1.  I am a Reader in Law at the University, specialising in Human Rights Law in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and have many publications in this field. I serve as Director of the University's Pan-European Institute, which co-ordinates the University's teaching, research and consultancy activities relating to the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union. I am also a member of the University's Human Rights Centre.

  2.  I work under contract for the Department for International Development (DFID) as their Expert on Human Rights and Law Reform in Russia; and have done so for the past two and a half years. In this capacity, I have prepared, and continue to work in relation to a number of projects. The two largest concern: support for judicial reform in Russia (Judicial Support Project), and independent—that is NGO—monitoring of Russia's human rights commitments to the Council of Europe (Independent Monitoring Project). Since I am not a DFID official, I cannot speak about the Department's policies or internal mechanisms, although my work for them has given me privileged access to Russian structures and actors. This Memorandum is written strictly in my personal capacity.

  3.  I have also, during the past years, undertaken inter alia the following activities in Russia:

—  Participation, from 1996, as Expert on Law and Legislation for the European Union TACIS Project "Developing a System of Social Services for Vulnerable Groups", working with the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection in Moscow, and the Oblast Administrations in Penza and Samara Oblasts (this Project has been led by the UK-based Russian European Trust for Welfare Reform, with French partners, and managed by the British Council).

—  Participation, from 1997, as Expert, in the EU TACIS Project "Strengthening the State of Law and Legal Education Under New Market Relations". This includes work with the Russian Foundation for Legal Reform, created to coordinate a large World Bank loan for law reform, and with the Moscow Higher School of Economics. The Project is led by the Paris International Institute and University of Paris X Nanterre.

—  Acting as Trial Observer, for Amnesty International, in the trial for treason and espionage, in St Petersburg in October 1998 and appeal, in Moscow in February 1999, of the Russian environmentalist and Amnesty Prisoner of Conscience Aleksandr Nikitin.

—  Teaching and training in the areas of human rights law and practice, for Open Society Institute (Soros) and others. A number of my former students are now active in human rights protection in Russia.

—  Frequent teaching and advising in other CIS countries, for OSI, OSCE, UNDP and others. This year I have worked in Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. I also have projects in Ukraine.

  4.  I am therefore qualified to assist the Committee specifically on issues concerning the "dialogue on human rights and good governance".

  5.  Drawing on my experience, I would like to suggest four principal factors which should guide British policy with regard to human rights and good government in Russia. Two of these relate to Russia and two to Britain. Each complements the others.

  6.  The first factor concerns Russia's place within an important grouping of states. It should be remembered that Russia is just one—of course the largest—of the components of the former Soviet Union. Most of the states which have emerged from it are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and all are still, to a considerable extent, Russian-speaking. In my view, however, there is a tendency to commit the lion's share of resources to Moscow: that is, to some extent to treat Moscow as if it were still the capital of the USSR. A visible sign of this is the large Embassy building now nearing completion in Moscow. Kazakstan, for example, is a state five times bigger than France, with enormous potential and natural resources, while each of the Newly Independent States has its own unique characteristics, culture and potential. It is my impression that some of our European Union partners invest more diplomatic resources than does the UK in these states. The UK should not lose out through an excessive focus on Russia.

  7.  Second, there is the internal complexity and dynamism of Russia itself. The most important aspect of Russian development since adoption of the new Constitution in December 1993, and direct elections for governors and presidents, has been the ever-increasing autonomy and diversity of the 89 "subjects of the Federation"—the 21 ethnic Republics, six ethnic Krais (territories), one (Jewish) Autonomous Oblast, 10 Autonomous Okrugs, 49 administrative Oblasts of mainly Russian ethnicity, and two Federal Cities, Moscow and St Petersburg. All have their own constitutions or charters, the republics have presidents, many have regional constitutional courts, and there is much legislative activity. Some 46 subjects of the Federation have concluded separate treaties with the Federal Government as to the division of power. As the parliamentary and presidential elections approach, it is the regional leaders who increasingly hold the balance of power, and whose alliances are likely to be the decisive factor. All this has significant implications for good government and human rights strategy. It is my own experience that the most important and progressive developments are taking place largely in the regions and not in the federal government. Thus, there should not be an excessive focus on Moscow.

  8.  A very similar pair of factors can be discerned with respect to the United Kingdom.

  9.  The first concerns the UK's role as a member of the European Union and Council of Europe (as well, of course, as NATO, the OSCE and the UN). This means that for the purpose of much human rights and good government activitiy in Russia, the UK is acting as one player in a Western European team. This is not simply a case of coordination of effort and avoidance of duplication. For example, British, French and other experts will often be working together within the same project. Given the very different legal and political traditions, there can be greater difficulties in communication between English common lawyers and French civil lawyers, than between either of them with their Russian partners. Thus, attention must be given to this question: what role should the UK be playing in a European team? Is there, or should there be, a distinctive British role? Many Russians—and many are great admirers of British traditions—believe so.

  10.  The second factor concerns the dynamic processes also taking place within the United Kingdom. Thus, Russians are fascinated by the new arrangements evolving for Northern Ireland, including unprecedented relations with another sovereign state, the Republic of Ireland; the formation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly; and the long-awaited domestication of the European Convention on Human Rights. The UK and Russia therefore have at least the following characteristics in common: both are former imperial states learning to live with a reduced role in the international community, and both have rapidly evolving constitutional and political internal relations whose outcomes are wholly unpredictable. This argues for a degree of humility in dealings with Russia, and a willingness to learn as well as to teach.

  11.  I should like to conclude with some positive and negative indicators.

  12.  The most positive indicators, in my view, are the strong emphasis in British foreign and international development policy on the protection and promotion of human rights, and, more important still, the clear recognition of the key importance of social and economic rights, mutually complementing and reinforcing the more traditional civil and political rights—this is especially important at a time when the pain of economic transition bears disproportionately on the most vulnerable in society. This new approach gives British initiatives a distinctive, attractive and more effective profile. Even if the UK is not the wealthiest or most generous donor, it has a very specific role to play. This is in part an answer to the queston posed in paragraph 9 above.

  13.  A negative indicator is the tendency which exists to underrate or even write Russia off, given the malign influence of corruption at all levels of society, and the refusal by some of the most powerful actors to respect the rule of law, together with the low level of respect for law and rights in all parts of society. This is sometimes exacerbated by a patronising tone, treating Russian partners as if they must be taught everything from first principles. It is not simply a question of remembering Russia's incomparable cultural heritage, in music, literature and art. It should also not be forgotten that from 1864 to 1917, for half a century, Russia enjoyed a rich experience of reform, with pride of place going to a largely independent judiciary and bar, and jury trials whose verdicts were mostly respected. Many present-day reforms draw strength from that period. Moreover, there are strong traditions, maintained during the Soviet period, of academic excellence, and of independent scholarship and inquiry. Thus, the proper attitude when working with Russians is one of partnership and willingness to learn. Very many Russians are well-educated, honest and competent. It is simply a question of identifying the best partners.

  14.  A related problem is that of failure to understand that Russia is (and has been for more than a century) essentially a civil law country. Its Civil Code is based on the Dutch and German models, its criminal procedure is on paper close to that of a number of Western European countries, its Constitutional Court's model is the German court at Karlsruhe. English (and other common-law) experts can often perceive as backward or unreformed that which is simply different.

  15.  My recommendations are therefore as follows:

—  Any tendency to allocate disproportionate resources to Russia (as compared with other former USSR states) should be resisted.

—  Any tendency to focus on central government in Moscow at the expense of the increasingly important regional factors should also be resisted.

—  British policy should draw strength from the common experience of the UK and Russia as post-imperial and rapidly decentralising policies.

—  The British policy focus on human rights, especially social and economic rights, should be maintained and enhanced.

—  All relations with Russians in the fields of good government and human rights should be pursued in a spirit of partnership and willingness to learn.

October 1999