Sir Frederick Crawford). Graysons (solicitors) suggested that scope for successful referrals on the 'new argument' leg of the statutory test was in practice limited (Appendix 5). Back

36   Appendix 13. Back

37   Q62. Back

38   Cm 2263, Chapter 11, para 9. Back

39   Q2. Back

40   Q3. Back

41   Q4, Q7; see also submission from Glaisyers (Solicitors) (Appendix 4). Back

42   Appendix 2. Back

43   QQ50-51. Back

44   Appendix 11, para 1.1; see also Q146. Back

45   Appendix 11, para 1.5; examples of the kinds of evidence or argument which the Commission has recognised as justifying a referral are given at para 1.8. See paras 42-45 below for further discussion on the way the CCRC approaches its work. Back

46   QQ 177-178. Back

47   This was as at 31 December 1998; see Appendix 10, para 2. Back


 
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