SUMMARY

Introduction

—  Agriculture is the mainstay of the Central Asian economy.

—  With agriculture almost entirely dependent on irrigation, access to water is essential.

Water resources and use in Central Asia

—  The region is extremely arid and the main sources of water are the Amu Darya and Syr Darya Rivers.

—  More than 80 per cent of water available for use is generated on the territory of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

—  Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan control most of the water storage within the Aral Sea Basin.

—  More than 70 per cent of all water is used by the downstream republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakstan, primarily for irrigating cotton.

—  The water resources of Central Asia are fully utilised, although 70-75 per cent of this water is wasted through inefficient use.

—  Inefficient use of water has resulted in widespread salinisation of soil and loss of valuable land. The availability of land for further development is limited.

International water politics

—  Tension over water has increased since independence.

—  Kyrgyzstan wish to increase the amount of hydro-electricity they can generate. To do this they must operate reservoirs on a winter regime.

—  Uzbekistan want water for irrigation which requires reservoirs to be operated on a summer regime.

—  The question of who pays for the management and maintenance of those parts of the system that benefit more than one republic is now a major political issue.

—  Civil unrest in Tajikistan and the potential of the country fragmenting is a serious threat to water security in the region.

—  Attempts to mediate between the republics have proved futile.

—  The lack of monitoring makes forecasting water availability and use impossible.

—  Government set agricultural targets will increase demand for water to 152 km3 per annum, more than 25 km3 greater than supply.

—  Population is predicted to double by 2025 further increasing demand for water.

Issues of water management at the national level

—  Management of the water distribution and irrigation network within republics is problematic.

—  Maintenance of the system has almost ceased. Irrigation canals are silting up and much of the drainage is non-functional.

—  The system is deteriorating rapidly and collapse of parts of the system is imminent.

—  Privatisation of land will further exacerbate the situation and create tension at the national and local level.

—  Many experts have left the region and there are no new people being trained in the institutes and ministries involved in water management and irrigation.

Conclusions

—  World attention has focused on the Aral Sea Crisis but has failed to tackle the root cause of the problem: overwatering.

—  The International community should turn its attention to supporting projects that focus on irrigation and water management at the local level.

—  Long term effective management of Central Asia's water resources will only be achieved if the Central Asian Republics are willing to co-operate.

INTRODUCTION

  For the people of Central Asia, agriculture represents a mainstay of the economy and in the economic crisis of the post-independence period it has gained even greater importance. With agriculture almost entirely dependent on irrigation access to water is essential. Since independence, the Central Asian Republics (CARs) have struggled to cope with the enormity of their water management problems, a situation exacerbated by the collapse of the economy, loss of expertise, lack of co-operation between states and social unrest in some regions. The aim of this report is to outline current problems and highlight the challenges, which Central Asia's leaders face as they strive to develop a water management strategy to ensure the economic and social well being of the region into the 21st century.

WATER RESOURCES AND USE IN CENTRAL ASIA

  With the exception of Kazakstan, the CARs lie almost entirely within the Aral Sea Basin, a large internal drainage system with its terminus at the Aral Sea (Figure 1). The vast, inhospitable and sparsely populated Kara and Kyzyl Kum Deserts dominate the region. These deserts are flanked to the south and southeast by the extensive mountain ranges of the Tien Shen and the Pamirs, which form the main water generation zone for the region's two main rivers the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya.

  The Amu Darya, Central Asia's largest river, rises in the Pamirs and flows some 2,540 km across Tajikstan, Uzbekistan (where it forms the border with Afghanistan) and Turkmenistan and finally back into Uzbekistan before discharging into the southern Aral Sea. Its annual flow varies from 46.9 to 108.4 km³ per annum with an average of 78.5 km³. The waters of the Amu Darya rank amongst the most turbid in the world and carry a huge amount of sediment.

  Central Asia's second largest river, the Syr Darya, rises in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan. It has two main tributaries: the Naryn and the Kara Darya, which merge in eastern Uzbekistan to form the Syr Darya. From here the river flows into Tajikistan before re-entering Uzbekistan and then finally Kazakstan where it discharges into the northern Aral Sea. Although similar in length to the Amu Darya (2,200 km), its discharge is considerably smaller ranging from 21.4 to 54.1 km³ per annum with the average being 37.2 km³.

  Taken together, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya account for nearly 90 per cent of the usable water in the Aral Sea Basin, which on average is ca. 125 km³ per annum. The remaining 10 per cent is derived from the region's numerous smaller rivers and streams.

  Tajikistan represents the main flow generation zone with more than 55.4 per cent of all flows forming on its territory. A further 25.3 per cent forms on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, these two republics account for more than 80 per cent of all water available for use in Central Asia (Figure 2).

  The distribution of reservoirs means that nearly 60 per cent of the total storage capacity of the Amu Darya Basin and 9 per cent of the total storage capacity in the Syr Darya Basin is controlled by Tajikistan, while Kyrgyzstan controls 58 per cent of the storage capacity in the Syr Darya Basin.

  Despite being the main flow generation zone and controlling virtually all the region's water resources, the amount of water used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is relatively small, totalling less than 15 per cent. In contrast, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan who have little in the way of indigenous water resources are the main consumers using 71 per cent of available water resources. The lion's share of this water is used to irrigate cotton.

  Until the 1960s as little as 50 per cent of the available water resources in Central Asia were used. But with the construction of huge irrigation schemes, such as the Kara Kum Canal, there was a rapid increase in water use, from 64.7 km³ in 1960 to over 120 km³ by 1980. So much water was extracted from the region's rivers that flow to the Aral Sea virtually ceased. As a result the level of the sea has declined substantially with a 53 per cent decrease in surface area and a 70 per cent decrease in volume since 1960. The exposure of over 33,000 km² of the former seabed has significantly increased dust storm potential. It is estimated that over 150 million tonnes of sediments enriched in salts, fertilisers and pesticides is eroded from the former sea-bed and is deposited some 500 km downwind of the sea. The devastating social, economic and environmental impacts of excessive water withdrawals from the Amu Darya and other major rivers in Central Asia are well documented with the decline of the Aral Sea being described by UNEP (1992) as "one of the most staggering disasters of the Twentieth century".

  It is estimated that as little as 25-30 per cent of the water abstracted from the region's rivers is actually used. The rest is wasted through inefficiencies in the irrigation with overwatering of fields being a particular problem. This has resulted in rising groundwater levels and salinisation of soils throughout the irrigation zone. The net result is degradation of the soil and loss of top quality arable land. Rehabilitation of this land is virtually impossible and land suitable for further development is extremely limited.

INTERNATIONAL WATER POLITICS

The Soviet era

  During the Soviet era, Central Asia was carved up in accordance with Stalin's pronouncement "Socialist in content. National in form". This created two small republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, endowed with enormous water resources, although little in the way of agricultural land, and three large republics, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, with huge agricultural potential but virtually no indigenous water supply.

  Having partitioned the region, the Soviet administration then proceeded to develop and manage the region's water resources as a single integrated system. From the 1950s onwards developments were characterised by huge multipurpose engineering projects. Reservoirs, for example, not only regulated flows and stored water for irrigation, but could also be used to generate electricity (HEP). Canals transferred water to irrigation projects as well as to towns and cities for domestic and industrial use. More often than not, schemes served more than one republic and were built with little, if any, regard for natural boundaries or national borders.

  Such schemes effectively increased competition for water amongst the republics. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, for example, had considerable HEP potential and needed to store water during the summer months and release it in the winter. Downstream users, however, wanted water during the summer months to coincide with the main irrigation period. The different water requirements of upstream and downstream republics was problematic and decisions on when and how much water was to be released was made by Moscow, who for years ordered Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to empty their reservoirs so that the cotton fields of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could be irrigated. Part of the revenues gained from selling cotton were then used to provide Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with just enough subsidies to keep the operation going.

  In effect the Soviet administration created a situation which would ensure competition between water-surplus and water-deficit republics. This situation worked to Moscow's advantage in two ways. Firstly, disputes over water reinforced the national distinctiveness of the republics, thus limiting the potential for regional co-operation, which would threaten Soviet control. Secondly, as competition for water increased the Republics were forced to ask Moscow to intervene; a role it was more than willing to undertake. In short, water policy was central to Moscow's efforts to divide and rule the region.

Independence

  At independence Moscow's role in determining water use and allocations as well as providing funds for the management and maintenance of the system came to an abrupt halt and overnight Central Asia's leaders had to assume this responsibility. Recognising the importance of water and the enormity of the Aral Sea crisis, representatives of the five CARs met in 1992 and signed the Almaty agreement in which they agreed to joint ownership and management of the region's water resources, but to retain sovereign control over crops, industrial goods and electric power obtained from them. The agreement emphasised the importance of co-operation stating "that only unification and joint co-ordination of action" will help improve economic and environmental conditions in the region. At the same meeting the Central Asian leaders agreed to adhere to existing water allocations (Table 1), to refrain from projects infringing on other states and to the free exchange of information.

  Despite the apparent high level of co-operation between the CARs it is clear that tension over water is increasing.

  A major problem is the conflicting interests between the different republics. Krygyzstan, for example, has stated its intention to increase HEP output and has not been releasing waters during the summer months. This has caused considerable concern to the downstream users, particularly Uzbekistan.

  The question of who pays for the management and maintenance of those parts of the system that benefit more than one republic has also become a major political issue. The Kyrgyz, for instance, resent the fact that waters that rise on its territory and flow into the Syr Darya mainly benefit Uzbek and Kazak cotton harvests, yet the cost of maintaining the dams and reservoirs on its territory must now be met from the Kyrgyz budget. They note that inter-state facilities built on their territory resulted in 47,000 hectares of land being flooded including 16,000 hectares of irrigated arable land. The loss of income from this land and from the fact that water can not be used to develop other lands has had, they state, a negative impact on their economy. In July 1997 the Upper House Assembly of the People's Representatives of Kyrgyzstan passed a resolution demanding that neighbouring states should pay them for the water they receive, with the money going on essential repairs.

  Uzbekistan and Kazakstan, however, argue that the reservoirs and dams on Kyrgyz territory were built and paid for by the Soviets and that Kyrgyzstan receives considerable benefit because of the hydropower potential it offers. They also claim that Kyrgyzstan failure to release water in the summer months has had huge economic impacts. The Uzbek government, for example, has claimed that water shortages caused by Kyrgyzstan cost their economy $700 million in lost crops in 1996 alone.

  Uzbekistan in turn has been accused by Kazakstan of preventing water from flowing to its territory. In July 1997, Kazak farmers held a series of demonstrations to protest at the decision by the Uzbek government to cut the flow of water to their land, threatening the cotton and wheat crop on over 100,000 hectares. The Uzbek government eventually re-opened the waterways to avoid any repeat of the Uzbek-Kazak clashes of the 1980s.

  There have also been continued problems along the Turkmen-Uzbek border where farmers confronted with water shortages have sent raiding parties across the border to destroy pumping stations and irrigation canals.

  A number of attempts have been made to resolve the situation. The Uzbeks, for example, have announced that they are willing to supply Kyrgyzstan with natural gas to help make up energy deficits if the Kyrgz operate reservoirs on a summer irrigation schedule. Furthermore, they have been willing to discuss help in financing new hydropower facilities in the region. In November 1997, a preliminary agreement between the two republics was brokered and it was believed that the situation had been resolved, but within a few months the Kyrgyz were reported to be violating the agreement. In yet another attempt to resolve disputes over water, the presidents of the four CARs sharing the Syr Darya Basin met in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in June 1998, to discuss water allocations and use, but the meeting ended without any decisions being taken.

Future considerations

  Civil unrest in Tajikstan represents a huge threat to water security. Many parts of the country are without effective government and the economy is in tatters. The severity of the situation is such that in 1997 an official stated that neither he nor his embattled government could make any promises over future water supplies. But if, as some observers believe, the country fragments the implications for the region as a whole are immense and it is likely that downstream users, particularly Uzbekistan will move to secure the water resources upon which its population is dependent.

  Increasing flows to the Aral Sea has been a major priority for the CARs and since independence and on several occasions government officials have reiterated their intentions to improve water use within the Aral Sea Basin. Monitoring water use, however, is virtually impossible as financial difficulties have meant that hydrological and meteorological information has decreased dramatically. There was, for example, a dense network of snow monitoring stations high in the mountains of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Data from these posts were used to forecast water availability for the coming year and also provided an early warning system of high flows. Today there are no operational posts in Tajikistan and relatively few in Kyrgyzstan.

  The loss of such information has created a number of problems and it is now impossible to determine water availability and use within the Aral Sea Basin. Thus despite assurances from government officials that they are acting to reduce water and that there has been an increase in flows to the Aral Sea there is no way of determining if this is the case. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that some republics are withdrawing more water than they are legally entitled to. Turkmenistan for example is allowed to take 12.9 km³ of water from the Amu Darya into the Kara Kum Canal, but a number of observers have indicated that this figure is nearer 18 km³.

  Detailed monitoring was also vital for flood prediction and the loss of this extremely important data source has resulted in a number of avoidable incidents in recent years. In July 1998, for example, an (unofficially) estimated 2,500 people died in the Uzbek enclave of Shakhimardon as a result of dam failure following a period of rapid and unexpected snowmelt.

  Demand for water will increase as a result of changing agricultural policy and increased population levels. Since independence the CARs have introduced a number of agricultural and land reforms aimed at improving output and developing a more diverse agricultural base. Particular emphasis had been placed on grain production and vast tracts of land have been given over to wheat. This has been achieved by developing new lands and/or reducing the amount of land sown to other crops, especially cotton.

  The change in cropping pattern should change both the timing and amount of water required, but an analysis of water use on a number of farms in the Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan, have shown that despite a marked increase in the area sown to grain and a decrease in that sown to cotton there has been no real change in the timing and amount of water delivered to the farms.

  Government backed initiatives, such as the grain programmes implemented in three of the five republics, have been aggressively promoted with little if any consideration of the consequences. In an attempt to assess demand, the International Council for the Aral Sea (ICAS) asked the CARs to provide estimates of need. Based on these self-assessments it was found that by 2005 demand will stand at 151.8 km³, which exceeds the natural annual average river flow by over 25 km³.

  Further adding to the problem is the fact that population is predicted to double to 100 million by 2025, placing even further stress on the region's water supply. The number of people per 1 million cubic metres (MCM) of water provides an important indicator of stress. When there are less than 100 people, water supply is generally not a problem, but at 600 people signs of stress begin to appear unless water supplies are efficiently managed. Chronic water shortage is said to occur at 1,000 with extreme scarcity occurring above 2,000 people per MCM.

  Currently there are less than 350 people per MCM of water in Central Asia as a whole, but with the predicted increases in population this figure will increase to 727 people by 2025 and efficient water management will be essential.

  However, water is not evenly distributed and a very different picture emerges when the republics are considered separately. Based on existing water allocations (agreed at 1992 Almaty meeting) there are 130 people per MCM in Turkmenistan and 500 in Kyrgyzstan. By 2010 these figures are predicted to have risen to 184 and 883 people respectively, and in 2025 there will be nearly 1,500 people per MCM in Kyrgyzstan compared to only 361 in Turkmenistan. Tajikistan will also experience chronic water shortages, with the situation in Uzbekistan being stressed but not chronic. Thus ironically the upstream water-rich republics will experience severe water shortages, while the water-poor downstream republics will not, a situation that neither Kyrgyzstan nor Tajikistan is likely to tolerate.

  If the republics were reliant on indigenous water resources the situation would be very different with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan having an abundance of water and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan experiencing extreme shortages. Indeed there are already over 2,500 people per MCM of indigenous water in Uzbekistan, a figure that will rise to over 5,230 by 2025 making it one of the most water stressed regions of the world. Given these figures it is not surprising that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been adamant that water allocations set during the Soviet period should be maintained ensuring that they have sufficient water well into the future.

  It is likely that water allocations will have to be re-negotiated in the very near future, although determining who will get what and when will undoubtedly be a thorny issue. Moreover, current allocations make no reference to Afghanistan. Given that over 5 per cent of water resources available for use in the Aral Sea basin are generated on Afghan territories representatives from region should be included in all talks. The current civil unrest in the region has reduced the amount of water being extracted from Afghan rivers that drain into the Aral Sea Basin, but it is likely that demand in this region will also increase in the future.

  Therefore, unless measures are taken to reduce water use, competition for water in Central Asia will greatly intensify.

ISSUES OF WATER MANAGEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

  The management and maintenance of the water and irrigation system at the national level is becoming increasing problematic for the CARs. Built at speed to satisfy Moscow's demands for cotton the system was poorly constructed and lacked many of the features essential for its efficient operation. As a result Central Asia's water distribution and irrigation network is difficult and expensive to maintain, while the loss of water from the many thousands of kilometres of open and unlined canals has created huge problems of waterlogging and soil salinisation throughout the irrigation zone. Coupled with this is the problem of overwatering which is endemic throughout the region. Most fields are irrigated using furrows which, if not properly monitored, results in a huge waste of water.

  Although Soviet figures suggest that the efficiency of the irrigation system is ca. 65-70 per cent, some observers have suggested a figure near 20-25 per cent. This means approximately 75 per cent of all water withdrawn from the region's rivers is effectively wasted.

  Since independence the republics have been wholly responsible for the management and maintenance of the systems within their national borders. The virtual collapse of the economy has made this an almost impossible task and in some republics maintenance programmes have virtually ceased. As a result the water distribution and irrigation systems have deteriorated and unless urgent action is taken parts of the system will cease to operate in the near future.

  Equipment essential for maintaining the systems is dilapidated and largely obsolete. The stock of working equipment has declined significantly and it is proving impossible to replace because of the lack of funds to buy spare parts and new equipment and the fact that much of the machinery previously supplied by other former Soviet Republics is no longer manufactured because of the economic problems in the region as a whole. Thus, even when funds are made available, it is impossible to get spare parts.

  The situation along the Kara Kum Canal, the largest irrigation canal in the World and upon which the livelihood of over 2 million Turkmens depends provides a graphic illustration on the problems facing national governments. In 1992 the Turkmen government spent $3.2 million on maintenance, but by 1996 this figure had fallen to a mere $2,000. The number of dredges, essential for keeping the canal free of sediment, has fallen by over 50 per cent and it is beginning to silt up. Sedimentation in the main canal reduces conveyance capacity and the sediment tends to collect at sites where pumps and other offtake structures operate. Forcing water through a reduced capacity canal increases velocity, which, in turn, increases suspended sediment loads. Heavily loaded water then enters the secondary and tertiary systems clogging these canals.

  High silt loads means that the pumps used to lift water from the canal are being damaged and an estimated 30 per cent of pumps are now inoperative. The situation away from the canal is even more problematic and many farms are finding it increasingly difficult to irrigate and consequently there has been a rapid and catastrophic decline in yields.

  Irrigated lands must be drained to stop groundwater levels rising and causing secondary salinisation. Drains have to be constantly maintained but the number of excavators cleaning both the inter and intra farm drainage system has declined rapidly and annual drain cleaning is no longer possible. Indeed in many cases the last time cleaning was undertaken was during the Soviet period. As a result the drainage system has become choked with weeds and is effectively non-operational. The "knock-on" effects are enormous and vast tracts of land are now susceptible to rising groundwater levels and consequently salinisation. A number of reports have suggested that there has been an increase in the area of irrigated land throughout Central Asia suffering from salinisation in the last 10 years and it has been cited as a major factor in the recent decline in crop yields.

  It is also becoming increasingly difficult to oversee the system because the number of working vehicles has declined. Many regional and local irrigation offices have no access to transport and thus are unable to undertake even the most basic monitoring of the system.

  Problems at the farm-level are also widespread with the lack of working machinery and equipment affecting all aspects of the farm system from management and maintenance of the irrigation system to the planning and cultivation of fields. A recent survey of operational farm equipment undertaken as part of the EU-TACIS WARMAP project noted that at least 30 per cent of all equipment is non-operational with the figure being as high as 65 per cent on some farms. Keeping equipment going is becoming more and more difficult and although parts can be cannibalised from defunct machinery, this is a short-term measure and it is likely that equipment levels will continue to decline rapidly over the next few years.

  Since 1991 there has been a dramatic decline in the number of people employed in the water management and irrigation sector because of financial constraints, and changing social and political conditions within the republics. Many departments have made a large number of people redundant. Others are leaving of their own accord to jobs in other sectors of the economy. A further factor has been the large out migration of highly skilled people, mainly ethnic Russians, who see little future in the agriculture and irrigation sector in Central Asia.

  The lack of trained personnel will become a major issue in the near future as there are currently very few people under the age of 40 working in the system. Unless action is taken to encourage people into the water management and irrigation sector in all the republics, there will be a massive skill shortage within the next 10 years.

  Agricultural policy will not only affect water management at the regional level but the local level as well. As reform progresses and farmers are allowed to grow what they want, as is the case in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakstan, water requirements will continue to change. These changes need to be carefully planned and monitored if they are not to have an adverse impact on an already failing system. Moreover, privatisation has created a large number of small-scale farmers who own or rent individual farm units of two to three hectares. As they become more market orientated and greater emphasis is placed on profits that can be derived from agriculture the way in which water is perceived may well change.

  During the Soviet period, for example, failure to irrigate on time had little impact on individuals whereas now it will directly affect their quality of life. Access to water will be critical and competition is likely to increase. The situation could be exacerbated by the fact that many farmers have spent their lives as employees on large farms where decisions were made by others or by committee. With little experience of such responsibility, farmers may be unable to adapt successfully to the shift from labourers to decision-makers. It is therefore essential that these farmers are equipped with the relevant farming and irrigation skills, thereby assuring that water is used efficiently and that agriculture is planned to make best use of available resources while minimising competition. In essence, successful management at the local level will be essential to the overall strategy of managing water at the regional level.

CONCLUSIONS

  The CARs are faced with an uncertain future. One of their most pressing problems is the rapid deterioration of the existing water distribution and irrigation network. Built at speed to satisfy Moscow's demands for cotton, the system was badly constructed and lacks many of the features required for operating a network of this magnitude. Yet in many respects its decline is not surprising and it may well be that, as so often in the past, the collapse of empire and loss of strong, central control precipitates a decline in irrigation. Halting this process require a wholesale change in the way the system is managed.

  The last 10 years have seen considerable attention focusing on the environmental crisis in the Aral Sea Basin. Vast sums of money largely donated by the international community have been spent on assessing the causes and consequence of this disaster, but as yet little has been done to try and tackle the root cause of the problem: namely over use of water at the farm level. Attempts to improve water efficiency so far have hinged on the introduction of water pricing. This policy is being pushed by organisations such as the World Bank, USAID and the EU-TACIS programme. While there is a clear rationale of policy it is debatable whether it will have any real impact and in all probability will only serve to heighten tension between users. In the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan, for example, it is clear that farm managers are requesting reduced quotas in order to cut costs. But once water is delivered to the farm it continues to be wasted. As a result some farmers have access to water and others do not. Who has access to water will become a major issue at the local level and it is already beginning to create problems. In some of the more densely populated and ethnically mixed regions of central Asia this could prove explosive.

  Improving water use at the farm level is the only way forward. Providing farmers with information on irrigation and highlighting the negative impacts of overwatering, not only in terms of waste but also, reduced yields is essential. Establishing farmer-associations based around former state and collective farms may prove a way forward. Such bodies could act as a local support and extension network for farmers, including acting as water user associations. This could be an effective way of providing on-farm training as well as managing and policing water-use at the local level. Individuals within the association would have responsibility for local water management including the calculation of water requirements, determination of irrigation schedules, the organisation of maintenance programmes and the implementation of good irrigation practice.

  Improving water use at the local level will be essential, as it is clear that if current government and individual aims are to be met demand will far exceed supply and increased competition both between and within the republics will result.

  This will require co-operation between the republics, but the creation of water-rich and water-deficit states by the Soviets, as part of their strategy of divide and rule, will have long-term implications for the region and could ultimately undermine regional co-operation.

  The upstream republics have inherited control of the region's water resources and can, if they wish, determine when and how much water is allowed to flow downstream. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan has already shown that it can and will use this power to its advantage, rather negating the rhetoric of regional co-operation.

  If the current situation is anything to go by, formulating a strategy for managing Central Asia's water resources will be extremely difficult and, if anything, will become even more complex as the system continues to fail and demands on it increase.

  In the immediate future, funding is a critical issue to ensure that the system is maintained and continues to function, but over the longer term effective management will only be achieved if the republics are willing or able to co-operate. If they do not, access to and control of the region's water supplies will be the single biggest factor determining the economic well-being and environmental security in Central Asia.

March 1999