(1)  We recommend that the United Kingdom should not normally agree to any Security Council resolution which relates to an arms embargo, and which therefore needs to be translated into United Kingdom law, unless the resolution is clear and unambiguous (paragraph 15).

(2)  We conclude that the government policy on individual arms embargoes must never again be stated in a way which could mislead Parliament, the public and even the FCO's own staff. We recommend that the FCO take all appropriate steps to ensure that this is achieved (paragraph 19).

(3)  We recommend that the United Nations Act 1946 be amended so that delegated legislation made under section 1 is subject to affirmative resolution in both Houses of Parliament, and that any sanctions order approved by an FCO Minister is brought specifically to the attention of the Foreign Affairs Committee (paragraph 23).

(4)  We recommend that the territorial departments concerned within the FCO should be consulted fully during the drafting of any future British legislation which affects any specific foreign territory, and that, when the legislation is finalised, its text, and any necessary explanatory material, is brought to the personal attention of all FCO officials who deal with that territory, both at home and overseas (paragraph 24).

(5)  We recommend that any change in arms embargo policy is announced to Parliament immediately, and that the FCO web site and the Library of the House of Commons should include continually updated information setting out the basis and scope of all current arms embargoes (paragraph 25).

(6)  It is the view of the Committee that Mr Spicer should have known the law about arms sales to Sierra Leone (paragraph 27).

(7)  We are not convinced that Mr Spicer made it really clear to FCO officials that Sandline was going to supply arms (paragraph 36).

(8)  We recommend that any future Order in Council dealing with arms embargoes should specify that any licence must be given in writing (paragraph 37).

(9)  We consider it was a serious failure not to have provided Mr Penfold and his deputy with secure communications equipment as soon as practicable after their move to Conakry (paragraph 39).

(10)  We believe it is unacceptable for any Ambassador or High Commissioner to operate in circumstances where they do not have the secure communications equipment or staff to operate efficiently. We recommend that the FCO takes all appropriate steps to ensure that overseas posts are fully and properly supported in future if obliged to move temporarily from their normal official premises (paragraph 40).

(11)  We recommend that clear instructions are issued to FCO officials in London that it is their responsibility to inform the relevant overseas post immediately if there is any evidence of its staff wrongly construing the terms of a UK arms embargo (paragraph 44).

(12)  We conclude by expressing our surprise at Mr Penfold's ignorance and his lack of due diligence in ascertaining the true legal position on arms supplies to Sierra Leone, and our equal surprise that the staff of AD(E) were not themselves clear on this matter and did not keep Mr Penfold informed (paragraph 44).

(13)  We conclude that Mr Penfold's relations with Sandline were open to criticism (paragraph 47).

(14)  We conclude that Mr Penfold did not pass on crucial information to the FCO during the period 19 December to 30 January in a way which was appropriate, though the fate of his minute of 2 February and of the Sandline military plan he had handed in on 29 January does not encourage us to believe that the Department would necessarily have reacted appropriately had he done so (paragraph 52).

(15)  We believe that Mr Penfold acted as he thought was in the best interests of the United Kingdom and of Sierra Leone, and that he did not consider that his actions went beyond government policy. Nonetheless, we believe they did. We hope that the Sandline affair will remind all diplomatic staff that they act only within the confines of policies set by Ministers, and the FCO must ensure that Government policy is made crystal clear to Heads of Mission and to the Departments concerned (paragraph 55).

(16)  The two failings (to take account of an accurate press report which appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mail on 1 August 1997 and of a telephone call by Mr Spicer to the FCO on 5 January 1998) display serious shortcomings by FCO officials. (paragraph 58).

(17)  We believe that the senior officials who received both Mr Penfold's minute of 2 February and Sandline's Project Python document (Ms Grant and Mr Dales) made serious errors of judgement and failed in their duty to Ministers by not acting promptly and decisively on the information it contained (paragraph 63).

(18)  We conclude that there was an appalling failure in the briefing of Ministers which we recommend should not be repeated. It is on the basis of briefing that Ministers report to Parliament and, in the words of the Resolution of the House, "it is of paramount importance that Ministers give accurate and truthful information to Parliament." We expect lessons to be learned from the Sandline case in the FCO and in all other Departments (paragraph 67).

(19)  We conclude that the Permanent Under-Secretary failed in his duty to Ministers. The Foreign Secretary was first informed about Sandline on 28 April—more than four weeks after Sir John Kerr had first been told of the Sandline affair and three weeks after he had learned of Customs' raid on his own Department. Moreover, the Foreign Secretary was informed, not by his own officials, but by Sandline's solicitors' letter. The Permanent-Under Secretary must be held responsible for this unacceptable situation. It represents a serious failure of communication by the Permanent Head of the Department to his Secretary of State (paragraph 70).

(20)  We recommend that the Permanent Under-Secretary remind all senior members of the diplomatic service of their constitutional responsibility to Ministers, and through them to Parliament. More specifically, we recommend that, as a matter of course, when a line manager in the FCO becomes aware that any prosecuting authority in the United Kingdom may be investigating an officer he or she manages for an indictable offence alleged to be committed in the exercise of the officer's duty, he or she ensure that the Permanent Under-Secretary is immediately informed, and that the Permanent Under-Secretary forthwith inform the Secretary of State (paragraph 71).

(21)  We recommend that the FCO review and modify where appropriate the methods by which intelligence from external agencies is assessed inside the Department (paragraph 74).

(22)  We recommend that in order to protect the interests of the Resident Clerk in the future, he or she should formally record the name of any official with whom he or she deals, and that every official who sees an intelligence report should be required to record the fact that he or she has done so (paragraph 75).

(23)  We welcome the establishment of a sanctions enforcement unit, and recommend that it is provided with proper resources and a wide mandate to enable it to discharge its brief (paragraph 76).

(24)  We regard any defence of the use of the phrase "we were not aware of any shipment of arms" on 30 March as quite implausible and unacceptable (paragraph 80).

(25)  We believe that FCO officials have a duty to ensure that prosecuting authorities are informed immediately when serious criminal allegations are made to them, and also to co-operate as fully as possible with those authorities when an investigation is under way (paragraph 81).

(26)  We recommend that instructions be issued to all FCO staff that they must not communicate, other than in a consular capacity, with persons they know to be subject to criminal investigation about matters germane to those investigations, except through legal channels (paragraph 83).

(27)  We recommend the employment of external management consultants to assess the effectiveness of management practices in the FCO and to make appropriate recommendations (paragraph 87).

(28)  We recommend that the guidance to officials on dealings with private military companies be amended to draw officials' attention to the particular difficulties which can arise when their contacts in private military companies have had previous service with the armed forces or other agencies of central government (paragraph 89).

(29)  We recommend that the Government reconsider seeking to amend the existing UN Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries but, if this cannot be achieved, that the Government take the lead in initiatives in the European Union, Council of Europe or the United Nations aimed at drawing up a new international legal instrument on the activities of mercenaries (paragraph 93).

(30)  We recommend that the Government take the lead in initiatives in Europe and/or the United Nations aimed at drawing up an international legal instrument on trafficking or brokering in arms subject to embargo (paragraph 95).

(31)  We recommend (a) in the case of mercenary activities, the publication, within 18 months, of a Green Paper outlining legislative options for the control of private military companies which operate out of the United Kingdom, its dependencies and the British Islands, and (b) in the case of arms trafficking and brokering, that the legislation to control these activities be introduced no later than in the next parliamentary session (paragraph 96).

(32)  We welcome the Government's decision to allow the Select Committee access to most of the key official documents in the Sandline affair (paragraph 99).

(33)  We recommend that the Government undertake in future to respect select committees' requirements for information, irrespective of any departmental inquiry on related matters which might have been established (paragraph 101).

(34)  We recommend that the Government reflect, in any future inquiry like that into Sandline, as to the merit of a more mature attitude towards controlled access for the Foreign Affairs Committee to appropriate intelligence material and to witnesses from the Secret Intelligence Service (paragraph 109).

(35)  Our inquiry has served three principal purposes. It has allowed us to examine what went wrong, to establish new information not previously known to Parliament and to make a number of recommendations for action. But it has also demonstrated to the FCO that the Committee will pursue objectively and vigorously cases of poor administration in the Department. That, we hope, will be a stimulus for improvement. It is certainly one of the principal justifications for the departmental select committee system: that officials and Ministers are aware that the beam of the select committee searchlight may one day swing in their direction, and that they may have to justify their action—or inaction—when subject to intense scrutiny by a committee such as ours, acting on behalf of Parliament and, beyond that, on behalf of a wider public interest (paragraph 111).